

AN
OUTLINE
OF
PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS





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*An Outline
of
Psychoanalysis*

EDITED BY

J. S. VAN TESLAAR

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

"In multiplicity of counsel there is confusion." Perhaps the multitude of feature articles in our newspapers and periodicals and of books aiming to popularize psychoanalysis denotes a widespread interest and ought to be welcomed. But so many incorrect views float about and so many absurd inferences, wrongly attributed to psychoanalysis, find ready acceptance, on this point, that the practicing psychoanalyst and earnest student finds this state of things far from satisfactory, notwithstanding the apparent popularity of the subject. The publishers of *The Modern Library* have conceived the excellent idea of adding to their Series a volume of contributions by the founders and pioneers of psychoanalysis and at their invitation I was glad to assume the responsibility of selecting the articles for the volume.

From the outset I resolved that the selections must represent the various schools of psychoanalytic thought. For the original sources of psychoanalysis we turn, first and foremost, to Freud and his circle of followers but also to Jung, Adler and Stekel, his former co-workers and associates. An Outline of Psychoanalysis must represent at least the work of these men.

Of Prof. Sigmund Freud it may be said that he has enriched with the penetrating insight of his rare genius every subject he has touched—and he has touched a wealth of themes. The range of his scientific contributions is encyclopedic. Fortunately the lectures which Prof. Freud delivered at Clark University on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary suggest themselves as particularly appropriate for this volume. These lectures were intended not for physicians or specialists but for persons

whose interest in psychoanalysis is presumably identical with that of the discriminating readers who turn to The Modern Library books. They contain an account of the origin and growth of psychoanalysis in the master's own words. It is obvious that the place for Freud's Clark University lectures is at the head of the volume.

The essay by Prof. James Jackson Putnam, which follows, will serve better than any formal admonition to impress the reader with the fact that psychoanalysis can neither be understood nor properly appreciated unless one divests oneself of customary previous prejudices and approaches the subject in a spirit of objective inquiry. At an advanced age, when most men of his assured position in the professional world are content to rest on their laurels, Dr. Putnam saw in the claims of psychoanalysis a challenge. He approached the subject with a spirit of intellectual hospitality which, unfortunately, is still rare, even among our men of science. The result of his unbiased investigation was that he became one of the most valued and trusted champions of psychoanalysis.

I have referred already to the difficulty of attempting to choose from Freud's writings. Aside from his larger studies, each a revelation in its respective field, many of Freud's shorter contributions are noteworthy additions to science. In slightly lesser measure this is true also of the contributions of some of his followers. The psychoanalytic writings abound in implications which open up new fields of research. One by one these hints are taken up by zealous followers and elaborated. Thus psychoanalytic research, constantly growing, unravels so many apparent mysteries within the mind-maze that it would be difficult to single out any particular discovery as the most important. The representative contributions I have chosen from the writings of Jones, Ferenczi and Brill, gifted pupils of Freud, are intended to acquaint the reader with the wide range and applicability of psychoanalysis.

The paper by Jones deals with a well-known mental

process first cleared up through psychoanalysis. I refer to the familiar habit of investing our unconscious wishes and prejudices with a pretense of logical motives. This habit of assigning automatically reasons for deeds and thoughts which express feeling-attitudes and which have little or nothing to do with the alleged reasons, first explained by Freud, is described in greater detail by Ernest Jones who also proposes for this mental process the term rationalization.

Dr. Brill's essay, *The Only or Favorite Child*, should interest the educator, the social worker and all others who are concerned with problems of social adjustment. The crucial situation into which Dr. Brill here applies psychoanalytic insight has numerous important ramifications.

Ferenczi's paper is an extension of one of Freud's most brilliant generalizations. The study of the psycho-sexual development of the individual, inaugurated by Freud, has revealed that our mental life is governed by a dual principle. Before we learn to adapt ourselves to the world of reality with its strict determinism, our mind dwells in a realm of its own which is governed entirely by the principle of unmediated gratification; here the pleasure motive is supreme. Mental adaptation and growth consists in abandoning the fantasy world in which wishes are supreme and accepting the world of external reality. Mentally we are grown up in the measure in which we do this. Briefly, this is the generalization to which I refer as one of Freud's most brilliant discoveries. He has formulated it in a short contribution which is a model of condensation. I should have gladly included it in this volume but it is difficult reading. Aside from the difficulties inherent in its pithy construction Freud's paper presupposes considerable familiarity with modern biology as well as with the mooted problems in the phenomenology of the mind. Fortunately Ferenczi, in the contribution here reproduced, has worked out in a simpler form the basic idea of Freud's original contribution.

The excerpt from one of Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe's contributions points the way towards the practical demolition of the old and troublesome division between organic and functional disorders. Instead of indulging in idle metaphysical speculations as heretofore, we are learning to apply the standpoint of natural science to the investigation of the problem of the mind-and-body relationship. This has always been and continues to be a problem of universal interest. The reader, I feel sure, will welcome the new light which psychoanalytic research throws on the inter-relationship of "psychical" and "physical." The bearing of psychoanalysis on organic disease—an unexpected relationship—is concretely shown by Dr. Jelliffe's illustrative case.

Perhaps the most bitterly contested and the least understood generalizations of psychoanalysis are its discovery of symbolism and its hypothesis of man's psycho-sexual constitution. Both concepts have undergone considerable transformation since they were first formulated, but their fundamental validity has not been shaken. The introductory chapter of Stekel's *Language of Dreams*, here reproduced, gives a general idea of the reciprocal bearings of these two themes.

For an account of the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis another of Dr. Stekel's essays suggested itself because of its candor and clarity.

These papers, however, fail to give an adequate idea of the rôle that Dr. Stekel's own contributions are playing in the development of psychoanalytic theory and technique. His original contributions are strewn in numerous various parts of his monumental *Disorders of the Instincts and Emotions* series and studies in such a way that they cannot be adequately singled out. The importance of Stekel is only beginning to dawn upon the English world. In the course of time he undoubtedly will be recognized as the spiritual heir of Freud—the man who more than any other has built upon the foundations laid by Freud, even

though he has had the temerity of reconstructing those foundations here and there in accordance with his own observations and experience. The selections I have made from Stekel's writings are intended to round out the Outline. They do not record his original contributions or standpoint, although in the interpretation of a dream in one of these papers he does take issue with Freud.

Jung has found much favor in this country largely, it is said, because he has broadened Freud's fundamental theory of man's psycho-sexual constitution into a conception of the libido from which all the features which Anglo-Saxon prudery finds objectionable have been excluded. At the same time, Jung's sterilized conception of the libido, it is alleged, leaves ample room for introjecting metaphysical-mystical and religious-ethical notions which are not supposed to have a place in science. Certainly Freud's infantile polymorph perverse trends and Stekel's asocial, criminal trends which are said to lurk in every human breast are part of the stern realities about human nature which few have the courage to acknowledge. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that Jung's standpoint is important and deserves representation. In spite of the allegations of narrow partisanship to the contrary, I have always held that the views of Freud and Jung are not mutually exclusive. Dr. James Jackson Putnam agreed wholeheartedly with me when I emphasized this point at the Friday afternoon meetings of the Boston group of psychoanalysts. In the article by Dr. Beatrice Hinkle, an experienced pupil of Jung, we have a trustworthy and clear account of Jung. His standpoint is further illumined by a portion of one of Jung's own contributions.

Adler, another former pupil of Freud, likewise substitutes for the libido theory a hypothesis of his own—the so-called theory of inferiority based on organic defect, with the Nietzschean Will to Power, or Masculine Protest, as Adler calls it, emerging upon the mental sphere as a compensatory defense reaction. Adler's own writings

are difficult reading; in none of them does he give an adequate summary of his doctrines. The nearest approach to such a summary is Bjerre's article included in this volume.

It has been said that the usefulness of the psychoanalytic technique as a therapeutic procedure, great as it is, will be overshadowed by the practical benefits which are bound to flow in the near future out of the application of psychoanalysis to education, politics, group psychology and generally to our larger social problems.

Remarkable beginnings have already been made. A special volume would be required to reproduce illustrative material bearing on the applicability of psychoanalysis to the mental-social group of sciences. The special bibliographies on hand record over six hundred studies and special contributions emanating from psychoanalysts on such varied subjects as mythology, religion, folklore, poetry, biography, literary criticism, history, linguistics and onomatology, art, character traits, philosophical and metaphysical systems, mysticism and so-called occult phenomena, etc. Unable to cover the whole range I had to be content with the choice of a few illustrative articles. The papers by Pfister, the Zurich pastor who is a pioneer in combining the educational uses of psychoanalysis with the minister's professional duties, Rivers, the anthropologist whose researches upon his own special field corroborate in many particulars some of Freud's generalizations, and E. D. Martin, the well-known Director of the People's Institute of New York, will give the reader at least a general idea of the usefulness and rich promise of psychoanalysis when thus applied.

The volume concludes with an essay in which I have attempted to point out the position which psychoanalysis logically occupies in the history of science. The chief contribution of psychoanalysis, aside from its special hypothe-

ses and doctrines, is the viewpoint it introduces in the investigation of mental processes. Psychoanalysis represents a logical extension of the evolutionistic theory. It has inaugurated the application of the principle of evolution to the explanation of mental processes. Henceforth the approach of any problem in which human nature plays a rôle must include a careful consideration of the developmental aspects of the mind of man. Conversely, psychoanalysis has taught us that a consideration of the evolutionary or developmental aspects of the mental processes holds the key to the understanding of problems in which human nature plays a rôle.

The adaptation of the developmental viewpoint to mental phenomena, then, is the chief—the permanent—contribution of psychoanalysis to the growth of human knowledge. It is too early as yet for any one to attempt to appraise the advantages which must accrue to humanity as the result of this new psycho-technical method of inquiry. The men to whose genius we are indebted for the origin and development of psychoanalysis are our contemporaries—fortunately living and active. We stand too close to them fully to appreciate the work they are doing or its far-reaching consequences. It remains for future generations to reap the benefit of applied psychoanalysis and they will be in a better position to appreciate the significance of this psycho-technical procedure whose birth and first growth we are witnessing.

Nevertheless a few far-seeing minds already discern the actual potentialities of psychoanalysis. Mr. H. G. Wells, to quote one prominent instance, expresses himself very enthusiastically on the subject of psychoanalysis and its promise for human welfare. In an article which he has contributed recently to a popular periodical he states:

“These new methods and new views and new discoveries are evidently recasting our fundamental ideas about the growth, the activity, and the interaction of human minds, and upon that recasting of these ideas I believe that there

is bound to follow such a reconstruction of our methods of using our minds and of education, and of the direction of human associations, as will be comparable to the reconstruction of methods of transport or of metallurgy during the last hundred years, due to the application of steam, steel, and electricity to these methods.

"The coming hundred years or so will be, I believe, essentially a century of Applied Psychology, with which a considerable amount of physiological science respecting glands and nervous states, drugs and secretions, will be very closely involved. It will mark a revolution in human affairs altogether more profound and more intimate than that merely material revolution of which our great-grandparents saw the early beginnings, and amidst whose achievements we live.

"The material revolution of the past century or so first affected the fields and towns and the distribution of the population of the world; it appeared as great railway cuttings, gashing the familiar landscape, bridges, smoking engines, railway stations, jerry-building. The new revolution of the coming days appears as a disturbance of the intellectual surface, as a new directness in art that makes much old achievement seem platitudinous, as a more penetrating curiosity in readers and an abandonment of many gracious conventions in literature, as a breach with many of the disciplines and restraints of the past in thought and act, as an increasing tendency to psychologize legal, political, financial, and economic conceptions. It will presently be making more extensive contacts with the common life through the schools of the world. It is already stirring in many schools and in the minds of all the best of our younger teachers.

"Before very long we shall begin to realize that there is a new sort of education active in the world, a more purposive education, an education bound up with new and clearer ideas of the psychology of economic and political life. There has been a curious discontinuity, hitherto, be-

tween our educational institutions and the realities of life: the former has not led to the latter, but has rather shrunk from it and away into elegant bypaths.

"The school has professed to make citizens, but rather it has stimulated a few competitors for success and failed to equip them for the struggle. This is because there has been and still is no clear theory of motives in the modern community; our economic and financial life and much of our social life has grown up without such a theory and independently of our schools altogether. But the vague, scrambling, accidental sort of living that makes up the world of men at the present time is not a necessary or permanent condition of things; the human intelligence resents it and will finally prevail against it.

"As we reshape our ideas of social justice and relationship, the character of our schools will change and education will realize its aims anew. Schools are a part of statecraft. The same growth of applicable psychology that will give the teacher a real power in developing dominating ideas and training motives in his school will give the world outside the school a conception of political and social organization based on a balance and reconciliation of motives quite beyond the scope of our present understanding.

"It is curious how difficult people find it at present to accept the idea of a mental as distinguished from a physical change in human conditions. Nowadays it startles nobody to suggest that it may presently be possible to go to the moon or the center of the earth for a holiday, or jump into another dimension, or prolong the individual life to a hundred and fifty.

"But the suggestion that presently there may be a sort of education, and a sort of social and economic order in the world, that will have the same relation to the schooling and politics and law and business of today that the Woolworth Building or an ocean liner has to the hut or canoe of a savage is met by an incredulous resistance. They

think that the school will always be the dull, tiresome place it is today; the teacher the same ineffective, underpaid weakling; business the same loud, disingenuous, and dangerous sprawling scramble; and employment the same distasteful drudgeries. They think there will always be the same amount of war, crime, and failure that there is today.

"Yet it is just such an application of the sciences of mental relationship as will change and modify these things directly and profoundly which is the most immediately probable thing before our race.

"Faced with the forecast that there will presently come a phase in the life of our race when the general behavior will be as different from and as much better than the general behavior of today as that is different from and better than the general behavior in a cannibal village in Central Africa, most people have been trained to reply that 'you cannot alter human nature.'

"That, in its way, is perfectly true, but it is also perfectly irrelevant. It is not only human nature you cannot change. You cannot change the nature of anything. You cannot change nature. But in the last hundred years we have learnt to do ten thousand things with nature we never knew how to do before, and in the coming centuries we shall learn to do ten thousand things with human nature that we cannot do now.

"It is because of my belief in the enormous creative and reconstructive power over human motive latent in the science of Psychology, and even now being unlocked for our use, that I find myself inclined to be more than a little impatient and disrespectful with the laws, the poor, feeble, silly schools, the flags and political institutions, the economic methods and business tangles that confuse human affairs and darken our days and worry our nights at the present time.

"I feel, in relation to such things, much as an American with some gift of vision might have felt in the middle of the last century as he drove his lumbering wagon day after

day across the Western prairies, in danger of thirst and famine and scalping Indians and disease. Filthy and foot-sore, anxious and with night coming upon him, he might have had a sudden vision of the great smooth train, brightly lit and well equipped and swift, that would carry his grandchildren to and fro across this lonely and frightful desolation.

"So, too, in this present twilight of human division and insecurity, amidst oppressions and strikes, shortages of goods and slumps in welfare, irreconcilable hatreds and the rumors of fresh wars, it is still possible for those who have faith and vision to foretell a new release of human life to a secure and world-wide peace, to a sufficient and happy production to satisfy all normal humane needs, to a common life of generous activities and kindness and lively interests and enterprise and hope.

"And it is along the line of a sedulous pursuit and a vigorous application of psychological science that this release is attainable, and will be attained."

A lifetime of preoccupation with psychology and of keen interest in the social sciences on a background of training in medicine and biology leads me to hold that Mr. Wells' picture theoretically, at least, is not overdrawn even though I am not inclined to be as optimistic as Mr. Wells regarding the rate of progression. Any appreciable improvement in the qualities of the human race probably requires biological eras to become fixed and a permanent gain. A cross-section view of human nature as it presents itself to the psychoanalyst's view does not hold out the promise of a marked change in the spirit of human relations in so trifling a period as one or two thousand years. But it is gratifying to know that the psycho-technical means for bringing about the eternal improvement in human relations of which Mr. Wells writes is at hand. We psychoanalysts who witness day by day the warfare which rages between man's primordial instincts and his higher trends find that

the end of the conflict is always a compromise. But we know also that man's capacity for spiritual growth is practically infinite; and that through psychoanalysis this conflict which rages in every human breast can be influenced at least so that the compromise is made upon ever higher, i.e., more adult, levels of adaptation to reality.

In the face of the practical significance of psychoanalysis, of its utility and promise, it is a curious fact that none of our institutions of learning have yet made any provision for systematic instruction in the subject. Even our medical schools do not provide proper training in psychoanalysis, although it has proven the only rational and adequate form of treatment for the functional disorders.

Recently a modest sum of money has been offered as a nucleus towards a fund for the establishment of a psychoanalytic clinic which shall serve also as a center of instruction and research. Already one of the foremost European analysts has provisionally accepted the invitation to come over and aid in establishing such an institution in the United States. If sufficient additional support is received to insure the work at least for a few years the plans will be taken up in the near future. For further information those who are interested may address the editor

JAMES S. VAN TESLAAR.

Brookline, Mass., June 14, 1924.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	v
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHO- ANALYSIS	21
Sigmund Freud	
PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF SIGMUND FREUD AND HIS WORK	71
James J. Putnam, M.D.	
RATIONALIZATION IN EVERY-DAY LIFE	98
Ernest Jones, M.D.	
STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY	108
S. Ferenczi	
THE ONLY OR FAVORITE CHILD IN ADULT LIFE	128
Dr. A. A. Brill	
THE DOMAIN OF THE PEDANALYSIS	140
Dr. Oskar Pfister	
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND ORGANIC DISEASE	146
Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe	
THE MEANING OF THE DREAM SYMBOLISM	154
Dr. Wilhelm Stekel	
SOME MECHANISMS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE CROWD FROM OTHER FORMS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR	180
Everett Dean Martin	
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS	202
W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., D.Sc., F. R. S.	

AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY . .	218
Beatrice M. Hinkle, M.D.	
THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES	255
Dr. C. G. Jung	
THE ADLER CONCEPTION OF NEUROSIS (DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY)	272
Dr. Paul Bjerre	
ANAGOGIC PSYCHOANALYSIS	299
Dr. Emanuel	
THE FINAL RESULTS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT	319
Dr. Wilhelm Stekel	
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE	361
Dr. James S. Van Teslaar	
GLOSSARY	379

THE OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS¹

BY SIGMUND FREUD

First Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a new and somewhat embarrassing experience for me to appear as lecturer before students of the New World. I assume that I owe this honor to the association of my name with the theme of psychoanalysis, and consequently it is of psychoanalysis that I shall aim to speak. I shall attempt to give you in very brief form an historical survey of the origin and further development of this new method of research and cure.

Granted that it is a merit to have created psychoanalysis it is not my merit. I was a student, busy with the passing of my last examinations, when another physician of Vienna, Dr. Joseph Breuer, made the first application of this method to the case of an hysterical girl (1880-82). We must now examine the history of this case and its treatment, which can be found in detail in "Studien über Hysterie," later published by Dr. Breuer and myself.

But first one word. I have noticed, with considerable satisfaction, that the majority of my hearers do not belong to the medical profession. Now do not fear that a medical education is necessary to follow what I shall have to say. We shall now accompany the doctors a little way, but soon we shall take leave of them and follow Dr. Breuer on a way which is quite his own.

¹ These lectures were delivered at Clark University in 1916. Translated from the German by Harry W. Chase, Fellow in Psychology, Clark University, and revised by Prof. Freud. Published with the permission of the author.

Dr. Breuer's patient was a girl of twenty-one, of a high degree of intelligence. She had developed in the course of her two years' illness a series of physical and mental disturbances which well deserved to be taken seriously. She had a severe paralysis of both right extremities, with anæsthesia, and at times the same affection of the members of the left side of the body; disturbance of eye-movements, and much impairment of vision; difficulty in maintaining the position of the head, an intense *Tussis nervosa*, nausea when she attempted to take nourishment, and at one time for several weeks a loss of the power to drink, in spite of tormenting thirst. Her power of speech was also diminished, and this progressed so far that she could neither speak nor understand her mother tongue; and, finally, she was subject to states of "absence," of confusion, delirium, alteration of her whole personality. These states will later claim our attention.

When one hears of such a case, one does not need to be a physician to incline to the opinion that we are concerned here with a serious injury, probably of the brain, for which there is little hope of cure and which will probably lead to the early death of the patient. The doctors will tell us, however, that in one type of cases with just as unfavorable symptoms, another, far more favorable, opinion is justified. When one finds such a series of symptoms in the case of a young girl, whose vital organs (heart, kidneys) are shown by objective tests to be normal, but who has suffered from strong emotional disturbances, and when the symptoms differ in certain finer characteristics from what one might logically expect, in a case like this the doctors are not too much disturbed. They consider that there is present no organic lesion of the brain, but that enigmatical state, known since the time of the Greek physicians as hysteria, which can simulate a whole series of symptoms of various diseases. They consider in such a case that the life of the patient is not in danger and that a restoration to health will probably come about of itself. The differen-

tiation of such an hysteria from a severe organic lesion is not always very easy. But we do not need to know how a differential diagnosis of this kind is made; you may be sure that the case of Breuer's patient was such that no skillful physician could fail to diagnose an hysteria. We may also add a word here from the history of the case. The illness first appeared while the patient was caring for her father, whom she tenderly loved, during the severe illness which led to his death, a task which she was compelled to abandon because she herself fell ill.

So far it has seemed best to go with the doctors, but we shall soon part company with them. You must not think that the outlook of a patient with regard to medical aid is essentially bettered when the diagnosis points to hysteria rather than to organic disease of the brain. Against the serious brain diseases medical skill is in most cases powerless, but also in the case of hysterical affections the doctor can do nothing. He must leave it to benign nature, when and how his hopeful prognosis will be realized.² Accordingly, with the recognition of the disease as hysteria, little is changed in the situation of the patient, but there is a great change in the attitude of the doctor. We can observe that he acts quite differently toward hystericals than toward patients suffering from organic diseases. He will not bring the same interest to the former as to the latter, since their suffering is much less serious and yet seems to set up the claim to be valued just as seriously.

But there is another motive in this action. The physician, who through his studies has learned so much that is hidden from the laity, can realize in his thought the causes and alterations of the brain disorders in patients suffering from apoplexy or dementia, a representation which must be right up to a certain point, for by it he is enabled to

² I know that this view no longer holds today, but in the lecture I take myself and my hearers back to the time before 1880. If things have become different since that time it has been largely due to the work the history of which I am sketching.

understand the nature of each symptom. But before the details of hysterical symptoms, all his knowledge, his anatomical-physiological and pathological education, desert him. He cannot understand hysteria. He is in the same position before it as the layman. And that is not agreeable to any one, who is in the habit of setting such a high valuation upon his knowledge. Hystericals, accordingly, tend to lose his sympathy; he considers them persons who overstep the laws of his science, as the orthodox regard heretics; he ascribes to them all possible evils, blames them for exaggeration and intentional deceit, "simulation," and he punishes them by withdrawing his interest.

Now Dr. Breuer did not deserve this reproach in this case; he gave his patient sympathy and interest, although at first he did not understand how to help her. Probably this was easier for him on account of those superior qualities of the patient's mind and character, to which he bears witness in his account of the case.

His sympathetic observation soon found the means which made the first help possible. It had been noticed that the patient, in her states of "absence," of psychic alteration, usually mumbled over several words to herself. These seemed to spring from associations with which her thoughts were busy. The doctor, who was able to get these words, put her in a sort of hypnosis and repeated them to her over and over, in order to bring up any associations that they might have. The patient yielded to his suggestion and reproduced for him those psychic creations which controlled her thoughts during her "absences," and which betrayed themselves in these single spoken words. These were fancies, deeply sad, often poetically beautiful, day dreams, we might call them, which commonly took as their starting point the situation of a girl beside the sick-bed of her father. Whenever she had related a number of such fancies, she was, as it were, freed and restored to her normal mental life. This state of health would last for several hours, and then give place on the next day to

a new "absence," which was removed in the same way by relating the newly created fancies. It was impossible not to get the impression that the psychic alteration which was expressed in the "absence" was a consequence of the excitations originating from these intensely emotional fancy-images. The patient herself, who at this time of her illness strangely enough understood and spoke only English, gave this new kind of treatment the name "talking cure," or jokingly designated it as "chimney sweeping."

The doctor soon hit upon the fact that through such cleansing of the soul more could be accomplished than a temporary removal of the constantly recurring mental "clouds." Symptoms of the disease would disappear when in hypnosis the patient could be made to remember the situation and the associative connections under which they first appeared, provided free vent was given to the emotions which they aroused. "There was in the summer a time of intense heat, and the patient had suffered very much from thirst; for, without any apparent reason, she had suddenly become unable to drink. She would take a glass of water in her hand, but as soon as it touched her lips she would push it away as though suffering from hydrophobia. Obviously for these few seconds she was in her absent state. She ate only fruit, melons and the like, in order to relieve this tormenting thirst. When this had been going on about six weeks, she was talking one day in hypnosis about her English governess, whom she disliked, and finally told, with every sign of disgust, how she had come into the room of the governess, and how that lady's little dog, that she abhorred, had drunk out of a glass. Out of respect for the conventions the patient had remained silent. Now, after she had given energetic expression to her restrained anger, she asked for a drink, drank a large quantity of water without trouble, and woke from hypnosis with the glass at her lips. The symptom thereupon vanished permanently." ³

³ *Studien über Hysterie*, 2d ed., p. 26.

Permit me to dwell for a moment on this experience. No one had ever cured an hysterical symptom by such means before, or had come so near understanding its cause. This would be a pregnant discovery if the expectation could be confirmed that still other, perhaps the majority of symptoms, originated in this way and could be removed by the same method. Breuer spared no pains to convince himself of this and investigated the pathogenesis of the other more serious symptoms in a more orderly way. Such was indeed the case; almost all the symptoms originated in exactly this way, as remnants, as precipitates, if you like, of affectively toned experiences, which for that reason we later called "psychic traumata." The nature of the symptoms became clear through their relation to the scene which caused them. They were, to use the technical term, "determined" (*determiniert*) by the scene whose memory traces they embodied, and so could no longer be described as arbitrary or enigmatical functions of the neurosis.

Only one variation from what might be expected must be mentioned. It was not always a single experience which occasioned the symptom, but usually several, perhaps many similar, repeated traumata coöperated in this effect. It was necessary to repeat the whole series of pathogenic memories in chronological sequence, and of course in reverse order, the last first and the first last. It was quite impossible to reach the first and often most essential trauma directly, without first clearing away those coming later.

You will of course want to hear me speak of other examples of the causation of hysterical symptoms beside this of inability to drink on account of the disgust caused by the dog drinking from the glass. I must, however, if I hold to my program, limit myself to very few examples. Breuer relates, for instance, that his patient's visual disturbances could be traced back to external causes, in the following way: "The patient, with tears in her eyes, was sitting by the sick-bed when her father suddenly asked her what time it was. She could not see distinctly, strained

her eyes to see, brought the watch near her eyes so that the dial seemed very large (macropia and strabismus conv.), or else she tried hard to suppress her tears, so that the sick man might not see them.”⁴

All the pathogenic impressions sprang from the time when she shared in the care of her sick father. “Once she was watching at night in the greatest anxiety for the patient, who was in a high fever, and in suspense, for a surgeon was expected from Vienna, to operate on the patient. Her mother had gone out for a little while, and Anna sat by the sick-bed, her right arm hanging over the back of her chair. She fell into a reverie and saw a black snake emerge, as it were, from the wall and approach the sick man as though to bite him. (It is very probable that several snakes had actually been seen in the meadow behind the house, that she had already been frightened by them, and that these former experiences furnished the material for the hallucination.) She tried to drive off the creature, but was as though paralyzed. Her right arm, which was hanging over the back of the chair, had “gone to sleep,” become anæsthetic and paretic, and as she was looking at it, the fingers changed into little snakes with deaths-heads. (The nails.) Probably she attempted to drive away the snake with her paralyzed right hand, and so the anæsthesia and paralysis of this member formed associations with the snake hallucination. When this had vanished, she tried in her anguish to speak, but could not. She could not express herself in any language, until finally she thought of the words of an English nursery song, and thereafter she could think and speak only in this language.”⁵ When the memory of this scene was revived in hypnosis the paralysis of the right arm, which had existed since the beginning of the illness, was cured and the treatment ended.

When, a number of years later, I began to use Breuer’s

⁴ *Studien über Hysterie*, 2d ed., p. 30.

⁵ *Studien über Hysterie*, 2d ed., p. 31.

researches and treatment on my own patients, my experiences completely coincided with his. In the case of a woman of about forty, there was a tic, a peculiar smacking noise which manifested itself whenever she was laboring under any excitement, without any obvious cause. It had its origin in two experiences which had this common element, that she attempted to make no noise, but that by a sort of counter-will this noise broke the stillness. On the first occasion, she had finally after much trouble put her sick child to sleep, and she tried to be very quiet so as not to awaken it. On the second occasion, during a ride with both her children in a thunderstorm the horses took fright, and she carefully avoided any noise for fear of frightening them still more.⁶ I give this example instead of many others which are cited in the *Studien über Hysterie*.

Ladies and gentlemen, if you will permit me to generalize, as is indispensable in so brief a presentation, we may express our results up to this point in the formula: *Our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences*. Their symptoms are the remnants and the memory symbols of certain (traumatic) experiences.

A comparison with other memory symbols from other sources will perhaps enable us better to understand this symbolism. The memorials and monuments with which we adorn our great cities, are also such memory symbols. If you walk through London you will find before one of the greatest railway stations of the city a richly decorated Gothic pillar—"Charing Cross." One of the old Plantagenet kings, in the thirteenth century, caused the body of his beloved queen Eleanor to be borne to Westminster, and had Gothic crosses erected at each of the stations

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, 2d ed., pp. 43-46. A selection from this book, augmented by several later treatises on hysteria, lies before me, in an English translation by Dr. A. A. Brill, of New York. It bears the title *Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses*, 1909. [No. 4 of the *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*, New York.]

where the coffin was set down. Charing Cross is the last of these monuments, which preserve the memory of this sad journey.⁷ In another part of the city, you will see a high pillar of more modern construction, which is merely called "the Monument." This is in memory of the great fire which broke out in the neighborhood in the year 1666, and destroyed a great part of the city. These monuments are memory symbols like the hysterical symptoms; so far the comparison seems justified. But what would you say to a Londoner who today stood sadly before the monument to the funeral of Queen Eleanor, instead of going about his business with the haste engendered by modern industrial conditions, or rejoicing with the young queen of his own heart? Or to another, who before "the Monument" bemoaned the burning of his loved native city, which long since has arisen again so much more splendid than before?

Now hystericals and all neurotics behave like these two unpractical Londoners, not only in that they remember the painful experiences of the distant past, but because they are still strongly affected by them. They cannot escape from the past and neglect present reality in its favor. This fixation of the mental life on the pathogenic traumata is an essential, and practically a most significant characteristic of the neurosis. I will willingly concede the objection which you are probably formulating, as you think over the history of Breuer's patient. All her traumata originated at the time when she was caring for her sick father, and her symptoms could only be regarded as memory symbols of his sickness and death. They corresponded to mourning, and a fixation on thoughts of the dead so short a time after death is certainly not pathological, but rather corresponds to normal emotional behavior. I concede this: there is nothing abnormal in the fixation of

⁷ Or rather the later copy of such a monument. The name "Charing" is itself, as Dr. E. Jones tells me, derived from the words "*chère reine*."

feeling on the trauma shown by Breuer's patient. But in other cases, like that of the tic that I have mentioned, the occasions for which lay ten and fifteen years back, the characteristic of this abnormal clinging to the past is very clear, and Breuer's patient would probably have developed it, if she had not come under the "cathartic treatment" such a short time after the traumatic experiences and the beginning of the disease.

We have so far only explained the relation of the hysterical symptoms to the life history of the patient; now by considering two further factors which Breuer observed, we may get a hint as to the processes of the beginning of the illness and those of the cure. With regard to the first, it is especially to be noted that Breuer's patient in almost all pathogenic situations had to suppress a strong excitement, instead of giving vent to it by appropriate words and deeds. In the little experience with her governess' dog, she suppressed, through regard for the conventions, all manifestations of her very intense disgust. While she was seated by her father's sick bed, she was careful to betray nothing of her anxiety and her painful depression to the patient. When, later, she reproduced the same scene before the physician, the emotion which she had suppressed on the occurrence of the scene burst out with especial strength, as though it had been pent up all along. The symptom which had been caused by that scene reached its greatest intensity while the doctor was striving to revive the memory of the scene, and vanished after it had been fully laid bare. On the other hand, experience shows that if the patient is reproducing the traumatic scene to the physician, the process has no curative effect if, by some peculiar chance, there is no development of emotion. It is apparently these emotional processes upon which the illness of the patient and the restoration to health are dependent. We feel justified in regarding "emotion" as a quantity which may become increased, derived and displaced. So we are forced to the conclusion that the patient

feli ill because the emotion developed in the pathogenic situation was prevented from escaping normally, and that the essence of the sickness lies in the fact that these "imprisoned" (*eingeklemmt*) emotions undergo a series of abnormal changes. In part they are preserved as a lasting charge and as a source of constant disturbance in psychical life; in part they undergo a change into unusual bodily innervations and inhibitions, which present themselves as the physical symptoms of the case. We have coined the name "hysterical conversion" for the latter process. Part of our mental energy is, under normal conditions, conducted off by way of physical innervation and gives what we call "the expression of emotions." Hysterical conversion exaggerates this part of the course of a mental process which is emotionally colored; it corresponds to a far more intense emotional expression, which finds outlet by new paths. If a stream flows in two channels, an overflow of one will take place as soon as the current in the other meets with an obstacle.

You see that we are in a fair way to arrive at a purely psychological theory of hysteria, in which we assign the first rank to the affective processes. A second observation of Breuer compels us to ascribe to the altered condition of consciousness a great part in determining the characteristics of the disease. His patient showed many sorts of mental states, conditions of "absence," confusion and alteration of character, besides her normal state. In her normal state she was entirely ignorant of the pathogenic scenes and of their connection with her symptoms. She had forgotten those scenes, or at any rate had dissociated them from their pathogenic connection. When the patient was hypnotized, it was possible, after considerable difficulty, to recall those scenes to her memory, and by this means of recall the symptoms were removed. It would have been extremely perplexing to know how to interpret this fact, if hypnotic practice and experiments had not pointed out the way. Through the study of hypnotic

phenomena, the conception, strange though it was at first, has become familiar, that in one and the same individual several mental groupings are possible, which may remain relatively independent of each other, "know nothing" of each other, and which may cause a splitting of consciousness along lines which they lay down. Cases of such a sort, known as "double personality" ("*double conscience*"), occasionally appear spontaneously. If in such a division of personality consciousness remains constantly bound up with one of the two states, this is called the *conscious* mental state, and the other the *unconscious*. In the well-known phenomena of so-called post hypnotic suggestion, in which a command given in hypnosis is later executed in the normal state as though by an imperative suggestion, we have an excellent basis for understanding how the unconscious state can influence the conscious, although the latter is ignorant of the existence of the former. In the same way it is quite possible to explain the facts in hysterical cases. Breuer came to the conclusion that the hysterical symptoms originated in such peculiar mental states, which he called "hypnoidal states" (*hypnoide Zustände*). Experiences of an emotional nature, which occur during such hypnoidal states easily become pathogenic, since such states do not present the conditions for a normal draining off of the emotion of the exciting processes. And as a result there arises a peculiar product of this exciting process, that is, the symptom, and this is projected like a foreign body into the normal state. The latter has, then, no conception of the significance of the hypnoidal pathogenic situation. Where a symptom arises, we also find an amnesia, a memory gap, and the filling of this gap includes the removal of the conditions under which the symptom originated.

I am afraid that this portion of my treatment will not seem very clear, but you must remember that we are dealing here with new and difficult views, which perhaps could not be made much clearer. This all goes to show that our

knowledge in this field is not yet very far advanced. Breuer's idea of the hypnoidal states has, moreover, been shown to be superfluous and a hindrance to further investigation, and has been dropped from present conceptions of psychoanalysis. Later I shall at least suggest what other influences and processes have been disclosed besides that of the hypnoidal states, to which Breuer limited the causal moment.

You have probably also felt, and rightly, that Breuer's investigations gave you only a very incomplete theory and insufficient explanation of the phenomena which we have observed. But complete theories do not fall from Heaven, and you would have had still greater reason to be distrustful, had any one offered you at the beginning of his observations a well-rounded theory, without any gaps; such a theory could only be the child of his speculations and not the fruit of an unprejudiced investigation of the facts.

Second Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen: At about the same time that Breuer was using the "talking-cure" with his patient, M. Charcot began in Paris, with the hystericals of the Salpêtrière, those researches which were to lead to a new understanding of the disease. These results were, however, not yet known in Vienna. But when about ten years later Breuer and I published our preliminary communication on the psychic mechanism of hysterical phenomena, which grew out of the cathartic treatment of Breuer's first patient, we were both of us under the spell of Charcot's investigations. We made the pathogenic experiences of our patients, which acted as psychic traumata, equivalent to those physical traumata whose influence on hysterical paralyses Charcot had determined; and Breuer's hypothesis of hypnoidal states is itself only an echo of the fact that Charcot had artificially reproduced those traumatic paralyses in hypnosis.

The great French observer, whose student I was during

the years 1885-86, had no natural bent for creating psychological theories. His student, P. Janet, was the first to attempt to penetrate more deeply into the psychic processes of hysteria, and we followed his example, when we made the mental splitting and the dissociation of personality the central points of our theory. Janet propounds a theory of hysteria which draws upon the principal theories of heredity and degeneration which are current in France. According to his view hysteria is a form of degenerative alteration of the nervous system, manifesting itself in a congenital "weakness" of the function of psychic synthesis. The hysterical patient is from the start incapable of correlating and unifying the manifold of his mental processes, and so there arises the tendency to mental dissociation. If you will permit me to use a banal but clear illustration, Janet's hysterical reminds one of a weak woman who has been shopping, and is now on her way home, laden with packages and bundles of every description. She cannot manage the whole lot with her two arms and her ten fingers, and soon she drops one. When she stoops to pick this up, another breaks loose, and so it goes on.

Now it does not agree very well with this assumed mental weakness of hystericals, that there can be observed in hysterical cases, besides the phenomena of lessened functioning, examples of a partial increase of functional capacity, as a sort of compensation. At the time when Breuer's patient had forgotten her mother-tongue and all other languages save English, her control of English attained such a level that if a German book was put before her she could give a fluent, perfect translation of its contents at sight. When later I undertook to continue on my own account the investigations begun by Breuer, I soon came to another view of the origin of hysterical dissociation (or splitting of consciousness). It was inevitable that my views should diverge widely and radically, for my point of departure was not, like that of Janet, laboratory researches, but attempts at therapy. Above everything else, it was prac-

tical needs that urged me on. The cathartic treatment, as Breuer had made use of it, presupposed that the patient should be put in deep hypnosis, for only in hypnosis was available the knowledge of his pathogenic associations, which were unknown to him in his normal state. Now hypnosis, as a fanciful, and so to speak, mystical, aid, I soon came to dislike; and when I discovered that, in spite of all my efforts, I could not hypnotize by any means all of my patients, I resolved to give up hypnotism and to make the cathartic method independent of it.

Since I could not alter the psychic state of most of my patients at my wish, I directed my efforts to working with them in their normal state. This seems at first sight to be a particularly senseless and aimless undertaking. The problem was this: to find out something from the patient that the doctor did not know and the patient himself did not know. How could one hope to make such a method succeed? The memory of a very noteworthy and instructive proceeding came to my aid, which I had seen in Bernheim's clinic at Nancy. Bernheim showed us that persons put in a condition of hypnotic somnambulism, and subjected to all sorts of experiences, had only apparently lost the memory of those somnambulic experiences, and that their memory of them could be awakened even in the normal state. If he asked them about their experiences during somnambulism, they said at first that they did not remember, but if he persisted, urged, assured them that they did know, then every time the forgotten memory came back.

Accordingly I did this with my patients. When I had reached in my procedure with them a point at which they declared that they knew nothing more, I would assure them that they did know, that they must just tell it out, and I would venture the assertion that the memory which would emerge at the moment that I laid my hand on the patient's forehead would be the right one. In this way I succeeded, without hypnosis, in learning from the patient all that was necessary for a construction of the connection

between the forgotten pathogenic scenes and the symptoms which they had left behind. This was a troublesome and in its length an exhausting proceeding, and did not lend itself to a finished technique. But I did not give it up without drawing definite conclusions from the data which I had gained. I had substantiated the fact that the forgotten memories were not lost. They were in the possession of the patient, ready to emerge and form associations with his other mental content, but hindered from becoming conscious, and forced to remain in the unconscious by some sort of a force. The existence of this force could be assumed with certainty, for in attempting to drag up the unconscious memories into the consciousness of the patient, in opposition to this force, one got the sensation of his own personal effort striving to overcome it. One could get an idea of this force, which maintained the pathological situation, from the resistance of the patient.

It is on this idea of *resistance* that I based my theory of the psychic processes of hystericals. It had been found that in order to cure the patient it was necessary that this force should be overcome. Now with the mechanism of the cure as a starting point, quite a definite theory could be constructed. These same forces, which in the present situation as resistances opposed the emergence of the forgotten ideas into consciousness, must themselves have caused the forgetting, and repressed from consciousness the pathogenic experiences. I called this hypothetical process "repression" (*Verdrängung*), and considered that it was proved by the undeniable existence of *resistance*.

But now the question arose: what were those forces, and what were the conditions of this repression, in which we were now able to recognize the pathogenic mechanism of hysteria? A comparative study of the pathogenic situations, which the cathartic treatment has made possible, allows us to answer this question. In all those experiences, it had happened that a wish had been aroused, which was in sharp opposition to the other desires of the individual,

and was not capable of being reconciled with the ethical, æsthetic and personal pretensions of the patient's personality. There had been a short conflict, and the end of this inner struggle was the repression of the idea which presented itself to consciousness as the bearer of this irreconcilable wish. This was, then, repressed from consciousness and forgotten. The incompatibility of the idea in question with the "ego" of the patient was the motive of the repression, the ethical and other pretensions of the individual were the repressing forces. The presence of the incompatible wish, or the duration of the conflict, had given rise to a high degree of mental pain; this pain was avoided by the repression. This latter process is evidently in such a case a device for the protection of the personality.

I will not multiply examples, but will give you the history of a single one of my cases, in which the conditions and the utility of the repression process stand out clearly enough. Of course for my purpose I must abridge the history of the case and omit many valuable theoretical considerations. It is that of a young girl, who was deeply attached to her father, who had died a short time before, and in whose care she had shared—a situation analogous to that of Breuer's patient. When her older sister married, the girl grew to feel a peculiar sympathy for her new brother-in-law, which easily passed with her for family tenderness. This sister soon fell ill and died, while the patient and her mother were away. The absent ones were hastily recalled, without being told fully of the painful situation. As the girl stood by the bedside of her dead sister, for one short moment there surged up in her mind an idea, which might be framed in these words: "Now he is free and can marry me." We may be sure that this idea, which betrayed to her consciousness her intense love for her brother-in-law, of which she had not been conscious, was the next moment consigned to repression by her revolted feelings. The girl fell ill with severe hysterical symptoms, and, when I came to treat the case, it

appeared that she had entirely forgotten that scene at her sister's bedside and the unnatural, egoistic desire which had arisen in her. She remembered it during the treatment, reproduced the pathogenic moment with every sign of intense emotional excitement, and was cured by this treatment.⁸

Perhaps I can make the process of repression and its necessary relation to the resistance of the patient, more concrete by a rough illustration, which I will derive from our present situation.

Suppose that here in this hall and in this audience, whose exemplary stillness and attention I cannot sufficiently commend, there is an individual who is creating a disturbance, and, by his ill-bred laughing, talking, by scraping his feet, distracts my attention from my task. I explain that I cannot go on with my lecture under these conditions, and thereupon several strong men among you get up, and, after a short struggle, eject the disturber of the peace from the hall. He is now "repressed," and I can continue my lecture. But in order that the disturbance may not be repeated, in case the man who has just been thrown out attempts to force his way back into the room, the gentlemen who have executed my suggestion take their chairs to the door and establish themselves there as a "resistance," to keep up the repression. Now, if you transfer both locations to the psyche, calling this "consciousness," and the outside the "unconscious," you have a tolerably good illustration of the process of repression.

We can see now the difference between our theory and that of Janet. We do not derive the psychic fission from a congenital lack of capacity on the part of the mental apparatus to synthesize its experiences, but we explain it dynamically by the conflict of opposing mental forces, we recognize in it the result of an active striving of each mental complex against the other.

⁸ This case has been translated by Dr. Brill in *Selected Papers on Hysteria*, etc., p. 31—F 4.

New questions at once arise in great number from our theory. The situation of psychic conflict is a very frequent one; an attempt of the ego to defend itself from painful memories can be observed everywhere, and yet the result is not a mental fission. We cannot avoid the assumption that still other conditions are necessary, if the conflict is to result in dissociation. I willingly concede that with the assumption of "repression" we stand, not at the end, but at the very beginning of a psychological theory. But we can advance only one step at a time, and the completion of our knowledge must await further and more thorough work.

Now do not attempt to bring the case of Breuer's patient under the point of view of repression. This history cannot be subjected to such an attempt, for it was gained with the help of hypnotic influence. Only when hypnosis is excluded can you see the resistances and repressions and get a correct idea of the pathogenic process. Hypnosis conceals the resistances and so makes a certain part of the mental field freely accessible. By this same process the resistances on the borders of this field are heaped up into a rampart, which makes all beyond inaccessible.

The most valuable things that we have learned from Breuer's observations were his conclusions as to the connection of the symptoms with the pathogenic experiences or psychic traumata, and we must not neglect to evaluate this result properly from the standpoint of the repression-theory. It is not at first evident how we can get from the repression to the creation of the symptoms. Instead of giving a complicated theoretical derivation, I will return at this point to the illustration which I used to typify repression.

Remember that with the ejection of the rowdy and the establishment of the watchers before the door, the affair is not necessarily ended. It may very well happen that the ejected man, now embittered and quite careless of consequences, gives us more to do. He is no longer among us, we are free from his presence, his scornful laugh, his

half-audible remarks, but in a certain sense the repression has miscarried, for he makes a terrible uproar outside, and by his outcries and by hammering on the door with his fists interferes with my lecture more than before. Under these circumstances it would be hailed with delight if possibly our honored president, Dr. Stanley Hall, should take upon himself the rôle of peacemaker and mediator. He would speak with the rowdy on the outside, and then turn to us with the recommendation that we let him in again, provided he would guarantee to behave himself better. On Dr. Hall's authority we decide to stop the repression, and now quiet and peace reign again. This is in fact a fairly good presentation of the task devolving upon the physician in the psychoanalytic therapy of neuroses. To say the same thing more directly: we come to the conclusion, from working with hysterical patients and other neurotics, that they have not fully succeeded in repressing the idea to which the incompatible wish is attached. They have, indeed, driven it out of consciousness and out of memory, and apparently saved themselves a great amount of psychic pain, *but in the unconscious the suppressed wish still exists*, only waiting for its chance to become active, and finally succeeds in sending into consciousness, instead of the repressed idea, a disguised and unrecognizable surrogate-creation (*Ersatzbildung*), to which the same painful sensations associate themselves that the patient thought he was rid of through his repression. This surrogate of the suppressed idea—the symptom—is secure against further attacks from the defenses of the ego, and instead of a short conflict there originates now a permanent suffering. We can observe in the symptom, besides the tokens of its disguise, a remnant of traceable similarity with the originally repressed idea; the way in which the surrogate is built up can be discovered during the psychoanalytic treatment of the patient, and for his cure the symptom must be traced back over the same route to the repressed idea. If this repressed material is once more made part of the con-

scious mental functions—a process which supposes the overcoming of considerable resistance—the psychic conflict which then arises the same which the patient wished to avoid, is made capable of a happier termination, under the guidance of the physician, than is offered by repression. There are several possible suitable decisions which can bring conflict and neurosis to a happy end; in particular cases the attempt may be made to combine several of these. Either the personality of the patient may be convinced that he has been wrong in rejecting the pathogenic wish, and he may be made to accept it either wholly or in part; or this wish may itself be directed to a higher goal which is free from objection, by what is called sublimation (*Sublimierung*); or the rejection may be recognized as rightly motivated, and the automatic and therefore insufficient mechanism of repression be reinforced by the higher, more characteristically human mental faculties: one succeeds in mastering his wishes by conscious thought.

Forgive me if I have not been able to present more clearly these main points of the treatment which is today known as “psychoanalysis.” The difficulties do not lie merely in the newness of the subject.

Regarding the nature of the unacceptable wishes, which succeed in making their influence felt out of the unconscious, in spite of repression; and regarding the question of what subjective and constitutional factors must be present for such a failure of repression and such a surrogate or symptom creation to take place, we will speak in later remarks.

Third Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is not always easy to tell the truth, especially when one must be brief, and so today I must correct an incorrect statement that I made in my last lecture.

I told you how when I gave up using hypnosis I pressed my patients to tell me what came into their minds that had

to do with the problem we were working on, I told them that they would remember what they had apparently forgotten, and that the thought which irrupted into consciousness (*Einfall*) would surely embody the memory for which we were seeking. I claimed that I substantiated the fact that the first idea of my patients brought the right clew and could be shown to be the forgotten continuation of the memory. Now this is not always so; I represented it as being so simple only for purposes of abbreviation. In fact, it would only happen the first time that the right forgotten material would emerge through simple pressure on my part. If the experience was continued, ideas emerged in every case which could not be the right ones, for they were not to the purpose, and the patients themselves rejected them as incorrect. Pressure was of no further service here, and one could only regret again having given up hypnosis. In this state of perplexity I clung to a prejudice which years later was proved by my friend C. G. Jung of the University of Zürich and his pupils to have a scientific justification. I must confess that it is often of great advantage to have prejudices. I put a high value on the strength of the determination of mental processes, and I could not believe that any idea which occurred to the patient, which originated in a state of concentrated attention, could be quite arbitrary and out of all relation to the forgotten idea that we were seeking. That it was not identical with the latter, could be satisfactorily explained by the hypothetical psychological situation. In the patients whom I treated there were two opposing forces: on the one hand the conscious striving to drag up into consciousness the forgotten experience which was present in the unconscious; and on the other hand the resistance which we have seen, which set itself against the emergence of the suppressed idea or its associates into consciousness. In case this resistance was nonexistent or very slight, the forgotten material could become conscious without disguise (*Einstellung*). It was then a natural supposi-

tion that the disguise would be the more complete, the greater the resistance to the emergence of the idea. Thoughts which broke into the patient's consciousness instead of the ideas sought for, were accordingly made up just like symptoms; they were new, artificial, ephemeral surrogates for the repressed ideas, and differed from these just in proportion as they had been more completely disguised under the influence of the resistances. These surrogates must, however, show a certain similarity with the ideas which are the object of our search, by virtue of their nature as symptoms; and when the resistance is not too intensive it is possible from the nature of these interruptions to discover the hidden object of our search. This must be related to the repressed thought as a sort of allusion, as a statement of the same thing in *indirect* terms.

We know cases in normal psychology in which analogous situations to the one which we have assumed give rise to similar experiences. Such a case is that of wit. By my study of psychoanalytic technique I was necessarily led to a consideration of the problem of the nature of wit. I will give one example of this sort, which, too, is a story that originally appeared in English.

The anecdote runs: ⁹ Two unscrupulous business men had succeeded by fortunate speculations in accumulating a large fortune, and then directed their efforts to breaking into good society. Among other means they thought it would be of advantage to be painted by the most famous and expensive artist of the city, a man whose paintings were considered as events. The costly paintings were first shown at a great soirée and both hosts led the most influential connoisseur and art critic to the wall of the salon on which the portraits were hung, to elicit his admiring judgment. The critic looked for a long time, looked about as though in search of something, and then merely asked,

⁹ *Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten*, p. 59. Deuticke, Vienna, 1905.

pointing out the vacant space between the two pictures; "And where is the Saviour?"

I see that you are all laughing over this good example of wit, which we will now attempt to analyze. We understand that the critic means to say: "You are a couple of malefactors, like those between whom the Saviour was crucified." But he does not say this, he expresses himself instead in a way that at first seems not to the purpose and not related to the matter in hand, but which at the next moment we recognize as an *allusion* to the insult at which he aims, and as a perfect surrogate for it. We cannot expect to find in the case of wit all those relations that our theory supposes for the origin of the irruptive ideas of our patients, but it is my desire to lay stress on the similar motivation of wit and irruptive idea. Why does not the critic say directly what he has to say to the two rogues? Because, in addition to his desire to say it straight out, he is actuated by strong opposite motives. It is a proceeding which is liable to be dangerous to offend people who are one's hosts, and who can call to their aid the strong arms of numerous servants. One might easily suffer the same fate that I used in the previous lecture to illustrate repression. On this ground, the critic does not express the particular insult directly, but in a disguised form, as an allusion with omission. The same constellation comes into play, according to our hypothesis, when our patient produces the irruptive idea as a surrogate for the forgotten idea which is the object of the quest.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is very useful to designate a group of ideas which belong together and have a common emotive tone, according to the custom of the Zürich school (Bleuler, Jung and others), as a "complex." So we can say that if we set out from the last memories of the patient to look for a repressed complex, that we have every prospect of discovering it, if only the patient will communicate to us a sufficient number of the ideas which come into his head. So we let the patient speak along any line that he

desires, and cling to the hypothesis that nothing can occur to him except what has some indirect bearing on the complex that we are seeking. If this method of discovering the repressed complexes seems too circumstantial, I can at least assure you that it is the only available one.

In practicing this technique, one is further bothered by the fact that the patient often stops, is at a standstill, and considers that he has nothing to say; nothing occurs to him. If this were really the case and the patient were right, our procedure would again be proven inapplicable. Closer observation shows that such an absence of ideas never really occurs, and that it only appears to when the patient holds back or rejects the idea which he perceives, under the influence of the resistance, which disguises itself as critical judgment of the value of the idea. The patient can be protected from this if he is warned in advance of this circumstance, and told to take no account of the critical attitude. He must say anything that comes into his mind, fully laying aside such critical choice, even though he may think it unessential, irrelevant, nonsensical, especially when the idea is one which is unpleasant to dwell on. By following this prescription we secure the material which sets us on the track of the repressed complex.

These irruptive ideas, which the patient himself values little, if he is under the influence of the resistance and not that of the physician, are for the psychologist like the ore, which by simple methods of interpretation he reduces from its crude state to valuable metal. If one desires to gain in a short time a preliminary knowledge of the patient's repressed complexes, without going into the question of their arrangement and associations, this examination may be conducted with the help of the association experiments, as Jung¹⁰ and his pupils have perfected them. This procedure is to the psychologist what qualitative analysis is to the chemist; it may be dispensed with in the therapy of neurotic patients, but is indispensable in the investiga-

¹⁰ Jung, C. G., *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien*, B. 1, 1906.

tions of the psychoses, which have been begun by the Zürich school with such valuable results.

This method of work with whatever comes into the patient's head when he submits to psychoanalytic treatment, is not the only technical means at our disposal for the widening of consciousness. Two other methods of procedure serve the same purpose, the interpretation of his dreams and the evaluation of acts which he bungles or does without intending to (*Fehl- und Zufallshandlungen*).

I might say, esteemed hearers, that for a long time I hesitated whether instead of this hurried survey of the whole field of psychoanalysis, I should not rather offer you a thorough consideration of the analysis of dreams; a purely subjective and apparently secondary motive decided me against this. It seemed rather an impropriety that in this country, so devoted to practical pursuits, I should pose as "interpreter of dreams," before you had a chance to discover what significance the old and despised art can claim.

Interpretation of dreams is in fact the *via regia* to the interpretation of the unconscious, the surest ground of psychoanalysis and a field in which every worker must win his convictions and gain his education. If I were asked how one could become a psychoanalyst. I should answer, through the study of his own dreams. With great tact all opponents of the psychoanalytic theory have so far either evaded any criticism of the *Traumdeutung*¹¹ or have attempted to pass over it with the most superficial objections. If, on the contrary, you will undertake the solution of the problems of dream life, the novelties which psychoanalysis present to your thoughts will no longer be difficulties.

You must remember that our nightly dream productions show the greatest outer similarity and inner relationship to the creations of the insane, but on the other hand are compatible with full health during waking life

¹¹ *Die Traumdeutung*, 2d ed. Deuticke, Vienna, 1909.

It does not sound at all absurd to say that whoever regards these normal sense illusions, these delusions and alterations of character as matter for amazement instead of understanding, has not the least prospect of understanding the abnormal creations of diseased mental states in any other than the lay sense. You may with confidence place in this lay group all the psychiatrists of to-day. Follow me now on a brief excursion through the field of dream problems.

In our waking state we usually treat dreams with as little consideration as the patient treats the irruptive ideas which the psychoanalyst demands from him. It is evident that we reject them, for we forget them quickly and completely. The slight valuation which we place on them is based, with those dreams that are not confused and nonsensical, on the feeling that they are foreign to our personality, and, with other dreams, on their evident absurdity and senselessness. Our rejection derives support from the unrestrained shamelessness and the immoral longings which are obvious in many dreams. Antiquity, as we know, did not share this light valuation of dreams. The lower classes of our people today stick close to the value which they set on dreams; they, however, expect from them, as did the ancients, the revelation of the future. I confess that I see no need to adopt mystical hypotheses to fill out the gaps in our present knowledge, and so I have never been able to find anything that supported the hypothesis of the prophetic nature of dreams. Many other things, which are wonderful enough, can be said about them.

And first, not all dreams are so foreign to the character of the dreamer, are incomprehensible and confused. If you will undertake to consider the dreams of young children from the age of a year and a half on, you will find them quite simple and easy to interpret. The young child always dreams of the fulfillment of wishes which were aroused in him the day before and were not satisfied. You need no art of interpretation to discover this simple

solution, you only need to inquire into the experiences of the child on the day before (the "dream day"). Now it would certainly be a most satisfactory solution of the dream-riddle, if the dreams of adults, too, were the same as those of children, fulfillments of wishes which had been aroused in them during the dream day. This is actually the fact; the difficulties which stand in the way of this solution can be removed step by step by a thorough analysis of the dream.

There is, first of all, the most weighty objection, that the dreams of adults generally have an incomprehensible content, which shows wish-fulfillment least of anything. The answer is this: these dreams have undergone a process of disguise, the psychic content which underlies them was originally meant for quite different verbal expression. You must differentiate between the *manifest dream-content*, which we remember in the morning only confusedly, and with difficulty clothe in words which seem arbitrary, and the *latent dream-thoughts*, whose presence in the unconscious we must assume. This distortion of the dream (*Traumentstellung*) is the same process which has been revealed to you in the investigations of the creations (*symptoms*) of hysterical subjects; it points to the fact that the same opposition of psychic forces has its share in the creation of dreams as in the creation of symptoms.

The manifest dream-content is the disguised surrogate for the unconscious dream thoughts, and this disguising is the work of the defensive forces of the ego, of the resistances. These prevent the repressed wishes from entering consciousness during the waking life, and even in the relaxation of sleep they are still strong enough to force them to hide themselves by a sort of masquerading. The dreamer, then, knows just as little the sense of his dream as the hysterical knows the relation and significance of his symptoms. That there are latent dream-thoughts and that between them and the manifest dream-content there exists the relation just described—of this you may convince

yourselves by the analysis of dreams, a procedure the technique of which is exactly that of psychoanalysis. You must abstract entirely from the apparent connection of the elements in the manifest dream and seek for the irruptive ideas which arise through free association, according to the psychoanalytic laws, from each separate dream element. From this material the latent dream thoughts may be discovered, exactly as one divines the concealed complexes of the patient from the fancies connected with his symptoms and memories. From the latent dream thoughts which you will find in this way, you will see at once how thoroughly justified one is in interpreting the dreams of adults by the same rubrics as those of children. What is now substituted for the manifest dream-content is the real sense of the dream, is always clearly comprehensible, associated with the impressions of the day before, and appears as the fulfilling of an unsatisfied wish. The manifest dream, which we remember after waking, may then be described as a *disguised* fulfillment of *repressed* wishes.

It is also possible by a sort of synthesis to get some insight into the process which has brought about the disguise of the unconscious dream thoughts as the manifest dream-content. We call this process "dream-work" (*Traumarbeit*). This deserves our fullest theoretical interest, since here as nowhere else we can study the unsuspected psychic processes which are existent in the unconscious, or, to express it more exactly, *between* two such separate systems as the conscious and the unconscious. Among these newly discovered psychic processes, two, condensation (*Verdichtung*) and displacement or transvaluation, change of psychic accent (*Verschiebung*), stand out most prominently. Dream work is a special case of the reaction of different mental groupings on each other, and as such is the consequence of psychic fission. In all essential points it seems identical with the work of disguise, which changes the repressed complex in the case of failing repression into symptoms.

You will furthermore discover by the analysis of dreams, most convincingly your own, the unsuspected importance of the rôle which impressions and experiences from early childhood exert on the development of men. In the dream life the child, as it were, continues his existence in the man, with a retention of all his traits and wishes, including those which he was obliged to allow to fall into disuse in his later years. With irresistible might it will be impressed on you by what processes of development, of repression, sublimation and reaction there arises out of the child, with its peculiar gifts and tendencies, the so-called normal man, the bearer and partly the victim of our painfully acquired civilization. I will also direct your attention to the fact that we have discovered from the analysis of dreams that the unconscious makes use of a sort of symbolism, especially in the presentation of sexual complexes. This symbolism in part varies with the individual, but in part is of a typical nature, and seems to be identical with the symbolism which we suppose to lie behind our myths and legends. It is not impossible that these latter creations of the people may find their explanation from the study of dreams.

Finally, I must remind you that you must not be led astray by the objection that the occurrence of anxiety-dreams (*Angstträume*), contradicts our idea of the dream as a wish-fulfillment. Apart from the consideration that anxiety-dreams also require interpretation before judgment can be passed on them, one can say quite generally that the anxiety does not depend in such a simple way on the dream content as one might suppose without more knowledge of the facts, and more attention to the conditions of neurotic anxiety. Anxiety is one of the ways in which the ego relieves itself of repressed wishes which have become too strong, and so is easy to explain in the dream, if the dream has gone too far towards the fulfilling of the objectionable wish.

You see that the investigation of dreams was justified by the conclusions which it has given us concerning things

otherwise hard to understand. But we came to it in connection with the psychoanalytic treatment of neurotics. From what has been said you can easily understand how the interpretation of dreams, if it is not made too difficult by the resistance of the patient, can lead to a knowledge of the patient's concealed and repressed wishes and the complexes which he is nourishing. I may now pass to that group of everyday mental phenomena whose study has become a technical help for psychoanalysis.

These are the bungling of acts (*Fehlhandlungen*) among normal men as well as among neurotics, to which no significance is ordinarily attached; the forgetting of things which one is supposed to know and at other times really does know (for example the temporary forgetting of proper names); mistakes in speaking (*Versprechen*), which occur so frequently; analogous mistakes in writing (*Verschreiben*) and in reading (*Verlesen*), the automatic execution of purposive acts in wrong situations (*Ver-greifen*) and the loss or breaking of objects, etc. These are trifles, for which no one has ever sought a psychological determination, which have passed unchallenged as chance experiences, as consequences of absent-mindedness, inattention and similar conditions. Here, too, are included the acts and gestures executed without being noticed by the subject, to say nothing of the fact that he attaches no psychic importance to them; as playing and trifling with objects, humming melodies, handling one's person and clothing and the like.¹²

These little things, the bungling of acts, like the symptomatic and chance acts (*Symptom- und Zufallshandlungen*) are not so entirely without meaning as is generally supposed by a sort of tacit agreement. They have a meaning, generally easy and sure to interpret from the situation in which they occur, and it can be demonstrated that they either express impulses and purposes which are repressed,

¹² *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*, 3d ed. S. Karger, Berlin, 1910.

hidden if possible from the consciousness of the individual, or that they spring from exactly the same sort of repressed wishes and complexes which we have learned to know already as the creators of symptoms and dreams.

It follows that they deserve the rank of symptoms, and their observation, like that of dreams, can lead to the discovery of the hidden complexes of the psychic life. With their help one will usually betray the most intimate of his secrets. If these occur so easily and commonly among people in health, with whom repression has on the whole succeeded fairly well, this is due to their insignificance and their inconspicuous nature. But they can lay claim to high theoretic value, for they prove the existence of repression and surrogate creations even under the conditions of health. You have already noticed that the psychoanalyst is distinguished by an especially strong belief in the determination of the psychic life. For him there is in the expressions of the psyche nothing trifling, nothing arbitrary and lawless, he expects everywhere a widespread motivation, where customarily such claims are not made; more than that, he is even prepared to find a manifold motivation of these psychic expressions, while our supposedly inborn causal need is satisfied with a single psychic cause.

Now keeping in mind the means which we possess for the discovery of the hidden, forgotten, repressed things in the soul life: the study of the irruptive ideas called up by free association, the patient's dreams, and his bungled and symptomatic acts; and adding to these the evaluation of other phenomena which emerge during the psychoanalytic treatment, on which I shall later make a few remarks under the heading of "transfer" (*Uebertragung*), you will come with me to the conclusion that our technique is already sufficiently efficacious for the solution of the problem of how to introduce the pathogenic psychic material into consciousness, and so to do away with the suffering brought on by the creation of surrogate symptoms.

The fact that by such therapeutic endeavors our knowledge of the mental life of the normal and the abnormal is widened and deepened, can of course only be regarded as an especial attraction and superiority of this method.

I do not know whether you have gained the impression that the technique through whose arsenal I have led you is a peculiarly difficult one. I consider that on the contrary, for one who has mastered it, it is quite adapted for use. But so much is sure, that it is not obvious, that it must be learned no less than the histological or the surgical technique.

You may be surprised to learn that in Europe we have heard very frequently judgments passed on psychoanalysis by persons who knew nothing of its technique and had never practised it, but who demanded scornfully that we show the correctness of our results. There are among these people some who are not in other things unacquainted with scientific methods of thought, who for example would not reject the result of a microscopical research because it cannot be confirmed with the naked eye in anatomical preparations, and who would not pass judgment until they had used the microscope. But in matters of psychoanalysis circumstances are really more unfavorable for gaining recognition. Psychoanalysis will bring the repressed in mental life to conscious acknowledgment, and every one who judges it is himself a man who has such repressions, perhaps maintained only with difficulty. It will consequently call forth the same resistances from him as from the patient, and this resistance can easily succeed in disguising itself as intellectual rejection, and bring forward arguments similar to those from which we protect our patients by the basic principles of psychoanalysis. It is not difficult to substantiate in our opponents the same impairment of intelligence produced by emotivity which we may observe every day with our patients. The arrogance of consciousness which for example rejects dreams so lightly, belongs—quite generally—to the strongest pro-

tective apparatus which guards us against the breaking through of the unconscious complexes, and as a result it is hard to convince people of the reality of the unconscious, and to teach them anew what their conscious knowledge contradicts.

Fourth Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen: At this point you will be asking what the technique which I have described has taught us of the nature of the pathogenic complexes and repressed wishes of neurotics.

One thing in particular: psychoanalytic investigations trace back the symptoms of disease with really surprising regularity to impressions from the sexual life, show us that the pathogenic wishes are of the nature of erotic impulse-components (*Triebkomponente*), and necessitate the assumption that to disturbances of the erotic sphere must be ascribed the greatest significance among the etiological factors of the disease. This holds of both sexes.

I know that this assertion will not willingly be credited. Even those investigators who gladly follow my psychological labors, are inclined to think that I overestimate the etiological share of the sexual moments. They ask me why other mental excitations should not lead to the phenomena of repression and surrogate-creation which I have described. I can give them this answer; that I do not know why they should not do this, I have no objection to their doing it, but experience shows that they do not possess such a significance, and that they merely support the effect of the sexual moments, without being able to supplant them. This conclusion was not a theoretical postulate; in the *Studien über Hysterie*, published in 1895 with Dr. Breuer, I did not stand on this ground. I was converted to it when my experience was richer and had led me deeper into the nature of the case. Gentlemen, there are among you some of my closest friends and adherents, who have traveled to Worcester with me. Ask them, and they will tell you that they all were at first completely skeptical of

the assertion of the determinative significance of the sexual etiology, until they were compelled by their own analytic labors to come to the same conclusion.

The conduct of the patients does not make it any easier to convince one's self of the correctness of the view which I have expressed. Instead of willingly giving us information concerning their sexual life, they try to conceal it by every means in their power. Men generally are not candid in sexual matters. They do not show their sexuality freely, but they wear a thick overcoat—a fabric of lies—to conceal it, as though it were bad weather in the world of sex. And they are not wrong; sun and wind are not favorable in our civilized society to any demonstration of sex life. In truth no one can freely disclose his erotic life to his neighbor. But when your patients see that in your treatment they may disregard the conventional restraints, they lay aside this veil of lies, and then only are you in a position to formulate a judgment on the question in dispute. Unfortunately physicians are not favored above the rest of the children of men in their personal relationship to the questions of the sex life. Many of them are under the ban of that mixture of prudery and lasciviousness which determines the behavior of most *Kulturmenschen* in affairs of sex.

Now to proceed with the communication of our results. It is true that in another series of cases psychoanalysis at first traces the symptoms back not to the sexual, but to banal traumatic experiences. But the distinction loses its significance through other circumstances. The work of analysis which is necessary for the thorough explanation and complete cure of a case of sickness does not stop in any case with the experience of the time of onset of the disease, but in every case it goes back to the adolescence and the early childhood of the patient. Here only do we hit upon the impressions and circumstances which determine the later sickness. Only the childhood experiences can give the explanation for the sensitivity to later trau-

mata and only when these memory traces, which almost always are forgotten, are discovered and made conscious, is the power developed to banish the symptoms. We arrive here at the same conclusion as in the investigation of dreams—that it is the incompatible, repressed wishes of childhood which lend their power to the creation of symptoms. Without these the reactions upon later traumata discharge normally. But we must consider these mighty wishes of childhood very generally as sexual in nature.

Now I can at any rate be sure of your astonishment. Is there an infantile sexuality? you will ask. Is childhood not rather that period of life which is distinguished by the lack of the sexual impulse? No, gentlemen, it is not at all true that the sexual impulse enters into the child at puberty, as the devils in the gospel entered into the swine. The child has his sexual impulses and activities from the beginning, he brings them with him into the world, and from these the so-called normal sexuality of adults emerges by a significant development through manifold stages. It is not very difficult to observe the expressions of this childish sexual activity; it needs rather a certain art to overlook them or to fail to interpret them.¹³

As fate would have it, I am in a position to call a witness for my assertions from your own midst. I show you here the work of one, Dr. Sanford Bell, published in 1902 in the *American Journal of Psychology*. The author was a fellow of Clark University, the same institution within whose walls we now stand. In this thesis, entitled *A Preliminary Study of the Emotion of Love between the Sexes*, which appeared three years before my "Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie," the author says just what I have been saying to you: "The emotion of sex love . . . does not make its appearance for the first time at the period of adolescence as has been thought." He has, as we should say in Europe, worked by the American method, and has

¹³ Three Contributions to a Sexual Theory. Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Monogr. Ser., N. Y.

gathered not less than 2,500 positive observations in the course of fifteen years, among them 800 of his own. He says of the signs by which this amorous condition manifests itself: "The unprejudiced mind, in observing these manifestations in hundreds of couples of children, cannot escape referring them to sex origin. The most exacting mind is satisfied when to these observations are added the confessions of those who have as children experienced the emotion to a marked degree of intensity, and whose memories of childhood are relatively distinct." Those of you who are unwilling to believe in infantile sexuality will be most astonished to hear that among those children who fell in love so early not a few are of the tender ages of three, four, and five years.

It would not be surprising if you should believe the observations of a fellow-countryman rather than my own. Fortunately a short time ago from the analysis of a five-year-old boy who was suffering from anxiety, an analysis undertaken with correct technique by his own father,¹⁴ I succeeded in getting a fairly complete picture of the bodily expressions of the impulse and the mental productions of an early stage of childish sexual life. And I must remind you that my friend, Dr. C. G. Jung, read you a few hours ago in this room an observation on a still younger girl who from the same cause as my patient—the birth of a little child in the family—betrayed certainly almost the same secret excitement, wish and complex-creation. Accordingly I am not without hope that you may feel friendly toward this idea of infantile sexuality that was so strange at first. I might also quote the remarkable example of the Zürich psychiatrist, E. Bleuler, who said a few years ago openly that he faced my sexual theories incredulous and bewildered, and since that time by his own observations had substantiated them in their whole scope.¹⁵ If it is true

¹⁴ Analyse der Phobie eines 5-jährigen Knaben. *Jahrb. f. Psychoanalyt. u. Psychopath. Forschungen*, Vol. I, No. 1.

¹⁵ Bleuler, *Sexuelle Abnormitäten der Kinder*, *Jahrbuch der schweizer, Gesellschaft für Schulgesundheitspflege* IX, 1908.

that most men, medical observers and others, do not want to know anything about the sexual life of the child, the fact is capable of explanation only too easily. They have forgotten their own infantile sexual activity under the pressure of education for civilization and do not care to be reminded now of the repressed material. You will be convinced otherwise if you begin the investigation by a self-analysis, by an interpretation of your own childhood memories.

Lay aside your doubts and let us evaluate the infantile sexuality of the earliest years.¹⁶ The sexual impulse of the child manifests itself as a very complex one, it permits of an analysis into many components, which spring from different sources. It is entirely disconnected from the function of reproduction which it is later to serve. It permits the child to gain different sorts of pleasure sensations, which we include, by the analogues and connections which they show, under the term sexual pleasures. The great source of infantile sexual pleasure is the auto-excitation of certain particularly sensitive parts of the body; besides the genitals are included the rectum and the opening of the urinary canal, and also the skin and other sensory surfaces. Since in this first phase of child sexual life the satisfaction is found on the child's own body and has nothing to do with any other object, we call this phase after a word coined by Havelock Ellis, that of "auto-eroticism." The parts of the body significant in giving sexual pleasure we call "erogenous zones." The thumb-sucking (*Ludeln*) or passionate sucking (*Wonnesaugen*) of very young children is a good example of such an auto-erotic satisfaction of an erogenous zone. The first scientific observer of this phenomenon, a specialist in children's diseases in Budapest by the name of Lindner, interpreted these rightly as sexual satisfaction and described exhaustively their transformation into other and higher forms of

¹⁶ *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, 2d ed. Vienna, 1910.

sexual gratification.¹⁷ Another sexual satisfaction of this time of life is the excitation of the genitals by masturbation, which has such a great significance for later life and, in the case of many individuals, is never fully overcome. Besides this and other auto-erotic manifestations we see very early in the child the impulse-components of *sexual pleasure*, or, as we may say, of the *libido*, which presupposes a second person as its object. These impulses appear in opposed pairs, as active and passive. The most important representatives of this group are the pleasure in inflicting pain (sadism) with its passive opposite (masochism) and active and passive exhibition-pleasure (*Schau-lust*). From the first of these later pairs splits off the curiosity for knowledge, as from the latter the impulse toward artistic and theatrical representation. Other sexual manifestations of the child can already be regarded from the viewpoint of object-choice, in which the second person plays the prominent part. The significance of this was primarily based upon motives of the impulse of self-preservation. The difference between the sexes plays, however, in the child no very great rôle. One may attribute to every child, without wronging him, a bit of the homosexual disposition.

The sexual life of the child, rich, but dissociated, in which each single impulse goes about the business of arousing pleasure independently of every other, is later correlated and organized in two general directions, so that by the close of puberty the definite sexual character of the individual is practically finally determined. The single impulses subordinate themselves to the overlordship of the genital zone, so that the whole sexual life is taken over into the service of procreation, and their gratification is now significant only so far as they help to prepare and promote the true sexual act. On the other hand, object-choice prevails over auto-eroticism, so that now in the sexual life all components of the sexual impulse are satisfied in

¹⁷ *Jahrbuch f. Kinderheilkunde*, 1879.

the loved person. But not all the original impulse-components are given a share in the final shaping of the sexual life. Even before the advent of puberty certain impulses have undergone the most energetic repression under the impulse of education, and mental forces like shame, disgust and morality are developed, which, like sentinels, keep the repressed wishes in subjection. When there comes, in puberty, the high tide of sexual desire it finds dams in this creation of reactions and resistances. These guide the outflow into the so-called normal channels, and make it impossible to revivify the impulses which have undergone repression.

The most important of these repressed impulses are coprophilism, that is, the pleasure in children connected with the excrements; and, further, the tendencies attaching themselves to the persons of the primitive object-choice.

Gentlemen, a sentence of general pathology says that every process of development brings with it the germ of pathological dispositions in so far as it may be inhibited, delayed, or incompletely carried out. This holds for the development of the sexual function, with its many complications. It is not smoothly completed in all individuals, and may leave behind either abnormalities or disposition to later diseases by the way of later falling back or *regression*. It may happen that not all the partial impulses subordinate themselves to the rule of the genital zone. Such an impulse which has remained disconnected brings about what we call a perversion, which may replace the normal sexual goal by one of its own. It may happen, as has been said before, that the auto-eroticism is not fully overcome, as many sorts of disturbances testify. The originally equal value of both sexes as sexual objects may be maintained and an inclination to homosexual activities in adult life result from this, which, under suitable conditions, rises to the level of exclusive homosexuality. This series of disturbances corresponds to the direct inhibition of develop-

ment of the sexual function, it includes the perversions and the general *infantilism* of the sex life that are not seldom met with.

The disposition to neuroses is to be derived in another way from an injury to the development of the sex life. The neuroses are related to the perversions as the negative to the positive; in them we find the same impulse-components as in perversions, as bearers of the complexes and as creators of the symptoms; but here they work from out the unconscious. They have undergone a repression, but in spite of this they maintain themselves in the unconscious. Psychoanalysis teaches us that overstrong expression of the impulse in very early life leads to a sort of fixation (*Fixierung*), which then offers a weak point in the articulation of the sexual function. If the exercise of the normal sexual function meets with hindrances in later life, this repression, dating from the time of development, is broken through at just that point at which the infantile fixation took place.

You will now perhaps make the objection: "But all that is not sexuality." I have used the word in a very much wider sense than you are accustomed to understand it. This I willingly concede. But it is a question whether you do not rather use the word in much too narrow a sense when you restrict it to the realm of procreation. You sacrifice by that the understanding of perversions; of the connection between perversion, neurosis, and normal sexual life; and have no means of recognizing, in its true significance, the easily observable beginning of the somatic and mental sexual life of the child. But however you decide about the use of the word, remember that the psychoanalyst understands sexuality in that full sense to which he is led by the evaluation of infantile sexuality.

Now we turn again to the sexual development of the child. We still have much to say here, since we have given more attention to the somatic than to the mental expressions of the sexual life. The primitive object-choice of

the child, which is derived from his need of help, demands our further interest. It first attaches to all persons to whom he is accustomed, but soon these give way in favor of his parents. The relation of the child to his parents is, as both direct observation of the child and later analytic investigation of adults agree, not at all free from elements of sexual accessory-excitation (*Miterregung*). The child takes both parents, and especially one, as an object of his erotic wishes. Usually he follows in this the stimulus given by his parents, whose tenderness has very clearly the character of a sex manifestation, though inhibited so far as its goal is concerned. As a rule, the father prefers the daughter, the mother the son; the child reacts to this situation, since, as son, he wishes himself in the place of his father, as daughter, in the place of the mother. The feelings awakened in these relations between parents and children, and, as a resultant of them, those among the children in relation to each other, are not only positively of a tender, but negatively of an inimical sort. The complex built up in this way is destined to quick repression, but it still exerts a great and lasting effect from the unconscious. We must express the opinion that this with its ramifications presents the *nuclear complex* of every neurosis, and so we are prepared to meet with it in a not less effectual way in the other fields of mental life. The myth of King Œdipus, who kills his father and wins his mother as a wife is only the slightly altered presentation of the infantile wish, rejected later by the opposing barriers of incest. Shakespeare's tale of Hamlet rests on the same basis of an incest complex, though better concealed. At the time when the child is still ruled by the still unrepressed nuclear complex, there begins a very significant part of his mental activity which serves sexual interest. He begins to investigate the question of where children come from and guesses more than adults imagine of the true relations by deduction from the signs which he sees. Usually his interest in this investigation is awakened by the threat to his welfare through

the birth of another child in the family, in whom at first he sees only a rival. Under the influence of the partial impulses which are active in him he arrives at a number of "infantile sexual theories," as that the same male genitals belong to both sexes, that children are conceived by eating and born through the opening of the intestine, and that sexual intercourse is to be regarded as an inimical act, a sort of overpowering.

But just the unfinished nature of his sexual constitution and the gaps in his knowledge brought about by the hidden condition of the feminine sexual canal, cause the infant investigator to discontinue his work as a failure. The facts of this childish investigation itself as well as the infant sex theories created by it are of determinative significance in the building of the child's character, and in the content of his later neuroses.

It is unavoidable and quite normal that the child should make his parents the objects of his first object-choice. But his *libido* must not remain fixed on these first chosen objects, but must take them merely as a prototype and transfer from these to other persons in the time of definite object-choice. The breaking loose (*Ablösung*) of the child from his parents is thus a problem impossible to escape if the social virtue of the young individual is not to be impaired. During the time that the repressive activity is making its choice among the partial sexual impulses and later, when the influence of the parents, which in the most essential way has furnished the material for these repressions, is lessened, great problems fall to the work of education, which at present certainly does not always solve them in the most intelligent and economic way.

Gentlemen, do not think that with these explanations of the sexual life and the sexual development of the child we have too far departed from psychoanalysis and the cure of neurotic disturbances. If you like, you may regard the psychoanalytic treatment only as a continued education for the overcoming of childhood-remnants (*Kindheitsresten*).

Fifth Lecture

Ladies and Gentlemen: With the discovery of infantile sexuality and the tracing back of the neurotic symptoms to erotic impulse-components we have arrived at several unexpected formulæ for expressing the nature and tendencies of neurotic diseases. We see that the individual falls ill when in consequence of outer hindrances or inner lack of adaptability the satisfaction of the erotic needs in the sphere of reality is denied. We see that he then flees to sickness, in order to find with its help a surrogate satisfaction for that denied him. We recognize that the symptoms of illness contain fractions of the sexual activity of the individual, or his whole sexual life, and we find in the turning away from reality the chief tendency and also the chief injury of the sickness. We may guess that the resistance of our patients against the cure is not a simple one, but is composed of many motives. Not only does the ego of the patient strive against the giving up of the repression by which it has changed itself from its original constitution into its present form, but also the sexual impulses may not renounce their surrogate satisfaction so long as it is not certain that they can be offered anything better in the sphere of reality.

The flight from the unsatisfying reality into what we call, on account of its biologically injurious nature, disease, but which is never without an individual gain in pleasure for the patient, takes place over the path of regression, the return to earlier phases of the sexual life, when satisfaction was not lacking. This regression is seemingly a twofold one, a *temporal*, in so far as the *libido* or erotic need falls back to a temporally earlier stage of development, and a *formal*, since the original and primitive psychic means of expression are applied to the expression of this need. Both sorts of regression focus in childhood and have their common point in the production of an infantile condition of sexual life.

The deeper you penetrate into the pathogenic of neu-

rotic diseases, the more the connection of neuroses with other products of human mentality, even the most valuable, will be revealed to you. You will be reminded that we men, with the high claims of our civilization and under the pressure of our repressions, find reality generally quite unsatisfactory and so keep up a life of fancy in which we love to compensate for what is lacking in the sphere of reality by the production of wish-fulfillments. In these phantasies are often contained very much of the particular constitutional essence of personality and of its tendencies, repressed in real life. The energetic and successful man is he who succeeds by dint of labor in transforming his wish fancies into reality. Where this is not successful in consequence of the resistance of the outer world and the weakness of the individual, there begins the turning away from reality. The individual takes refuge in his satisfying world of fancy. Under certain favorable conditions it still remains possible for him to find another connecting link between these fancies and reality, instead of permanently becoming a stranger to it through the regression into the infantile. If the individual who is displeased with reality is in possession of that *artistic talent* which is still a psychological riddle, he can transform his fancies into artistic creations. So he escapes the fate of a neurosis and wins back his connection with reality by this round-about way.¹⁸ Where this opposition to the real world exists, but this valuable talent fails or proves insufficient, it is unavoidable that the *libido*, following the origin of the fancies, succeeds by means of regression in revivifying the infantile wishes and so producing a neurosis. The neurosis takes, in our time, the place of the cloister, in which were accustomed to take refuge all those whom life had undeceived or who felt themselves too weak for life. Let me give at this point the main result at which we have arrived by the psychoanalytic investigation of neurotics,

¹⁸ Cf. Rank, Otto, *Der Künstler, Ausätze zu einer Sexualpsychologie*, 56 pp. Heller & Co., Wien, 1907.

namely, that neuroses have no peculiar psychic content of their own, which is not also to be found in healthy states; or, as C. G. Jung has expressed it, neurotics fall ill of the same complexes with which we sound people struggle. It depends on quantitative relationships, on the relations of the forces wrestling with each other, whether the struggle leads to health, to a neurosis, or to compensatory over-functioning (*Ueberleistung*).

Ladies and gentlemen, I have still withheld from you the most remarkable experience which corroborates our assumptions of the sexual impulse-forces of neurotics. Every time that we treat a neurotic psychoanalytically, there occurs in him the so-called phenomenon of *transfer* (*Uebertragung*), that is, he applies to the person of the physician a great amount of tender emotion, often mixed with enmity, which has no foundation in any real relation, and must be derived in every respect from the old wish-fancies of the patient which have become unconscious. Every fragment of his emotive life, which can no longer be called back into memory, is accordingly lived over by the patient in his relations to the physician, and only by such a living of them over in the "transfer" is he convinced of the existence and the power of these unconscious sexual excitations. The symptoms, which, to use a simile from chemistry, are the precipitates of earlier love experiences (in the widest sense), can only be dissolved in the higher temperature of the experience of transfer and transformed into other psychic products. The physician plays in this reaction, to use an excellent expression of S. Ferenczi,¹⁹ the rôle of a *catalytic ferment*, which temporarily attracts to itself the affect which has become free in the course of the process.

The study of transfer can also give you the key to the understanding of hypnotic suggestion, which we at first used with our patients as a technical means of investigation of the unconscious. Hypnosis showed itself at that

¹⁹ Ferenczi, S., *Introjektion und Uebertragung*, *Jahrbuch f. Psycho-anal. u. Psychopath. Forschungen*. Bd. I, H. 2, 1909.

time to be a therapeutic help, but a hindrance to the scientific knowledge of the real nature of the case, since it cleared away the psychic resistances from a certain field, only to pile them up in an unscalable wall at the boundaries of this field. You must not think that the phenomenon of transfer, about which I can unfortunately say only too little here, is created by the influence of the psychoanalytic treatment. The transfer arises spontaneously in all human relations and in the relations of the patient to the physician; it is everywhere the especial bearer of therapeutic influences, and it works the stronger the less one knows of its presence. Accordingly psychoanalysis does not create it, it merely discloses it to consciousness, and avails itself of it, in order to direct the psychic processes to the wished-for goal. But I cannot leave the theme of transfer without stressing the fact that this phenomenon is of decisive importance to convince not only the patient, but also the physician. I know that all my adherents were first convinced of the correctness of my views through their experience with transfer, and I can very well conceive that one may not win such a surety of judgment so long as he makes no psychoanalysis, and so has not himself observed the effects of transfer.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am of the opinion that there are, on the intellectual side, two hindrances to acknowledging the value of the psychoanalytic viewpoint: first, the fact that we are not accustomed to reckon with a strict determination of mental life, which holds without exception, and, second, the lack of knowledge of the peculiarities through which unconscious mental processes differ from these conscious ones with which we are familiar. One of the most widespread resistances against the work of psychoanalysis with patients as with persons in health reduces to the latter of the two moments. One is afraid of doing harm by psychoanalysis, one is anxious about calling up into consciousness the repressed sexual impulses of the patient, as though there were danger that they could

overpower the higher ethical strivings and rob him of his cultural acquisitions. One can see that the patient has sore places in his soul life, but one is afraid to touch them, lest his suffering be increased. We may use this analogy. It is, of course, better not to touch diseased places when one can only cause pain. But we know that the surgeon does not refrain from the investigation and reinvestigation of the seat of illness, if his invasion has as its aim the restoration of lasting health. Nobody thinks of blaming him for the unavoidable difficulties of the investigation or the phenomena of reaction from the operation, if these only accomplish their purpose, and gain for the patient a final cure by temporarily making his condition worse. The case is similar in psychoanalysis; it can lay claim to the same things as surgery; the increase of pain which takes place in the patient during the treatment is very much less than that which the surgeon imposes upon him, and especially negligible in comparison with the pains of serious illness. But the consequence which is feared, that of a disturbance of the cultural character by the impulse which has been freed from repression, is wholly impossible. In relation to this anxiety we must consider what our experiences have taught us with certainty, that the somatic and mental power of a wish, if once its repression has not succeeded, is incomparably stronger when it is unconscious than when it is conscious, so that by being made conscious it can only be weakened. The unconscious wish cannot be influenced, is free from all strivings in the contrary direction, while the conscious is inhibited by those wishes which are also conscious and which strive against it. The work of psychoanalysis accordingly presents a better substitute, in the service of the highest and most valuable cultural strivings, for the repression which has failed.

Now what is the fate of the wishes which have become free by psychoanalysis, by what means shall they be made harmless for the life of the individual? There are several ways. The general consequence is, that the wish is con-

sumed during the work by the correct mental activity of those better tendencies which are opposed to it. The repression is supplanted by a condemnation carried through with the best means at one's disposal. This is possible, since for the most part we have to abolish only the effects of earlier developmental stages of the ego. The individual for his part only repressed the useless impulse, because at that time he was himself still incompletely organized and weak; in his present maturity and strength he can, perhaps, conquer without injury to himself that which is inimical to him. A second issue of the work of psychoanalysis may be that the revealed unconscious impulses can now arrive at those useful applications which, in the case of undisturbed development, they would have found earlier. The extirpation of the infantile wishes is not at all the ideal aim of development. The neurotic has lost, by his repressions, many sources of mental energy whose contingents would have been very valuable for his character building and his life activities. We know a far more purposive process of development, the so-called *sublimation* (*Sublimierung*), by which the energy of infantile wish-excitations is not secluded, but remains capable of application, while for the particular excitations, instead of becoming useless, a higher, eventually no longer sexual, goal is set up. The components of the sexual instinct are especially distinguished by such a capacity for the sublimation and exchange of their sexual goal for one more remote and socially more valuable. To the contributions of the energy won in such a way for the functions of our mental life we probably owe the highest cultural consequences. A repression taking place at an early period excludes the sublimation of the repressed impulse; after the removal of the repression the way to sublimation is again free.

We must not neglect, also, to glance at the third of the possible issues. A certain part of the suppressed libidinous excitation has a right to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in life. The claims of our civilization make life too

hard for the greater part of humanity, and so further the aversion to reality and the origin of neuroses, without producing an excess of cultural gain by this excess of sexual repression. We ought not to go so far as to fully neglect the original animal part of our nature, we ought not to forget that the happiness of individuals cannot be dispensed with as one of the aims of our culture. The plasticity of the sexual-components, manifest in their capacity for sublimation, may cause a great temptation to accomplish greater culture-effects by a more and more far reaching sublimation. But just as little as with our machines we expect to change more than a certain fraction of the applied heat into useful mechanical work, just as little ought we to strive to separate the sexual impulse in its whole extent of energy from its peculiar goal. This cannot succeed, and if the narrowing of sexuality is pushed too far it will have all the evil effects of a robbery.

I do not know whether you will regard the exhortation with which I close as a presumptuous one. I only venture the indirect presentation of my conviction, if I relate an old tale, whose application you may make yourselves. German literature knows a town called Schilda, to whose inhabitants were attributed all sorts of clever pranks. The wiseacres, so the story goes, had a horse, with whose powers of work they were well satisfied, and against whom they had only one grudge, that he consumed so much expensive oats. They concluded that by good management they would break him of this bad habit, by cutting down his rations by several stalks each day, until he had learned to do without them altogether. Things went finely for a while, the horse was weaned to one stalk a day, and on the next day he would at last work without fodder. On the morning of this day the malicious horse was found dead; the citizens of Schilda could not understand why he had died. We should be inclined to believe that the horse had starved, and that without a certain ration of oats no work could be expected from an animal.

PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF SIGMUND FREUD AND HIS WORK ¹

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I

The doctrines of Freud and his colleagues have been made known to us here more through the gossip of prejudice and misconception ² than by the testimony of those who have really tested them, and this, in itself, is an interesting fact. For these doctrines involve at every point the belief that the hidden motives which help to rule our lives, and which frequently show themselves as prejudices, are made up of "attraction," "desire," "acceptance," on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of "repulsion," "repression," "denial," mixed in equal parts. A strong prejudice often means a strong, instinctive attempt to set aside as false an influence which we feel that, if differently presented, we might be forced to accept, at least in part, as true, and the strength of the prejudice usually measures the importance of the half-felt but perhaps wholly suppressed truth. To say the least, our prejudices express feelings that at the moment we cannot or will not put to the test of reason.

Let me now attempt the task of modifying this prejudice—shared formerly by myself.

In brief, the history of Freud's investigations and opinions is the following: In 1881, an older colleague, Dr. J. Breuer, of Vienna, had occasion to treat an intelligent young woman suffering from hysteria in a serious form for which he tried the usual means in vain. At length,

¹ From *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Dec., 1910-Jan., 1911. Reprinted by permission.

² On account of their insistence on the importance of the sexual life in the etiology of the psycho-neuroses.

after long and tireless searching, he found that the facts offered by the patient in explanation of her illness, although they were freely furnished and represented her entire history so far as she consciously could furnish it, constituted only a tithe of the story which, in the end, her memory succeeded in drawing from its depths. Under the influence of a special method of inquiry, many hidden facts, representing painful experiences long ago forgotten, came one by one to light and were as if lived over, attended by the emotions that originally formed a part of them. And just in proportion as this happened, in proportion as the dense barriers were overcome that separated this hidden portion of the patient's past from that of which she had remained consciously aware, one and another of her distressing symptoms dropped away and disappeared forever. The details of the long and significant history of this case cannot be given here. Let it suffice to say that although no further investigations based on it were undertaken for ten years, yet the facts observed had made a deep impression upon Dr. Freud and were meditated on by him during this decade, a part of which he passed as a student of Charcot's in Paris, and that on his return he begged Breuer to take the matter up again. After this, for a considerable length of time, they worked together; later, Freud alone. It became gradually more and more clear to them that the childhood of this patient had been in an unsuspected degree and sense the parent of her later years.³ For not only had it been found that many of the events which counted for so much in the production of her illness dated back to days of early

³ I make no attempt, in this hasty sketch, either to separate the principles developed through the study of this first case from those of subsequent development, or to state these principles in the historical order of their discovery. Neither does this communication claim to furnish an authorized or systematic record of the Worcester lectures. My purpose is solely to reproduce the more prominent of my own impressions, obtained through reading, private conversations and the lectures, and reinforced through personal observation in my own practice.

youth, but the later experiences which had come upon her, one after another, and which were the ostensible and apparently sufficient causes of her illness, were discovered to owe a large portion of their power for harm to the fact that they reproduced in a new shape old emotions of childish form and substance, of which, before her treatment, she would truthfully have professed herself to be entirely unaware. Only when these emotions were reached and the experiences corresponding to them lived over, in memory and in speech, was the recovery complete.

There is little in the bare outlines of this proposition that a psychologist need count as wholly novel. Every one has heard the claim that no experience is ever wholly lost, that our present acts are the outcome of all our antecedent acts; that our perceptions, even when apparently new, are in reality nine parts memory,⁴ and that disclosing and talking over old troubles clears the mind and relieves the feelings of distress. But this dictum of the psychologists has now received a practical confirmation of an unexpected sort. The number and character of the revelations eventually made; the demonstration that memories apparently so wholly lost could with sufficient effort be recovered; the discovery that symptoms of illness and old and forgotten emotional states were not only connected by a certain bond, but by a bond so subtle and yet so strong that this patient, through living her experiences over again in words, could succeed in freeing herself from the signs—physical as well as mental—of her present illness; the discovery, finally, that the nature of some of these experiences was what it proved to be; these were the surprising facts.⁵

⁴ Cf. especially Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire*.

⁵ At first, the aid of hypnotism, later of "hypnoid" states, was invoked to secure this enlargement of the memory. Later it was found that quiet and relaxation, with the encouragement of the physician and the opportunity of talking and reminiscing, rather in his presence than under his scrutiny, were sufficient. This is accordance with the observations of Bernheim that the amnesia of the hypnotic state, profound as it at first sight seems, may be invaded

The physical signs of the hysteria in this case consisted partly in a paralysis and contracture of the arm and a peculiar affection of the speech. Such signs are of very common occurrence, and the fact of their mental origin had been clearly pointed out by Janet. But the study of their specific relationship to this patient's mental experiences was utilized by Breuer and Freud as the basis of an elaborate theory of "conversion," or substitution, which has proved to be of wide bearing. It would be an instance of such conversion if a person wishing to exclude from his mind an unpleasant thought or memory should strive instinctively to aid himself by closure of the eyes and then should find that an actual and uncontrollable closure of the eyes had remained as a persistent memorial of the misjudged attempt at self-concealment. We can "convert" or we can neutralize the effect of our experiences, but we cannot kill them. Every experience retains the right and need to express its influence in our later history. We can accept it, work it out, assimilate it to the remainder of our conscious lives, or we can repress it. If we adopt (instinctively or consciously) the repressive policy, we may give birth to a sort of evil genius, who keeps himself concealed only on condition that we yield up to him some physical or mental evidence of the hold that, until exorcised, he will have on us. The physical symptoms of hysteria are thus analogous, to use Freud's simile, to the monuments which people set up to commemorate important events in history. It became clear to Breuer and Freud, further and in harmony with the principle just expressed, that this patient's painful memories of the past, which at first had seemed as dead to her as if the experiences which they stood for never had occurred, represented in reality living and acting forces.⁶ And not only this but that the very barriers which had to

and overcome by the power of the subject's memory, if sufficiently urged thereto.

⁶ Cf. Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire*; also Janet, *Etat Mental des Hystériques*, etc., and the works of other writers.

be overcome in reproducing them represented living and active forces too, all vibrating with significance for the present moment and for the details of the illness. In other words, the term "barrier" as used for the "forgetting" of the hysterical patient was shown to be a misnomer. Indeed, the forgetting of persons in normal health is largely repression, an active process of lending oneself to the task of learning how *not* to dwell upon a subject now painful but which perhaps had once a powerful interest. It has often been remarked that the conscious memory picks out the pleasant items of life and rejects the rest. We remember the charms and novelty of an ocean trip, of foreign travel, and conveniently "forget"—in reality turn away from—the seasickness, the dirty inns, the sleepless nights. It was the significance of this species of forgetting and its relation to sickness and to health that Freud was led to study, and to which he has devoted all the powers of a keen and well-trained mind for twenty years. In the course of these investigations Freud and Jung and their followers have dived more deeply than any one before into the mysteries of the unconscious life. These investigations were inspired primarily, not by theory, but by the recitals of patients who had been helped to search out their memories and their motives to a degree that never before had been made possible. New evidence has thus been brought to show that this hidden life, if technically "unconscious," is anything but inactive.⁷ On the contrary, it is the living supplement of our conscious and willed existences, the dwelling-place and working-place of emotions which we

⁷ Eminent psychologists sometimes deny the propriety of using the term "consciousness" for a mental state of which we are not at the moment given consciously aware. This criticism has been expressed and met in a discussion on the Subconscious, published in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* for June-July, 1907. It is there satisfactorily shown, as I think, by Dr. Prince, that "awareness" is not necessary for "consciousness," and that the suppressed mental states of hypnotized and hysterical patients, for example, are properly designated as conscious states.

could not utilize in the construction of the personality that we had shaped and rounded and that we longed to think of as standing completely for "ourselves." It is the study of this portion of our lives, repressed yet active, and not the attempt to push forward the sexual element in our experiences, that has constituted the main feature of Freud's work, looked at broadly and as a whole. The sexual element has indeed been pushed forward, but this has been due to two causes. In the first place, Freud's patients themselves, one after another, when urged to analyze the motives and influences that had prompted them to this or that act of repression or self-reproach, uniformly referred to one or another manifestation of this great passion as the ultimate source from which these motives sprang; and no wonder, for it is the basis of most of what we care for in this world. In the next place, the frequent references to the sexual life have been seized upon by Freud's critics as the basis for attack against the remarkable and truth-seeking observations of a remarkable man. I shall try, in the second installment of this paper, to explain in more detail just what influence it is that, in Freud's view, the sexual life does introduce into the composition of our characters. What I wish to do here is to make a plea for open-mindedness in this matter. There are many subjects intensely disagreeable for discussion, from the social standpoint, which nevertheless the trained man of science studies eagerly and without a trace of unpleasant feeling. This is true, for example, of the bodily excretions. The study of sexual problems in all their manifold bearings are being taken up in this same spirit by an increasing number of persons of fine feeling and scientific instinct and a desire to work for the remedy of great practical evils. Each one of these persons has had to overcome an intense sense of aversion to this task of dwelling on details, of odious social connotation, but he has overcome it, at least to the extent of setting his intelligence moderately free to act. Most physicians are still in the grasp of this aversion

and strive to justify themselves by denying the importance of the inquiry and the significance of the facts adduced. Meantime, the aversion means something more than it seems at first sight to mean. It indicates that the topic has or has had a sort of hold on us or a right to demand our interest and attention, and that we fain would persuade ourselves that this was not the case. This hold on our attention, which we instinctively feel this subject has the right to claim even when we repudiate this right, constitutes one instance of the "desire," which is made to play such a large part in Freud's doctrines. What once was an instinctive desire, the expression of a perfectly natural craving, the basis of the natural curiosity, of an infant or young child, becomes, next, something to be repressed, as incompatible with the social life which the child grown older plans to lead. Either one of several consequences is liable to flow from this repression. First, it may be adequate and successful. The craving, the curiosity, the desire may find some sufficient outlet, may be assimilated or neutralized, and disappear permanently from view. Next, instead of this, the process of repression may go too far, may become too manifest, may impress the character too strongly with its own features. Then the "desire" utterly disappears from memory, but the eventual outcome is an individual of so-called over-sensitiveness and refinement, overwatchful of himself. Or, again, the "desire" or "craving" element may be too strong, or the mechanism whereby it should have been assimilated or neutralized may have been inadequate. Then the patient—for such we may now call him—becomes conscious of a lack of harmony with himself. He is one person who wishes and strives, consciously, to lead a certain life, but is also another person with an unsatisfied craving. As the result of this tendency he becomes predisposed to undergo a still more complete and definite cleavage, and this may, through "conversion," on the occasion of some new mental strain or trauma, earn for him the title of "hysteric" (a portion of

the symptoms becoming *physical*) or may cause him to adopt some "phobia" (through a process of substitution) in accordance with a principle to be described later. Thus fear and repressed desire are shown to have an intimate kinship.

The cravings based on the sexual instincts of infancy and childhood take their place, in this scheme, along with those of adolescence and adult life, and along, too, with a great number of other cravings and ambitions, emotional interests and desires, of manifold character and force. It should be recognized that the doctrines and methods of Freud are full of interest as throwing light upon the mode in which the mind works, independently of the particular nature of the emotions that are involved. The life of every one, even the most commonplace person, even the most harmonious and best balanced, is complex enough to furnish the material for many a romance, for many a study of the conflicting tides of feeling. Every one acts from motives, many of which he does not clearly grasp; if it were not so no novels would be written, wars would have been few, and the great tragedians and mythmakers would never have existed. And yet, although we do not clearly grasp our motives, either as regards their nature or their origin; and although, if set to the task of describing ourselves and the history of our development we should leave out much that was important, yet the very fact that we understand novels and tragedies and character studies, and find them so entrancing, is an indication that we have felt, in some measure, the sentiments they are based on, and that we have passed through something corresponding in type with all the situations pictured. It may not be necessary that every one should become intimately acquainted with all these crooked byways and obscure corners of himself, or that each person should force himself to recognize his kinship with others whose qualities he deprecates or whose acts he regards as criminal. But there are times when such knowledge becomes necessary for the preser-

vation of the mental health, and the physician should fit himself to be the guide to its attainment.

I propose, in the rest of this communication, to consider a little further some of these psychological principles which Freud's observations have brought out in a new light, and to show their bearing on his therapeutic methods. The principles which I select as examples are embodied in the following propositions:

A. Desire, or craving, furnishes the motive for many thoughts and acts that seem actuated by sentiments of a different and even of an opposite character.

B. The principle of "conversion" in accordance with which the physical symptoms of hysteria are produced, is one manifestation of the wider principle of "substitution." Other manifestations of the same general tendency are: (1) the attributing to other persons, without adequate reason, qualities whose interest for us lies in the fact that we ourselves possess or have possessed and have, likewise, sought instinctively to repress them; (2) the harboring of prejudices for or against certain persons, on similar grounds; (3) the identification of ourselves with others, as in the assumption of ailments similar to theirs; (4) the transference to one person of interest originally centered on another; (5) the substitution of fear or of some morbid impulsion, for desires which cannot be adequately gratified.

C. The "forgetting" considered typical of hysteria and kindred forms of mental disharmony and disturbance is a feature of every one's mental growth.

D. Dreams are closely related, psychologically, to psychoses, and, like them, are classifiable, from certain points of view, as "compromises." Dreams likewise furnish valuable information of the unconscious life and are analyzable to a hitherto unsuspected degree, in the interests of therapeutics.

E. Finally, I wish to add a few more words on the principles involved in Freud's treatment.

A. Desire and craving are generally admitted to be powerful if only partial motives to conduct. One need not accept the doctrine of "hedonism" as alone binding in order to admit that we all have instincts and passions which press for gratification, and that ungratified or imperfectly gratified desires remain as unwelcome comrades to our thoughts. The point which mainly calls for comment is that even concealed and partial desires and cravings play an immensely important part in health and in disease. A few illustrations may take the place of argument. The partial wishes or cravings of young children are familiar to every one. Accustomed to deal with fairy tales, living in a world of fancy, and subjected to but slight censorship in his fancies, the child gives his desires free rein. It is often felt as a fine thing by a child to be in the eye of friends and comrades, even when the cause for distinction is really a cause for grief. A partial hostility towards a parent is entirely compatible with warm affection, but it is not recognized that when the child in question is of hysterical tendency, that is, when he is a person whose unconscious life plays too large a part in controlling his acts and thoughts, making him fitful, moody, and capricious, the affection may stand for an infantile passion, and the hostility which develops out of it may reach a high grade. The fable of the sour grapes hints at such a mixture of half-hidden and half-felt sentiments. The mental operations of older children and adults are not exempt from the working of these principles. The craving for recognition and sympathy flames in the eye and thrills in the voice of many a person who would deny that he was subject to these motives; disappointed hopes, the necessity for sacrifice and renunciation tinge a sincere grief with unwelcome and perhaps scarcely recognized longings. In these and in kindred ways mental conflicts arise, although the actual battle may be concealed from view.

The curiosity and emulation of children, as also of adolescents and adults, are other species of desire. They

may be of manifold sorts, and in certain of their forms they represent cravings that are instinctively concealed. Out of such materials as these, in the manner thus indicated, and in the same ratio as we build the conscious personality, we form and feed and organize the unconscious life.

B. It will be recognized by every close observer that in entertaining a series of conflicting emotions, such as that typified by the sour-grapes illustration, for example, the instinctive effort is to escape from one distressing situation by grasping at another, which if in some respects worse is in some respects also better. This process is characteristic of the nervous invalid's mental life and, unsatisfactory as it is, it is often justified by the fact that it leads to the substitution of a definite evil for an indefinite. The operation of the principle under the form of "conversion" has been alluded to, but there are many other kinds of substitution, of analogous sort, and one of these is the substitution of a specific fear for a sense of humiliation or self-reproach. It is sometimes possible for a patient to witness the actual occurrence of this process of substitution. Certain forms of stage fright are of this order. In analogous fashion the personal relationship between two individuals, as a pupil and a teacher, may be felt to have in it an element of excess or wrong, and this feeling may tinge the next friendship, not in itself objectionable, with a sense of fear which may spread by unconscious paths to a general sense of apprehension, but finally concentrate itself in some one direction. Similarly, the strong ambition to gain a social success and the dread of failure are said by Freud to account for some of the fears of appearing in public places (as in agoraphobia), or where people must be met, or even of traveling in trains. In other words, this fear is the accepted substitute for an exaggerated form of self-consciousness attended by a sense of shame or guilt. Thus "self-conscious

ness" means the consciousness of oneself as seen by others in an unfavorable light.

Of course I indicate here only the bare outlines of a transformation which might be accepted only when delineated in detail. Usually, the process of transformation is hidden, even from the patient. He finds himself with a fear—the fear of open windows, or of the railroad train, or with one or another of the morbid impulses enumerated by Janet or by Loewenfeld—but it may be only with difficulty and after overcoming reluctance that he can be led to see the full force of the desires which he repressed or the fact that it was to escape from them that he grasped the fear, to justify, as it were, the perturbation of his mind, as a drowning man catches at a straw. Janet has indicated, in an interesting paper, published in this journal, other modes of unsatisfactory substitution through which psychopathic patients instinctively seek relief.⁸

C. It has been strongly urged by Freud that in the amnesia of hysteria, which every close student of the subject, since Janet, would admit to be a sort of active process, a contrivance for the obliteration of the memories of the unhappy and the disagreeable, we have an exaggerated form, a type of much of the forgetting of ordinary life. This principle is indeed admitted and widely acted on, but, as in the other cases, it is in the detail, in the fullness of illustrations and in pointing out that the principle applied when we feel unwillingly to apply it, that Freud's main service lies.

Every one agrees that "hell is paved with good intentions," which means that we soothe our consciences with words, satisfy ourselves by calling ourselves bad

⁸ Fits of anger, and the commoner forms of depression, as I have elsewhere pointed out, are species of substitution whereby a person seeks to escape from the necessity of showing courage and clear thought. Unpleasant as those states are they really represent a sort of self-indulgence.

names, and then proceed to actively forget our duties and to close our eyes to the real images of ourselves. But it takes a truly scientific conscience, or the conscience of a person who is sick and sees a real chance of getting well, to recognize the complexity, the elaborate exactness of the machinery by which, through this forgetting, we construct for the torment of our lives.

D. The laying down of the theory and mode of analysis of dreams is one of the most remarkable, and in principle the most original of Freud's contributions.

Accustomed as we are to see in dreams only phantasmagorias of the fancy, sparks leaping to and fro on burnt-out paper, to use William James' simile, it is hard for us to believe the explanations and constructions of this analyst, who shows, as one or two others have done in part, that they occupy a definite and useful place in the economy of life.

In our dreams, as in our illnesses, our unconscious and repressed thoughts and emotions find expression. But, as in our illnesses, again, the revelations are not straightforward, the instinct for compromise and concealment makes itself everywhere apparent. In the night dream as in the day dream, wishes are fulfilled, but they are often partial wishes, and such as in our waking moments we do not admit even to ourselves. Symbolisms and innuendoes take the place of direct statement, and the possession of a treasury of dramatic power is revealed by the sleeper, of which his waking moments may indicate no trace, so deadening, even though useful, is the repression of education and convention. The volume devoted to the interpretation of dreams indicates the method of analysis which underlies all Freud's work, and it must be studied carefully by any one who would be either a critic or an investigator working on his lines. Let it be, if one will, that there is exaggeration, too much ingeniousness of interpolation and explanation. That criticism is nothing. No student need accept, in his own

interpretations, more than he believes true. The fact remains that—in my view at least—Freud has offered us a master-key to many of the mysteries of life, and we need not reject this because we find ourselves inclined contemptuously to deny the reports brought back by this or that explorer of the dark realms of the unconscious.

E. Freud's therapeutic method is his method of analysis into the structure and working of the whole mind, the whole man, carried out with a searching and merciless vigor that is in the end fully justified by the fact that it brings at last a sense of freedom and of manhood.

A critical or rather a hostile feeling invariably raises itself in the mind of each new listener to these and kindred statements,⁹ and it is one that every earnest student of the subject, including the pioneers themselves, has had to deal with in himself before he could proceed. This critical sentiment favors the view that such inquiries as those here sketched out are unwholesome, unhealthy, morbid. The pretended cure is worse, it is said, than the disease. Introspection is of the devil. Why show us that we once were little animals, having no touch with the things that now make life so sacred and showing propensities our riper interests have no use for? Let us rather press constantly forward into the free air and more abundant light, and let those who have had a dark history forget it. Look forward and not back.

This is a fine cry, but unfortunately it has served the cause of ignorance, narrowness, and prejudice as well as that of progress. It was the cry of the church against Darwin, when he sought to "introspect" the history of life, and its echoes have drowned the voices of those who have sought to talk about the problems of sex, no matter with what earnestness. The cause of formal modesty and reticence has indeed had many noble martyrs, both before the days of Paul and Virginia and since. But

⁹ Cf. *Boston Med. and Surg. Jour.*

there is such a thing as paying too dear for this niceness, especially when, through the opposite course, we can have all that we should gain by this, and more besides. Strikingly enough, this outcry against one or another sort of investigation is never raised except with regard to our neighbors' efforts to find the truth; the purity of our own motives, the value of our own inquiries, provided they are genuine, rarely come in question. We may kill animals for food and put them to pain for our convenience, but may not inflict any pain on them as physiologists, even for the sake of preventing infinitely more. The detective novel is welcome at every fireside, but the scientific student of human acts and motives is considered a disseminator of morbid tendencies. We are ready enough to say "why worry" when the answer is only to show that it is unphilosophical to anticipate trouble, but we may not ask "why *do we* worry" if there is danger of finding out that we worry because we are unwilling to see ourselves as we are, or to recognize that we are what we are partly because we were what we were.

All this is wrong. A fool's paradise is a poor paradise. If our spiritual life is good for anything it can afford to see the truth. No investigation is wrong if it is earnest. Knowledge knows nothing as essentially and invariably dirty. It is a piece of narrow intolerance, cruel in its outcome, to raise the cry of "introspection," in order to prevent an unfortunate invalid, whose every moment is already spent in introspection of the worst sort, forced on him by the bigotry, however well meant, of social conventions, from searching, even to the death, the causes of his misery and learning to substitute the freedom, liberality, tolerance, and purity that comes from knowledge for the tyranny of ignorance and prejudice.

This outcry against intolerance may seem overdone and out of place, but it is not so, and one evidence of the fact is that these remarkable researches of Freud and Jung.

and their small band of followers, have met with such bitter opposition, even among physicians.

It is a delightful task to lead our invalids to the mountain top and urge them to look out over the splendid fields around them, waiting for them to till. But it is cruel to attempt this when they must drag thither a heavy burden under which they are forced to stagger, pale and panting, to find themselves, at the summit, unable to proceed further. The real mountain top is always within the mind, and outward activity, which is so much prized, is of little value unless it is the symbol of an inward harmony and peace. At every feast Truth should have the first place.

To sum up the essential facts, let me say that Freud's main thesis, as I apprehend it, may be stated somewhat as follows: (1) Whereas, hitherto, the most important cause of the functional psycho-neuroses has usually been considered to be a constitutional and in general an inherited taint, and the influence of environment and education has been rated as of secondary significance, the facts point to a different conclusion. Our inheritance varies indeed within wide limits, but that which makes us sick or well (so far as the symptoms of these psycho-neuroses are concerned) is the influences to which we are subjected after birth. This is not to depreciate the importance of what we bring with us to the world, but to exalt the significance of education taken in a wide sense. (2) But if the influence of education, whether for good or ill, is to be exalted, it must be shown that these influences are to be given a broader meaning than that usually accorded to them; and (3) in so far as it is held that adult invalids are susceptible of cure through re-education, to a greater extent than others have believed, it must be proved that there are educational influences hitherto unrecognized or insufficiently recognized, which can be called to aid in this work.

In support of both these propositions Freud brings forward a remarkable array of evidence, based on the actual recitals of his patients. Some of these have been published by him or by his colleagues, while many others, for obvious reasons, have been withheld. These recitals are held to justify a number of subpropositions, such as those which follow, and as the result of my reading of the published communications, from personal conversations with Freud, and with his colleagues, and from my personal observations, I believe these claims to be well founded.

(a) From birth onward our lives are builded on a double principle. We have ostensible personalities and concealed personalities, and though the two may harmonize fairly well they are never fully in accord. Society and our own choice and effort make us what *ostensibly* we are,—artists, merchants, honorable citizens, persons following an aim. But in order to fit ourselves to molds of such a sort we must, of course, at every moment discard temptations and repress emotions out of harmony with this or that set purpose.

(b) These emotions and temptations, in spite of being discarded and repressed, not only were but continue to be important portions of ourselves. They may never come to light again individually and in their own form, but at the least they contribute something, if only a note of seriousness, to our perceptions and our thoughts. When they do not help us to remember they may be forcing us to forget, and in reality these two results are often one. Even our discarded, repressed, forgotten childhood lives actively in our adult years, helping to form that variously named portion of our mental lives, of which we are not consciously aware, and *cannot make ourselves entirely aware except with special aid*, never, perhaps, completely.

(c) These repressed emotions and thoughts organiz-

themselves¹⁰ more or less definitely into groups, and there is a constant interplay between them and the thoughts and emotions of our conscious lives. Thus, the repression of a desire gives rise to a vague sense of disquiet; and this feeling attaching itself to a definite object may be felt as a morbid impulse or a defined fear. The desire and repression may never, at best, have been more than half-conscious processes, and finally become wholly forgotten, in the sense above described.

The vague distress (*flottierende Angst*) is consciously felt as something unendurable, and is at once attached to a special object, as in obedience to an impulse which counts as "protective," although the relief afforded may be anything but complete. The fears of water, of the dark, of certain animals, of meeting people, of crowds, of church and theater, and so on through all their multitudinous forms, are made up in part, according to this view, of *fears of ourselves*, i.e., fears engendered in the course of the effort to set aside a situation felt to be unbearable. Sometimes the whole process can be witnessed, as when a morbid fear of meeting people, or even a so-called misanthropy, arises out of the half-awareness that one has been living under conditions that were socially compromising. Often, however, the links of this chain pass wholly out of sight, and a person finds himself fearing or hating a person or set of persons without knowing why, when in fact it is because these persons stand as representing certain aspects of our past selves.

It is a little harder to explain the common fears of open windows, bridges, and the like, than fears of less external sorts, but there can be little doubt that these also are at least partly due to a similar substitution. We would shine, we would be virtuous and recognized as such, conse-

¹⁰ The organization of hell, as figured by Milton, may fairly be taken as representing a part, though only a part, of this unconscious realm of suppressed thoughts.

quently we fear to fall. "Natural" fear and symbolism do the rest.

II

It is an interesting fact that the unfavorable criticisms which these researches have called forth, whether directed against their validity or against their value, have been of strikingly contradictory sorts. Most of these criticisms have centered really, whether the fact was admitted or concealed, on the prominence given by Freud to the sexual element in the causation of the Psycho-neuroses. This was considered as a disagreeable topic on which we had closed our eyes so long that we thought we might permit ourselves to regard it as legitimately outlawed. Its vast literature—well known to be of great importance—was repulsive, and should not be seen upon our shelves. It counted for but little that this immense subject was daily and hourly thrusting itself upon our notice, whether as the cause of terrible sufferings, of terrible crimes, of terrible misunderstandings and misjudgments, and that it has played a huge part in the history of religion and of civic progress; those who have ventured to study it scientifically have been, nevertheless, regarded widely as disturbers of the peace. There can be no doubt that prejudices of these sorts have warped the reasoning of students, otherwise of fair judgment, and have led to contradictory kinds of depreciation of Freud's work. Some able men claim to have thoroughly tested his opinions by methods which they regard as entirely equivalent to his, and declare his conclusions to be unverifiable and absurd. They believe that Freud mischievously introduces sexual notions into his patients' minds, and a mistaken conception of their importance into medical doctrine. Other men believe, on the contrary, that just because sexual influences, even morbid influences, are so widely prevalent, so much more so than the more serious forms of the psychoneuroses, they can

not play the important part in pathology which Freud assigns to them.

Without undertaking to discuss these conflicting differences of opinions it is clear that they suggest the prevalence, not only of serious prejudices, but also of real misunderstandings. Meantime, one good reason for hesitating to take up afresh the study of the sexual aspects of psychopathology has been for many persons the instinctive feeling that nothing practically satisfactory could come of it, either because of their belief that the wall of social repugnance is too strong, or because of doubt whether any new arguments could be more convincing than the old. Neither of these reasons seems to me applicable in the present case. There is an audience, small, perhaps, but constantly increasing, to which the researches of a band of workers, of whom Freud is one, strikingly appeal. Freud's particular contribution is of unquestionable importance, and yet there are so many investigators working on lines parallel with his that the conclusions of each one are sure to be both supplemented and controlled.

One other point needs special emphasis which, if understood, should place this whole matter, for intelligent students, on a better footing. The principal objection to the discussion of sex questions, or the prejudice against it, rests on the assumption that "sexual" means "sensual," and that to speak of sexual influences as of fundamental importance for psychopathology is equivalent to imputing immorality to the fine, intelligent men and women whose experiences might be at stake. But this hasty prejudice needs correction. In the first place, Freud's whole doctrine is permeated with the belief that much of the later neuropathic history of the adult patient was practically determined in his infancy, i.e., at a period which indeed needs watching, but when "sensuality" is not in question. In the second place, it is an essential feature of his thesis that "repression" is one of the main agencies in the pro-

duction of nervous symptoms, and also that much of what goes on lies for the most part outside the patient's conscious knowledge. The possession of the finest, the noblest qualities of thought and sentiment is not thus incompatible with nervous invalidisms of every sort, and certain types of invalidism are the outgrowths of both early and late repression of sexual instincts under personal effort or parental discipline, "*Die Tugend ist der Vollandeter Kampf.*" Every one has sexual instincts, if the word be correctly understood. Their possession is one of the universal properties and glories of all living things, and to assume that this is not so would be a piece of false and narrow pride. Here, again, it is the "sensuality" connotations that confuse the issue.

As a corollary to this proposition it should be recognized that with regard to this, as with regard to many other matters, no line is to be sharply drawn between disease and health. Stronger efforts to attain our own ideal of virtue always are in place, but so, too, is a deep recognition of the old sentiment, "*nil humanum a me alienum puto*" and a consequent willingness to arrest judgment, except when some practical decision is at stake. In place of moral judgments the physician may well substitute a wider knowledge. Morbid sexual tendencies are, indeed, extremely common, but the physician may and should study them with these sentiments in mind.

So true is this, that the argument ought to be recognized as properly applying to the medical estimate even of persons and acts classifiable as "abnormal," "criminal," or "perverted." For it is true, however those who have not looked into the matter may think otherwise, that, in the eye of science, perverted instincts—such, for example, as an excessive passion for a person of the same sex, carried from the realm of thought into that of act,—finds its analogue in many overdone or even quasi-normal relationships of daily life. It is a question of degree that is at stake, and although for purposes of punish-

ment, prevention, public self-protection and social standards, we must draw sharp lines, yet knowledge should make us prudent in passing scientific judgments. Furthermore, it is one of the propositions of the writer whom we are here reviewing, that from certain points of view, as, for example, in the production of symptoms and of dreams, thoughts count as acts, and if this dictum is accepted society would have to recast its estimates of the criminal and the abnormal. Let it not be imagined that it is in the annals of criminology alone that we should look for these analogies. The literature of the great myths and great tragedies call to mind the existence of tendencies in human nature which prove that conventional morals, important as they are, as indicating standards towards which every one should, for certain reasons, strive, are often, in a wider view, extremely narrow.

The course followed by Freud in classifying as "sexual" many common emotions, as of affection, and their opposites,¹¹ as well as a great variety of apparently indifferent sentiments, longings, and "physiological" habits, having no obvious connection with the reproductive functions is, from the medical and scientific standpoints, useful and indeed essential. He and his colleague have sought conscientiously for some wider term which might include the idea "sexual" yet without making that word so prominent, but they have come to the conclusion that the attempt was useless and, perhaps, not worth making. Dr. Jung discusses this point in a footnote to his valuable paper on the influence of the father on the evolution of the child (*Die Bedeutung des Vaters für das Schicksal des Einzelnen. Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychologische Forschungen. I Hälfte*, p. 153), saying, in reference to the word "Libido," which they widely use, that this term corresponds to the "Longing and Striving" (*Wollen und Streben*) of the older psychiatrists, but, as employed by Freud is a *denominatio a potiori*.

¹¹ Cf. the sexual significance of violence inflicted or received.

The English word "craving" seems to me perhaps the most significant for general uses; but the main thing is that we should strive to comprehend the truth and not miss the important analogies, inferences, and symbolism which are here at stake. The burden of proof lies with those who are willing to let their ignorance of the facts obscure their judgment.

Freud's position as to this question of sexuality, or of unsatisfied craving for which equally unsatisfactory outlets are instinctively being sought, and their significance for social evolution, is expressed in many places, but nowhere in a more significant and comprehensive form¹² than in an article entitled *Die "Kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität*, published in his *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre: Zweite Folge*, 1909.

Without trying literally to summarize this article, I shall strive to give in my own words some of the principles there laid down, together with certain others, brought forward in his earlier papers. The task which the human race finds itself called upon to meet is one of twofold character. We must seek to build up a civilization corresponding to our higher needs, yet are forced to recall that we are under sacred obligation to see that our species is perpetuated, and that, too, under the best conditions. These two sets of obligations often come, broadly speaking and narrowly speaking, into striking conflict. The pressure which all of us are under to make individual interests subservient to community interests finds its strongest, its most fundamental expression at the point where the problem is in question, how to raise to what may be called a higher level, the intense and varied emotions and tendencies that cluster round the great instinct and function of reproduction. This process of transforming our instincts into what may be called by courtesy nobler forms is designated by Freud as one

¹² In this paper the evolution, normal and morbid, of the individual is traced out in relation to the evolution of society.

of "sublimation," and he is surely right in saying that in it, that is, in the repression of our instincts in the interest of other sorts of gain, the march of progress toward a higher culture virtually consists. But the special form of instinct repression which is here in question and which is the most fundamental one of all, is not accomplished without a corresponding sacrifice, a sacrifice which falls partly on the individual and partly on the community as well.

It is true that this sacrifice is often unattended by a marked sense of personal loss, but this is because of the immense power of the influences which social imitation and convention, religion, and the obligations under which we instinctively place ourselves in the interest of common happiness and stability, exert upon our emotions, our habits, and our thoughts. Every watchful observer, nevertheless, can trace, from infancy onwards, the working and the conflict of these two great influences, natural instinct and the repression of this instinct for the sake of society as a whole. This conflict complicates and underlies all the great movements by which the emotions, the hopes, the fears of men are stirred, and those investigators who claim not to trace its influence in psychopathology are either blind or do not know of what they speak. The greatest problem for the psychopathology of the future is to learn how to detect the subtle working of this conflict and the principles which it implies.

When the symptoms and history described by an adult nervous invalid are scrutinized it may be that we obtain at first no obvious trace of the sexual emotions and tendencies which played so important a part in the conflict from which his symptoms sprang. Least of all is he himself able to recognize these tendencies. He appears to himself a puzzle and a problem and his symptoms seem as irrational as if he was possessed by some parasitic demon. Like the balking horse, who through repeated vain attempts to draw his load has learned to expect fail-

ure, he often stands as if paralyzed before the problems of his life, or he may have learned to exchange his uncertainty for fear; or, as if in cramplike attempts to gain relief, he may have constrained himself to convert his fears into some impulsive act of useless outcome. Or, again, if he would make a strong fight against his troubles, he is likely to feel himself, like Braddock's army in the Virginia Wilderness, helpless against an unseen foe. It is only after a long and patient analysis of motives, instincts, and desires, that the real enemy from whose attacks he suffers is found to consist in the above described discarded elements that went to make up the secondary and hidden stream of life, described in the earlier portion of this paper. It is needless to refer here to these elements in so far as they form a portion of his adult experiences alone, because these are reasonably well known to all. I would only repeat that, as I have said elsewhere, if the process of gaining the knowledge of them is to be compared in any sense, as it has been compared, to the confessional of the Catholic Church, it should be understood that the real analysis begins where the confessional leaves off.¹³ The remarkable fact, however, is that the nervous invalid is always discovered at last to be still partially under the sway of the influences of childhood. Few persons remember much of their infantile existence, but the researches of able men have made it clear that the sexual life of infancy, and the conflicts involved in childish forms of "sublimation," are of remarkable complexity and force. The child has many

¹³ This comparison and contrast are introduced for the sake of calling attention again to the fact that the thoughts, memories, and emotions which the physician seeks to set free are not simply with regard to matters which are "on the mind" of the patient. They form, indeed, a supplementary complex of vast amount, and one which is unified by one thread, running from infancy to later years, and reappearing again and again in moments of abstraction and in dream-life; but neither thread nor complex are to be discovered except by long and patient searching.

desires, complex sensations, and interests besides those which might be classed as intellectual or emotional in a higher sense. One series of his deeper feelings are related, of course, to hunger, but it has become certain that others form a large connected group, of which the most important members are those which later go to subserve the functions of reproduction. In the period of infancy he does not by any means distinguish clearly between the different members of this latter group,—which comprise, amongst others, the various sensations referable to all the orifices of the body, the nose and mouth as well as the vagina, the urethra, and the anus,—but only knows that through them all he can obtain analogous sorts of gratification. Thus equipped, the child is launched upon the task of evolution and repression. He is expected to follow a stated pathway, to retain and nourish the great function of transmitting his inheritance, but to do so under conventional and often highly artificial limitations. What wonder if, in the attempt to accomplish this, he so often goes at least partly wrong even when seeming to go most right. Why is it that sensitive, refined children are so prone to grow timid, shy, self-conscious, over-conscientious, morbidly dependent on one parent or another? These questions and others which they suggest have been variously answered and there are doubtless various influences at work; but it is certain that every answer must be false which denies the action of the subconscious and unconscious mental repressions and conflicts of the sexual period of infancy and childhood; and that every answer must be inadequate that is not based on an intimate knowledge of the real contents of the child life from which we emerge, and which, in the sense in which forgetting has been above described, we so soon forget. It is, of course, true that we know as yet little of the exact part played by hereditary influences in the production of the neuro-pathic invalid. What we do, however, know, is that we can inherit what may be called a predisposition only.

The tuberculous adult was not tuberculous as a newborn infant, and there are many who through care and prudence escape the destiny to which many another less careful falls a victim. The same thing is true of nervous invalidism, and of some, at least, of the severer forms of mental illness. These new researches open a distinctly new door for hope. I find myself believing more strongly in the reasonableness of this hope; in this opportunity—furnished by a better self-knowledge—to work out our possibilities and to escape from our temptations. I cannot pretend to have verified as yet all the many inferences and conclusions of Freud and his companions, reaching as they do infinitely further than I have here been able even to suggest. But I have learned to believe fully in the theory and in the value of their methods of analysis and of treatment, and I am the more ready to accept their views for having made the personal acquaintance of the three men mentioned at the beginning of this paper, and for having found them so kindly, unassuming, tolerant, earnest, and sincere. I believe there is still a good deal to be said on the psychological side of the discussion, and believe also that the intimate knowledge of ourselves, which is so essential, needs to be supplemented by more or less distinct study of motives of a social and ideal sort. But these considerations do not detract from the importance of the ideas here referred to. However strongly we may believe in the importance of character and its relationship to social, philosophical, and religious training, it is not to be forgotten that one deep root of character lies in the influences brought to bear during the remote period and by the remote conflicts of infancy and childhood.

RATIONALIZATION IN EVERY-DAY LIFE¹

BY ERNEST JONES, M.D.

One of the most brilliant results of Professor Freud's researches, and one of the cardinal points of his psychological theory, has been the demonstration that a number of mental processes owe their origin to causes unknown to and unsuspected by the individual. This applies equally to the mentally normal and abnormal, between whom, here as elsewhere, it is so arbitrary to draw a distinction. In my opinion this apparently simple idea is one of most far-reaching significance both to psychology and to the sciences, such as sociology, that must be founded on psychology. This conclusion is based on the view that inquiry, pursued with adequate skepticism, shows the number of such mental processes to be exceedingly great; in fact I would maintain that the large majority of mental processes in a normal person arise from sources unsuspected by him. We are as yet only on the threshold of important discoveries that will surely be made as soon as this principle finds a rigorous application, and the subject opened up is so vast that in these remarks I can do no more than sketch out a few of the directions along which it would seem that fruitful conclusions are readily to be attained.

Although the importance of feeling in the molding of our judgments, beliefs, and conduct has for centuries been recognized by poets and writers, academic psychology has usually allotted to it a very subordinate position in relation to what may be called the intellectual processes.

¹ From *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Aug.-Sept., 1908. Reprinted by permission.

Of late years, however, more and more recognition has been given to the importance of feeling, until now one may fairly question whether there exist any mental processes in the formation and direction of which feeling does not play a part of the first rank, and the science of feeling-psychology, to which Professor Freud has devoted himself, shows every sign of becoming the only scientific psychology of the future. He has shown with convincing precision that a number of previously incomprehensible mental processes, such as dream formation and certain apparently meaningless and accidental happenings of daily life, are throughout to be explained by regarding them as problems of feeling. He has further shown that the causes of these mental processes are usually not only unsuspected by the individual concerned, but are repudiated and denied by him when the very existence of them is suggested. In other words there exist elaborate psychological mechanisms, the effect of which is to conceal from the individual certain feeling processes which are often of the highest significance to his whole mind. The complexity and subtlety of these mechanisms vary with what may be called the extent of the necessity for concealment, so that the greater the resistance the individual shows to the acceptance of the given feeling the more elaborate is the mechanism whereby it is concealed from his consciousness. Consideration of this fact from a skeptical point of view should make one entertain the possibility that even among practical psychologists a number of mental processes may take their origin from sources widely different from those commonly given as explanatory of them.

The concealment mechanisms may be studied in two ways. The known feeling processes may be traced from their origin to the changed form in which they appear in consciousness and their effect on associated mental processes thus observed; or a given mental process may be analyzed and its causes traced back to their elementary

sources. Study along these lines shows that although the mechanisms in question are both numerous and complex they may from one point of view be grouped into two great classes, according to whether the individual will offer one explanation as to the origin of the terminal mental process or not. In both classes inquiry into the source of the mental process is stopped and the individual regards any such inquiry as superfluous, in the one case because he already has an explanation, in the other case because he thinks one does not exist. As will presently be seen there is no sharp line between the two classes, and in both of them instances may be found of all kinds of mental processes, actions, judgments, memories, beliefs, etc.

The prominent characteristic of the *second class* is the fact that the individual considers the given mental process to be self-explanatory and regards any further inquiry into its origin as being absurd, irrelevant, meaningless, unnecessary, and above all fruitless. This broadly speaking is the mechanism that prevents the individual from becoming conscious of the source of the mental process. His precise attitude towards the inquiry varies somewhat according to the kind of mental process concerned, and this enables us further to subdivide the class into two.

When a person is asked what was the cause of a given mental process belonging to this class, he may in the first place categorically assert that it was causeless. Such is the usual attitude adopted towards any of the large group of unconscious and accidental occurrences described by Professor Freud in his *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* under the different sections of *Versprechen*, *Verschreiben*, *Vergreifen*, *Zufallshandlungen*, etc. If pressed the individual may assert vaguely that they are due to "chance" or "inattention," but it is plain that what he means is that they have no effective cause, and that there is no reason whatever why that particular mistake should

have been made rather than any other. Yet, as is well known, psychoanalysis always reveals a precise cause for the occurrence, showing that only it and no other could have arisen, as indeed might have been anticipated from the general principles of scientific determinism, and this cause is often associated with some of the most intimate of the individual's feeling processes.

The person may in the second place not so much solemnly deny that the occurrence had a cause as regard the question as being foolish or meaningless. The key to the interpretation of this attitude lies in recollecting the popular illusion that a volitional process is a self-caused one, *i.e.*, has no cause, for it is doubtful whether any one is entirely free from the taint of voluntarism in feeling, although the heretical nature of the fallacy itself is from an intellectual standpoint plain enough. The mental processes now under discussion are thus always volitional ones, though the volitional element may not always be evident at the time, but may be imported as an after-thought. A beautiful example of this class, in which the volitional element was prominent at the moment of occurrence is the classic one given by Adler in which an individual deliberately selected a number under the full impression that there was no mental process at work other than his free unfettered choice; psychoanalysis, however, revealed a complex series of causes which had determined precisely the number chosen, causes reaching into the most intimate part of his mind. Careful consideration of this example shows further that here were two groups of mental processes concerned, first a conscious determination to select a number and secondly the actual selection itself. The former was a volitional process caused by the reading of Professor Freud's book, the second an automatic process caused by the subconscious feeling processes revealed in the psychoanalysis. Yet both groups appeared equally volitional to the individual, the feeling of volition having been extended from the conscious mental process to the

automatic one that was associated with it. The same mechanism may be seen in the other cases in which the volitional element is imported as an after thought. If for example a person decides to take a stroll, the actual direction of his stroll may well be determined by various minor influences that pass unnoticed. If later he is asked why he walked down such-and-such a street, the probability is that he will simply answer "Because I decided to." Here also the slightest trace of volitional feeling is utilized to cover other associated mental processes. In a large number of routine acts, performed automatically the individual adopts the same attitude when questioned as to their cause. Many acts, the cause of which is a reflex obedience to the custom prevailing in his circle, he will regard when questioned as being volitional, the true cause being thus concealed from him. If for instance he is asked why he wears a stiff collar or a tie, he will certainly regard the question as being extremely foolish, though if he is in an indulgent mood he may humor one to the extent of giving some imaginary explanation, such "to keep warm," "to look respectable," etc. It is quite plain that he does so only to please the inquirer, and to his mind the real and final explanation of the act lies in its obviousness. The fact that he regards the question as to the origin of the mental process as essentially absurd is evidently because he considers there is no need to search for a cause in an action that he likes to think is volitional, *i.e.*, self-caused.

We thus soon come to a full stop in the case of the ordinary man, but in the case of an observer who has trained himself to introspective analysis we can get this further clew. Such an observer may quite well recognize that there is something behind the volitional process, though he cannot directly detect what it is. If, for instance, he essays spontaneously to choose a number, he discovers that he is not free to choose any number; one number alone comes and not as one of many alternatives;

it comes with a certain impulsive force and he has no option but to "choose" this one number. In other words, he can recognize that it comes to him apparently from without, and it is clear to him that it must have been determined by some hidden influence to which he has no direct access. A striking illustration of this mechanism, together with an analysis of the source of the mental process, is described by Professor Freud in relation to his "choice" of the name Dora to designate the heroine of his *Bruchstück-Analyse*.

Summing up this class of mental processes, therefore, we may say that whenever an individual considers a given process as being too obvious to permit of any investigation into its origin and shows resistance to such an investigation, we are right in suspecting that the actual origin is concealed from him—almost certainly on account of its unacceptable nature. Reflection shows that this criterion applies to an enormous number of our fixed beliefs—religious, ethical, political and hygienic, as well as to a great part of our daily conduct: in other words, the principle above quoted refers to a large sphere of mental processes where we least suspect it. Yet if such beliefs and conduct are to be brought into scientific harmony, it is of the highest importance that the mechanisms controlling them should be made the subject of precise study in a way that is as yet only just begun.

We return now to the first great class of mental processes in regard to which the individual proffers indeed an explanation, but a false one. It is not sharply divided from the other class we have considered, for there we saw examples in which the individual casually gave an obviously inadequate explanation for an act which to his mind really needed none. Indeed, all possible grades may be observed in what may be called the feeling of a necessity to provide an explanation. On inquiring into the source of this necessity we see that it is only another aspect of the necessity everyone feels to have what may

be called a theory of life, and particularly a theory of himself. Every one feels that as a rational creature he must be able to give a connected, logical and continuous account of himself, his conduct and opinions, and all his mental processes are unconsciously manipulated and revised to that end. No one will admit that he ever deliberately performed an irrational act, and any act that might appear so is immediately justified by distorting the mental processes concerned and providing a false explanation that has a plausible ring of rationality. This justification bears a special relation to the prevailing opinion of the circle of people who are most significant to the individual concerned, and two different groups of false explanations can be distinguished according as they are formed essentially for the individual himself or for him in special reference to the opinions of his circle, or roughly speaking, according as they are formed mainly for private or mainly for public consumption. The former of these I would term "evasions," the latter "rationalizations"; there is however no sharp line dividing the two.

We may now consider a couple of examples of these. One of the best instances of evasion is the form of religious belief chosen by an individual. Religious belief itself rests of course on far different psychological principles from those now under discussion, but the form of doctrine accepted is another matter. There are a number of arguments used by each sect to support its special view of religion, and as a rule these are as convincing to the members of the given sect as they are unconvincing to the members of other sects. Let us take the case of a man brought up in a close circle, family and otherwise, of Baptists. At the age of puberty he may become a Baptist without thinking twice about the matter, but it often occurs to such a man that it is an irrational and therefore distasteful thing to hold a belief merely because all his friends do so. He therefore embarks with a great show of reason upon what seems to him to be a

critical and dispassionate examination of the evidence for and against Baptism. It need hardly be said that in most cases an individual is strongly prejudiced in favor of Baptism, and is so deeply persuaded in his subconsciousness of its truth that he is only seeking for the slightest pretext to become an open convert. The matter once settled he then maintains that he has become convinced of the truth of his doctrine by the overwhelming force of the evidence in its favor, and is highly offended if one bluntly says that he believes in Baptism simply because his father did, and he passionately denies this true but unacceptable explanation. The origin of this belief is thus concealed from him by the mechanism of evasion. How different with an individual brought up in a Catholic environment. The same arguments that with the one man proved so efficacious may here be repeated with the most persuasive eloquence and are rejected with scorn as being obviously fallacious. We see here that environmental influence may inculcate a given belief by the indirect way of raising the standard of acceptability of the arguments used in its favor; in other words, by making them appear more obviously sensible and reasonable to the individual. It will be an interesting question for the future to determine how many of our most firmly held opinions in the value of universal suffrage, of representative government, of marriage, institutions, etc., are not similar examples of blind acceptance of the suggestive influence of our environment, fortified by the most elaborate evasions and rationalizations.

As an example of the allied mechanism of rationalization I will take the current use of valerian as a specific antidote for hysteria. It will be remembered that for many centuries asafoetida and valerian were administered on the grounds that hysteria was due to the wandering of the uterus about the body and that evil smelling drugs tended to drive it down to its proper position and thus cure the complaint. Although these assumptions have

not been upheld by experience, nevertheless at the present day most cases of hysteria are still treated by these drugs. Evidently the operating influence that leads to their administration is the blind response to a prevailing tradition, the origin of which is largely forgotten. But the necessity of teachers of neurology to provide reasons for their treatment to students has led to the explanation being invented that the drugs act as "antispasmodics"—whatever that may mean—and they are often given in the following refined form. One of the constituents of valerian, valerianic acid, is given the name of "active principle," and is administered, usually as the zinc salt, *sugar-coated* so as to disguise its unpleasant taste. Some modern authorities, aware of the origin of the treatment, have even remarked how curious it is that the ancients, in spite of their false views about hysteria, should have discovered a valuable line of treatment and have given such an absurd explanation of its action. This continuous rationalization in the face of the knowledge that the process in the past was irrational is often seen, a well-known example being the Last Supper explanation of the Mass and Communion, in spite of the recognized theophagic origin of the rite, that is to say present day exponents often plume themselves on their superior rational behavior while performing the identical acts that they deride as irrational in their forefathers. It is difficult to see to what further lengths self-deception can go, once the beaten path of experience and the scientific standard of verifiability are departed from, and yet I hold it probable that many of our beliefs now thought to be beyond suspicion will prove to be just as bizarre as soon as the searchlight of skepticism is turned on them.

My aim in these few remarks has been to illustrate from what diverse sides Professor Freud's principle may be supported and to indicate what a vast field there yet remains for it to be applied over. We are beginning to see man not as the smooth self-acting agent he pretends

to be, but as he really is, a creature only dimly conscious of the various influences that mold his thought and action, and blindly resisting with all the means at his command the forces that are making for a higher and fuller consciousness. In conclusion I would point out that future studies in this direction must give us the secret to the formation of opinion and belief and the methods whereby these can be controlled. This will yield practical help in the knowledge of how best to promulgate ideas that are in themselves unacceptable, for the day is past when psychologists are justified in still sharing the common illusion of mankind that the best way to spread an opinion is simply to state and restate the evidence in its favor under the pious belief that sooner or later it will surely be accepted if only it is true. We know that that method is not only tedious, but often permanently unsuccessful. There are unquestionably true ideas that mankind has had the opportunity of accepting for two or three thousand years, but which will never be accepted until they are promulgated with the aid of the knowledge now being gleaned by the new school of psychology.

STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF REALITY¹

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The development of the mental forms of activity in the individual consists, as Freud has shown, in the resolution of the originally prevailing pleasure-principle, and the repression mechanism peculiar to it, by the adjustment to reality, *i.e.*, by the testing of reality that is based on judgment. Thus arises out of the "primary" psychical stage, such as is displayed in the mental activities of primitive beings (animals, savages, children), and in primitive mental states (dreams, neurosis, phantasy), the secondary stage of the normal man in waking thought.

At the beginning of its development the new-born babe seeks to attain a state of satisfaction merely through insistent wishing (imagining), whereby it simply ignores (represses) the unsatisfying reality, picturing to itself as present, on the contrary, the wished-for, but lacking, satisfaction; it attempts, therefore, to conceal without effort all its needs by means of positive and negative hallucinations. "It was only the non-appearance of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by the hallucinatory method. Instead, the psychical apparatus had to decide to represent the actual circumstances of the outer world to itself, and to strive to alter reality. With this a new principle of mental activity was initiated; not what was pleas-

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ant was any longer imagined, but what was real, even though it should be unpleasant.”²

The significant essay in which Freud displayed to us this fundamental fact of psychogenesis is confined to the sharp differentiation between the pleasure and the reality stages. Freud also concerns himself here, it is true, with transitional states in which both principles of mental functioning coexist (phantasy, art, sexual life), but he leaves for the present unanswered the question whether the development of the secondary form of mental activity from the primary takes place gradually or in a series of steps, and whether such stages of development are to be recognized, or their derivatives demonstrated, in the mental life of the normal or abnormal.

An earlier work of Freud's, however, in which he affords us deep insight into the mental life of obsessional patients,³ calls attention to a fact from which as a starting point one may attempt to bridge over the gap between the pleasure and the reality stages of mental development.

Obsessional patients who have submitted themselves to a psychoanalysis—so it runs in that work—admit to us that they cannot help being convinced of the omnipotence of their thoughts, feelings, and wishes, good and bad. However enlightened they may be, however much their academic knowledge and their reason may strive to the contrary, they have the feeling that their wishes in some inexplicable way get realized. Of the truth of this state of affairs any analyst can convince himself as often as he likes. He will learn that the weal and woe of other people, indeed their life and death, seem to the obsessional patient to depend on certain thought processes and actions, in themselves harmless, on which he engages. The patient has to think of certain magical formulas, or carry out a

² Freud, *Formulierungen über die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens* Jahrb., Bd. III, S. 1.

³ Freud, *Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose* Jahrb., Bd. I, S. 411.

certain action; otherwise a great misfortune will befall this or that person (mostly a near relative). This conviction, though felt to be superstitious, is not shaken even by repeated experiences to the contrary.⁴

Leaving aside the fact that analysis reveals such obsessive thoughts and actions to be the substitutes of wish-impulses that are logically correct, but which on account of their intolerableness have been repressed,⁵ and turning our attention exclusively to the peculiar manifestation of this obsessional symptom, we must admit that it constitutes a problem in itself.

Psychoanalytical experience has made it clear to me that this symptom, the feeling of omnipotence, is a projection of the observation that one has slavishly to obey certain irresistible instincts. The obsessional neurosis constitutes a relapse of the mental life to that stage of child-development characterized, among other things, by there being as yet no inhibiting, postponing, reflecting thought-activity interposed between wishing and acting, the wish-fulfilling movement following spontaneously and unhesitatingly on the wishing—an averting movement away from something disagreeable, or an approach towards something agreeable.⁶

A part of the mental life, more or less removed from consciousness, thus remains with the obsessional patient—

⁴ This article was finished before use could be made of Freud's article on "Animismus, Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken" (*Imago*, *Jahrg.* II, Heft I), which deals with the same topic from other points of view.

⁵ Freud, *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, 1906, S. 45 und 86.

⁶ It is well known that small children almost reflexly stretch out their hands after every object that shines or in any other way pleases them. They are, to begin with, also incapable of foregoing any "naughtiness" that yields them any kind of pleasure, whenever the stimulus causing this appears. A young boy who had been forbidden to bore his finger into his nose answered his mother, "I don't want to, but my hand does and I can't prevent it."

as the analysis shows—on this childhood level in consequence of an arrest in development (fixation), and makes wishing equivalent to acting because—just on account of the repression, of the distraction of attention—this repressed portion of the mental life was not able to learn the difference between the two activities, while the ego itself, which has developed free from repression and grown wise through education and experience, can only laugh at this equating of the two. Hence the inner discordance of the obsessional patient, the inexplicable occurrence of enlightenment and superstition side by side.

Not being quite satisfied with this explanation of the feeling of omnipotence as an autosymbolic phenomenon,⁷ I put to myself the question: Whence then does the child get the boldness to set thinking and acting as equivalents? Whence comes the feeling of obviousness with which it stretches out its hand after all objects, after the lamp hanging above him as after the shining moon, in the sure expectation of reaching it with this gesture and drawing it into the domain of its power?

I then recalled that according to Freud's assumption "a piece of the old grandiose delusion of childhood was honestly confessed" in the omnipotence phantasy of the obsessional patient, and I tried to trace out the origin and fate of this delusion. In this way I hoped also to learn something new about the development of the ego from the pleasure to the reality principle, since it seemed to me probable that the replacement (to which we are compelled by experience) of the childhood megalomania by the recognition of the power of natural forces composes the essential content of the development of the ego.

Freud declares an organization that is a slave to the pleasure principle, and which can neglect the reality of the outer world, to be a fiction, one, however, which is almost realized in the young infant, when one only takes

⁷ This is what Silberer terms the self-perceptions that are symbolically represented.

into account the maternal care.⁸ I might add that there is a stage in human development that realizes this ideal of a being subservient only to pleasure, and that does so not only in imagination and approximately, but in actual fact and completely.

I mean the period of human life passed in the womb. In this state the human being lives as a parasite of the mother's body. For the nascent being an "outer world" exists only in a very restricted degree; all its needs for protection, warmth, and nourishment are assured by the mother. Indeed, it does not even have the trouble of taking the oxygen and nourishment that is brought to it, for it is seen to that these materials, through suitable arrangements, arrive directly into its blood-vessels. In comparison with this an intestinal worm, for example, has a good deal of work to perform, "to change the outer world," in order to maintain itself. All care for the continuance of the foetus, however, is transferred to the mother. If, therefore, the human being possesses a mental life when in the womb, although only an unconscious one—and it would be foolish to believe that the mind begins to function only at the moment of birth—he must get from his existence the impression that he is in fact omnipotent. For what is omnipotence? The feeling that one has all that one wants, and that one has nothing left to wish for. The foetus, however, could maintain this of itself, for it always has what is necessary for the satisfaction of its instincts,⁹ and so has nothing to wish for; it is without wants.

⁸ *Jahrb.*, Bd. III, S. 2, footnote. See also the controversy between Bleuler and Freud on this question, Bleuler, *Das antistatische Denken*, *Jahrb.*, Bd. IV).

⁹ As a result of disturbances, such as through illness or injury of the mother or of the umbilical cord, etc., necessity can face a human being already in the mother's body, can rob him of his omnipotence, and compel him to the effort of "changing the outer world," i. e., of performing work (an example being the inspiration of amniotic fluid when in danger of suffocation).

The childhood megalomania of their own omnipotence is thus at least no empty delusion; the child and the obsessional patient demand nothing impossible from reality when they are not to be dissuaded from holding that their wishes must be fulfilled; they are only demanding the return of a state that once existed, those "good old days" in which they were all-powerful. (*Period of unconditional omnipotence.*)

With the same right by which we assume the transference of memory traces of the race's history on to the individual, indeed with more justification than this, we may assert that the traces of intra-uterine psychical processes do not remain without influence on the shaping of the psychical material produced after birth. The behavior of the child immediately after birth speaks for this continuity of the mental processes.¹⁰

The new-born child does not accommodate himself uniformly as regards all his needs to the new situation which is visibly disagreeable to him. Immediately after the delivery he begins to breathe, so as to restore the provision of oxygen that has been interrupted by the tying of the umbilical vessels; the possession of a respiratory mechanism, formed already in intra-uterine life, at once enables him actively to remedy the oxygen privation. If, however, one observes the remaining behavior of the new-born child one gets the impression that he is far from pleased at the rude disturbance of the wish-less tranquillity he had enjoyed in the womb, and indeed that *he longs to regain this situation*. Nurses instinctively recognize this wish of the child, and as soon as he has given vent to his discomfort by struggling and crying they deliberately bring him into a situation that resembles as closely as possible the one he has just left. They lay him down by the warm body

¹⁰ Freud has incidentally pointed out that the sensations of the child during the birth act probably evoke the first anxiety affect of the new being, which remains prefigurative for all later anxiety and anxiousness.

of the mother, or wrap him up in soft, warm coverings, evidently so as to give him the illusion of the mother's warm protection. They guard his eye from light stimuli, and his ear from noise, and give him the possibility of further enjoying the intra-uterine absence of irritation, or, by rocking the child and crooning to him monotonously rhythmical lullabies, they reproduce the slight and monotonously rhythmical stimuli that the child is not spared even *in utero* (the swaying movements of the mother when walking, the maternal heart-beats, the deadened noise from without that manages to penetrate to the interior of the body).

If we try, not only to feel ourselves into the soul of the new-born babe (as the nurses do), but also to think ourselves into it, we must say that the helpless crying and struggling of the child is apparently a very unsuitable reaction to the unpleasant disturbance that the previous situation of being satisfied has suddenly experienced as a result of the birth. We may assume, supported by considerations which Freud has expounded in the general part of his *Traumdeutung*,¹¹ that the first consequence of this disturbance is the hallucinatory re-occupation of the satisfying situation that is missed, the untroubled existence in the warm, tranquil body of the mother. The first wish-impulse of the child, therefore, cannot be any other than to regain this situation. Now the curious thing is that—presupposing normal care—this hallucination is in fact realized. From the subjective standpoint of the child the previously unconditional “omnipotence” has changed merely in so far that he needs only to seize the wish-aims in a hallucinatory way (to imagine them) and to alter nothing else in the outer world, in order (after satisfying this single condition) really to attain the wish-fulfillment. Since the child certainly has no knowledge of the real concatenation of cause and effect, or of the nurse's existence and activity, he must feel himself in the possession of a

¹¹ Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, 3 e Aufl., S. 376.

magical capacity that can actually realize all his wishes by simply imagining the satisfaction of them. (*Period of magical-hallucinatory omnipotence.*)

That the nurse guesses the hallucinations of the child aright is shown by the effect of her actions. As soon as the first nursing measures are carried out the child calms itself and goes to sleep. *The first sleep, however, is nothing else than the successful reproduction of the womb situation (which shelters as far as possible from external stimuli)*, probably with the biological function that the processes of growth and regeneration can concentrate all energy on themselves, undisturbed by the performance of any external work. Some considerations, which cannot be presented in this connection, have convinced me that also every later sleep is nothing else than a periodically repeated regression to the stage of the magical-hallucinatory omnipotence, and through the help of this to the absolute omnipotence of the womb situation. According to Freud, one has to postulate for each system subsisting by the pleasure-principle arrangements by means of which it can withdraw itself from the stimuli of reality.¹² Now it seems to me that sleep and dreams are functions of such arrangements, that is to say, remains of the hallucinatory omnipotence of the small child that survive into adult life. The pathological counterpart of this regression is the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment in the psychoses.

Since the wish for the satisfying of instincts manifests itself periodically, while the outer world pays no attention to the occurrence of the occasion on which the instinct is exerted, the hallucinatory representation of the wish-fulfillment soon proves inadequate to bring about any longer a real wish-fulfillment. A new condition is added to the fulfillment: the child has to give certain *signals*—thus performing a motor exertion, although an inadequate one—so that the situation may be changed in the direction of

¹² Freud, *Jahrb.*, Bd. III, S. 3.

his disposition, and the "ideational identity" be followed by the satisfying "perpetual identity."¹³

The hallucinatory stage was already characterized by the occurrence of uncoordinated motor discharges (crying, struggling) on the occasion of disagreeable affects. These are now made use of by the child as magic signals, at the dictation of which the satisfaction promptly arrives (naturally with external help, of which the child, however, has no idea). The subjective feeling of the child at all this may be compared to that of a real magician, who has only to perform a given gesture to bring about in the outer world according to his will the most complicated occurrences.¹⁴

We note how the omnipotence of human beings gets to depend on more and more "conditions" with the increase in the complexity of the wishes. These efferent manifestations soon become insufficient to bring about the situation of satisfaction. As the wishes take more and more special forms with development, they demand increasingly

¹³ Freud, *Die Traumdeutung*, loc. cit.

¹⁴ When I search in pathology for an analogy to these discharges I have always to think of *genuine epilepsy*, that most problematical of the major neuroses. And although I fully admit that in the question of epilepsy the physiological is difficult to separate from the psychological, I may call attention to the fact that epileptics are known to be uncommonly "sensitive" beings, behind whose submissiveness frightful rage and domineeringness can appear on the least occasion. This characteristic has up to the present usually been interpreted as a secondary degeneration, as the consequence of repeated attacks. One should, however, think of another possibility, namely, whether the epileptic attacks are not to be considered as regressions to the infantile period of *wish-fulfilment by means of uncoordinated movements*. Epileptics would then be persons with whom the disagreeable affects get heaped up and are periodically abreacted in paroxysms. If this explanation proves to be useful we should have to localize the place of fixation for a later affliction of epilepsy in this stage of uncoordinated wish-manifestations.—The irrational stamping of the feet, clenching of the fists, and grinding of the teeth, etc., that are to be seen in outbursts of anger would be a milder form of the same regression in otherwise healthy persons.

specialized signals. To begin with are such as, imitations of the movement of sucking with the mouth when the infant wants to be fed, and the characteristic expressions by means of the voice and abdominal pressing when it wants to be cleansed after excreting. The child gradually learns also to stretch out its hand for the objects that it wants. From this is developed later a regular gesture-language: by suitable combinations of gestures the child is able to express quite special needs, which then are very often actually satisfied, so that—if only it keeps to the condition of the expression of wishes by means of corresponding gestures—the child can still appear to itself as omnipotent: *Period of omnipotence by the help of magic gestures.*

This period also has a representative in pathology; the curious jump from the world of thought into that of bodily processes, which Freud has discovered hysterical conversion to be,¹⁵ becomes more intelligible to us when we view it as a regression to the stage of gesture-magic. Psychoanalysis shows us in fact that hysterical attacks present with the help of gestures the repressed wishes of the patient as fulfilled. In the mental life of the normal the countless number of superstitious gestures, or such as are in some other way considered efficacious (gestures of cursing, blessing, praying) is a remainder of that developmental period of the sense of reality in which one still felt mighty enough to be able to violate the regular order¹⁶ of the universe. Fortune-tellers, soothsayers, and magnetizers continually find belief in the assertion of such complete power of their gestures, and the Neapolitan also averts the evil eye with a symbolic gesture.

With the increase in the extent and complexity of the wants goes naturally an increase, not only of the "conditions" that the individual has to submit to if he wishes to see his wants satisfied, but also of the number of cases in

¹⁵ See Freud's works in the *Studien über Hysterie*, 1895.

¹⁶ This being, of course, quite unsuspected.

which his ever more audacious wishes remain unfulfilled even when the once efficacious conditions are strictly observed. The outstretched hand must often be drawn back empty, the longed-for object does not follow the magic gesture. Indeed, an invincible hostile power may forcibly oppose itself to this gesture and compel the hand to resume its former position. Till now the "all-powerful" being has been able to feel himself one with the world that obeyed him and followed his every nod, but gradually there appears a painful discordance in his experiences. He has to distinguish between certain perfidious things, which do not obey his will, as an outer world, and on the other side his ego; *i.e.*, between the subjective psychical contents (feelings) and the objectified ones (sensations). I once called the first of these stages the *Introjection Phase* of the psyche, since in it all experiences are still incorporated into the ego, and the later one the *Projection Phase*. One might also, following this terminology, speak of the omnipotence stage as the introjection stage, the reality stage as the projection stage, of the development of the ego.

Still even the objectifying of the outer world does not at once destroy every tie between the ego and the non-ego. The child learns, it is true, to be content with having only a part of the world, the ego, at his disposal, the outer world, however, often opposing his wishes, but there still remains in this outer world qualities that he has learned to know in himself, *i.e.*, ego qualities. Everything points to the conclusion that the child passes through an *animistic period* in the apprehension of reality, in which every object appears to him to be endowed with life, and in which he seeks to find again in every object his own organs and their activities.¹⁷

The derisive remark was once made against psychoanalysis that, according to this doctrine, the unconscious

¹⁷ On the subject of animism, see also the essay *Ueber Naturgefühl*, by Dr. Hanns Sachs (*Imago*, Jahrg, I.)

sees a penis in every convex object and a vagina or anus in every concave one. I find that this sentence well characterizes the facts. The child's mind (and the tendency of the unconscious in adults that survives from it) is at first concerned exclusively with his own body, and later on chiefly with the satisfying of his instincts, with the pleasurable satisfactions that sucking, eating, contact with the genital regions, and the functions of excretion procure for him; what wonder, then, if also his attention is arrested above all by those objects and processes of the outer world that on the ground of ever so distant a resemblance remind him of his dearest experiences.

Thus arise those intimate connections, which remain throughout life, between the human body and the objective world that we call *symbolic*. On the one hand the child in this stage sees in the world nothing but images of his corporeality, on the other he learns to represent by means of his body the whole multifariousness of the outer world. This capacity for symbolic representation is an important completion of the gesture-language; it enables the child not only to signalize such wishes as immediately concern his body, but also to express wishes that relate to the changing of the outer world, now recognized as such. If the child is surrounded by loving care, he need not even in this stage of his existence give up the illusion of his omnipotence. He still only needs to represent an object symbolically and the thing, believed to be alive, often really "comes" to him; for the animistically thinking child must have this impression at the satisfaction of his wishes. From the uncertainty regarding the arrival of the satisfaction it gradually dawns on him, to be sure, that there are also higher, "divine" powers (mother or nurse), whose favor he must possess if the satisfaction is to follow closely on the magic gesture. Still this satisfaction also is not hard to obtain, especially with indulgent surroundings.

One of the bodily means that the child makes use of

for representing his wishes, and the objects he wishes for attains then an especial significance, one that ranges beyond that of all other means of representation—speech, namely. Speech is originally ¹⁸ imitation, *i.e.*, vocal representation, of sounds and noises that are produced by things, or which can be produced by their help; the executive capacity of the speech organs allows the reproduction of a much greater multiplicity of objects and processes of the outer world than was possible with the help of gesture-language, and in a much simpler manner. Speech symbolism thus gets substituted for gesture symbolism: certain series of sounds are brought into close associative connection with definite objects and processes, and indeed gradually identified with these. From this accrues the great progress: there is no longer a necessity for the cumbrous figurative imagination and the still more cumbrous dramatic representation; the imagination and representation of the series of sounds that we call words allow a far more specialized and economic conception and expression of the wishes. At the same time conscious thinking makes speech symbolism possible by becoming associated to thought processes that are in themselves unconscious, and lending them perceptual qualities.¹⁹

Now conscious thought by means of speech signs is the highest accomplishment of the psychical apparatus, and alone makes adjustment to reality possible by retarding the reflex motor discharge and the release from unpleasantness. In spite of this the child knows how to preserve his feeling of omnipotence even in this stage of his development, for his wishes that can be set forth in thoughts are still so few and comparatively uncomplicated that the attentive *entourage* concerned with the child's welfare

¹⁸ See Kleinpaul, "Leben der Sprache" (1893), and Sperber "Über den Einfluss sexueller Momente auf Entstehung und Entwicklung der Sprache," *Imago*, 1912.

¹⁹ See Freud, "Traumdeutung," III Aufl., S. 401, and *Jahrb.*, Bd. III, S. I.

easily manages to guess most of these thoughts. The mimic expressions that continually accompany thinking (peculiarly so with children) make this kind of thought-reading especially easy for the adults; and when the child actually formulates his wishes in words the *entourage*, ever ready to help, hastens to fulfill them as soon as possible. The child then thinks himself in possession of magic capacities, is thus in the *period of magic thoughts and magic words*.¹⁹

It is this stage of reality development to which the obsessional patients seem to regress when they are not to be dissuaded from the feeling of the omnipotence of their thoughts and verbal formulas, and when, as Freud has shown, they set thinking in the place of acting. In superstition, in magic, and in religious cults this belief in the irresistible power of certain prayer, cursing, or magical formulas, which one has only to think inwardly or only to speak aloud for them to work, plays an enormous part.²¹

This almost incurable megalomania of mankind is only apparently contravened by those neurotics with whom behind the feverish search for success one at once comes across a feeling of inferiority (Adler), which is well known to the patients themselves. An analysis that reaches to the depths reveals in all such cases that these feelings of inferiority are in no sense something final, an explanation of the neurosis, but are themselves the reactions to an exaggerated feeling of omnipotence, to which such patients have become "fixed" in their early childhood, and which has made it impossible for them to adjust themselves to any subsequent renunciation. The manifest seeking for greatness that these people have, however, is only a "return of the repressed," a hopeless

²⁰ The psychological explanation of "magic" naturally does not exclude the possibility of this belief containing also the foreshadowing of physical facts (telepathy, etc.).

²¹ This "omnipotence" ("motor power") is highly characteristic also of obscene words.

attempt to reach once more, by means of changing the outer world, the omnipotence that originally was enjoyed without effort.

We can only repeat: All children live in the happy delusion of omnipotence, which at some time or other—even if only in the womb—they really partook of. It depends on their “Daimon” and their “Tyche” whether they preserve the feelings of omnipotence also for later life, and become *Optimists*, or whether they go to augment the number of *Pessimists*, who never get reconciled to the renunciation of their unconscious irrational wishes, who on the slightest provocation feel themselves insulted or slighted, and who regard themselves as step-children of Fate—because they cannot remain her *only* or *favorite* children.

Freud dates the end of the domination of the pleasure-principle only from the complete psychical detachment from the parents. It is also at this epoch, which is extremely variable in individual cases, that the feeling of omnipotence gives way to the full appreciation of the force of circumstances. The sense of reality attains its zenith in Science, while the illusion of omnipotence here experiences its greatest humiliation: the previous omnipotence here dissolves into mere “conditions.” (Conditionalism, determinism.) Nevertheless, we possess in the doctrine of the freedom of the will an optimistic philosophical dogma that can still realize phantasies of omnipotence.

The recognition that our wishes and thoughts are conditioned signifies the maximum of normal projection, *i.e.*, objectification. There is also, however, a psychical disorder, paranoia, which has the characteristic, among others, that in it even the person’s own wishes and thoughts are expelled into the outer world, are projected.²² It seems natural to locate the fixation-point of this psychosis

²² See Freud, *Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen* (Kl. Schr. z. Neurosenlehre, S. 45), *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia*, Jahrb., Bd. III.

in the period of the final renunciation of omnipotence, *i.e.*, in the projection phase of the sense of reality.

The stages in the development of the sense of reality have here been presented up to now only in terms of the egoistic, so-called "ego-instincts," which serve the function of self-preservation; reality has, as Freud has established, closer connections with the ego than with sexuality, on the one hand because the latter is less dependent on the outer world (it can for a long time satisfy itself auto-erotically), on the other hand because it is suppressed during the latency period and does not come at all into contact with reality. Sexuality thus remains throughout life more subjected to the pleasure-principle, whereas the ego has immediately to experience the bitterest disappointment after every disregarding of reality.²³ If we now consider the *feeling of omnipotence in sexual development* that characterizes the pleasure stage, we have to observe that here the "period of unconditional omnipotence" lasts until the giving up of the auto-erotic kinds of satisfaction, a time when the ego has already long adjusted itself to the increasingly complicated conditions of reality, has passed through the stages of magic gestures and words, and has already almost attained the knowledge of the omnipotence of natural forces. Auto-erotism and narcissism are thus the omnipotence stages of erotism, and, since *narcissism never comes* to an end at all, but always remains by the side of object-erotism, it can thus be said that—in so far as we confine ourselves to self-love—in *the matter of love we can retain the illusion of omnipotence throughout life*. That the way to narcissism is at the same time the constantly accessible way of regression after every disappointment in an object of love is too well known to need proof; auto-erotic—narcissistic regressions of pathological strength may be suspected behind the symptoms of Paraphrenia (*Dementia præcox*) and Hysteria, whereas the fixation-points of the Obsessional Neurosis

²³ Freud, *Jahrb.*, Bd. III, S. 5.

and of Paranoia should be found in the line of development of "erotic reality" (the compulsion to find an object).

These relations, however, have not yet been appropriately studied with all the neuroses, so that we have to be content with Freud's general formulation concerning the *choice of neurosis*, namely, that the variety of the subsequent disorder is decided by "which phase in the development of the ego and the sexual hunger is affected by the determining inhibition of development."

One may nevertheless venture to add to this sentence a second one; we suspect that the wish-constituent of the neurosis, *i.e.*, the varieties and aims of the erotism that the symptoms present as fulfilled, depends on where the fixation-point is in the phase of the development of the sexual hunger, while the mechanism of the neuroses is probably decided by what stage in the development of the ego the individual is in at the time of the determining inhibition. It is very well thinkable that with the regression of the sexual hunger to earlier stages of development the level of the reality-sense that was dominant at the time of fixation also becomes renascent in the mechanisms of the symptom-formation. Since, that is to say, this earlier kind of "reality-testing" is incomprehensible to the present ego of the neurotic, there is nothing to prevent its being placed at the disposal of the repression, and used for the presentation of censured feeling- and thought-complexes. Hysteria and the obsessional neurosis, for example, would according to this conception be characterized on the one hand by a regression of the sexual hunger to earlier stages of development (auto-erotism, Œdipusism), and on the other hand in their mechanisms by a relapse of the reality-sense to the stage of magic gestures (conversion) or of magic thoughts (omnipotence of thought). I repeat: It will need much longer laborious work before the fixation-points of all neuroses can be established with certainty. I wish here only to point to

one possibility of a solution, one, it is true, that to me is plausible.

What we may conceive about the *phylogenesis* of the reality-sense can at present be offered only as a scientific prediction. It is to be assumed that we shall some day succeed in bringing the individual stages in the development of the ego, and the neurotic regression-types of these, into a parallel with the stages in the racial history of mankind, just as, for instance, Freud found again in the mental life of the savage the characters of the obsessional neurosis.²⁴

In general the development of the reality-sense is represented by a succession of repressions, to which mankind was compelled, not through spontaneous "strivings towards development," but through necessity, through adjustment to a demanded renunciation. The first great repression is made necessary by the process of birth, which certainly comes about without active coöperation, without any "intention" on the part of the child. The foetus would much rather remain undisturbed longer in the womb, but it is cruelly turned out into the world, and it has to forget (repress) the kinds of satisfaction it had got fond of, and adjust itself to new ones. The same cruel game is repeated with every new stage of development.²⁵

It is perhaps allowable to venture the surmise that it was the geological changes in the surface of the earth, with their catastrophic consequences for primitive man, that compelled repression of favorite habits and thus "development." Such catastrophes may have been the sites of repression in the history of racial development, and the temporal localization and intensity of such catas-

²⁴ Freud, *Ueber einige Uebereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker*, *Imago*, Jahrg. I, 1912.

²⁵ If this thought is logically pursued, one must make oneself familiar with the idea of a tendency of perseveration, or regression-tendency, also dominating organic life, the tendency to further development, adaptation, etc., depending only on external stimuli.

trophes may have decided the character and the neuroses of the race. According to a remark of Professor Freud's, racial character is the precipitate of racial history. Having ventured so far beyond the knowable, we have no reason to shrink before the last analogy and from bringing the great step in individual repression, the latency period, into connection with the last and greatest catastrophe that smote our primitive ancestors (at a time when there were certainly human beings on the earth), *i.e.*, with the misery of the glacial period, which we still faithfully recapitulate in our individual life.²⁶

The impetuous curiosity to know everything that has just seduced me into enchanted vistas of the past, and led me to bridge over the yet unknowable by the help of analogies, brings me back to the starting-point of these considerations: to the theme of the acme and decline of the feeling of omnipotence. Science has to repudiate this illusion, or at least always to know when she is entering the field of hypotheses and fancies. In fairy-tales, on the contrary, phantasies of omnipotence are and remain the dominating ones.²⁷ Just where we have most humbly to bow before the forces of Nature, the fairy-tale comes to our aid with its typical motives. In reality we are weak, hence the heroes of fairy-tales are strong and unconquerable; in our activities and our knowledge we are

²⁶ Cases where development precedes the real needs seem to contradict the conception that only external compulsion, and never spontaneous impulse, leads to the giving up of accustomed mechanisms (development). An example for this would be the development of the respiratory mechanism already in utero. This happens, however, only in ontogenesis, and is here to be regarded as a recapitulation of a compulsory process of development in the history of the race. The playful practising of animals (Gross) also are not the preliminary stages of a future racial function, but repetitions of phylogenetically acquired capacities. They thus allow of a purely historical-causal explanation, and we are not compelled to regard them from the point of view of finality.

²⁷ Cp. Riklin, *Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen*. (*Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, Heft 2.)

cramped and hindered by time and space, hence in fairy-tales one is immortal, is in a hundred places at the same time, sees into the future and knows the past. The ponderousness, the solidity, and the impenetrability of matter obstruct our way every moment: in the fairy-tale, however, man has wings, his eyes pierce the walls, his magic wand opens all doors. Reality is a hard fight for existence; in the fairy-tale the words "little table, be spread" are sufficient. A man may live in perpetual fear of attacks from dangerous beasts and fierce foes; in the fairy-tale a magic cap enables every transformation and makes us inaccessible. How hard it is in reality to attain love that can fulfill all our wishes! In the fairy-tale the hero is irresistible, or he bewitches with a magic gesture.

Thus the fairy-tale, through which grown-ups are so fond of relating to their children their own unfulfilled and repressed wishes, really brings the forfeited situation of omnipotence to a last, artistic presentation.

THE ONLY OR FAVORITE CHILD IN ADULT LIFE¹

BY DR. A. A. BRILL (NEW YORK)

Very little attention has been given to the problem of the only child, and the little literature we have at our disposal deals mainly with the superficial and general aspects of the question. Neter, who has written an excellent pamphlet on the subject, gives a very good description of the only child's attributes, but he does not enter into the deeper psychological elements. Moreover, no attempt has been made outside of the Freudian school to follow those children into adult life and to trace the individual influence at play in their adjustment to environments. This can be readily understood when we remember that very little has been done in child psychology in general and that only few psychologists are at present occupying themselves with the subject.

Stimulated by the works of Freud and Jung I have investigated the subject from the psychoanalytical side and shall endeavor to present some of the results. But before proceeding to do so it will be necessary to orient ourselves on some of the psychological principles that form a part of the discussion.

In his famous essay *Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke tells us that the child's mind is essentially a *tabula rasa*, a blank tablet upon which nothing is written, and that all knowledge rests on experience. Psychoanalysis fully demonstrates Locke's empiricism, and confining our-

¹ This chapter is reprinted from the book *Psycho-Analysis*, by A. A. Brill. Copyright, 1922, by W. B. Saunders Company. Reprinted through the courtesy of the publishers.

selves to the question of parental influences and relationships we may say that every individual's mind possesses certain stereotype plates or models, as it were, which are the result of mental impressions produced by the parents during childhood. Thus a father image and a mother image remain permanently engraved in the mind and act as standards for estimation of men and women that later enter into this person's life. It is not difficult to show that our behavior toward our fellow beings depends mostly on our early relations to our parents. In other words, we unconsciously endeavor to fit every stranger into one of our latent parental images and our likes and dislikes depend in a great measure on the success or failure of such correlation. Further investigation shows that children do not always love their parents as is commonly supposed, but very often hate one of them. The first woman the little boy loves is his mother, and the first man the little girl loves is her father. The little boy idolizes his mother and supplies her with that part of poetic love which she no longer gets from her husband. The mother calls her little boy sweetheart and tries to realize in him her ideal of the man. The same thing takes place between the little girl and her father. Normally, however, these parental ideals vanish with the advancing age, when the growing child begins to project his love on strangers. The boy then no longer thinks that his mother is the prettiest and loveliest woman in the world, but he evinces an interest in other persons of the opposite sex. The deflection of love from the mother may also be furthered by the appearance of a little brother, who claims a part of his mother's love and attention. However, this absence of the mother ideal is only apparent. It is not eliminated, but repressed into the unconscious and there it continues to exert its influence throughout the whole life of the individual. Psychoanalysis of normal persons shows beyond any doubt the enormous influence of unconscious parental complexes. It explains the important mechanism

of transference as well as many of the peculiarities of the love life.

Recently I was consulted by a young girl of twenty-one years who was said to have become nervous as a result of a disagreement with her mother. She was in love with a man of forty-six years to whom her mother strongly objected, not only on account of the marked difference in their ages, but because the man was considered mentally abnormal. During our conversation she remarked that her mother had always been in her way, and by way of explanation she stated that her mother was jealous of her and that when she was younger she hated to have her mother go along when she went out with her father. "I always looked upon her as a stranger," she said. She idolized her father who is her ideal in every respect, although he is a paranoiac and has been for years in an insane asylum. She surprised me when she told me that there is as marked a difference in the ages of her father and mother as there is in her own and her fiancé's ages. Indeed, all the features of the case unmistakably pointed to an identification with her mother and an unconscious desire to get her father ideal. Such cases are not at all uncommon, I have reported some in the preceding chapter and could cite many more.

From what has just been said it can be readily understood that such parental influences may often be strong enough to inhibit materially the individual's relations to the other sex. Thus, too much and prolonged affection on the part of the mother is apt to cause an undue conscious or unconscious attachment to the parents, and thus prevent the child from going through the various stages of its psychosexual development. In this connection it may be repeated that the sexual impulse of childhood is autoerotic or objectless. The child knows no other sexual object than himself and gets his gratification through the erogenous zones of his own body. As it grows older we have the so-called latency period, during which the greater

part of the sexual excitation is utilized for aims other than sexual, viz., for the formation of social feelings and the future sexual barriers. Between autoerotism and the object love there is an intermediate stage which has been designated as narcissism. Freud tells us that every stage of development of the psychosexual life offers a possibility for "fixation" which may result in a type of character. Thus we have shown above that fixation in narcissism may cause paranoia or homosexuality, and that fixation in autoeroticism may lay the foundation for dementia præcox. By giving the child too much love, mothers often prolong or cause a fixation in the various stages mentioned. This naturally occurs very often in only children, who, having no one with whom to share their parents' affection, are overburdened with love. The same is true of favorite children who are subjected to the same conditions as only children during the impressionable period of their existence. Since the fall of 1908 I have examined hundreds of only or favorite children, and my findings may be divided into (a) general and (b) specific.

(a) Whether *burdened by heredity or not* the adult only child usually shows one prominent feature, namely, he is a very poor competitor in the struggle for existence. Having been carefully reared and constantly watched by his loving mother, he remains forever "mama's boy." He is devoid of those qualities which characterize the real boy. He lacks independence, self-confidence and the practical skill which the average boy acquires through competition with other boys.

Owing to the fact that the only boy constantly associates with grown-ups he is usually precocious even in childhood, and as he grows older he finds it very hard to associate with persons of his own age. Real friendships begin very early in life. I know an only boy of nineteen years who has not a single friend. He is practically asocial. He wishes only to associate with persons much older than himself and cannot adapt himself to the society

of young people because they "bore" him. Some time ago I was consulted about another only boy, seven years old, because, as his mother put it, he did not get along with other children and was a real blasé. He was not interested in anything. Toys, pets, books, etc., that would have been sufficient to delight the hearts of a dozen children had absolutely no charm for him. He was in constant need of new excitements and as they could not be supplied quickly enough he was unhappy and morose.

The only child is usually spoiled and coddled because the parents gratify all his whims and have not the heart to be severe with or punish him when necessary. This has its evil consequences in adult life, for the slightest depreciation, hardly noticeable by the average person, is enough to throw him into a fit of depression and rage lasting for days and even for weeks. An only daughter attempted suicide because her best friend received more attention than she at a social gathering.

It is due to the undivided attention and abnormal love that the only child gets from his parents that he develops into a confirmed egotist. He is never neglected in favor of sisters and brothers. He is the sole ruler of the household and his praises are constantly sung. It is, therefore, no wonder that the only child becomes vain and one-sided and develops an exaggerated opinion of himself. In later life he is extremely conceited, jealous and envious. He begrudges the happiness of friends and acquaintances and he is therefore shunned and disliked.² A favorite son, a bachelor of sixty-two years who was a wealthy retired merchant, told me that whenever there was a rise in the market he suffered from severe depression and fits of envy, simply because he knew that some of his friends would make money. He himself had no personal interest in the market. Such qualities are surely not conducive to

² A typical example is Joseph of the Bible; having been his mother's only son (Rachel died during the birth of Benjamin) and his father's favorite, he was despised and hated by his half-brothers.

happiness, and it is not at all surprising that almost all such children are selfish, unhappy and morose.

(b) The specific findings are of still greater interest. Of 400 cases observed years ago there were 172 men and 228 women. Their ages ranged from eighteen to sixty-eight years. The morbid manifestations were as follows:

The predominant feature in about 36 per cent of my cases was the abnormal sex life. Most of them sought treatment for homosexuality, psychic impotence (men) and sexual anæsthesia (women); there were also some exhibitionists, voyeurs, sadists and masochists. About 18 per cent suffered from the various types of dementia præcox. The rest represented the different forms of the psychoneuroses. I was unable to tabulate the hundreds of cases that I have observed since I had published these cases but I am quite certain that the percentages are about the same.

No statistical conclusions should be drawn from these figures, as most of these patients came, or were sent to me for treatment because they suffered from psychoneuroses or from the other maladies enumerated above. They show, however, the marked prevalence of only or favorite children in these classes. Bearing in mind our psychoanalytic knowledge of early impressions this is not at all surprising. As shown above, the foundations for one's later erotic life are mostly laid by the parent of the opposite sex. It primarily depends on the mother whether the son will pass through normally the various stages of psychosexual evolution. If for some reason she prevents him from giving up his infantile erotic activities by encouraging him to look for his love outlets in her only, he will perforce remain sexually speaking infantile, and hence abnormal. It is quite obvious that abnormal love in early life hinders the normal sexual evolution. It either keeps alive or later revives some of the early sexual activities. The boy cannot transfer his libido on other women because his mother stands in his way. As a rule this is

accomplished quite innocently under the guise of maternal care. Such mothers discourage social intercourse with the opposite sex because consciously they wish to preserve their son's purity, unconsciously they are extremely jealous of any other woman. This may also be conscious. A number of my homosexual patients told me that their mothers were actually jealous of every woman with whom they chanced to come in contact and behaved exactly as if they were confronted with a rival. No one is good enough for such children. At least that is what the parents think. This, by the way, explains the difficulties with mothers-in-law. They unconsciously want their sons for themselves and are jealous of every other woman. It is a sex jealousy pure and simple.³ The majority of only children

³ The deeper reasons, however, lying at the basis of the hostility between the proverbial mother-in-law and her son-in-law are explained by Freud in his *Totem und Taboo*. He first shows that among savages the world over there exist very stringent laws against any familiarity with one's mother-in-law. The son-in-law and mother-in-law are forced by the tribal laws to shun each other. They must run away or hide when they meet by chance. In civilized communities where, to the regret of many, there are no such laws, it is extremely common to find very strained, not to say hostile, feelings between mother-in-law and son-in-law. Freud uses the term coined by Bleuler to describe the feeling between mother-in-law and son. He thinks that the relation between them may be designated as "ambivalent," *i. e.*, it is made up of both affectionate and hostile feelings. Some of these feelings are quite clear. Thus, the mother-in-law dislikes to relinquish her daughter to a stranger whom she suspects, and shows a tendency to assume a domineering attitude to which she became accustomed in her own home. The son-in-law, on the other hand, is determined to resent any subordination on the part of his wife to the will of any stranger. He is jealous of all persons who once possessed his wife's love and, what is more, he dislikes to have his illusion of sexual overestimation disturbed. Such disturbance mostly emanates from the mother-in-law, who reminds him of his wife because of many common features between them, but who lacks all the attractions of youth, beauty and psychic freshness which give value to his wife.

Added to that there are unconscious motives. Whenever the psychosexual needs of the woman are to be gratified in marriage or

do not marry at all or they frequently marry some near relative whom they unconsciously identify with their parent image. The *probable average* of my patients' ages was thirty-four years, but only ninety-three out of the 400 had been married. Most of them remained old maids and bachelors.

There are many other forms of sexual maladjustments in family life she is always threatened by the danger of lack of gratification through a premature cessation of the marital relations or through the uneventfulness of her emotional life. The aging mother protects herself against it by living, as it were, in her children. It is said that one remains young with one's children. This is really the most valuable psychic gain accruing to the parents from their children. This living through the daughter proceeds in the mother to an extent that she falls in love with the man her daughter loves, which, in pronounced cases, leads to severe forms of neurotic disturbance brought on by the violent psychic conflicts. A tendency to love her son-in-law is frequently observed in the mother-in-law and either this feeling alone or its contrary emotion allies itself to the tumultuous struggling forces in her psyche. Quite often the son-in-law faces the hostile, sadistic components of the emotions of love which only serve to better repress the prohibited affectionate feelings.

The relations of the man to his mother-in-law are complicated by similar feelings which flow, however, from another source. As a rule the road of object selection leading to the love object is followed by the man over the images of his mother or perhaps his sister. The deflection of his first love from these beloved persons of his childhood is effected by the incest barriers in order that he should attain in a stranger this prototype. In place of his mother or the mother of his sister he is now confronted by the mother-in-law. This gives rise to a tendency to return to the prehistoric selection which is rapidly repressed. His incest shyness demands that he should not be reminded of the genealogy of his love selection. The rejection is facilitated by the actuality of the mother-in-law whom he did not know from the beginning of his existence and hence, unlike his mother's, her image does not remain unchanged in his unconscious. A special addition of attractiveness and repulsion to the emotional mixture allows the conjecture that the mother-in-law really represents an incestuous temptation for the son-in-law. On the other hand, it is not rare for a man to fall in love first with his future mother-in-law before turning his affection to her daughter.—

which one finds in such children, but as they are not necessarily peculiar to only or favorite children there is no need to dwell on them. I merely repeat that parental influences play a great part in both normal and neurotic individuals, but whereas the normal person gets away at least consciously from these dominations the neurotic remains anchored and succeeds only partially in freeing himself from them. This fixation is mainly responsible for psychic impotence, frigidity in women, and homosexuality, and its general influences can always be found in every psychoneurotic. I know an old bachelor of forty-five years, an only son, who slept with his mother until she died. He is a good business man and is said to be normal in every other respect. I have treated an old maid, a favorite daughter, who lost her father three years ago. She still wears black and cries bitterly at any allusion to her father. Her answer to my question as to why she still wore mourning was typical of many similar expressions that one hears from such patients. "Why shouldn't I? No one ever had such a kind, generous and self-sacrificing father. There is not another man like him in this world. Oh! how I love this man, etc." This may sound like pure filial love, but having analyzed her, I have definitely ascertained that she unconsciously loved her father as any woman loves a stranger. We can readily see why such persons cannot marry. This patient characteristically expressed it when she said: "If I could find a man like my father I would marry."

Judging from what was said about only or favorite children it would naturally be best for the individual as well as the race that there should be no only children. However, when this cannot be avoided by virtue of ill health or death of one of the parents the child need not necessarily become a neurotic and belong to any of the categories mentioned above. It all depends upon its subsequent bringing up.

When we read the history of only children we find that

only those who have been brought up in the manner described develop into abnormal beings, those who are not pampered and coddled have the same chances as other children. As classical examples we may mention Nero and Confucius; the former was a spoiled only child, while the latter was a well-bred only child. For a number of years I have been investigating only children from history and as far as I have gone I could mention quite a number of only children belonging to both types. As a matter of fact if properly brought up the only child actually possesses some attributes which tend towards leadership. Some of the greatest leaders in all walks of life were only children in the absolute or relative sense (only child for first few years). An only child should be made to associate with other children who will soon teach him that he is not the only one in the world. This should begin at a very early age. I have seen many "nervous and wild" only children who were completely changed after a few weeks' attendance in a kindergarten. This form of therapy is effective only when applied very early in life where the parents are aware that only childism is a bad disease. But even in such cases the only child traits can always be recognized. But what is still more important is that only children should not be gorged with parental love. Parents should take care that such children should not develop an exaggerated idea of their own personality and think that they are superior to everybody. For individuals imbued with such paranoid ideas are bound to come into conflict with their fellowmen. What is true of the individual may also be true of a race, and history furnishes us with a very nice example.

I refer to the only and favorite child of Jehovah, the Jewish race. The Bible tells us that the Jews are the "chosen people," "the only son," and even "the first-born." That the Jews have displayed all the attributes of the only or favorite child need hardly be mentioned. From the Bible we learn that they were stiff-necked, spoiled and

overbearing, and considered themselves superior to every other nation. Characteristics of such nature have been attributed to them by almost all writers of ancient and modern times, and although some are gross exaggerations it must nevertheless be admitted that they are essentially correct in reference to the Hebrews of antiquity and the modern orthodox European Jews. Still it is gratifying to note that this no longer holds true of the great bulk of western Jews who have enjoyed a couple of generations of freedom. The explanation of this change is given by Dr. M. Fishberg in his very interesting book. He plainly shows that "Judaism has been preserved throughout the long years of Israel's dispersion by two factors: its separative ritualism, which prevented close and intimate contact with non-Jews, and the iron laws of Christian theocracies of Europe which encouraged and enforced isolation." In other words, as long as the Jew has been imbued with the racial pride of belonging to the "chosen people" and has been offering daily prayers to Jehovah because he was not created a gentile, he perforce remained exclusive and therefore was suspected and disliked by his non-Jewish neighbors. When we study the history of the Jews we find that their enforced isolation was the result of an early, voluntary clannish exclusiveness. This shows the striking analogy to the only boy who at first refuses to associate with others because he believes himself superior to everybody else, and who is later excluded from social relations because he is misunderstood and disliked. Dr. Fishberg also tells us that as soon as the barriers are removed the Jews readily assimilate and all former prejudices disappear. The only boy, too, loses his identity as soon as he realizes that he is no better than his fellow beings.

More could be said in reference to this problem, but I must reserve that for the future. Perhaps the most important thing to remember is, that regardless of heredity, environments here definitely stamp the individual into a

certain type. For no matter how careful parents are to eliminate the only child attributes, the fact remains that any average child who is alone for the first few years of its existence always shows the only child traits. I do not find it difficult to pick out from among the people I meet former only or favorite children, even if they have made a good adjustment. To be sure, it is quite simple to diagnose the Aaron Burr type of only children.

Another point to remember is that the psychosexual life is a part of every individual and that the infantile part of it is the foundation of the adult sex life. Our civilization, which is based on renunciation, demands that much of the sex impulse should be sublimated to other aims and that the rest of it should be controlled, that is to say, that its actual biological rôle must be deferred for many years. When parents who are ignorant of these basic facts stimulate the child with much love, because the child offers them a love outlet, they not only spoil the normal mental evolution by interfering with the latency period, but the premature stimulation makes the child incapable of controlling his sex life when control is absolutely necessary. Such parents fail to see that love and sex are one and the same thing, and that the little boy who is gorged with love will continually need more and more of it and that mere kisses will not suffice at the prepubescent and pubescent age. Sex must and can only be controlled, but if the parents are shocked at the later manifestation of love and if they try to exterminate the whole impulse they reopen or keep alive some of the components and partial impulses of sex which are part of the infantile sexuality, and thus they usually make neurotics, perverts or inverts.

THE DOMAIN OF THE PEDANALYSIS¹

BY DR. OSKAR PFISTER (ZURICH)

Under pedanalysis, I understand in this connection an educational method practiced by professional teachers. I am well aware that this definition involves a certain arbitrariness. The analysis performed by a physician on a young person is also a pedagogic one. Even in the name, the difficulty of separating the medical analysis from the professional educational analysis is indicated.

I. THE RIGHTS OF THE PEDAGOGIC PSYCHOANALYSIS (A) THE ANALYSIS OF HEALTHY INDIVIDUALS

The treatment of the healthy pupil is solely a matter for the teacher. Pedagogy has to decide how far the healthy pupil may and should be analyzed. We have already expressed the opinion that an analysis of youthful persons is only to be undertaken when necessary, hence the healthy youth drops out of consideration. On the other hand, a good bit of psychoanalysis can be done without the youth's knowing it. The clever educator can guess from essays and symptomatic acts hundreds of important background processes which would otherwise remain hidden, as indeed the knowledge of humanity in general gains an unsuspected enrichment from psychoanalysis.

Little superficial analyses for the purpose of theoretical demonstration will naturally do no harm although it may be asked how far one may go in this direction. It would be bad, if, for instance, pupils of a teachers' seminary were to receive a half-understanding of the analysis and should make foolhardy attempts with this little knowledge. It seems obvious to me that the new educational work must

¹ From *The Psychoanalytic Method*, by Dr. Oskar Pfister. Reprinted by courtesy of the publishers, Dodd, Mead and Co., New York.

some time be known to every teacher. That every one should make practical use of it is not my intention.

An immense field of work is opened to the analyzing education in the salvation of those who are not sick in the medical sense, yet have their lives disturbed and destroyed as a result of continuing unconscious anachronisms. To-day, the analytic neurologist receives many of this class of persons. They treat with wonderful results sons who behave very badly at home and in school, daughters who suffer from fluctuating erotic conditions or female Don Juanism, unhappy marriages, etc., all, however, only when no severe constitutional defects are present. In so doing, they attain much better results than professional educators and pastors untrained in analysis, since they receive into their treatment almost entirely only individuals on whom the forenamed have tried their skill. Also, fatal distortions of character, religious abnormalities, ethical monstrosities do not belong so much in the keeping of the neurologist and psychiatrist as in that of the analytic pedagogue.

Likewise to the latter belongs the noble work of prophylaxis. But how can one rightly prevent disease who does not know its causes?

(B) THE RIGHT OF THE PEDAGOGIC ANALYSIS ON SICK CHILDREN

The analytic therapy is, as is admitted on all sides, a work of education. That far, the medical man invades the field of the pedagogue. The treatment of the sick, however, is an affair of the physician. If the pedagogue exercises his office on sick children, it may be asked whether he does not invade the rights of another profession.

So long as medicine followed, wholly or predominantly, physiological ways, a sharp division was possible. Should the professional educator, today, after the physician himself has become pure educator for a great number of patients, simply withdraw, or does he possess the right also to treat the mental conflicts when a medically patho-

logical trait appears, as he has these same processes to treat exclusively, when—I might almost say accidentally—no pathological sign appears?

I believe that every one is agreed in the view that physician and educator exist for the sake of the child, not the child for their sake. Consideration for the welfare of the child may thus be the supreme test for the decision of our problem. I will not boast, therefore, that historically, psychotherapy was for thousands of years an affair of the priests and other educators before the medical men engaged in it.

From this standpoint, the following considerations speak for a pedagogic analysis:

1. The great majority of physicians are not so familiar with the child mind as the teacher and pastor. The physician as physician studies people predominantly as physiologist, therewith knowing them according to the physical side; the pedagogue submerges himself early and late in the child mind and thereby adapts himself for the psychoanalysis, on a whole, more easily and quickly than the physician. Of course, the analytic neurologist will also much surpass the educator as student of the mind.

2. In many insignificant pathological symptoms, there is a large educational work to be performed. Hence, since a trespass by one profession upon the other is not to be avoided, the pedagogue commits far less usurpation than the physician.

3. A considerable percentage of all pupils in country and city are neurotics. Admonitions, punishments and promises are rendered of no account by the tyranny of the complexes, while the analysis, by setting the individual free from these inhibiting complexes, can work transformations in the life. Has the teacher now a right to dismiss from educational consideration such pupils, who are often the most valuable ones, the leaders of their classes, when, for example, a little stuttering or writing disturbance is exhibited?

4. The analysis of healthy individuals is best learned

on patients, because these show many phenomena most plainly and require the deepest exploration.

5. The teacher sees the neurosis when he understands it, earliest, and can therefore guard most efficiently against misfortune. He will also, as we shall soon show, direct the sufferer to the physician best adapted for handling this class of cases. When the teachers understand enough of pedagogic analysis, the physicians will receive more analytic work through them, for today much too few patients come into medical care within the period when they may be benefited. It is greatly to be desired that teachers should consult more with the physicians. In the neglect of this consultation, much harm is done by pedagogic ignorance.

6. The power of the physicians could never suffice to eliminate the vast array of neurotic disturbances. In particular, without pedanalysis, numerous poor children lose the benefit of appropriate help, since the physician, for reason of support of self and family, cannot give them his valuable time in sufficient amount, no matter how sympathetic he may be.

2. THE BOUNDS OF THE PEDANALYSIS

The danger and foolishness of a "wild" pedagogic analysis has been pointed out many times. I emphasize again the most important points:

1. The educator is often unable to tell whether a psychogenic or physiogenic disturbance is present. Even a clever physician is very often compelled to go to the specialists for a diagnosis. A pedagogue, who, for example, would drive away neuralgic pains, might easily consider every neuralgia as hysteria and apply the analysis in unwise manner. Now, to be sure, this work can do no harm directly, but under some circumstances it might consume time within which another treatment, for example surgical, might be applied with success.²

² Stekel, *Zur Differentialdiagnose organischer u. psychogener Erkrankungen*. Zbl. I, p. 45 ff.

2. Further, the educator cannot diagnose mental anomalies sufficiently well. Often he does not know whether hysteria or obsessional neurosis, catatonia or some other beginning psychosis is present. The suicide of a patient will be charged to him while the physician is excused when it happens to him. Further, the psychiatrist recognizes changes for the worse in mental disease earlier than the teacher.

3. THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EDUCATIONAL TREATMENT OF THE SICK

1. In all pathological cases which are not insignificant (analogous to the minor surgery of the barber), the pedagogue obtains the diagnosis from an analytic physician wherever possible and has him authorize the educational work. Dangerous cases, he will gladly renounce.

2. In the further course of the analysis, he will keep in touch with the physician where it is necessary, and, in case of need, obtain his advice.

3. The analyzing educator, in his work on patients, never considers himself as rival of the experienced physician but always as pupil, helper and co-worker.

If the educator adheres to these fundamental principles, he has good right to be recognized in his analytic work, not as layman but as professional. To this end, not only his office as professional educator aids him, but also his scientific training. It is beyond question that the psychoanalytic investigation and the elaboration of its technique has much of value to expect from keen-sighted educators and no physician will hesitate to accept this service gratefully.

Our experience agrees fully with the expressions which Prof. Freud has contributed to this book. Aside from him, there have spoken concerning this circumstance only physicians who understand nothing or almost nothing of psychoanalysis. That they are indignant when someone else does something which was denied to them, will neither

surprise nor disturb us. A real professional, Riklin, expresses himself thus: "Obviously, we must greet the collaboration of philologists, pedagogues and others with joy. We need them and have the greatest stimulus to expect from them. For psychoanalysis can never be limited to pathology. Further, it is very desirable that the educated world should acquire psychoanalytic knowledge. From the strictly medical standpoint, much is to be expected from this collaboration and a restriction of the neuroses in particular. The principle of the necessary liberation from the parents, the knowledge of the own personality, the conditions of marital competence, etc., must have an unconditional mitigating influence. Besides a prophylactic result, a therapeutic one must also be present. It will be less possible for the conflicts to hide behind the poor masks of the neurosis and happen less often that a patient can terrorize his whole environment. A number of conflicts, for example, those of puberty, will be judged quite differently and be led to rational solutions.

"Concerning the practice of analysis by non-physicians the following standpoint may well be taken: There are non-physicians of great psychological acumen and complete comprehension of psychoanalytic questions whose collaboration we very much need: in the assistance of the physician, in the education of neurotic children, etc. For the sake of order, we must wish that the patients treated by these non-physicians should have the diagnosis passed on by a physician schooled in analysis and that the latter should keep in touch with the course of the analytic treatment and help bear the responsibility. Against this formulation, it will be difficult to find an important objection.

"To declaim against the application of analytic knowledge in pedagogy and to want to forbid the pedagogue from that kind of conference with his pupils, seems to me unreasonable." ³

³ Riklin, *Ueber Psa.* Corr. bl. f. Schweizer Aertzte, 1912, No. 27, 1020 f.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND ORGANIC DISEASE¹

BY DR. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE (NEW YORK)

In 1914, an old friend came to my office and dramatically said, "For God's sake, save my wife. The doctors have given her six months to live, and I am out of my mind." In response to my question he said: "She has kidney trouble, a blood pressure of 240. And according to the doctors, unless she dieted, went to bed, did this and did not do that, she would die in six months."

I assured him that it could not be as bad as he said. He was upset and his fears had magnified what had been told him. I said I was sorry but did not specialize in kidney disease, etc. His attendant and consultant physicians were the best in the city; in fact, they had national repute and could be relied on. I knew his wife was of a very active type, but I said it would be better for her if she slowed down a bit and possibly gave up her plan of stumping the state for woman's suffrage, or what not.

He insisted on my doing something. So I told him I would send her to one of the city's best hospitals, to one of the best internists, and get as complete a balance sheet of her condition as I could get, and then, as he was an engineer, I would translate, as best I could, the Greek and Latin terminology of the medical lingo, into mechanical terms with which he was familiar.

So I did. She was examined by all the methods known to internists' lore of the time. She was under observation for two or three weeks. The problems involved were, clinically speaking, quite banal. There was a cardiovas-

¹ Reprinted by courtesy of Dr. Jelliffe.

cular-renal syndrome known to all medical men, and hypertension of from 220 to 240 mm. systolic pressure, with nephritis. The treatment prescribed was rest in bed, plenty of water, a restricted diet, plenty of restrictions. The prognosis was dubious and serious; she might live for some time if she followed the treatment indicated; if not she would probably die within a short time.

A woman, aged 36, married, children , , ,
nephritis-hypertension.

Symptoms

Headache four years. Blood pressure 240-250 mm. Albumin. Diminished urea output. Retention. Asthenia. Edema. Dyspnea. Constipation + + +. Slight momentary lapses.

Behavior

Able, energetic, cultivated interests in home, children, society. Two girls in family. Devoted father; beautiful, much admired mother. Large family group of professional people. Never peculiar. No eccentricities.

Unconscious

Oedipus evolutions, defective. Strong father fixation. Rejection of male. Homophilic. *Supremacy of genital zone*, defective. Urinary fixations. Strong anal erotic components.

Outline of Case.

I asked concerning the cause of the nephritis. The physician said it was the high tension. I said, "Why the high tension?" "The nephritis," he answered. "And where do we get off this circle?" "We don't," he asserted. And there we were. Of course, I am abbreviating the conversation. A review of the world's literature during the past four or five years on this problem shows that this is its present status. As Vidal, in answer to a similar inquiry I made to him last summer, at the close of a bril-

liant bedside clinic on almost a facsimile of my patient, said, "*C'est les mystères!* Internal medicine, so far as it has gone, cannot break into the circle, and looks, when it looks at all, at the 'mysteries.'"

When I explained to my engineer friend what I had been told, he saw the difficulty, but was surprised at the static position in which the internists left the case. I agreed with him. After much discussion I finally consented to make a tentative appraisal of the intrapsychic situation and try to determine whether, in terms of what has here been formulated, there was any look in on the dynamic side.

Within two weeks it was quite apparent that the unconscious material afforded illuminating glimpses of some of the "mysteries," and told us *why the organism as a whole* was not functioning satisfactorily, although I was not able in that time to determine why the cardiovascular-renal components were the structures which showed the most evident signs of breakdown (that is, from present day clinical criteria).

I then proposed to conduct a research. If, in the crude thought of centuries, the mind was said to influence the body, what could the refinements of analytic technic show as to such influences? Or, since modern psychopathology rejects this setting off of opposites, body versus mind, what could such a technic show as to the mental, that is, the symbolic level activities, going on in the individual? These the internist knows little about, except as he mouths such vague monstrosities as "nervous," or "emotional" or "psychic." The internist is, for the most part, working at the physico-chemical level. Like Yank, in O'Neill's *Hairy Ape*, he thinks he "belongs" because he stokes the fires. He is iron and steel. Our present internist's conception of the "human machine" is as crude as Yank's conception of the world which broke him. I am not unmindful of the legitimate protest against such a statement, as evidenced, for example, in Kraus' *Allge-*

meine Pathologie der Person, in which, fortunately, it may be seen that internal medicine is breaking away from the static molds of descriptive science which have been building up too onesidedly for the past fifty years. Nevertheless, I maintain that when the time comes that Claude Bernard dreamed of—"when the physiologist, the philosopher, and the poet would talk the same language, and understand each other"—a true science of medicine will be possible. That time has not yet arrived. We have a few physiologists, but where are the medical philosophers? As for seers in medicine, they are too few and are mostly despised and rejected of men. I need only refer to one medical poet, philosopher, and physiologist, who after thirty years of contumely and most prejudiced criticism, is finally recognized as a genius, and whose illumined hypotheses are making it possible to understand the enormous rôle that psychopathology plays, not only in the neuroses and psychoses, but in what is termed constitutional disease. But to return to our patient:

I cannot recapitulate all the evidence, but the very first finding in the "unconscious" contained some interesting material. While in the hospital she had dreamed the following which was a seminightmare:

"There was a road along which two men were driving like mad in single-horse racing sulkies. As they went by in a cloud of dust, a woman with disheveled hair came from a house facing the road wringing her hands and screaming at the top of her voice. The men and horses went up a steep hill, and as one reached the top he turned sharply to the left and ran into a stone wall about two feet high and smashed the sulky all to pieces."

Now I know to the nonanalytically trained observer this means as little as the sight of a small red stained rod under the microscope means to one who does not know anything about the tubercle bacillus.

To the patient I said, "What about it?"

"About what?" she said.

"Well, imagine yourself one of those riders."

"I'd be crazy," she said.

Well, I said, "It looks as if somebody was destroying something, at all events, and maybe the *wish* to destroy has something to do with your own breakdown. Let us go further." Then her free associations were obtained, and for several sessions we worked on this dream.

To give the results of these investigations in extenso would be as wearisome as to give in minute detail all of the intricate directions for carrying out a Wassermann test. The general findings showed an obvious difficulty in her object choice. According to the principles of the Œdipus hypothesis, she showed a strong unconscious father fixation. He was the man of the sulky. A part of him, the one that ran into the stone wall and smashed up the machine, was related to the incestuous component of an infantile fixation period; but to the student of unconscious processes as modified through the dream work, and as further extended by the technic of free associations, an enormous amount of material may be recorded, just as the physician who finds the tubercle bacillus in a patient's sputum has opened up an enormous amount of material heretofore unknown.

Here, then, one finds the first obvious failure in the energy delivery system, since it had become fixed (conditioned) for infantile rather than for adult psychosexual functioning. The psychopathologist can envisage some high voltage energy seeking an adequate pathway for discharge (*racing horses on the road*), and not finding the adequate outlet, backfires and creates havoc somewhere in the machine. This is the general rough idea. Can an analytic Franklin conceive, with his kite and string, how to determine the line of discharge? That is, can the analytic technic show why the cardiovascular-renal structures were chosen as the lightning rod for grounding this faultily delivered energy? If so, then, in general, we

have the leading features of our problem laid bare: *faulty psychosexual evolution* in terms of *object choice*, and *supremacy of the genital zones*.

Every psychopathologist working with the analytic technic knows that the stage of the Œdipus formula turns up fairly early in an analysis. It may be that Freud's genius in pointing out the way enables us to recognize the main indicia of difficulties in its development. The traveler from New York to San Francisco recognizes Buffalo, Chicago, St. Paul, Denver, Salt Lake City as stopping places on the road; so the analyst can observe the symbolizations of the *Archaic*, *Organic*, *Narcisistic* and *Social* stages in the growth of the individual to adult psychosexual development. But there are innumerable stations between these larger more or less arbitrarily named stopping places. The libido is, however, ever on the go. It stops nowhere. It is the insufficiency of the intellect that creates the need of static stopping places, of giving dead names to dynamic processes.

Psychopathology is still working to analyze the displacements, the side tracking, splittings, and condensations of energy traversing the somatic segmental pathways in the evolutionary urge toward a truly creative use of the segmental structures.

Judging from conscious criteria, the fact that our patient had four children all growing up and free from gross defect would argue that the supremacy of the genital zone had reached an adult stage in the plan of psychosexual evolution. This is the general intellectual conception. But on looking over the accumulating dream material, a sufficient number of reasons are found which tend to explain why the patient was frigid in her intercourse with her husband, even frigid to manual or any type of contact with the genitals. The evidence was plain that a fixation had taken place even before the clitoris could serve as a guide to the zone supremacy. There was

plainly indicated in the dream material that vesical and urethral fixations were conditioned and that no supremacy had been reached beyond this stage.

Marked constipation which had resisted over twenty years of attempted treatment by scores of procedures was soon traced to its anal erotic sources—another libido displacement—and was effectively relieved in a few months. One bit of dream evidence bearing on the anal eroticism is worthy of record. After I had known the patient about eighteen months and she had been free from constipation for over a year, she had a short period of relapse. She came in one day and laughingly asked me what I thought of this dream:

She and B. (her maid) were trying to smuggle a couple of boxes filled with long bottles into a small closet on the second floor. It was locked from the inside and she had to descend to the cellar and ascend a circular staircase in order to unfasten this closet door. As she started going up the circular staircase she noticed a Chinese mask on the wall of the cellar.

"The bottles?" I asked. "Pluto. Isn't the dream a cute one? It looks as if my attack of constipation was hankering for some gratification."

"But why the Chinese mask and the circular staircase?" This was addressed to me.

The Chinese mask was soon resolved as Father. The circular staircase, her intestinal tract. Further analysis resolved the outlines of the pederastic aspect of the anal erotic wish. Whereas it seems a far cry from Fabre's story of the impregnated spider who immediately devours her mate for food for the offspring, it is by no means an unrecognized factor in certain human matings that the "bringing home the bacon" for the sake of support of self and children (often the latter being but narcissistic replicas of the self) is, if not the chief motive, certainly near consciousness. In this connection the myth of Lot's wife

and the story of Sodom and Gomorrah would repay reading in the light of unconscious fixations.²

The temporary constipation regression cleared up, and for seven years now there has been no necessity for treatment for constipation. The constipation, that is, the anal erotic fixations also showed on analysis much concealed sadistic material directed toward the homo-sexual, much envied mother (unconscious), displaced and concealed behind the heterosexual, husband-father image. This mother rivalry also was marked (unconscious) and hidden behind urinary phantasies. In childhood water plays were adored. They were numerous and were followed with fascinated excitement; copious, almost abnormal, water drinking afforded greater somatic outlet as well. The urinary gratifications were all of this intense quality. They thus demanded a large renal output, and they got it. In a complicated and subtle manner from the ages of 3, 4 and 5 years, the unconscious urinary phantasies made use of the cardiovascular-renal mechanism to gratify an almost feverish urge to overcome the mother and later the mother imago (homosexual) substitutes. Hence the constant narcissistic homosexual unconscious symbolizations which throughout the entire analysis were persistent sign-posts of the retardation in complete psychosexual development, both as to object choice and to supremacy of the genital zones.

It would take many more hours to present the complete analysis, but I hope I have given a glimpse of the problems as seen from the analytic standpoint.³

² Cf. Jones, *The Symbolism of Salt, in the Unconscious*. Collected papers, 2d. ed. William Wood & Co., New York, 1921.

³ Jelliffe, S. E., *Paleopsychology. A tentative sketch of the Evolution of Symbolic Function*, *Psychoanalytic Rev.*, April, 1923

THE MEANING OF THE DREAM SYMBOLISM ¹

BY DR. WILHELM STEKEL (Vienna) -

Translated by Dr. James S. Van Teslaar (Boston)

The art of dream interpretation is a most ancient one. Some of the oldest documents relate to dream interpretations. The dream was considered an intermediary between the higher forces of nature and mankind. Usually it was the voice of divinity that was speaking through the medium of dreams. But demons and evil powers, too, were capable of coming into contact with man through the dream life. That was a period which we, belonging to a sophisticated age, can hardly visualize. "The lights and shadows and the coloring, at any rate, have changed," says Nietzsche. "We no longer understand precisely how ancient mankind felt about the most ordinary and common facts of life—about daylight and about waking up; for instance: *because the ancients believed in dreams, their waking life had another coloring.*"

Contrary to the learned men, the simple folk have never looked upon dreams as "foam." Within their soul there persisted a belief in the reality of this psychic experience. But the belief rested stubbornly on what might be termed the "historic" background: the people wanted to interpret the future through the dream. The dream was looked upon as the infallible prophet. Whoever could interpret dreams possessed the gift to solve the riddle of the future. A derivation of this belief is the application

¹ Reprinted from *Sex and Dreams*, by Wilhelm Stekel, M. D. Translated by James S. Van Teslaar, M.D. Richard G. Badger, Publisher. Boston.

of the dream to mercenary ends. The transposition of the dream pictures into figures is diligently practiced to this day and plays a great rôle among the people.² The "cultured" classes regard it as their duty superiorily to smile at such practices. They look upon the dream as a meaningless play of the phantasy uncontrolled by consciousness. Even so, ordinary reflection should have suggested the thought that here was raw material of great psychic value, though in a distorted form. We ought to see what we can make out of it. Here and there an investigator occasionally tried to penetrate the riddle of dreams. But these promising beginnings only led to far-fetched theories.³

Anatole France is justified when he states: "I am firmly convinced that the power of dreams is greater than that of reality." The dream is the bridge between the real and the supersensory world. The ancient peoples knew this better than we. They believed in dreams and through the dream they felt themselves nearer their divinity.

Divinity is the projection of our ideal into infinity. What we demand of our ideal self appears to us as God's command. All appearances of self are continually referred to an ideal that stands supreme. Hence the first conception about the origins of dreams—that the dream is a gift sent down by the gods. The divine voice commands and warns, it announces and praises through the dream. The dream interpreter of former ages claimed

² I want to take this opportunity to state that I have not disdained to look over the various Egyptian and Persian Dream books. I wanted to find out whether our knowledge derived through the modern analysis of dreams is in any way corroborated in the old writings. That is but rarely the case. The dream books, so-called, which circulate among the people, impress me as being deliberate artifacts. The transposition of dream pictures into numbers is clearly traceable to the lottery game which is only a few centuries old.

³ The extensive literature on dreams has been adequately considered by Freud to whose work the interested reader is referred

the gift of understanding that secret language and to be able thereby to foretell the future.

But not only is the ideal self projected into infinity. The evil self is also refracted outwardly and it reflects back as temptation or as the influence of demonic powers. The naïve conception of the Middle Ages was that the dream represents a struggle between heaven and hell, a contest between God and Satan. That combat has always fascinated man's fancy. From Job and Jesus down to Faust and Parsifal,—what a wealth of poetic creations!

It is the eternal warfare between instinct and repression, between man, in his primordial character, and himself, under the tinsel of culture, which breaks forth in this wonderful symbolic picture. Our culture requires the continual repression of our cravings. The higher man ascends upon the cultural scale the stricter are the laws which impose the ethical strictures of the society in which he finds himself. Culture means smooth-working inhibition. The greater the social freedom, i.e., the stronger the social rights of the individual, the smaller becomes the span of his individual freedom; the stricter also the limitations which the individual must impose upon himself for the benefit of all. Social progress is based on the annihilation of individualism.

The dream represents an indulgence in fancies without the intervention of consciousness or under a limited control by the latter. The dream is a hallucination. Consciousness is the bearer of inhibitions. The ethical self first assumes control of consciousness and then it attempts to penetrate into the depths of the unconscious. Hence the cleft which arises between the pictures of the waking self and the hallucinations of the dream. Conscience is the sum of all inhibitions of a religious and ethical character. The term conscience in itself shows that it pertains to a knowledge of good and evil. The primitive man has no such knowledge. He is familiar only with the promptings of his cravings; with unpleasure, which arises out of

the non-fulfillment of wishes and with the pleasure which accompanies and follows their gratification. The primordial man in us lives again in the dream.

But the tremendous gap which exists between the requisites of our cultural and those of our elemental self leads eventually to a strange state of affairs. The cultural self knows not, or assumes not to know, the primordial self. It fails to recognize the language of the dream and thus carries out more completely its attitude of "innocent" ignorance. For that reason, too, the dream portrays its images in a secret symbolic language. Its language is the language of the primordial man. For man's aboriginal ancestor also expressed himself in symbolic form. The earliest written documents are symbolic writings. A sword signifies fight, a tree nature, lightning divinity, etc. The art of dream interpretation consists of transposing this symbolic language into everyday terms.

What is the function of the dream? We pass over the old conception according to which the dream was merely a senseless play of mental elements; we disregard likewise the ancient hypotheses which were based on the premise of an intervention of evil powers. We turn directly to the theory of Freud, who regards the dream as a wish fulfillment.

"Our relations to the world,"⁴ states Freud in his latest writing on dreams, "is from the outset such that we cannot endure it without a break. Therefore we withdraw from time to time into the primordial state,—that state which is characteristic of our intra-uterine existence. At least we create for ourselves an environment very close to it: warmth, darkness, and absence of stimuli. Some of us curl up and actually assume during sleep a position very close to that which is characteristic of the infant when resting within the mother-body. It looks as if the world does not possess us wholly as adults, it can lay claim only to two-thirds of us: for one-third of our existence we are

⁴ A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Boni & Liveright Publishers, New York.

as if we were yet unborn. Every rising in the morning is thus like a new birth."

Hebbel has expressed the same thought more fittingly without recourse to the dubious notion of a sinking back into the intra-uterine state: "Sleep is a sinking into one's self." I have expressed the same idea in my monograph, *The Will to Sleep*, as follows: "Sleep means reëxperiencing one's past, forgetting one's present, and pre-feeling one's future."

This one example from Freud's latest work is enough to show the one-sided character of his conception of dreams. The dream is and remains for him a wish fulfillment. Into this procrustean bed of wish he wedges in every dream. Thus he neglects altogether the telepathic dreams which do not happen to fit in with his theory. He does not believe in telepathic dreams. But he brushes aside also all other dreams, which we must recognize as denoting warning or anxiety as well as the dreams which we may call "instructive." Anxiety is always for him the sign of a repressed wish. But knowing that the dream portrays the eternal warfare between craving and inhibition, the struggle of man with himself under his dual aspect as the heir of primordial instincts and as the representative of culture, we must look upon the dream as a picture of both sides of the combat, a dramatization in which the cravings as well as the inhibitions find pictorial representation, and in which even foreign thoughts may crop out through telepathic means. If one sees only the cravings, one may be easily led to the erroneous conception which I myself have held for a time, that the dream is merely a wish fulfillment. For back of every wish there always stands some craving: the sexual instinct, the nutritional instinct, the craving for power, for self-aggrandizement, etc. But if we investigate the inhibitions we find back of them also the influences of culture: warnings, preparation for the future, foreshadowings, religiosity and moral restrictions of every kind.

Perhaps my conception will be more clear if I contrast it with Freud's in connection with a concrete illustration. In the work mentioned above Freud relates a peculiar dream and adds his interpretation. He states:

"One of my patients had lost her father during the treatment. Since then she takes every opportunity to find him again in her dreams. In one of her dreams the father appears in a certain connection . . . and says: 'It is a quarter past eleven, half past eleven, it is a quarter of twelve.' Towards the solution of this strange dream feature the patient recalls merely that the father always wanted to see the children gather for their meals on time. That undoubtedly had something to do with the dream element in question but this association yields no light on its meaning. On account of certain considerations which arose in the course of the treatment the suspicion seemed justified at the time that a carefully repressed, critical revulsion against the beloved and honored father had its share in this dream. Continuing further her associations, apparently in a direction remote from the dream proper, the subject relates that she had listened the day before to a lengthy psychologic discussion when a relative said: 'The primordial man lives in each of us!' We now think we understand her. That gave her an excellent chance to conjure into life once more her deceased father. She made him in the dream the primordial man, by having him call out the quarter hours for the noon meal. [*Urmensch-Uhrmensch*, savage—"Father Time," or *lit.*, primordial man—clock man, a play on words!]"

Any one finding this play of words between *Uhrmensch*, clock man, and *Urmensch*, primordial man, rather forced, will be informed by the genial master that the dream is capable of punning and wit. The dreamer wishes to see her father, and the obliging dream fulfills her wish. Therefore, a typical clear wish fulfillment—according to Freud. I would have conceived this dream as a warning. The death of her father had strongly influenced the patient and caused her thoughts to shift from worldly to supermundane themes. She is interested in the question of life

after death. This earthly life must be but a preparation for the life eternal. It is as if the father cried out to her: "Life is short! Use your days well! Soon twelve bells will strike (the ghost hour). Soon your day will be over!"

The flight of time is very ingeniously indicated by the progressive admonition: "a quarter past eleven, half past eleven, a quarter of twelve." Since the neurosis expresses the struggle between craving and repression under the form of an ailment, we may appreciate the patient's trouble. A power draws her towards indulgence and enjoyment and another pulls her in the direction of renunciation and self-control. The father appears as the representative of authority (also of the divine) and admonishes her: "Renounce all earthly joys and prepare thyself for God's judgment, for the life eternal. The day of judgment is near."

But is this dream a wish fulfillment? If the father appeared in response to her wish, conjured up (hallucinatorily) by her yearning to see him again, would he have found no other words, no kindlier attitude, with which to approach his child? I see in this dream merely the power of conscience. I sense the torturing anxiety, I note the racking regret over a life misspent or lost, I hear an anguishing outcry which fills me with compassion.

This dream is a warning and it foreshadows at the same time the subject's future. She will continue to wander on the path of asceticism and self-denial. Letters of flame proclaim in the subject's dream the approach of that end which overtakes every one.

And—what about the character of the dream? It is a wish or a warning, according to the power (craving or inhibition) which pervades it. The dream seeks solutions for unsolvable problems. It is an apposition of past and present and a foreshadowing of the future. Its realm is inexhaustible and it is not to be encased within the narrow limits of a formula. The dream is in fact as inexhaustible as the riddle of man and yet as transparent as a man, pro-

vided one does not start out with any preconceived notions. Are the thoughts of a person in the waking state reducible to a single formula? Do we think merely in terms of wish fulfillment? This question is rendered superfluous when we take into consideration the factor of conscience alone. The dream is the stream of our mental life as it flows out of the unexplored depths through the filter of conscience and up to the level of awareness.

Every falling asleep is a dying for the day. Every waking up is a rebirth. The thought of death reveals itself in curious pictures in the dreams. Though we forget the fact of death during the day, and though the bustle of daily existence may stifle the voice of conscience, the dream brings back to our mind the eternal "memento mori!" Each one of us hears the admonishing voice: "It is a quarter of twelve!" And we hear it in the midst of our entangling wishes,—we hear the swan song in the midst of all the frivolous cravings. And thus we die many times, and we pass again and again through the last accounting—thus we look over our past critically, appraisingly, amidst fears and regrets. Every night provides a cleansing purgatory for our world of thoughts. Within us lies heaven and earth—within us judge and defendant alike. It is as if the ideal which we have shifted to infinity at night finds the path back to us again, as if we are trying every night to overcome once more the demons which incite us from one indulgence to another and which fill our childish heart with envy and with feelings of revenge, with treacherous self-seeking and forbidden cravings. And every dream dramatizes plastically this bitter combat, every dream is a proof that humanity strives to grow out of itself and up towards unsuspected heights. In Grillparzer's ⁵ wonderful drama, *Traum ein Leben*, we

⁵ *Vide.* Analysis of this drama in my: *Poetry and Neurosis*, Contributions to the Psychology of the Artist and of Creative Activity. English version by Dr. James S. Van Teslaar has appeared serially in *The Psychoanalytic Review* and will be published shortly as a monograph.

find a wonderful expression of this function of the dream as a warning, as a picture of the struggle between craving and inhibition. The artist has furnished us in this poetic drama the key to the understanding of dreams.

But we must be grateful to Freud for having shown us the path leading into the realm of dreams and for having been the first to penetrate with the pioneer's keen eye the veil which has kept the dream a secret. Today the interpretation of dreams has become an indispensable aid in the practice of psychotherapy. Any one intending to be helpful as a psychotherapist must familiarize himself with the art of dream interpretation.

It is not an easy art to acquire. It requires special training and a great deal of patience. It involves careful testing for one's self of the results thus far gained until one acquires the requisite knowledge and conviction through personal observation and experience.

The proper schooling for the interpretation of dreams involves an appropriate new conception of language, the keen tracing of double meanings and familiarity with symbolisms and with the processes of dream distortion.

The rôle of symbolism in human life is not yet sufficiently appreciated. "All art is symbolism," states Feuchtersleben. "The most important task of my career," states Hebbel, speaking as an artist, "I regard the symbolization of my inner life." Symbolism pervades all our existence. Language, customs, beliefs and thoughts are more or less cryptic symbolisms.

Without knowledge of symbolism the interpretation of dreams is an impossible task.

The proper training for dream interpretation consists of learning to read aright its language, of tracing the double meanings and of becoming familiar with the symbolisms and processes of dream distortion.

The significance of symbolism in human life is still but insufficiently recognized. "*All art is but symbolism,*" states Feuchtersleben. "*The most important task of my*

career," declares Hebbel, "*I regard the symbolization of my inner life.*" Symbolism pervades all our life. Language, customs, peculiarities, thoughts—all are more or less hidden symbolisms. To Rudolf Kleinpaul belongs the credit of having shown up the tremendous significance of symbolism, through his various works, particularly, his *Sprache ohne Worte* (Language without Words) and his more elaborate work entitled, *Das Leben der Sprache* (Leipzig, Wm. Friedrich, 1888).

What is truly a symbol?

Riklin states: ⁶

"A symbol is a sign, an abbreviation for something more elaborate. When I look over a railroad time table and find a 'postal sign' in the form of the familiar horn mark, against the name of a station, it enables me to know that the station has postal connections with places not on that line.

"But the symbol stands for more than that. Why does not some other sign stand for postal connections in the railroad time guide? The postal horn is something that originally belonged to the postal service. Although no longer an essential part of that service it was formerly one of its most conspicuous signs, impressive both to the eye and to the ear. Thus we find here two additional features which belong to the symbol. The sign chosen for a symbol stands in associative inner, as well as outer, relationship to the thing it signifies and is meaningful. It is particularly fitting as a symbol on account of its history and development in connection with the thing it signifies, although its importance in that connection is not without its fluctuations. At the present time we no longer have the long-distance drivers lustily blowing their horn. But the horn persists as a sign in the railroad time guides, in military service denoting the field postal station, and in various other connections.

"Usually the concept symbol embodies also something

⁶ *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, II, Franz Deuticke, Wien u. Leipzig, 1909.

mystical (or mysterious). Symbols are frequently used as signs of recognition among members of secret organizations, as for instance, the signs among the Freemasons. The 'mysterious' feature consists of the fact that only the initiated is familiar with the meaning of the sign. That was the case, for instance, with the Runic Characters, which only certain persons could read; that, too, is what lends churchly ceremonials their power of impressing the human sensitive mind. Developmental history and the changes in meaning incidental thereto are enough to obscure the true meaning of the symbol to all but the initiated.

"Because the symbol is only a sign, only a part of the original thing which it stands for, in the course of its developmental history it may gradually assume varied significance and stand for a number of things: the postal horn may be variously taken, in a psychologic sense, and may mean any one of a number of things according to the locality, or circumstances: it may mean 'junction' when placed against the station name in a railroad time guide, or 'postal connection' when found in a circular. In a distant mountain village it means one thing, on a uniform sleeve it stands for something else.

"This indication of possible meanings shows that the sign or symbol stands for a summation or fusion of all the possible associations. It is characteristic of the dream symbol, for instance, that it takes in thousands of association paths. This leads to many-sidedness and the 'shadowy sense' of the symbol lends itself, for that reason, to a number of plausible interpretations. Any one who is not experienced and does not know the symbol in all its possible applications, may interpret it falsely or only in a sense with which he happens to be familiar. The Bible, for instance, has the advantage—and disadvantage at the same time—of containing numerous symbols which may be interpreted in any one of various ways." (*Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen.*)

Without a knowledge of symbolism the interpretation

of dreams is impossible. The great fault of modern dream interpreters was precisely the fact that they knew nothing about symbolism. The ancients were further advanced in that respect. How impressive is the symbolism of dreams set forth in the Bible! And how completely rounded out appears the symbolism of Artemidoros of Daldis, whose book entitled *The Symbolism of Dreams* is worthy of the modern psychoanalyst's attention.⁷

Before beginning to describe the art of dream interpretation proper let us turn our attention briefly to the Bible dreams and to the Greek art of interpretation. I know no more fitting examples for introducing the subject of dream symbolism.

The best known is the dream interpretation of Joseph, found in the first book of Moses. Joseph owed his high position entirely to his extraordinary ability to interpret properly his master's dreams. The first dream which he told his brothers was:

(1) *We tied sheafs on the field and my sheaf stood upright; and your sheafs bowed before my sheaf.*

The brothers at once interpreted the dream to mean that Joseph will surpass them: "Shalt thou be our king and rule over us?" Even we children of this age could not interpret the dream otherwise. Only we are able to conclude from it that it is the dream of an ambitious person. And since ambition carries one far, especially when one is endowed with the necessary wisdom and with indefatigable energy, we are justified to surmise favorable augury regarding the future of any one whose youth is filled with such dreams.⁸

⁷ There is an excellent German translation of this work by Friedr. S. Krauss (Hartleben, Vienna, 1881). Unfortunately, the most significant portion, *The Symbolism of the Sexual Processes*, has been omitted. Dr. James S. Van Teslaar's English version is an unabridged rendering from the original text.

⁸ In modern dreams "ambition" is symbolized by modern means: the ambitious person flies high above the heads of others in a

The second of Joseph's dreams also denotes similar ambition:

(2) *I thought the sun and the moon and the eleven stars bowed before me.*

This dream led to his supposed perdition and was the beginning of his miraculous good luck. Equally remarkable are Joseph's further interpretations of dreams:

(3) *The seven ugly starved cows, which eat up the seven fat cows*

he genially interpreted as seven years of famine which were to follow seven years of abundance.

These interpretations exhibit a remarkable grasp of dream symbolism.

The art of dream interpretation was similarly developed among the Greeks, and I quote two examples from Artemidoros (*loc. cit.*, p. 236):

(4) *Some one dreamed of being tied with a chain to the post of Poseidon. He became a priest of Poseidon; for in that position he could not get away from the holy place.*

This glimpse into the future is as clever as the next prophecy of Artemidoros which I shall presently relate. No one becomes a priest who did not first wish it, unless he were coerced. . . .

The second dream from the work of Artemidoros shows a symbolism to which we will have occasion frequently to revert. In that dream picture the sexual is represented as flesh: the sensuous in man, through the animal flesh.

(5) *Some one dreamed of seducing and sacrificing his own wife, of bartering with and offering her flesh for sale, and that he earned a great sum thereby. Thereupon he dreamed that he was very joyful over it and he attempted to hide the money he had gained, on account of the jealousy of those around.*

"That man eventually sold his own wife and made balloon, aeroplane, or according to the good old fashion, as an angel. Sometimes the flight through air is carried on without wings, merely by swaying the limbs or the body.

money out of the shameful deed. That source of income proved very profitable, but he found it necessary to keep the matter from any one's knowledge."

In the case of that man, too, wish was father to the thought—and that, long before the deed. He first dreamed what he lacked the courage of carrying out. As he could look upon the dream as an order from the gods, that dream led to a course of action which he might have adopted even in the absence of the dream. Possibly only in a short time. The dream is a dream of impatience. The dreamer can hardly wait to sell his wife and acquire the gain.

From the art of dream interpretation of the East one might also draw some excellent examples. I limit myself to one account of a jest of Buadem (literally "*that man*"), a name which, according to Dr. Müllendorf, is only a pseudonym devised by Mehemed Tewfik, the publisher, for the well-known Jester-Poet, Nassr-ed-din. This Turkish *Eulenspiegel* is supposed to have "flourished" during the fourteenth century.

Buadem was not quite five or six years of age, when he related the following dream to his father:

(6) "*Father, last night I have seen fancy cakes in my dream.*"

"*My son, that has a good meaning.*" (Jokingly): "*Give me ten paras (the smallest monetary unit current in Constantinople) and I will interpret the dream for you.*"

"*If I had ten paras, I would not be dreaming of cakes.*"⁹

Let us now take a long jump all the way into the sixteenth century and turn our attention to a dream of the famous physician, philosopher and mathematician, Cardanus, author of a book, *De Somniis*, and whose faith in the prophetic truth of his dreams was so unshakable that he chose his wife, the daughter of a highway robber, after a resemblance with a face he had seen in dreams; the

⁹ *Die Schwanke des Nassr-ed-din und Buadem*. Reklam Bibliothek, 2735.

dream had prophesied for him the awakening of his passion, previously dormant, in that particular woman's company. He had been impotent up to his thirty-fourth year. That an impotent man should crave entrance into the "garden of love" any one may easily understand. Here is how Cardanus relates the story:

(7) *One night I found myself in a beautiful garden of flowers and fruit. A soft air pervaded everything so that no painter, no poet, no human thought could have conjured up anything more charming. I was at the entrance to that garden. The gate was open and I saw a girl clad in white. I embraced and kissed her; but at the very first kiss the gardener bolted the gate close. I begged him most fervently to leave the gate open. It seemed to me that I felt sad about it and I was still clinging to the girl when I was locked out.*

What is a man of rich imagery likely to dream about when the garden of love closes on him? This beautiful example shows us the day wish in a symbolism but partly covered up. But the symbolism is not always so obvious and plain as in this example. Often the whole dream is devoted to a symbolic dramatization. I want to avoid for the present the more complicated problems which we shall have to consider later. I shall merely quote an example from Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* showing how the dream expresses colloquialisms through pictures.

A lady dreams:

(8) *A servant girl climbs on the ladder, as if preparing for window cleaning and carries a chimpanzee and a gorilla cat (later corrected to angora cat) with her. She throws the animals at the dreamer; the chimpanzee clings to the latter, who finds this very disagreeable.*

"This dream has achieved its end through the simplest of means, namely, by taking a colloquialism literally and representing the picture to which it gives rise. 'Monkey,' like almost any animal name, is a derogatory term, and the dream situation merely depicts the colloquialism 'mit

Schimpfworten um sich werfen, 'hurling insult,' (Interpretation of Dreams, translated by Brill.)

Occasionally we are compelled thus to reduce the situations and pictures of a dream back to *Redewendungen*, "colloquialisms." The dream takes words in a literal sense; we must conceive the processes pictorially. That requires a special art and particular practice. Both must be acquired.

In order to illustrate what I have just stated I record now a brief dream with a very significant content. Beta,¹⁰ a man suffering from anxiety, has the following dream:

(9) *I see before me a large wooden picture of the Christ. I take a chip out of it.*

This dream is also to be understood in a symbolic sense. The dreamer is still a believer at heart, even strongly so, though outwardly a fanatic free thinker. The day before the dream he had read a book, entitled *La Folie de Jésus* (The Insanity of Jesus).¹¹ Suddenly he had to give up the reading. He is unable to state why. It was a compulsive-like act. Like a commandment: *Now, quit reading!* The deeper reasons for this compulsion-like act are revealed in this dream. *Er hat sich etwas gegen seine Gottheit herausgenommen* [a German colloquialism not unlike our "chip on the shoulder" expression].

The further significance of this dream and the relationship between anxiety and wish need not be taken up at this time. For the present I have merely attempted to indicate in a few general lines the foundations of dream symbolism. *The understanding of symbolism forms the basis of dream interpretation.* We have had even before Freud some intimation of the rôle of symbolism in human

¹⁰ For the subjects whose dreams are repeatedly quoted I have adopted substitutive designations in the form of Greek letters. The names of all persons are changed so as to make their recognition impossible. That is a strong disadvantage in a work of this character. But it cannot be done otherwise. Discretion is the first duty of the psychotherapist.

¹¹ Dr. Binet-Sanglé, *La Folie de Jésus* (Paris, Maloine, 1908).

life. Schubert and Kleinpaul, for instance, have dwelt on the symbolic conception of life as a whole. These investigators have also boldly pointed out the sexual symbolism. Is it not remarkable that our language [the author here refers, naturally, to the German] distinguishes words according to their gender?

When we take up the dream analysis we are impressed with the far-reaching extent of our symbolic thinking and particularly of sexual symbolism. In the dream anything oblong may represent the penis and any round object may stand for the vagina. But is that the case only in dreams? One should consult what Kleinpaul has to say on the subject in his work entitled *Das Leben der Sprache*, already mentioned, particularly the chapter on *Die Psychopathia Sexualis des Volkes* (*loc. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 490). He points out that language as a whole is sexualized and symbolized. Language is full of sexual symbols.

"Indeed, the human race is love-mad," says Kleinpaul. "Whichever way we turn we meet perpetually her phantasy, half morbidly, half foolishly centered on the sexual sphere. The race seems to have lost its reason! It cannot put the male and female out of its mind, it cannot see an elevation or a hole without thinking of sex—and if it is a tower in which prisoners are languishing away, it is called '*il maschio di Volterra*.'

"The iris is called '*das Mädchen des Auges*,' literally, the 'girl of the eye,' not because of any resemblance to a girl. The iris itself is a girl. Because it has a hole in the middle—no anatomy is needed for that—the black mid-spot in the middle of the eye looks like a hole. *Hole*, *trypa*, *τρῦπα*, *trou*, in all languages is the name for *woman*, so also in *Genesis* (i. 27); and because the eye is small, it was regarded as a little girl.

"Reflection or thought assumes this erotic bent particularly when something fits into a hole, like the foot into the shoe, or the knife into the sheath,—when things come in pairs and one sticks into the other. All such 'paired'

things evoke the 'great luck' of sexual beings, sexual union,—that which is called *lingam* in the Ganges region.

"*'Qual Buco, tal Cavicchio,'* is an Italian proverb, or, as Fischart once remarked, '*es war eben ein Zapff für diese Flasch, denn faul Eyer und stinkent Butter gehören zusammen*'—'the right stopper for the bottle, for bad eggs and rancid butter belong together'; a popular German saying expresses the same thought: '*Auf jedes Töpchen gehört sein Deckelchen*'—'every vessel has its cover.' Numberless technical expressions can be explained only through their reverberation of the old Adam and Eve theme. The numerous mothers, matrices, etc., in the various technical industries have the same origin.

"*Mutter, Nonne, Weib* and *Schneke*, mother, nun, female, screw; on the other side *Vater, Mönch* and *Mann*, father, monk and male, represent here only the important parts. There is deep significance in such terms: *monk* and *nun*. Often it happens the male half bears also a particularly significant name, like *stamp*, or *spindle*, while the typically female parts are poetically covered up. The screw seems to imply a marital relationship (*spindle and female*)."

Truly, Kleinpaul's statement is correct: Language is full of sexual symbols.

In fact, it is enough to perceive the true spirit of the language in order to interpret quite a number of dreams. A young boy, sixteen years of age, whose father is a famous artist and a very popular Don Juan much admired by the ladies, tells me the following dream:

(10) *Father finds various holes in the rooms. I am worried because he alone wants to stop them up.*

When I asked him why it worried him, he answered, "Because father took all that trouble alone. I could help him. That is not a suitable task for so great an artist." He rationalizes his dream—to use the fitting expression of Jones. But we prefer to take the dream literally. The young man is an Alexander who is worried because Philip leaves him nothing to conquer. All the women in the house

worship the father: the mother, the aunt, the French teacher, the secretary. He suspects the father of relations grossly sexual—perhaps with good reason. The holes in the walls are to be taken in Kleinpaul's literal sense.

We began with the general neutral symbolisms—the sheafs in the field¹² and already we find ourselves in the midst of erotic symbolism. That is inevitable in the case of dream interpretation. Whoever takes up the subject must be prepared to meet the issue.

I may mention here another forerunner of Freud's—the well-known investigator of dreams, Scherner,¹³ who has conceived the hypothesis that all dreams are generated by bodily sensations. This theory has proven altogether untenable. Nevertheless its founder formulated a fairly correct view of sexual symbolism. Some details may appear ridiculous. But facts lose none of their significance merely because they seem ridiculous.

Regarding sexual symbolism Scherner writes:

“Sexual excitation is symbolized by representations of the erect organ itself or by pictures and phantasy actions which arouse desire for sexual gratification. But here, too, we meet the masked formulations as preserved by the plastic art of the phantasy. For instance, one finds on the street while on the way to a particular spot, the stem of a clarinet, near by, the similar portion of a pipe, a penny whistle, or a piece of fur. (The stem of clarinet or whistle represents unmistakably the form of the male organ, the pipe-like configuration of the found object corresponding to the similar form of the external male sexual organ; but the found objects are always double, on account of the character of the excitation of the double organ

¹² Joseph's dream may also lend itself to another—an erotic interpretation. Dreams of “greatness,” and the wish for extraordinary potency often go hand in hand. Paranoiacs with delusions of grandeur often claim they have a thousand wives, a thousand sons, etc.

¹³ *Das Leben des Traumes*. Heinrich Schindler, Berlin, 1861.

of vision, which is primarily involved in the act of finding the respective objects. Finally the fur piece in question stands for the pubic hairs, just as the brush stands for eyebrows and eyelashes, instead of the symbolically more fitting brush; finding the three pictures together means the conjunction of the objects represented through them). Or as the result of bladder stimuli one finds a curiously crumpled up short stem or cigarette holder which portrays the collapse of the whole male external apparatus. More clearly delineated appears to be the symbolism denoting states of sexual tension, such as usually follow urinary stimuli, the clearer symbolic expression corresponding to the sharper degree of stimulation. For instance, one sees through a clump of trees under which one is standing a near-by tower of great height, and one wonders that the highest peak of the familiar tower (an object known in reality) is crumpled up, and observing the round cupola below, the impression is gained that a second peak (nothing corresponding to reality) must have flattened out down there; while thus watching attentively, the dreamer sees himself standing under women, or he sees them step over him. The high tower represents the tension of the active organ, its peak seems crumpled or flattened, corresponding to the uppermost portion of the sexual apparatus; phantasy seeks forcefully to find two towers where only one exists in reality, in order thus to express the parity of the lower organ; it suggests the vision of a high tower through the undergrowth, because the active organ in erection stands forth in the midst of the surrounding pubic hair (underbrush). Tower, peak, double ball, cupola, underbrush, together express a composite thought, because fantasy fuses all pictures in one. . . ."

(*Das Leben des Traumes*, p. 197.)

The next dream is that of an unmarried thirty-year-old woman:

(II) *Papa goes around cutting off all the leaf ends to all the plastic figures in the room. I am angry at that and want to prevent it. I am thinking: has he turned crazy?*

The girl tells us that her father was always terribly

jealous. He did not allow her so much as to shake hands with a strange man. Young men never called at the house. She could not attend a dance. That is how she remained unmarried.

This dream we may also take in a literal sense. The father removes all ends, he thus prevents her from having an opportunity to become familiar with a phallus. In the dream she finds courage to tell him what she, unfortunately, has never dared say to him in actual life. She was the obedient type of daughter. There comes to her mind a figure protected in front with the usual fig leaf. We note the circumlocution so characteristic of dream thoughts. Why that covering? What was the fig leaf for—if the ends are clipped off? She notes how senseless her father's conduct seemed to be. She is struck by the peculiar (crazy) feature of his conduct.

We thus perceive in connection with two different dreams the symbolic meaning of "hole" and of "end" or tip. The language of dreams makes use of the cryptic forces which have created our everyday language.

That symbolism holds true not only of dreams. It is equally valid in connection with stories, myths, folklore, and wit.

The symbolism of fairy stories is particularly clear.

Dream and story! What wonderful association! What the children experience, the adults dream about. New principles are being evolved. We transpose the old truths and now declare: the obverse is true: what the adults experience, the children dream about. That is not a mere play on words.

Freud has furnished us the key to the meaning of dreams. Dr. Franz Riklin tries to apply that key to the investigation of the charming realm of fairy stories. And lo! the attempt proves successful. It turns out that the fairy stories of children bear an intimate inner relationship to the dreams of adults, that they are pervaded through and through with a cryptic sexual symbolism the

significance of which presents no particular difficulty. The *Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen* (*Wish Fulfillment and Symbolism of the Fairy Story*) by Riklin, proves that the fairy story has a cryptic sexual meaning. The fairy story, too, like the dream, represents a "wish fulfillment" in Freud's sense.

The simple fairy stories represent relatively simple folk wishes. Riklin brings a number of excellent illustrations. Who is not familiar with the charming *Märlein* in Bechstein's famous collection of fairy stories? A mother weeps three days and three nights over her most deeply beloved child. At night the door opens softly and the deceased child appears in its nightgown carrying the little tear vessel in which all the mother's tears are gathered up. A few more tears and the little vessel is filled to overflowing and the child attains peace and quiet. "Therefore, weep no more, for thy child is well taken care of and little angels are its playmates!" The child disappears. The mother avoids shedding more tears. The child must not be disturbed in its heavenly peace! Riklin very properly observes that the story could equally well be an actual dream of some particular person. But it happens not to be an account of a particular experience; this curative means (*consolation*) has become a generalized, psychically purposive belief—namely, that excessive tears disturb the peace of those who have passed away! That is not a notion helpful to the dead but it is helpful to the living. The same motive is played up in numerous variants: in the Japanese story about the *Nun of the Temple of Armida*; in another German version by Grimm as *Todtenhemdchen*; in the *New Islandic Folk-tales*, edited by Ritterhaus. Everywhere the wish of the adults to be rid of their worry sooner reveals itself as the cryptic motive of the weaver of the fairy story.

The sexual symbolism reveals to us the character of the story even more penetratingly than the principle of wish fulfillment. Here we first learn that the adults tell the

child chiefly what they themselves prefer to hear. Naturally they do so in symbolic, that is, masked, form.

We underrate the significance of symbolic acts and of symbolic representations in our everyday life. As a matter of fact, existence is inconceivable without symbols. Riklin states: "Is not almost every word a symbol? The writing signs are symbols, the words are symbols, our mimicry, our gestures are in great part symbolic. A geographic chart is a symbol. Noteworthy are the meaningful abstract symbols: God's eye; the scales (as, of justice, for instance); the cross; the color symbols: black, red; the symbolism of uniforms, etc."

What tremendous power belongs in the first place to the sexual symbol! It pervades our whole life. There is no object, which under certain circumstances may not represent a sexual symbol. A particular intonation, a deliberate gesture, a wink of the eye accompanying an innocent remark may give the latter a "double meaning."

Sexual symbolism is the key which unravels for us the various myths of the different races. Also the religious formulations. A striking example of the latter we have in the concept of the snake, which plays also a great rôle in folklore. A snake seduced Eve in paradise. The snake appears to young girls (Oda and the Snake, Bechstein), and when the latter overcome their revulsion and take the cold snake into their bed . . . the snake suddenly changes into a wonderful prince who had been bewitched. The slippery, cold, ugly snake is a sexual symbol, like the ugly toad, which climbs into the bed of the king's daughter (*Der Froschkönig* and *Der Arme Heinrich*, of Grimm). Here, too, the overcoming of disgust is rewarded with the presence of a wonderful prince. Further illustrations of this type may be found in Riklin's work already mentioned.

What the fairy stories mean to the individual, that the folk story or myth represents in its relations to the folk mind. The myth is a folk dream and contains in a cryptic

symbolic language an expression of the unconscious wish-excitations and fulfillment-hallucinations of the folk mind. The myth, too, contains a more or less cryptic, sometimes fairly overt and rather obvious, sexual symbolism which is remarkably like the similar dream symbolism—a fact convincingly brought out by Abraham in his interesting study in folk psychology entitled *Traum und Mythos* (Dream and Myth).

The study of these myths has long been assiduously cultivated by the folk-psychologists who justifiedly expected to find through them a path towards a better understanding of the mental life of the various people. Just as dreams disclose the secret thoughts of the individual man, so myths must disclose in unmistakable manner the ideals and wishes of the people. It turns out that a number of myths which have appeared at different times among the most varied nations on earth show a remarkable similarity between them so that some investigators were led to conclude that the formation of myths depends on mental processes common to all mankind. On the other hand, many other investigators held that the similarity of myths is due to transference—a borrowing or transferring of the same myth material. What was lacking until recently in the investigation of the problem of myths was an appreciation of the parallels between the process of myth formation and the mental life of the individual. The bridging over of the two realms of inquiry—the world of individual dreams and the sphere of folk dreams as represented in myths, represents a gigantic step forward.

It is pleasing to record that the connecting links between the social and the individual activities of the psyche have been successfully revealed at least in one limited field, namely, The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, in a study under that title, by Otto Rank, to whom we were already indebted for another excellent study, *The Artist* (*Der Künstler*, Wien und Leipzig, 1907). Rank points out very convincingly the similarities between the phantasies

of individuals and the folk phantasies as revealed in a series of birth myths.

We want to lay stress on the mere fact of this parallelism: for dreams and myths, fairy and traditional stories present the same kind of psychic structure. One may contend that the myths about heroes were conceived originally by poets, while fairy stories are creations of the poetic genius of the whole people. Such a contention may be met best with Hebbel's fitting words: *in den Dichtern träumt die Menschheit*—mankind dreams through its poets.

An almost inexhaustible fund of material for symbolism is to be found in the collections gathered by the well-known folklorist F. S. Krauss and his co-workers, and published under the title *Anthropophytica* (Leipzig, Deutsche Verlagsaktiengesellschaft). The tremendous material gathered therein awaits systematic elaboration in the light of dream symbolism. Occasionally I shall refer to the similarities between folk language and the symbolism of dreams. The formations of wit, too, reveal to us the operations of the unconscious.¹⁴

I have thus far indicated only a few simple examples illustrating the significance of sexual symbolisms. It is not possible to give an account of a dream analysis without touching on eroticism. There is, in fact, no an erotic dream.

The power of the sexual instinct is so tremendous that it probably never leaves us out of its grip even for a few seconds of time. We shall see later, when we consider the subject of drowsing, of hypnagogic pictures (dream pictures before falling asleep, or just before fully waking up—during the so-called "twilight" states), that the sexual instinct is momentarily ready to take possession of man's psyche.

The symbolism of dreams is chiefly sexual. If in the pages of this work the erotic plays a predominating rôle

¹⁴ Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious. Translated by Brill. Moffat, Yard Co.

it is not my fault. I cannot do otherwise than present the material as it reveals itself.

There is another determinant which plays a tremendous rôle in the dream life: the criminal tendency. The cryptic criminality within us reveals itself in our dream. But the criminal tendency stands nearly always in the service of the sexual. Perhaps every criminal is a sexual criminal—possibly. In the chapters which follow I expect to prove that the investigator is not responsible for the presence of the erotic features. We do not lay stress on it deliberately. It is there. Whoever is endowed with unencumbered eyes cannot fail to see that symbolism plays the most important rôle in our mental life.

Why do persons make free use of symbolism in witicism and why do they usually display such a keen appreciation of the symbolic shadings of meaning employed by the flirt? Hitschmann¹⁵ rightly observes that, "in the cynical gathering of males at festivities, or at cabarets, or on reading the humorous papers the same persons usually display sufficient insight into sexual symbolism."

What would be the sense of avoiding these facts of life simply because we do not like them? This work is a record of facts. . . .

The ancient, eternal struggle between instinct and society, between mine and thine (Gross) does not cease in the dream. The wish fulfillment, postulated by Freud, may also be a wish fulfillment of the moral self.

But there are many dreams which do not fit within the range of wish fulfillment, even though we conceive the "conscience dreams" as wishes of the moral self. There are, above all, the telepathic dreams: no objective investigator can doubt any longer their occurrence or validity.¹⁶

¹⁵ Hitschmann, *Freud's Theories of the Neuroses*. Translated by Charles R. Payne. Moffat, Yard & Co., New York.

¹⁶ Stekel, *The Telepathic Dream*, translated by Van Teslaar.

SOME MECHANISMS WHICH DISTINGUISH THE CROWD FROM OTHER FORMS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR¹

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Social psychology may profitably adapt to its own uses the knowledge of abnormal behavior possessed by the psychopathologist. There is much group behavior which shows a lack of adjustment to social situations very similar to that of certain neuroses. Without entering upon the discussion of the question of the therapeutic value of the Freudian method of psychoanalysis, it is safe to say that we are greatly indebted to Freud for such knowledge as we possess concerning the determinants of many well recognized types of individual maladjustment to environment. Much of Freud's terminology has met with severe criticism at the hands of psychologists whose training has been confined to the laboratory. Some of his basic concepts, notably that of the unconscious, have likewise become controversial subjects among psychologists. But from a pragmatist point of view, the unconscious is at any rate a most valuable fiction, an assumption which throws light upon many mental phenomena. Freud's method of tracing the causal connections between symptoms and certain repressed, forgotten and unconscious impulses and experiences which are unacceptable to the consciousness of his patient, gives us a new insight into many forms of human behavior that could not be strictly termed psychopathic.

¹ Reprinted by courtesy of the author and his publishers, Harper and Brothers, New York.

This is especially true in the case of group behavior. The same unconscious mechanisms which cause the unadjusted individual to be out of harmony with his fellows may on occasion lead a group of men to forms of behavior which are in the true sense anti-social. The term "anti-social" is somewhat ambiguous. In one sense any reaction to the human beings in one's environment is social behavior, and anti-social behavior is that in which human fellowship plays no part, being present neither in the stimulus nor as a factor which modifies the mode of response. If we exclude certain very simple reflexes, it is doubtful if there is anti-social behavior in this sense. Certainly most so-called egoistic actions have social significance, since the imagery through which the ego urge operates is socially acquired. In a second sense, the true sense, the term "anti-social" denotes those modes of behavior in which there is a failure in mutual adjustment. The paranoiac's delusion of grandeur, though the imagery which his wish fancy assumes involves factors of a social nature, is anti-social in the sense that the behavior which is motivated by his wish fancy fails to bring him into harmonious relationships with his neighbors. Psychopathology finds in such behavior a criterion by which the normal may be distinguished from the abnormal.

Now unless we are content to regard any sort of social relationship as a norm, it would seem that we are justified in applying to groups of men the same criteria that are used to determine whether an individual is adjusted or unadjusted. There are many instances where the behavior of a group results in serious maladjustment toward the community as a whole. We do not hesitate to say that certain popular ideas are "crazy," or that the crowd on certain occasions "has lost its head," is "swept away by passion," is "hysterical." Thoughtful men know how little confidence may be placed in rumor and propaganda. When thousands of people visit the scene of a gruesome murder and carry away for souvenirs everything that is

loose, even the newspapers speak of such behavior as an exhibition of "morbid curiosity." Spasmodic reform movements are declared "quixotic." Strikes are condemned because the behavior of those who participate in them frequently shows no "concern for the public." Revolutionary groups are said to be "intoxicated." Race riots and lynching mobs are regarded as "insane attacks upon law and order."

Men with common sense have long regarded such phenomena as these as epidemic mental affections. Thus, I think, we may fairly say that there is a generally recognized distinction between that social behavior which results in satisfactory adjustment and that which fails in this respect. To be sure, the social situation taken as a whole is never altogether satisfactory. There is always an element of struggle among the various factions, parties, cults, sects, or classes in the community. Each struggling group aspires to increased power and prestige, looks upon its imaginary future supremacy as a sort of millenium, and watches its rivals, jealously regarding any expression of their will to power as a social menace. Nevertheless, there are recognized modes of adjustment between these rival groups which all coöperate in imposing upon a common rival and without which there could be between the factions in the community no social peace or stability. These recognized forms of behavior are the social controls which constitute any community a society. And it is by creating an abnormal social environment in which the indulgence in behavior of the sort inhibited by general social control is possible that a group becomes a crowd.

Not every group is a crowd, in the psychological sense of the term. Popularly speaking, a crowd is a multitude. There are writers who use the word crowd to denote the many, the mass, the common people, the rabble as distinguished from the superior few. Such writers tell us that the crowd is fickle, irresponsible, ignorant, easily swayed by oracularly uttered half-truths; incapable of discrimina-

tion, self-criticism or tolerance; given to enthusiasm and uncontrolled by reason. In other words, the crowd is the vulgus, the men in the street, the "lower classes." On the other hand, democrats are inclined to idealize the "crowd," and dwell upon its possibilities for good. But whether one hold the crowd in contempt or in good opinion is usually a mere class prejudice.

Le Bon, to whom I believe we are indebted for the first serious attempt to understand the psychology of the crowd as a special subject of study, started out with such a social prejudice. To his mind, also, the demos was a dreadful sort of conglomerate beast which might unless held in check destroy the social order in an orgy of revolution. But in the effort to learn just what are the mental habits of this animal, Le Bon saw that almost any group, large or small, could at times act and think as a crowd. Thus crowd mentality was something which might happen to a group of people under certain conditions. The mere fact of their being present in large numbers was not enough to make them a crowd. Thus with Le Bon the psychology of the crowd becomes a study of those traits which are sometimes manifest in groups. The problem of the crowd becomes that of distinguishing crowd behavior from other forms of reaction to social situations. Le Bon thought that when a group became a crowd a sort of mysterious "collective mind" was created. Like Jung recently—if I understand Jung correctly—he held that personality was a sort of principle of individuation, a conscious achievement which existed over or alongside of a "subconscious" principle which was common to us all and identical. This common humanity, Le Bon thought, consisted of certain reflexes and animal impulses which exist chiefly "in the spinal cord." Intellect, therefore, has nothing to do with it.

When a group becomes a crowd, according to Le Bon, there is a stripping off of the layer of conscious personality along with all higher mental faculties. Hence the individual in the crowd descends several rungs in the lad-

der of civilization. He becomes more of an automaton. He is more a creature whose actions are governed by imitation and suggestion. He becomes at once credulous, passionate and irresponsible. All this results from the fact that the individual merges himself in an anonymous and impersonal whole.

We need not pause to discuss Le Bon's theory; it is rather old-fashioned today, although much of it persists in different terminology in the writings of Trotter, McDougall and Jung. The point is that Le Bon, fanciful as his explanation may have been, was on the right track. He saw that the behavior of crowds is a special phenomenon of social psychology; that the thought and behavior of people in a crowd is different from that which we find in their ordinary social relationships. On this point Le Bon's thinking was essentially empirical. The facts of behavior justify such a distinction, and without it it is difficult to see how a social psychology can be very significant.

Let one who has a knowledge of psychopathology watch a mob in the making, listen to its orators, talk with men who are about to go out on a strike or have watched with sympathy the lynching of a negro, or let him study a movement like the communist party, prohibition, or a nation at war, or a religious revival; let him watch carefully a large popular audience and he will see men whose behavior has on the whole shown the customary adaptations to real situations, suddenly manifest symptoms which in an isolated individual he would at once recognize as compulsive or even paranoiac.

I give as an illustration an episode in the political history of New York City. In the fall of 1917, Mr. John P. Mitchel was candidate for reelection to the office of mayor. During his term in office, he had brought upon himself the bitter antipathy of certain religious groups as a result of a series of investigations into the management of certain charitable institutions. Moreover, Mr. Mitchel had given evidence that he favored America's entrance

into the World War, and as the candidate of the fusion party he had the support of those elements in the community which the man in the street calls "highbrow."

Now on none of these counts could the opposition make a public attack upon the Mayor. Although the matters to which I have referred were the real issues in the campaign, the main point of attack was made with an issue which at first sight appears irrelevant and insignificant. The opposition candidate attacked the educational policies of the administration, and the popular response was overwhelming. Because it was found that the school buildings in certain districts were overcrowded, while at the same time these buildings were only used to one-half of their capacity, the Board of Education, with approval of the Mayor, sent to Gary, Indiana, and brought to New York a man who had established there a system which appeared to be both economical and in accord with contemporary educational psychology. About thirty schools had been organized by the fall of 1917, and the newspapers had given these schools the name "Gary Schools." The word Gary suggested the United States Steel Corporation, and steel meant munitions, and munitions meant war. Moreover, the newer educational methods were associated with the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, and the name Rockefeller meant big business, capitalism. The Gary School issue was therefore an issue between designing capitalists and honest labor. In some of these schools, little shops were established in order that pupils might learn by doing. What purpose could such shops have but that of training nonunion workers who might therefore be able to take the places of union men if they should strike for their rights?

Here we have two phenomena which are known to psychopathologists—substitution and rationalization. The Gary School because of certain unconscious associations with the war, and also with the inferiority complex which the working classes feel when they compare their lot with

that of the rich and the educated, was substituted for the real objects of resentment, since the latter could not be openly expressed. Again, the thought processes through which the evils of the "Gary Schools" were elaborated were mechanisms by which the opposition to our entrance into the war, and other things which the Mayor represented, could be made to appear as justifiable opposition to "wicked capitalists."

All the elements which disliked the Mayor for reasons which they could not consciously and openly express, could now express their dislike in the form of dislike of the "Steel Trust" and the Rockefellers, who were ostensibly plotting to corrupt the very foundation of this free republic, the public school. A city-wide crowd was formed. Facts no longer counted. Those who tried to state the facts of the case were suspected of being "bought up" by the Rockefellers and the Steel Magnates. Violent hostility was manifested toward the entire educational system. School children were induced to "go on strike" against the evil system. I saw mobs of them, aided by their elders, all over New York, in districts where there was not a "Gary School" within five miles. Speakers who tried to tell the parents of the children that there were no Gary Schools near them were attacked on the streets and driven off. Men, thousands of them, who had never before shown the slightest interest in public education, amongst whom for three years the Gary Schools had existed without attracting their attention, suddenly became excited. The "little red school house"—a piece of imagery borrowed from rural communities which were wholly foreign to the experience of the city proletariat—suddenly became an ideal. Men were ready to fight for it, as they were for the sacredness of their mothers. They suddenly discovered that they wanted "old-fashioned" education, the kind that had produced Abraham Lincoln. They were "down on experts" and on "new-fangled ideas" and "wealthy foundations." After promising the crowd that the day after

he was elected "all the trains leaving New York City would be crowded with experts seeking employment elsewhere," Judge Hylan was elected Mayor by the largest majority that any one had ever received in the history of the city. When the election returns began to come in on the night of the election, the streets were literally filled with a shouting, ecstatic crowd, comparable only to that which we witnessed on Armistice Day. One would have thought that society had been redeemed.

Consciously, the elation was joy in the triumph of democracy over plotting capitalists and their alleged retainers. Unconsciously, it was joy over a victorious expression of opposition to our entering the war, over the apparent vindication of religious organizations whose charities had been subject to ridicule, over the victory of "lowbrows" over experts—"highbrows." The man in the street had elected to a great office a man like unto himself; he had showed the rich and the cultured "where they got off," and in the victory of one who represented himself, he felt that he too was triumphant over that element in the community which had caused him to feel himself inferior.

Here we have a protest against the feeling of inferiority, a mechanism of compensation, also a mechanism of escape through disguised forms, of impulses which were in conflict with consciously accepted social ideals. This illustration is typical of crowd behavior in all its forms. If we had space within the limitations of this paper, I could show that most of our political behavior, our social reform, our industrial class struggle, our religious revivals, our patriotism, and morality, are determined by psychic mechanisms which are very similar to those which brought about the defeat of Mr. Mitchel.

Wherever the crowd mind takes possession of a group of men, there is an all-or-none type of reaction, in which all sensible discrimination and third alternatives are brushed aside, and everything is just "utterly utter"—

wholly good or wholly bad. Always the true motive of group behavior is disguised. Always there is a propaganda of rationalization by means of which the unconscious motives are made to appear as devotion to lofty patriotic and moral principles. Always there is a disturbance of the function of the real, so that the situation reacted to is turned into a fictitious issue of some sort and the plain facts of the case are denied or ignored. Always certain repressed impulses find, through what I call justification mechanisms, an escape from social control. Always there is an egomania which is at bottom a protest against the feeling of inferiority. Always there is manifest an impulse toward hostile behavior, generally disguised as the vindication of some moral principle. Commonly one sees what psychopathologists call "projection"—an accusation of the prospective victim of crowd hatred of the very motives which impel the crowd itself.

Freud has shown us that social control is a severe repressive force. Tendencies in the individual psyche, which are in conflict with its requirements, are unacceptable to his consciousness. They are "repressed" into the unconscious, automatically forgotten for the purpose of self-appreciation. In the unconscious, or unattended, these repressed impulses continue to make their presence felt, not however for what they are, but in disguised form. Hence between the latent content of the dream and its manifest content the censor is imposed. The dream is therefore a disguised symbolic expression of a wish fancy which is egoistic and anti-social, and the symptoms of the neuroses and the psychoses may be said to be likewise disguised expressions of repressed wishes.

The psychopathic patient takes the solitary course in his effort to solve the conflict between his unconscious impulses and the conscious picture of himself which he has acquired in social experience. He strives to save that picture by disguising the significance of those impulses which are in conflict with it.

Now suppose that there were a group of persons who upon occasion found that they were impelled to action which was in conflict with social control ideas. Suppose they were all simultaneously impelled to give expression to some protest against the feeling of inferiority or to carry out some deed of violence. If a sort of unconscious conspiracy could be entered into so that the forms of social control which we customarily impose upon one another could be modified in such a way that the anti-social behavior could appear to be conformity to principle, then, obviously, each might permit his fellows to perform the anti-social deed with the tacit assumption that they would also approve it in his own behavior, and if principle could be so twisted as to become a plausible justification for such behavior, all present could indulge themselves with mutual and hence self-approval. We should have a mob, and all mobs however murderous, revolutionary or destructive, believe that their behavior is a vindication of some universal principle. A fictitious, temporary social environment is created in which anti-social behavior appears to be social. This pseudo-social environment is made possible by the concentration of attention upon those great generalizations which are really the forms of rationalization for the forbidden wish. Crowd thinking seizes upon certain general principles and in the sequestered social environment it creates, makes them into justification mechanisms for the use of the repressed wishes of those present. This is why all propaganda takes on the appearance of virtuous devotion to abstract moral ideas. All demagogues and mob orators therefore speak platitudes because they thus easily catch the attention of all present and stir up the fewest resistances while at the same time they are using their platitudes as justifications for certain unconscious wishes of their hearers.

Thus the lynching mob is concerned only with vindicating female chastity, the patriotic mob with resisting foreign aggression, the reformist mob with saving the com-

munity from vice, the revolutionary mob with establishing social justice. It is interesting that with all such mobs the behavior of the group reveals the fact that the professed motive was only an irrelevant plausibility. The lynching mob forgets about chastity in the fun of killing its victim with moral approval; the reformist mob begins to disintegrate after its quixotic legislative triumph; the patriotic mob after overthrowing the foreign aggressor adopts his tyrannical customs; the revolutionary mob abandons "social justice" in the hour of its triumph and sets up a dictatorship of its own.

Normally a man after participating in mob behavior "comes to," that is, the pseudo-social situation passes away, the normal social controls return and he sees his conduct in the light of his wider social habits. But in cases where there is a permanently unconscious interest which draws men together, the crowd mechanism may continue to operate for years and we have a crowd even though the members of the crowd are widely diffused and are only held together through such means as the press, occasional meetings, or the common acceptance of certain cult beliefs. These cult beliefs are at bottom only rationalizations of wishes and of hypothetical situations which if ever realized would turn any crowd into an ordinary mob. The crowd differs from the mob therefore only in the fact that the former is hypothetical and potential; the latter does the thing, and gets it out of its system.

There are three characteristics of the crowd mind, which so far as I can discover, are uniformly present, and these traits are interesting psychologically, first, because I think they help the student of society to distinguish the crowd from normal forms of social behavior, and, second, because they are strikingly analogous to the symptoms of paranoia, and are doubtless the outgrowth of similar unconscious mechanisms.

There is first the closed system of ideas which the crowd professes and which it substitutes for the facts of experi-

ence. With the paranoiac patient, this is symptomatic. It is his delusional system, his ideal world in which he takes refuge from the real, and in which he finds a fictitious reality that is more congenial to his ego than is the world of fact.

The crowd likewise has its fixed ideas, its propaganda, its dogma, its creed. It will not permit these ideas to be changed or modified by fact. To the crowd its "truth" is not a matter of hypothesis which is to be verified in experience, it is a matter of principle which the crowd proposes to vindicate and thus humiliate its enemies. The crowd's truth is always *a priori* truth, any modification of which is regarded as an act of disloyalty to the group. And the vindication of the crowd's principle is not to be achieved by research and experimentation, but by the power of numbers or of direct action. The vindication is but the symbol of the crowd's own prospective victory and the whole system of crowd ideas is but the rationalization of its wish to do something which society inhibits.

The paranoiac along with certain other psychopathic patients commonly has a delusion of grandeur. Psychopathology in recent years has had much to say about delusional systems of this nature. It is not necessary here to dwell upon the etiology of such delusions in narcissistic and autoerotic fixations. For the social psychologist it is sufficient that almost any sort of inferiority may give rise to a protest of some sort, or ideal compensation. The crowd is a great face-saving device. It helps men preserve their self-appreciation. The sense that one is a member of a like-minded multitude brings both consolation and a feeling of potential power through collective effort. And praise of the crowd to which one belongs is unconscious self-flattery. Moreover, the crowd commonly professes high moral motives—even in its basest actions. Hence one's crowd is the fellowship of the good, and the consummation of its egoism, its proposed self-vindication and triumph is pictured as the salvation of society. It is a

great thing to be able to find that one's fellows approve that in him which is socially taboo, that together they may translate their own imagined rights into universal righteousness.

Thus in a crowd men will perform acts of exhibition, as for instance, marching in a parade dressed in fancy regalia when they would be too modest to do such things alone. And the group may claim a superiority for all its members which they could not claim for themselves. The Jews are God's chosen people; the Ku Klux Klan are the finest patriots; the Catholics are the true church of Christ; the Presbyterians are the elect; the prohibitionists are the "temperance people"; America is the land of the free and the home of the brave; the cause of the proletariat is the cause of humanity; the Republican Party alone has the ability to run the government, and the "boosters" of Gopher Prairie have the "finest little city on God's green earth" and all who do not think so are "knockers." As a rule, the farther men are removed from those circles of wealth and power which they envy, the more they find themselves lacking in those qualities to which they defer and regard as marks of superiority, the stronger is their tendency to strive to keep up a fiction of superiority with the aid of their crowd.

The apparent exception to this rule is to be found in the very lowest strata of society in which people become too dull and unimaginative to care about superiority of any sort. But even here one often finds a sort of perverse pride in squalor and depravity and a contempt for those who strive for beauty and value. Such an attitude of mind is really an attempt to discount and ridicule a superiority which while recognized is despaired of. So that it is among this class that the most violent mob behavior in history is manifest. The tendency to sporadic crowd behavior in this class shows that our rule still applies but that with persons of this sort there is an inability to sustain any line of effort very long.

Amongst the groups which form the strata between this lower element and the thin layer of real superiority at the top of society, the tendency to crowd behavior is most prevalent. The Ku Klux Klan and the prohibition movement flourish in the rural west and south where goodness is identified with provincial morality. The religious revival takes place among the lower middle class; the industrial riot among the proletariat, and patriotism is often the "last refuge of the scoundrel." The crowd orator knows that he may always "get the crowd" by casting a slur upon the educated. In fact men simply will not consciously endure the feeling of inferiority; against it they fabricate various fictions of self-importance and one of the elemental functions of the crowd is to sustain these fictions.

Closely associated with the psychotic delusion of grandeur is the delusion of persecution. The latter is a phenomenon of "projection." Psychopathologists have come to regard the delusion of persecution as a device by which the patient attributes his own feeling of hostility to the object of that feeling. It is unnecessary here for us to enter into a discussion of the unconscious connections between this psychopathic egoism and feeling of hostility. It is enough to see that they are related symptoms in certain psychoses. The same is true of the crowd mind. This symptom uniformly appears in the behavior of crowds. Every crowd is either actually or potentially homicidal. The crowd's rationalizations provide it with a mechanism which permits its members to indulge with a good conscience in acts of torture, killing and destruction. Such deeds are the first impulse of the mob. Some one has said that the electorate does not vote for its candidate, but against the candidate of the opposition. Crowd patriotism, even when no national enemy is visible, inevitably glories in thoughts of war. The crowd orator seldom fails to delight his hearers by abusing some one. Socialists are always pointing to the sufferings of the poor to justify their hatred of capitalists, a hatred which emanates

from envy. I once asked a large audience composed chiefly of radicals whether it was not true that their ideal of the coöperative commonwealth was at bottom a rationalization the function of which was to justify their will to destroy in the moment of revolutionary mass action. I suggested that each ask himself how much he really wanted the co-operative commonwealth, whether he would be as enthusiastic a radical if he felt that the ideal social order was to come, as Bellamy suggested, peacefully, without the killing of any one, without struggle, without a triumph of any party over any one. To their own amazement they all laughed. Even the church when it becomes a crowd becomes the church militant, and has upon its record a long list of persecutions. A psychological connection between this hostility and the feelings of inferiority which gives rise to the crowd's egoism, is seen in the uniform tendency of propaganda to caricature those who challenge the crowd's fictions of superiority. It is seen again in race riots. It is significant that the mobs which kill and burn negroes are composed chiefly of that element of the white race which is socially nearest the status of the negro, and habitually saves its face by the fiction that at least its members are "better than niggers." As long as negroes are cringing and obsequious in the presence of men of this type all is well. But let a few negroes acquire wealth or education or let an occasional superior negro be treated with respect by those of the white race to whom the lower stratum has to defer, and their fiction of superiority is destroyed. It must be reëstablished by the destruction of the object which challenges it. But this homicidal wish must wait for a moral justification. The moment a negro commits a crime, or is believed to have done so, such a justification is provided. The colored population may then be massacred. The wish fancy appears in consciousness as a determination to keep an alleged dangerous and criminal race in its place.

Much anti-Semitic prejudice is motivated in this same

way, also the opposition of agrarians to the "wicked metropolis." Our quixotic episodes of moral reform are manifestations of similar wish fancies. Consciously such reform movements appear to be a hunger and thirst after righteousness. Unconsciously the righteousness is but a justification mechanism for the escape of the wish to denounce, attack, exterminate some one, and do it in the name of morality. Even the crowds which flock to baseball games show that the hostile wish exists in them. It is no mere accident that most of the games men love are played by hitting something with a club, and are interesting because they present a matched contest. The contest is a sublimated fight. As army officers say, "You know, war is the greatest game in the world."

Thus we have three characteristics of crowd behavior which are so symptomatic that they may be used empirically to distinguish the crowd from normal forms of social behavior. When a group manifests a collective egoism, when it shows homicidal tendencies, and when it justifies the escape of these two wish fancies by a closed system of platitudinous ideas, a creed, a dogma, a propaganda, the function of which is to rationalize its behavior and make its real motives appear like devotion to ideal ends, we have a crowd.

I have left out of this discussion any reference to rumor and panic; the former because it is a phenomenon of the rationalization which we have discussed, and the latter because it does not appear as a uniform characteristic of the behavior of crowds. Panic is a manifestation of terror and it would seem that it makes its appearance when a pseudo-social environment is created which removes the customary inhibition to cowardice, in much the same way that the homicidal wish appears when the crowd removes the social inhibition to that sort of behavior.

The mechanisms of crowd behavior are therefore devices for creating a pseudo-social environment in which certain repressed wishes may escape from control. Crowd

behavior grows out of inner conflicts between forms of social control which are consciously assented to, and those human traits which are unacceptable to consciousness. Such behavior cannot be regarded as the solution of problems which arise in the world of objects. It is not the finding of the unknown means toward desired ends with which the organisms may so intervene in the course of events that better adaptations are secured to environmental situations. Crowd thinking is a philosophy of "as if"; it is a disturbance of the function of the real. It substitutes fictions for fact. The true social situation is ignored and one is created in imagination which is congenial to the fancy of the repressed wish. The fact that this fictitious social reality appears simultaneously to the consciousness of a number of people makes possible a sort of concerted action within the sequestered social situation so created, but the behavior of the crowd as a whole is in conflict with the social as such. The behavior of the crowd is therefore a sort of coincident somnambulism, in which the dream may be acted out so long as dissociation continues.

The normally social consists of acquired habits of mutual adjustment. People exist permanently in one another's environment. Certain habits of behaving together inevitably arise. One may adjust himself to his environment only if that environment has a degree of stability and regularity. Hence men necessarily reduce to some degree of predictability the conduct of one another. Thus there arise what Sumner called the folkways, the *mores*, habits of language, custom and law, the function of which is to secure mutual adjustment. The habits so engendered are not necessarily wise adaptations of means to ends. Nor are the adjustments so achieved ever equally satisfactory to all concerned. Many social forms of behavior are themselves motivated by unconscious desires, but once they exist and become mutually recognized, they are as truly environmental as are natural objects. The great bulk of our behavior toward our fellows consists

of those movements which we know they expect of us, and which we in turn expect of them. The sum total of the relationships so achieved we call society. Hence the distinction between social behavior and crowd behavior is radical. The mechanisms of the one are designed to solve problems which lie in the relations of the organism to its environment. Those of the other are designed to solve conflicts which exist within the psyche.

Full value is given to this distinction only if we approach the problem from the standpoint of psychopathology. Otherwise we are obliged to fall back upon such generalizations as the "group mind," or the "instinct of the herd." Neither of these hypotheses helps us toward the solution of our problem. Social psychology would do well to give them up.

The concept of the group-mind would seem to be at best only an analogy. If we try to conceive of any individual as distinct from the group in which he lives, we notice that there are certain similarities between his behavior and that of the other members of his group. Thus the likeness between the members of a group is conceived of as a likeness between the individual and the group as a whole, and as the behavior of each individual is greatly modified by his contacts with other individuals, it is possible to think of much of the mental life of the individual as a social product. The group as such must then have certain mental qualities. So the student proceeds to psychologize, pointing out the similarities of the group to the individual.

Now this group mind either means that there is a psychological entity which is exclusive of individual psyches and yet includes them, or it means that for certain purposes individual differences may be ignored and we may speak of collective behavior as the behavior of the collectivity. In the first case, the group mind is a mystical concept, and in the second it is tautological.

Individual minds do not sum themselves up into a col-

lective mind which is different from that of any other mind. As there are no impersonal ideas or permanently existing ideas, there can be no common consciousness. My thought may be about my neighbor, and his about me, but taken together there is no sharing of thoughts or mingling of subjects and objects. My thought may be like my neighbor's, also my behavior, but similarity is not identity. What is shared in human association is the objective situation which the thought or behavior is about, not the mental activity itself. There is no more reason for believing in a collective mind than in a collective stomach. The concept arises through the intellectualist habit of ascribing independent existence to the mere fact that certain objects are alike in certain respects. The philosopher abstracts from the various objects that attribute in which they are alike, thinks of it as separate from the objects in which it inheres, and then in good Platonic fashion sticks it up behind them as if it were some higher kind of being.

In the other sense, the concept of the group mind is mere tautology. Of course, there is much likeness between the individual and his group for the reason that each individual is in certain respects like his fellows, and especially so when they have together acquired certain similar habits of mutual adjustment. In the psychological sense, the group is an objective situation which stimulates certain responses and to which certain adjustments are made, but the objective situation as such has no mind or psychology of its own. The mind and the psychology which are ascribed to the group really belong to the several individuals in it, each of whom is a subject to himself and an object for the experience of the others. Thus the psychologist may if he wishes call attention to the mental similarities of the individuals within the group, comparing in turn the behavior of each imaginary individual with that of the rest. He may speak of the similarity of behavior as a group mind, but it is difficult to see how such

a concept will aid him in discovering the motives which impel men to this or that form of mutual adjustment. Neither does the concept of the group mind aid us in distinguishing the crowd from the normally social. Since by hypothesis the crowd must have its own group mind, a mind therefore within a larger group mind, we should still have the problem of the likenesses and differences of these two "minds," and of the relation of each to the mind of the individual.

The concept of the herd instinct has played a prominent rôle in social psychology which is rather surprising considering the vagueness of this concept and the ambiguous manner in which it is ordinarily used. Social psychologists are not unaware of the fact that the whole subject of instinct is as yet problematical. The concept has met with serious criticism from writers whose points of view are as wide apart as those of Hocking and Watson. Few who resort to instinct in order to explain social behavior take the trouble to make it clear whether by instinct they mean an innate disposition to act and feel toward certain objects in a characteristic way, or mean simply an hereditary mode of response of the pattern reaction type. With the exception of the Behaviorist school, there is still much confusion between instinct and its affect, and as to whether instinctive behavior is essentially teleological.

Much that is written about the "gregarious instinct" involves all the confusion of the concept of instinct along with much that has nothing to do with instinct whatever. Trotter and his followers would "explain" almost the whole social interest as a manifestation of the herd instinct; ideas, institutions, sentiments and habits which are obviously acquired. McDougall can find no definite affect in connection with gregariousness. Rivers finds that suggestion plays a large part in it, and certain Freudians have difficulty in distinguishing the instinct of the herd from that of sex.

If we follow Watson in holding that there is a distinction between instinctive behavior and those modes of response which are acquired, then instinct as he says is an inherited mode of response of the pattern reaction type. To say that an act is instinctive, we must be sure that the organism has inherited just that behavior trend. We must discover the inherited pattern and distinguish between that and those conditioned reflexes• which are acquired modes of response.

Man perhaps has the gregarious instinct, but even so it is deeply conditioned by tradition and habit and the effects of his institutional environment. If the original pattern is lost in a variety of deliberately cultivated habits most of which have originated in necessities and interests which were related to sex, egoism, and economic situations, we might better look for our explanation of social behavior in these habits rather than in gregariousness.

To attempt to explain public opinion, as Trotter does, by calling it a manifestation of the herd instinct, is simply to read into the concept of gregariousness what one wishes to discover there.

Rivers classified the instincts teleologically, and classified as gregarious all those modes of behavior which served to perpetuate the group. Thus he brought sympathy and suggestion under this head. But sympathy is an emotion, and is as closely related to sex as to gregariousness, and suggestion is simply a means of communication. The problem is not how certain impulses are communicated, but the content of that which is communicated.

Here is our problem: What impulses are operative in the behavior of the crowd? And how do these impulses and their operation differ from those of normal social behavior? Obviously there are other motives than those of pure gregariousness at work. We are not told much about the behavior of a crowd when one says that it is a phenomenon of the herd instinct—even though he seems to find in this instinct patterns of so diverse a nature as those

of the sheep herd and those of the wolf pack. In fact, since by hypothesis the instinct of the herd is equally operative in the crowd and in the other forms of social behavior, the concept of the herd instinct would seem to be irrelevant if we are striving to discover the peculiar mechanisms of the behavior of the crowd.

Instinct or no instinct, social situations are objects of experience. Social forms grow out of the fact that we are in one another's way. We must come to some predictable processes of mutual adjustment. Once our social habits are formed, they necessarily inhibit many impulses which, if indulged, would bring us into conflict with our neighbors. Conflict between the organism and its environment is avoided, but it reappears in the unconscious as conflict between the socialized consciousness and its repressed desires. The neurotic seeks to solve the problem by symptoms which express the repressed wish in disguised form. The crowd solves it by substituting for the true social situation a fictitious environment in which the moral principles of social control are made to appear to justify the very sort of behavior that they normally inhibit.

PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS¹

BY W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.

(From a series of lectures delivered in London in 1922)

I am afraid that I have been unduly bold in undertaking the task of speaking about the relation between psychology and politics. Probably most of you are hoping that I may be able to utilize such psychological knowledge as we possess to point the way towards a solution of some of the many thorny political problems with which we are now confronted. Though it is possible that I may be able to go some little way in this direction, I wish to begin this course of lectures by asking you not to expect too much, and by pointing out some of the obstacles in the way of fulfilling the purpose at which we should all wish to aim.

The first point on which to insist is that the science of psychology is still very young; in so far as concerns the kind of problem with which we are now concerned, it can hardly be said to be yet in its teens. We all recognize now that the art of government is far more than a matter ruled by intellect, and yet until quite recently the psychologist was interested in little else. Until recently he paid but scant attention to the affective aspect of mental life, to the instincts with which this aspect is so closely linked, and to the vast store of experience which is capable of influencing our thoughts and actions, though it is not readily, or may be even only with the greatest difficulty accessible, to consciousness. These realms of mental experience and activity are of so vague and indefinite a kind

¹ From *Psychology and Politics*. Reprinted by courtesy of Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York.

as compared with intellectual processes that their study did not appeal to men who had been trained, as nearly all psychologists then were, in the intellectual exercises of logic or the subtle distinctions and verbal refinements of metaphysics. As a shocking example of the neglect of the less intellectual aspects of psychology I am able to quote myself. So recently as just before the war, less than ten years ago, I was one of those concerned in drawing up a syllabus for an examination in psychology, and what makes the matter worse, for an examination intended for those who wished to specialize in psychological medicine. When, after the war, we had to undertake a revision of this syllabus, I discovered to my horror that the heading of instinct had not been included. So little did instinct occupy our thoughts in those days that we had neglected the subject even when prescribing a course of psychological study in a case where its importance is now so obvious that it seems incredible it could be omitted. And now we all recognize that in many other departments of mental activity the instincts, the affective states associated with them, and the sentiments of which they form the basis, are all factors of the greatest importance in the determination of human behavior, and especially behavior of that social kind of which political behavior is only a special branch. At the present moment, as seems always to happen when experience leads people to correct a fault the pendulum has swung, or is swinging, too far in the opposite direction, so that there is now a tendency to underestimate the importance of the intellectual factors in the determination of human conduct. It is only gradually that we shall come to see just how intelligence and the intellectual factor take their part in controlling and directing the more affective elements, and how the ultimate factors upon which sane conduct, whether of individual or group, depends are those in which the basic instinctive elements have been modified by reason.

In this state of uncertainty in which a young, almost

indeed an embryo, science finds itself, one should be chary of attempting to apply its findings practically. There is now a serious danger that psychology will fall into discredit, partly owing to the zeal of its votaries for the unconscious and infantile aspects of the mind, but still more owing to premature attempts to utilize its supposed discoveries practically while the basis upon which they rest is uncertain and insecure. It seems to me almost certain that there will be a reaction against the almost universal interest which the study of psychology excites today, and that we are approaching a period when it may even become a matter of ridicule to make those references to psychological explanation and interpretation which now arouse such hopes and interest.

Animated as I am by these apprehensions concerning the immediate value—I have no doubts whatever concerning the ultimate value—of psychology in politics, I have no intention of adding to the gravity of the approaching reaction by too ambitious attempts to show how psychological doctrines can be immediately applied to the solution of political problems.

In these lectures I shall deal in the main with certain general principles and shall state problems rather than attempt their solution. Though at the same time I confess to the belief that if it is possible to state a problem clearly and unequivocally, one has already gone a long way towards its solution.

In beginning the consideration of my subject after this preliminary warning, I must first stress the fact that, in applying psychology to the field of politics, we shall be dealing with social or collective psychology rather than with the psychology of the individual. This at once raises a whole group of problems, some of a most difficult kind, concerning the relation between individual and collective psychology, such problems as the concept of a collective or group mind, together with the question how far society can be regarded as an organism, and the explanation of

the fact that when a number of individuals act together, the product of their combined activity is not the same as that which would have emerged from the separate activity of the individuals, even if the products of their individual activity were synthesized by some external agent. With some of these matters I shall attempt to deal in the course of these lectures, and I now propose to proceed to a problem of a fundamental kind which confronts the psychologist who turns from the study of the individual to that of the group.

In a paper written in 1914, but owing to the occurrence of the war not published until two years later,² I have considered the relation between psychology and sociology, putting forward the position that our chief avenue to the formulation of an adequate science of social psychology lies in the observation of social conduct, including under this heading not merely the social conduct of everyday life, but still more those forms of it which are subsumed under the headings of religion, economics and politics, as well as the social institution of language. Though I did not use the term "behaviorism," the point of view put forward in that paper was that in order to understand the real springs of social conduct we have to adopt the attitude of the behaviorist. I put forward the view that the social behavior of mankind is capable of being studied as a methodological principle, independently of the psychological basis of that behavior, forming a discipline which might be called "pure sociology," and that such a discipline would give us a firm basis for the study of social psychology. In illustration of my point I took the relation between the social institution of war as studied comparatively and the emotion of revenge which had been especially emphasized by Professor Westermarck. In his book on *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*³ this

² *Sociology and Psychology, Sociological Review*, 1916, Vol. IX, p. 1.

³ London, 1906, Vol. I, p. 477.

writer had assumed at the outset that especially that form of warfare known as the blood-feud was the result of the activity of the emotion of revenge, and had then proceeded to cite in favor of this position a number of examples of warfare from various parts of the world, apparently believing them to support his position when, as a matter of fact, a number of them directly contradicted it. Thus, to take only one example, Professor Westermarck cites in favor of his thesis that the blood-feud is determined by revenge cases in which the "revenge" takes the form of adopting the murderer into the family and treating him as one of its members. Judging from his most recent work ⁴ Professor Westermarck seems to be unable to see that such social behavior does not readily fit in with the dependence of the blood-feud on revenge. If we start from behavior of this kind we shall be driven to formulate motives more complicated than the simple emotion of revenge put forward by Professor Westermarck. Even if revenge remains our chief interest, we need some different mode of treatment if we are to discover how far revenge is a universal character of the human mind; how far, if universal, it has developed, atrophied and been modified in the course of human history; and whether, if universal, it is an emotion which has the same content and character among different peoples or varies with the physical and social environment. These questions do not involve idle academical distinctions, but are of the greatest possible importance. Thus, if it could be shown that revenge is not a universal human character, it would follow that it is not instinctive, or if instinctive, that it is either the expression of an instinct only recently acquired or, if deeply seated, that it is capable of being successfully suppressed. In either case we should be in a far more hopeful position so far as the eradication of war is concerned than if revenge is the primary, deeply seated, universal

⁴ The History of Human Marriage, 5th ed., 1921, Vol. I, p. 9.

instinct which it is assumed to be by Professor Westermarck.

In the further course of the paper I am considering, I showed that though it was theoretically possible to have a science of pure, or as it might be more suitably termed inductive, sociology, this was not possible so long as this science takes its terminology from the language of everyday life with its inevitable psychological implications, and that the two lines of study of pure sociology and social psychology, or of inductive and deductive sociology, should go on side by side, and that the student should recognize clearly which of the two methods he is following.

The general conclusion to which I was led is that at the present stage of our inquiry, and probably for a long time to come, the student of pure or inductive sociology is, and will be, able to do far more for a science of social psychology, than at present, or for some time, the psychologist can do for a science of sociology. The observation of social behavior must for long be our chief instrument towards the formulation of a science of collective psychology.

I am afraid that it may seem a somewhat depressing introduction to a course of lectures on psychology and politics to begin with such a statement concerning the science of sociology which includes politics in its scope. The paper to which I have referred was written eight years ago, and though as a statement of method I believe that it still holds good, the science of psychology has advanced greatly in the interval, or perhaps more correctly, certain psychological doctrines which were then little known have now become the subject of almost universal interest, though not, I am afraid, of universal understanding. I propose in this course to consider whether these advances in knowledge have made it more possible now than eight years ago to apply psychological doctrines directly to the solution of any of the practical problems of politics.

In considering the relation between psychology and the comprehensive science of sociology of which the study of politics forms a part, I have taken as an example the relation between the social institution of warfare and the emotion of revenge. I propose now to give some examples of the same kind of principle which come more definitely into the realm of political science. Before doing so, however, I may refer to a problem of fundamental importance which has a definite bearing on our subject. Our existing psychological knowledge is derived from the study of the individual; from the observation or introspection of the mental processes of the more or less normal individual in the first place, and in the second place by the observation from without, combined in favorable cases with conclusions gained from introspection, of the individual under abnormal conditions, and especially when afflicted by disease, and during the development of childhood. A great deal of so-called "social psychology" consists in the direct application of the conclusions of this psychology of the individual to collective behavior on the assumption, tacit or avowed, that since society consists of individuals, what is true of the individual must necessarily be true of the group of individuals. I propose to consider this problem at a later stage and only mention it now as another reason why it is necessary to study social behavior as an independent discipline, for I believe that such a question as that I have just put is not going to be answered on *a priori* grounds, but that a satisfactory answer will only be reached by the study of evidence in which the behavior of the individual is compared with the behavior of the group. For the moment I must be content to mention this problem and ask you to bear it in mind while you follow me in a brief inquiry into the relation between motive and behavior in certain departments of politics.

I will take as my first example the institution of female suffrage. Among the mass of conflicting motives which

prompted the long struggle concerning this political institution in our own and other countries, one which was absent was any definite body of knowledge worthy of being called scientific, concerning the existence of psychological differences between men and women in respect of the capacity to govern. Works in which the psychological character of the two sexes were compared dealt largely with observations on such subjects as sense-acuity and speed of reaction, which have no obvious connection, probably none at all, with the far more subtle factors which come into play in the exercise of political functions. I doubt whether the science of psychology was in a position to make a contribution of any value at the time when female suffrage was a subject of political conflict. The problem which had to be solved was determined by factors of a very different kind. Apart from the application of such political principles as that which regards the right of representation as a necessary result of taxation, the issue was largely determined by personal preferences and prejudices, and on grounds of political expediency, while perhaps the most striking fact is that in our own country the final and peaceful outcome of the conflict was largely, if not mainly, determined by a purely affective state, viz., the gratitude of the community to women for all that they had done during the war. Moreover, while women were deprived of political functions there was no possibility of any real knowledge of their qualification for the art of government, except, of course, in so far as political power had been entrusted to them in connection with other bodies than parliament and in other countries. Whereas, after women have exercised political functions, the world comes into possession, or should come into possession, of a mass of facts which make scientific study possible. The point I wish to make is that the observation of the political behavior of women, and of the differences, if there be such, between their political behavior and that of men, is capable of supplying us with a mass of facts which make

a real contribution to our knowledge of the psychology of the sexes; which will tell us whether there are psychological differences and the nature of such differences, if they exist, between men and women. One kind of fact of which I am thinking would be derived from a study of the relative proportions of men and women who vote, and especially of any differences in this respect between local elections where the issues are readily appreciated as compared with parliamentary elections where the issues are more confused and intangible. Another kind of fact would be derived from the study of the nature of legislation before and after the introduction of female suffrage, especially in matters of education and hygiene. Especially valuable in this respect would be the evidence from regions so like one another as those of the United States of America at the time when only some of these states had adopted this form of suffrage. My point is that the observation and statistical study of political behavior is capable of contributing far more to our psychological knowledge of any differences between the two sexes than such knowledge otherwise gained has been able to contribute towards the solution of the political problems involved.

Again, it will only be through the utilization of facts of this kind combined with other lines of evidence that we can expect the solution of the far more difficult problem whether if differences in the political behavior of men and women are shown to exist, they are inherent in the nature of the two sexes or are determined by the factors which Graham Wallas has summarized so aptly under the heading of social heritage. The point on which I wish to insist is that just as I have previously held that it is only through the comparative study of that special kind of behavior we call warfare that we can expect to understand the place taken by the emotion of revenge in human history, so in politics it is only through the study of political behavior that we can hope to understand the real nature

of the psychological factors which enter into this behavior. Both in the broader field of comparative sociology and in the narrower field of politics, knowledge of the facts of social and political behavior can make a far greater contribution to our psychology than any psychological knowledge we possess at present can contribute to our understanding and treatment of social and political problems.

A striking example of the thesis I am putting forward is, in my opinion, provided by the great book of our Chairman on Human Nature in Politics. Throughout that book the author modestly implies that he is engaged in applying psychological knowledge to the elucidation of political behavior. I venture to put forward the somewhat different view that the most important contribution made by that book is that it gave us a body of evidence collected by one who, while taking part in political life, had succeeded in keeping alive the capacity for dispassionate observation; that, by the study of political behavior recorded in Human Nature in Politics Graham Wallas contributed far more to psychology than he was helped by it. It is true that through other lines of work the science of psychology was moving in the direction along which Graham Wallas was led by his political observations, but the special contribution of that book was its demonstration that the factors to which others were being led through the study of morbid states of the individual are also active in the collective behavior of our own people in the political sphere.

I fear that what I have said in introducing the subject of the relation between psychology and politics may be disappointing to those who have been expecting that I should be able to point clearly to the value of psychological knowledge to the politician. I have deliberately chosen, however, to begin in this way because if there is any truth in what I have said the lesson to which it points is clear. The psychologist of politics cannot make bricks without straw. You cannot expect him to formulate laws

concerning the motives of political behavior unless he has the data whereon to found hypotheses and the facts wherewith to test those hypotheses.

If there is any truth in the view I have put before you, what is needed if we are to advance in knowledge is the collection of data derived from the observation of political behavior, using the terms "observation" and "behavior" in a very wide sense. These data fall into several classes of which two may be clearly distinguished from one another. One class of facts which should be available for the use of the psychologist are the records, usually more or less statistical in form, which are already collected by government departments or are capable of such collection. The other main class will be derived from the direct observation by those trained in psychology of the various forms of political behavior, of which kind of observation I have already cited the work of Graham Wallas as an example. In considering these two forms of observation I will begin by stating my conviction not only that the second kind of observation is by far the more important of the two, but also that it is the more immediately necessary and that the knowledge derived therefrom is essential to the successful utilization of statistical data. The social psychologist is here confronted with a problem very similar to that which was presented thirty years ago to the individual psychologist when he was first introduced to the experimental method. Carried away by the glamour and attractiveness of a new method, many believed that the problems of psychology were going to be solved by experimental methods. Advocates of what in those days was called the "new psychology" firmly believed that the more they refined their methods and measured by the thousandth of a second, and the more they multiplied the observations so made and applied to them the most elaborate statistical methods, the sooner they would reach the psychological millennium. The hopes thus raised have been rudely disappointed, though believers still linger here

and there. The disillusionment came because the advocates of these new methods did not appreciate the fact that we need knowledge derived from the close qualitative study of the individual mind, and from the comparison of its nature under such variation of conditions as disease provides, before we can expect to be able to utilize such statistical data as are provided by the very limited forms of mental activity to which the experimental method is capable of application.

It is very necessary that the social psychologist should now avoid the similar danger into which he may fall. It is essential that he shall recognize that he will not be in a position to learn much from the psychological interpretation of social and political statistics until he has prepared the field by a close and immediate study of social and political behavior. I propose to devote what remains of this lecture to a brief examination of two examples of political behavior which need far closer study than they have hitherto received.

One of these is the behavior of the committee which is so prominent in the mechanism of government; the other is the behavior associated with bureaucracy.

The committee now occupies so important a position in our system of government; it is an instrument so obviously capable of being turned to good or evil purpose according to the way it is conducted, that it needs definite study of a kind which, so far as I know, has never been attempted. At the same time it is a study from which a successful issue can hardly be expected except on the basis of psychological knowledge and by the application of psychological method.

Committees are of many kinds and work with very different degrees of success. One important distinction which could be made is according to the nature of their functions, and especially whether they are advisory or have executive functions. My own impression, it is nothing more than an impression, is that the committees of

the former kind, with which I am acquainted, are a success and those of the latter kind often a failure. It is evident that a form of grouping which is adapted to one kind of social or political function need not, and probably will not, be suitable for another, and the two kinds of function which differ from one another so greatly as those denoted by the terms "advisory" and "executive" would probably need instruments of different kinds. Committees might also be classed according to the nature of their mode of working and of their results. We probably all know the committee which does little more than support and register the decisions of one of its members, in which the result may be better or worse than that which would be reached by its members acting individually, according as the master mind is superior or inferior to the rest. Leaving this frequent case on one side, it will probably be widely recognized that some committees reach conclusions definitely superior to those which would be reached by their individual members, while other committees may produce results altogether on a lower level than the decisions of their constituent members if acting as individuals. Certain factors to which such differences may be due are fairly obvious. The former result is the more likely to be reached the more the individual members are able to contribute special knowledge, and are ready to put this knowledge in the possession of others. The latter result is the more likely when the members of the committee have not the adequate knowledge or, if they have it, have not the courage, the enterprise, sometimes perhaps the honesty, to put it forward, but allow the opinion of the more vocal members to carry the day. Here again I should like to register the impression that there is a tendency for this mode of classification of committees to coincide with that which distinguishes committees according to their advisory or executive functions, the advisory committee tending to produce a result superior to that which would be reached by its individual members, while the committee of the

executive class is one in which the result often tends to be of a kind one has to regard as inferior to that of the individual members. I only put forward this suggestion in the most tentative manner, for I believe that the whole subject needs an exhaustive examination, through the results of which I believe it would be possible to reach conclusions which would make the committee an institution of greater value to the community, or at least reduce the magnitude of certain unsatisfactory aspects of this mode of government which cannot altogether be abolished.

The other subject to which I should like to refer briefly, though here again only by way of illustration of the kind of way in which psychology may be useful to politics, is one connected with what is usually called bureaucracy, a subject perhaps of as great and as immediate political importance as any other which can be named. There is no question that the greatest obstacle to the management of production, distribution and consumption in the interest of the community is the general dread of certain evils which have become closely connected in public opinion with government control, a dread which has been greatly accentuated by the experience of nearly every one who had to do with government departments, at any rate with certain government departments, during the war. One of the most important problems with which our society is confronted is to discover how to administer and manage enterprises of various kinds without the evils which are summed up under the name bureaucracy. There can be little question that we have here a subject in which psychology can be of service. Here again we need an exhaustive study of the factors which enter into management, among which, of course, the subject with which I have just dealt, the committee, will rank as one of the most important. This is not the place, even had I the necessary knowledge to enter upon the full consideration of this subject, but as an illustration of the kind of problem with which the investigating psychologist would have to

deal I may mention the highly important and widespread social institution known as "red tape." It is obvious that in the conduct of any extensive business one cannot trust to the unregulated individual judgment of every one concerned in management, but that there have to be definite rules of procedure. The state or process which is known as "red tape" is one in which these rules are unduly complex and unduly rigid, and have become masters instead of servants. Here again I shall make no attempt to deal with the subject fully, but shall be content to throw out a suggestion concerning one kind of psychological process which acts as a factor in the misuse of a necessary procedure.

Modern psychology is largely concerned with the mechanisms by which certain mental products, and especially those products we regard as morbid, come into being. Among the many processes or mechanisms it has distinguished is one which is called the defense-mechanism. A good example of this process is the exaggerated confidence, often amounting to bluster and swagger, which is adopted by those who, under the surface, have a definite sense of inferiority. I think that most educated people now recognize that many examples of exaggerated social behavior only cover an attitude of self-distrust and doubt. The psychologist classes this mode of behavior, with many others of different kinds, as due to the action of a defense-mechanism in which the blustering or swaggering attitude is adopted, not of set purpose, but more or less unwittingly, as a defense against the unpleasant state of mind which would be present if the inferiority were explicitly recognized. I should like to suggest that one of the factors which enters into the production of "red tape" is the activity of a defense-mechanism; that it is a protection adopted in a more or less, usually more rather than less, unwitting manner by those who find themselves confronted with administrative problems to which their powers are not adequate. My own experience of individual experts

in the use of "red tape" certainly points in this direction, while it is significant that it flourishes luxuriantly in such departments as the War Office, where men who enter upon the career of arms because they have the qualifications for fighting and adventure find that their essential task is the management of a vast organization in which the qualities especially needed are very different from those which led them to adopt the army as a career. I must be content to throw out this suggestion as to one of the lines which may serve as a guide in the psychological investigation of an attitude which must be understood if we are to correct the evils now associated with government control.

I must be content with these examples of the kind of way in which psychology may be able to help towards the solution of certain practical problems, but I should like to insist again that these must only be regarded as examples of the kind of problem to which psychological methods and principles may be applied. As a beginner in the study of politics it is not my place to attempt the practical application of psychology to such problems.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY¹

BY BEATRICE M. HINKLE, M.D.

When Professor Freud of Vienna made his early discoveries in the realm of the neuroses, and announced that the basis and origin of the various symptoms grouped under the terms hysteria and neuroses lay in unfulfilled desires and wishes, unexpressed and unknown to the patient for the most part, and concerned chiefly with the sexual instinct, it was not realized what far-reaching influence this unpopular and bitterly attacked theory would exert on the understanding of human life in general.

For this theory has so widened in its scope that its application has now extended beyond a particular group of pathologic states. It has in fact led to a new evaluation of the whole conduct of human life; a new comprehension has developed which explains those things which formerly were unexplained, and there is offered an understanding not only of the symptoms of a neurosis and the phenomena of conduct but the product of the mind as expressed in myths and religions.

This amazing growth has proceeded steadily in an ever-widening fashion despite opposition as violent as any of which we have knowledge in the past. The criticism originally directed towards the little understood and much disliked sexual conception now includes the further teachings of a psychology which by the application to it of such damning phrases as mystical, metaphysical and sacrilegious, is condemned as unscientific.

¹ Reprinted from Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious*, with the author's permission and by courtesy of Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

To add to the general confusion and misunderstanding surrounding this new school of thought there has arisen a division amongst the leaders themselves, so that there now exist two schools led respectively by Professor Sigmund Freud of Vienna and Dr. Carl Jung of Zürich, referred to in the literature as the Vienna School and the Zürich School.

It is very easy to understand that criticism and opposition should develop against a psychology so difficult of comprehension, and so disturbing to the ideas which have been held by humanity for ages; a psychology which furthermore requires a special technique as well as an observer trained to recognize and appreciate in psychologic phenomena a verification of the statement that there is no such thing as chance, and that every act and every expression has its own meaning, determined by the inner feelings and wishes of the individual.

It is not a simple matter to come out boldly and state that every individual is to a large extent the determiner of his own destiny, for only by poets and philosophers has this idea been put forth—not by science; and it is a brave act to make this statement with full consciousness of all its meaning, and to stand ready to prove it by scientific reasoning and procedure.

Developed entirely through empirical investigation and through an analysis of individual cases, Freudian psychology seems particularly to belong to that conception of Max Müller's that "An empirical acquaintance with facts rises to a scientific knowledge of facts as soon as the mind discovers beneath the multiplicity of single productions the unity of an organic system."²

Psychoanalysis is the name given to the method developed for reaching down into the hidden depths of the individual to bring to light the underlying motives and determinants of his symptoms and attitudes, and to reveal the unconscious tendencies which lie behind actions and

² Science of Language. First series, p. 25.

reactions and which influence development and determine the relations of life itself. The result of digging down into the hidden psyche has been to produce a mass of material from below the threshold of consciousness, so astonishing and disturbing and out of relation with the previously held values as to arouse in any one unfamiliar with the process the strongest antagonism and criticism.

Although originally studied only as a therapeutic method for the sick it was soon realized through an analysis of normal people how slight were the differences in the content of the unconscious of the sick and of the normal. The differences observed were seen to be rather in the reactions to life and to the conflicts produced by contending forces in the individual.

These conflicts, usually not fully perceived by the individual, and having to do with objectionable desires and wishes that are not in keeping with the conscious idea of self, produce marked effects which are expressed either in certain opinions, prejudices, attitudes of conduct, faulty actions, or in some definite pathologic symptom. As Dr. Jung says, he who remains healthy has to struggle with the same complexes that cause the neurotic to fall ill.

In a valuable book called *The Neighbor*, written by the late Professor N. Shaler of Harvard University, there occurs this very far-reaching statement: "It is hardly too much to say that all the important errors of conduct, all the burdens of men or of societies are caused by the inadequacies in the association of the primal animal emotions with those mental powers which have been so rapidly developed in mankind."

This statement, reached by a process of reasoning and a method of thought and study entirely different from psychoanalysis, nevertheless so completely expresses in brief form the very basis of the postulates developed through psychoanalysis that I quote it here. Such a statement made in the course of a general examination of human relations does not arouse opposition nor seem to

be so difficult of acceptance. It appears to be the individual application of these conceptions that has roused such bitter antagonism and violent denunciations.

Rightly understood and used, psychoanalysis may be compared to surgery, for psychoanalysis stands in the same relation to the personality as surgery does to the body, and they aim at parallel results.

It is well recognized that in the last analysis nature is the real physician, the healer of wounds; but prior to the development of our modern asepsis and surgical technique the healing produced by nature was most often of a very faulty and imperfect type—hideous scars, distorted and crippled limbs, with functions impaired or incapacitated, resulted from the wounds, or else nature was unable to cope with the hurt and the injured one succumbed.

Science has been steadily working for centuries with the aim of understanding nature and finding means to aid and coöperate with her so that healing could take place with the least possible loss of function or permanent injury to the individual. Marvelous results have rewarded these persistent efforts, as the brilliant achievements of surgery plainly indicate.

Meantime, however, little thought was given to the possibility of any scientific method being available to help man overcome the wounds and conflicts taking place in his soul, hurts which retarded his development and progress as a personality, and which frequently in the struggle resulted in physical pains and symptoms of the most varied character. That was left solely to religion and metaphysics. Now, however, this same assistance that surgery has given to the physical body, psychoanalysis attempts to give to the personality. That it cannot always succeed is as much to be expected, and more, than that surgery does not always succeed, for the analytic work requires much of the individual. No real result can be attained if he has not already developed a certain quality of character and intelligence which makes it possible for him to

submit himself to a facing of his naked soul, and to the pain and suffering which this often entails. Here, as in no other relation in life, an absolute truth and an absolute honesty are the only basis of action, since deception of any kind deceives no one but the individual himself and acts as a boomerang, defeating his own aims.

Such deep searching and penetrating into the soul is not something to be undertaken lightly nor to be considered a trivial or simple matter, and the fact is that where a strong compulsion is lacking, such as sickness or a situation too difficult to meet, much courage is required to undertake it.

In order to understand this psychology which is pervading all realms of thought and seems destined to be a new psychological-philosophical system for the understanding and practical advancement of human life, it will be necessary to go somewhat into detail regarding its development and present status. For in this new direction lies its greatest value and its greatest danger.

The beginnings of this work were first published in 1895 in a book entitled *Studien über Hysterie*, and contained the joint investigations into hysteria of Dr. Breuer of Vienna and his pupil Dr. Sigmund Freud. The results of their investigations seemed to show that the various symptoms grouped under the title of hysteria were the result of emotionally colored reminiscences which, all unknown to the conscious waking self, were really actively expressing themselves through the surrogate form of symptoms and that these experiences, although forgotten by the patient, could be reproduced and the emotional content discharged.

Hypnosis was the means used to enable the physician to penetrate deeply into the forgotten memories, for it was found through hypnosis that these lost incidents and circumstances were not really lost at all but only dropped from consciousness, and were capable of being revived when given the proper stimuli. The astonishing part about

it was that with the revival of these memories and their accompanying painful and disturbing emotions, the symptoms disappeared. This led naturally to the conclusion that these symptoms were dependent upon some emotional disturbance or psychic trauma which had been inadequately expressed, and that in order to cure the patient one merely had to establish the connection between the memory and the emotions which properly belonged to it, letting the emotion work itself out through a reproduction of the forgotten scene.

With further investigation Freud found that hypnosis was unnecessary for the revival of the forgotten experiences, and that it was possible to obtain the lost emotional material in the conscious and normal state. For this purpose the patient was encouraged to assume a passive, non-critical attitude and simply let his thoughts flow, speaking of whatever came into his mind, holding nothing back. During this free and easy discussion of his life and conditions, directed by the law of association of ideas, reference was invariably made to the experiences or thoughts which were the most affective and disturbing elements. It was seen to be quite impossible to avoid this indirect revelation because of the strength of the emotions surrounding these ideas and the effect of the conscious wish to repress unpleasant feelings. This important group of ideas or impressions, with the feelings and emotions clustered around them which are betrayed through this process, was called by Jung a *complex*.

However, with the touching of the *complex* which always contains feelings and emotions so painful or unpleasant as to be unacceptable to consciousness, and which are therefore repressed and hidden, great difficulties appeared, for very often the patient came to a sudden stop and could apparently recall nothing more. Memory gaps were frequent, relations twisted, etc. Evidently some force banished these memories so that the person was quite honest in saying that he could remember nothing or

that there was nothing to tell. This kind of forgetfulness was called *repression*, and is the normal mechanism by which nature protects the individual from such painful feelings as are caused by unpleasant and unacceptable experiences and thoughts, the recognition of his egoistic nature, and the often quite unbearable conflict of his weaknesses with his feelings of idealism.

At this early time great attention was given towards developing a technique which would render more easy the reproduction of these forgotten memories, for with the abandonment of hypnosis it was seen that some unknown active force was at work which not only banished painful memories and feelings, but also prevented their return; this was called *resistance*. This resistance was found to be the important mechanism which interfered with a free flow of thought and produced the greatest difficulty in the further conduct of the analysis. It appeared under various guises and frequently manifested itself in intellectual objections based on reasoning ground, in criticism directed towards the analyst, or in criticism of the method itself, and finally, often in a complete blocking of expression, so that until the resistance was broken nothing more could be produced.

It was necessary then to find some aid by which these resistances could be overcome and the repressed memories and feelings revived and set free. For it was proven again and again that even though the person was not at all aware of concealing within himself some emotionally disturbing feeling or experience with which his symptoms were associated, yet such was the fact, and that under proper conditions this material could be brought into consciousness. This realm where these unknown but disturbing emotions were hidden was called the "Unconscious"—the "Unconscious" also being a name used arbitrarily to indicate all that material of which the person is not aware at the given time—the not-conscious.

This term is used very loosely in Freudian psychology

and is not intended to provoke any academic discussion but to conform strictly to the dictionary classification of a "negative concept which can neither be described nor defined." To say that an idea or feeling is unconsciously means to indicate that the individual is unaware at that time of its existence, or that all the material of which he is unaware at a given time is unconscious.

With the discovery of the significance in relation to hysteria of these varied experiences and forgotten memories which always led into the erotic realm and usually were carried far back into early childhood, the theory of an infantile sexual trauma as a cause of this neurosis developed. Contrary to the usual belief that children have no sexuality and that only at puberty does it suddenly arise, it was definitely shown that there was a very marked kind of sexuality among children of the most tender years, entirely instinctive and capable of producing a grave effect on the entire later life.

However, further investigations carried into the lives of normal people disclosed quite as many psychic and sexual traumas in their early childhood as in the lives of the patients; therefore, the conception of the "infantile sexual trauma" as the etiological factor was abandoned in favor of "the infantilism of sexuality" itself. In other words, it was soon realized that many of the sexual traumas which were placed in their early childhood by these patients did not really exist except in their own phantasies and probably were produced as a defense against the memories of their own childish sexual activities. These experiences led to a deep investigation into the nature of the child's sexuality and developed the ideas which Freud incorporated in a work called *Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory*. He found so many variations and manifestations of sexual activity even among young children that he realized that this activity was the normal, although entirely unconscious, expression of the child's developing life, and while not comparable

to the adult sexuality, nevertheless produced a very definite influence and effect on the child's life.

These childish expressions of this instinct he called "polymorphous perverse," because in many ways they resembled the various abnormalities called perversions when found among adults under certain conditions.

In the light of these additional investigations Freud was led to change his formulation, for instead of the symptoms of the neurotic patient being due to definite sexual experiences, they seemed to be determined by his reactions towards his own sexual constitution and the kind of repression to which these instincts were subjected.

Perhaps one of the greatest sources of misunderstanding and difficulty in this whole subject lies in the term sexuality, for Freud's conception of this is entirely different from that of the popular sense. He conceives sexuality to be practically synonymous with the word *love* and to include under this term all those tender feelings and emotions which have had their origin in a primitive erotic source, even if now their primary aim is entirely lost and another substituted for it. It must also be borne in mind that Freud strictly emphasizes the psychic side of sexuality and its importance, as well as the somatic expression.

Therefore, to understand Freud's theories, his very broad conception of the term sexual must never be forgotten.

Through this careful investigation of the psychic life of the individual, the tremendous influence and importance of phantasy-making for one's fate was definitely shown. It was discovered that the indulgence in day-dreams and phantasies was practically universal not only among children but among adults, that even whole lives were being lived out in a phantastic world created by the dreamer, a world wherein he could fulfill all those wishes and desires which were found to be too difficult or impossible to satisfy in the world of reality.

Much of this phantasy thinking was seen to be scarcely conscious, but arose from unrealized wishes, desires and strivings which could only express themselves through veiled symbols in the form of phantastic structures not understood, nor fully recognized. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the most common human experiences to find "queer thoughts," undesired ideas and images, forcing themselves upon one's attention to such an extent that the will has to be employed to push them out of mind. It is not unusual to discover long-forgotten impressions of childhood assuming a phantastic shape in memory, and dwelt upon as though they were still of importance.

This material afforded a rich field for the searchers into the soul, for through the operation of the law of association of ideas these phantastic products, traced back to their origin, revealed the fact that instead of being meaningless or foolish, they were produced by a definite process, and arose from distinct wishes and desires which unconsciously veiled themselves in these mysterious forms and pictures.

It is conceded that the most completely unconscious product of an individual is his dream, and therefore Professor Freud turned his attention from phantasies and day-dreams to the investigation of the nightly dreams of his patients to discover whether they would throw light upon the painful feelings and ideas repressed out of consciousness, and therefore inaccessible to direct revelation.

This brilliant idea soon led to a rich fruiting, for it became evident that, contrary to the usual conception that the dream is a phantastic and absurd jumble of heterogeneous fragments, having no real relation to the life of the individual, it is full of meaning. In fact, it is usually concerned with the problem of life most pressing at the time, which expresses itself not directly, but in symbolic form so as to be unrecognized. In this way the individual gains an expression and fulfillment of his unrealized wish or desire.

This discovery of the symbolic nature of the dream and the phantasy was brought about entirely through the associative method and developed empirically through investigations of the dreams of many people. In this manner it became evident that certain ideas and objects which recurred again and again in the dreams and phantasies of different people were definitely associated with certain unconscious or unrecognized wishes and desires, and were repeatedly used by the mind to express these meanings where a direct form was repressed and unallowed. Thus certain dream expressions and figures were in a general way considered to be rather definite symbols of these repressed ideas and feelings found in the unconscious. Through a comparative and parallel study it soon appeared that there was a similar mechanism at work in myths and fairy tales and that the relationship between the dreams and phantasies of an individual and the myths and folk tales of a people were so close that Abraham could say that the myth is a fragment of the infantile soul life of the race and the dream is the myth of the individual.

Thus through relating his dreams the patient himself furnished the most important means of gaining access to the unconscious and disturbing complexes with which his symptoms were connected.

Besides the dream analysis the patient furnished other means of revelation of his complexes—his mannerisms and unconscious acts, his opening remarks to his physician, his emotional reactions to certain ideas; in short the whole behavior and verbal expressions of the individual reveal his inner nature and problems.

Through all this work it became clear that in the emotional nature lay the origin not only of the various nervous illnesses themselves, but also of the isolated symptoms and individual idiosyncrasies and peculiarities which are the part of all humanity and that the pathogenic cause of the disturbances lies not in the ignorance of individuals,

but in those inner resistances which are the underlying basis of this ignorance.

Therefore the aim of the therapy became not merely the relief of the ignorance but the searching out and combating of these resistances.

It becomes evident from even this brief description of the analytic procedure that we are dealing with a very complex and delicate material, and with a technique which needs to make definite use of all influences available for the help of the patient. It has long been recognized that the relation established between physician and patient has a great effect upon the medical assistance which he is able to render—in other words, if a confidence and personal regard developed in the patient towards the physician, the latter's advice was just so much more efficacious. This personal feeling has been frankly recognized and made of distinct service in psychoanalytic treatment under the name of *transference*. It is through the aid of this definite relationship which must be established in the one being analyzed towards the analyst that it is possible to deal with the unconscious and organized resistances which so easily blind the individual and render the acceptance of the new valuations very difficult to the raw and sensitive soul.

Freud's emphasis upon the rôle of the sexual instinct in the production of the neurosis and also in its determining power upon the personality of the normal individual does not imply that he does not also recognize other determinants at the root of human conduct, as for instance, the instinct for preservation of life and the ego principle itself. But these motives are not so violently forbidden and repressed as the sexual impulse, and therefore, because of that repressive force and the strength of the impulse he considers this primary in its influence upon the human being.

The importance of this instinct upon human life is clearly revealed by the great place given to it under the

name of love in art, literature, poetry, romance and all beauty from the beginning of recorded time. Viewed in this light it cannot seem extraordinary that a difficulty or disturbance in this emotional field should produce such far-reaching consequences for the individual. The sexual impulse is often compared with that of hunger, and this craving and need lying in all humanity is called by Freud *libido*.

The Œdipus Problem

With further investigations into the nature of the repressed complexes a very astonishing situation was revealed. The parental influence on children is something so well recognized and understood that to call attention to it sounds much like a banality. However, here an extraordinary discovery was made, for in tracing out the feelings and emotions of adults it became evident that this influence was paramount not only for children but for adults as well; that the entire direction of lives was largely determined quite unconsciously by the parental associations, and that, although adults, the emotional side of their nature was still infantile in type and demanded unconsciously the infantile or childish relations.

Freud traces out the commencement of the infantile attachment for the parents in this wise.

In the beginning the child derives its first satisfaction and pleasure from the mother in the form of nutrition and care for its wants. In this first act of suckling Freud sees already a kind of sexual pleasure, for he apparently identifies the pleasure principle and the sexual instinct and considers that the former is primarily rooted in the latter. At this early time commence such various infantile actions unconnected with nutrition as thumbsucking, various movements of the body as rubbing, boring, pulling and other manifestations of a definite interest in its own body, a delight in nakedness, the pleasure exhibited in inflicting pain on some object and its opposite, the pleasure from

receiving pain. All of these afford the child pleasure and satisfaction, and because they seem analogous to certain perversions in adults they are called by Freud the "polymorphous perverse sexuality" of childhood. The character of these instinctive actions which have nothing to do with any other person, and through which the child attains pleasure from its own body, caused Freud to term this phase of life as autoerotic, after Havelock Ellis. However, with the growth of the child there is a parallel development of the psychic elements of its sexual nature and now the mother, the original object of its love, primarily determined by its helplessness and need, acquires a new valuation. The beginnings of the need for a love object to satisfy the craving or libido of the child are early in evidence and, following along sex lines in general, the little son prefers the mother and the daughter the father after the usual preference of the parents.

At this early time children feel deeply the enormous importance of their parents and their entire world is bounded by the family circle. All the elements of the ego which the child possesses have now become manifest; love, jealousy, curiosity, hate, etc., and those instincts are directed in the greatest degree towards the objects of their libido, namely, the parents. With the growing ego of the child there is a development of strong wishes and desires demanding satisfaction which can only be gratified by the mother; therefore there is aroused in the small son the feeling of jealousy and anger towards the father in whom he sees a rival for the affection of the mother and whom he would like to replace. This desire in the soul of the child Freud calls the *Œdipus complex* in recognition of its analogy to the tragedy of King Œdipus who was drawn by his fate to kill his father and win his mother for a wife. Freud presents this as the *nuclear complex* of every neurosis.

At the basis of this complex, some trace of which can be found in every person, Freud sees a definite incest wish

towards the mother which only lacks the quality of consciousness. Because of moral reactions this wish is quickly subjected to repression through the operation of the "incest barrier," a postulate he compares to the incest taboo found among inferior peoples. At this time the child is beginning to develop its typical sexual curiosity expressed by the question, "Where do I come from?" The interest and investigation of the child into this problem, aided by observations and deductions from various actions and attitudes of the parents, who have no idea of the watchfulness of the child, lead him, because of his imperfect knowledge and immature development, into many false theories and ideas of birth. These infantile sexual theories are held by Freud to be determinative in the development of the child's character and also for the contents of the unconscious as expressed in a future neurosis.

These various reactions of the child and his sexual curiosity are entirely normal and unavoidable, and if his development proceeds in an orderly fashion then, at the time of definite object choice he will pass smoothly over from the limitations of the family attachment out into the world and find therein his independent existence.

However, if the libido remains fixed on the first chosen object so that the growing individual is unable to tear himself loose from these familial ties, then the incestuous bond is deepened with the developing sexual instinct and its accompanying need of a love object, and the entire future of the young personality endangered. For with the development of the incestuous bond the natural repressions deepen because the moral censor cannot allow these disturbing relations to become clear to the individual. Therefore, the whole matter is repressed more deeply into the unconscious, and even a feeling of positive enmity and repulsion towards the parents is often developed in order to conceal and over-compensate for the impossible situation actually present.

This persistence of the attachment of the libido to the original object, and the inability to find in this a suitable satisfaction for the adult need, interferes with the normal development of the psychosexual character, and it is due to this that the adult retains that "infantilism of sexuality" which plays so great a rôle in determining the instability of the emotional life which so frequently leads into the definite neuroses.

These were the conclusions reached and the ground on which Freudian psychology rested, regarding the etiology of the neurosis, and the tendencies underlying normal human mechanisms, when Dr. Carl Jung, the most prominent of Freud's disciples, and the leader of the Zürich school, found himself no longer able to agree with Freud's findings in certain particulars, although the phenomena which Freud observed and the technique of psychoanalysis developed by Freud were the material on which Jung worked and the value of which he clearly emphasizes. The differences which have developed lay in his understanding and interpretation of the phenomena observed.

Beginning with the conception of libido itself as a term used to connote sexual hunger and craving, albeit the meaning of the word sexual was extended by Freud to embrace a much wider significance than common usage has assigned it, Jung was unable to confine himself to this limitation. He conceived this longing, this urge or push of life as something extending beyond sexuality even in its wider sense. He saw in the term libido a concept of unknown nature, comparable to Bergson's *élan vital*, a hypothetical energy of life, which occupies itself not only in sexuality but in various physiological and psychological manifestations such as growth, development, hunger, and all the human activities and interests. This cosmic energy or urge manifested in the human being he calls libido and compares it with the energy of physics. Although recognizing, in common with Freud as well as with many others,

the primal instinct of reproduction as the basis of many functions and present-day activities of mankind no longer sexual in character he repudiates the idea of still calling them sexual, even though their development was a growth originally out of the sexual. Sexuality and its various manifestations Jung sees as most important channels occupied by libido, but not the exclusive ones through which libido flows.

This is an energetic concept of life; and from this viewpoint this hypothetical energy of life or libido is a living power used instinctively by man in all the automatic processes of his functioning; such very processes being but different manifestations of this energy. By virtue of its quality of mobility and change man, through his understanding and intelligence, has the power consciously to direct and use his libido in definite and desired ways.

In this conception of Jung will be seen an analogy to Bergson, who speaks of "this change, this movement and becoming, this self-creation, call it what you will, as the very stuff and reality of our being."³

In developing the energetic conception of libido and separating it from Freud's sexual definition, Jung makes possible the explanation of interest in general, and provides a working concept by which not only the specifically sexual, but the general activities and reactions of man can be understood.

If a person complains of no longer having interest in his work or of losing interest in his surroundings, then one understands that his libido is withdrawn from this object and that in consequence the object itself seems no longer attractive, whereas, as a matter of fact, the object itself is exactly the same as formerly. In other words, it is the libido that we bestow upon an object that makes it attractive and interesting.

The causes for the withdrawal of libido may be various and are usually quite different from those that the persons

³ Creative Evolution.

offer in explanation. It is the task of psychoanalysis to discover the real reasons, which are usually hidden and unknown. On the other hand, when an individual exhibits an exaggerated interest or places an overemphasis upon an idea or situation, then we know there is too much libido here and that we may find as a consequence a corresponding depletion elsewhere.

This leads directly into the second point of difference between Jung's views and those of Freud. This is concerned with those practically universal childish manifestations of sexuality called by Freud "polymorphous perverse" because of their similarity to those abnormalities of sexuality which occur in adults and are called perversions.

Jung takes exception to this viewpoint. He sees in the various manifestations of childhood the precursors or forerunners of the later fully developed sexuality, and instead of considering them perverse he considers them preliminary expressions of sexual coloring. He divides human life into three stages. The first stage up to about the third or fourth year, generally speaking, he calls the presexual stage, for there he sees the libido or life energy occupied chiefly in the functions of nutrition and growth, and he draws an analogy between this period and that of the caterpillar stage of the butterfly.

The second stage includes the years from this time until puberty, and this he speaks of as the prepubertal stage.

The third period is that from puberty onward and can be considered the time of maturity.

It is in the earliest stage, the period of which varies greatly in different individuals, that are fully inaugurated those various manifestations which have so marked a sexual coloring that there can be no question of their relationship, although at that time sexuality in the adult meaning of the word does not exist.

Jung explains the polymorphism of these phenomena

as arising from a gradual movement of the libido from exclusive service in the function of nutrition into new avenues which successively open up with the development of the child until the final inauguration of the sexual function proper at puberty. Normally these childish bad habits are gradually relinquished until the libido is entirely withdrawn from these immature phases and with the ushering in of puberty for the first time "appears in the form of an undifferentiated sexual primitive power, clearly forcing the individual towards division, budding, etc."

However, if in the course of its movement from the function of nutrition to the sexual function the libido is arrested or retarded at any phase, then a *fixation* may result, creating a disturbance in the harmony of the normal development. For, although the libido is retarded and remains clinging to some childish manifestation, time goes on and the physical growth of the child does not stand still. Soon a great contrast is created between the infantile manifestations of the emotional life and the needs of the more adult individual, and the foundation is thus prepared for either the development of a definite neurosis or else for those weaknesses of character or symptomatic disturbances which are not sufficiently serious to be called a neurosis.

One of the most active and important forms of childish libido occupation is in phantasy making. The child's world is one of imagery and make-believe where he can create for himself that satisfaction and enjoyment which the world of reality so often denies. As the child grows and real demands of life are made upon him it becomes increasingly necessary that his libido be taken away from his phantastic world and used for the required adaptation to reality needed by his age and condition, until finally for the adult the freedom of the whole libido is necessary to meet the biological and cultural demands of life.

Instead of thus employing the libido in the real world, however, certain people never relinquish the seeking for

satisfaction in the shadowy world of phantasy and even though they make certain attempts at adaptation they are halted and discouraged by every difficulty and obstacle in the path of life and are easily pulled back into their inner psychic world. This condition is called a state of *introversion*. It is concerned with the past and the reminiscences which belong thereto. Situations and experiences which should have been completed and finished long ago are still dwelt upon and lived with. Images and matters which were once important but which normally have no significance for their later age are still actively influencing their present lives. The nature and character of these phantasy products are legion, and are easily recognized in the emotional attitudes and pretensions, the childish illusions and exaggerations, the prejudices and inconsistencies which people express in manifold forms. The actual situation is inadequately faced; small matters are reacted towards in an exaggerated manner; or else a frivolous attitude is maintained where real seriousness is demanded. In other words, there is clearly manifested an inadequate psychic adaptation towards reality which is quite to be expected from the child, but which is very discordant in the adult.

The most important of these past influences is that of the parents. Because they are the first objects of the developing childish love, and afford the first satisfaction and pleasure to the child, they become the models for all succeeding efforts, as Freud has worked out. This he called the *nuclear* or *root complex* because this influence was so powerful it seemed to be the determining factor in all later difficulties in the life of the individual.

In this phase of the problem lies the third great difference between Jung's interpretation of the observed phenomena and that of Freud.

Jung definitely recognizes that there are many neurotic persons who clearly exhibited in their childhood the same neurotic tendencies that are later exaggerated. Also that

an almost overwhelming affect on the destiny of these children is exercised by the influence of the parents, the frequent over-anxiety or tenderness, the lack of sympathy or understanding, in other words, the complexes of the parent reacting upon the child and producing in him love, admiration, fear, distrust, hate, revolt. The greater the sensitiveness and impressionability of the child, the more he will be stamped with the familial environment, and the more he will unconsciously seek to find again in the world of reality the model of his own small world with all the pleasures and satisfactions, or disappointments and unhappinesses with which it was filled.

This condition to be sure is not a recognized or a conscious one, for the individual may think himself perfectly free from this past influence because he is living in the real world, and because actually there is a great difference between the present conditions and that of his childish past. He sees all this, intellectually, but there is a wide gap between the intellectual grasp of a situation and the emotional development, and it is the latter realm wherein lies the disharmony. However, although many ideas and feelings are connected with the parents, analysis reveals very often that they are only subjective and that in reality they bear little resemblance to the actual past situation. Therefore, Jung speaks no longer of the real father and mother but uses the term *imago* or *image* to represent the father or mother, because the feelings and phantasies frequently do not deal with the real parents but with the distorted and subjective image created by the imagination of the individual.

Following this distinction Jung sees in the *Œdipus complex* of Freud only a symbol for the "childish desire towards the parents and for the conflict which this craving evokes," and cannot accept the theory that in this early stage of childhood the mother has any real sexual significance for the child.

The demands of the child upon the mother, the jealousy

so often exhibited, are at first connected with the rôle of the mother as protector, caretaker and supplier of nutritive wants, and only later, with the germinating eroticism, does the child's love become admixed with the developing sexual quality. The chief love objects are still the parents and he naturally continues to seek and to find in them satisfaction for all his desires. In this way the typical conflict is developed which in the son is directed towards the father and in the daughter towards the mother. This jealousy of the daughter towards the mother is called the *Electra complex* from the myth of Electra who took revenge on her mother for the murder of the husband because she was in this way deprived of her father.

Normally as puberty is attained the child gradually becomes more or less freed from his parents, and upon the degree in which this is accomplished depends his health and future well-being.

This demand of nature upon the young individual to free himself from the bonds of his childish dependency and to find in the world of reality his independent existence is so imperious and dominating that it frequently produces in the child the greatest struggles and severest conflict, the period being characterized symbolically as a *self-sacrifice* by Jung.

It frequently happens that the young person is so closely bound in the family relations that it is only with the greatest difficulty that he can attain any measure of freedom and then only very imperfectly, so that the libido sexualis can only express itself in certain feelings and phantasies which clearly reveal the existence of the complex until then entirely hidden and unrealized. Now commences the secondary struggle against the unfilial and immoral feelings with a consequent development of intense resistances expressing themselves in irritation, anger, revolt and antagonism against the parents, or else in an especially tender, submissive and yielding attitude which overcompensates for the rebellion and reaction held within.

This struggle and conflict gives rise to the unconscious phantasy of self-sacrifice which really means the sacrificing of the childish tendencies and early love type in order to free libido; for man's nature demands that he attain the capacity for the accomplishment of his own personal fulfillment, the satisfaction of which belongs to the developed man and woman.

This brings us to one of the most important of Jung's conceptions in that it bears practically upon the treatment of certain types of the neuroses and stands theoretically in direct opposition to Freud's hypothesis. While recognizing fully the influence of the parents and of the sexual constitution of the child, Jung refuses to see in this infantile past the real cause for the later development of the illness. He definitely places the cause of the pathogenic conflict *in the present moment* and considers that in seeking for the cause in the distant past one is only following the desire of the patient, which is to withdraw himself as much as possible from the present important period.

The conflict is produced by some important task or duty which is essential biologically and practically for the fulfillment of the ego of the individual, but before which an obstacle arises from which he shrinks, and thus halted cannot go on. With this interference in the path of progression libido is stored up and a *regression* takes place whereby there occurs a reanimation of past ways of libido occupation which were entirely normal to the child, but which for the adult are no longer of value. These regressive infantile desires and phantasies now alive and striving for satisfaction are converted into symptoms, and in these surrogate forms obtain a certain gratification, thus creating the external manifestations of the neurosis. Therefore Jung does not ask from what psychic experience or point of fixation in childhood the patient is suffering, but what is the present duty or task he is avoiding, or what obstacle in his life's path he is unable to over-

come? What is the cause of his regression to past psychic experiences?

Following this theory Jung expresses the view that the elaborate phantasies and dreams produced by these patients are really forms of compensation or artificial substitutes for the unfulfilled adaptation to reality. The sexual content of these phantasies and dreams is only apparently and not actually expressive of a real sexual desire or incest wish, but is a regressive employment of sexual forms to symbolically express a present-day need when the attainment of the present ego demand seems too difficult or impossible, and no adaptation is made to what is possible for the individual's capability.⁴

With this statement Jung throws a new light on the work of analytic psychology and on the conception of the neurotic symptoms, and renders possible of understanding the many apparent incongruities and conflicting observations which have been so disturbing to the critics.

Jung sees the infantile sexuality itself as one of the symptoms of the immature and only partially developed personality. In other words, the development of man's personality is looked upon as being due to factors other than the sole one of his sexual organism, although this plays a large part—much larger than is generally supposed.

Perhaps Dr. Jung's most important contribution for the understanding of human personality, however, is the differentiation and study of the psychologic types. The advantage of the classification of mankind into distinct psychologic types whose reactions to stimuli are different

⁴For a more complete presentation of Jung's views consult his *Theory of Psychoanalysis in the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series*. No. 19. Also, Chapter on Jung, in Van Teslaar's volume of essays entitled, *The Founders of the New Psychology: Freud, Stekel, Adler and Jung*, to be published shortly

and distinct and can fairly adequately be postulated in advance is as valuable for the medical psychologist as is Dr. Joel Goldthwaite's anatomical and physiological classification for the internist.

To be sure, William James referred to two distinct mental types when he spoke of the tough-minded and tender-minded persons, and the age-old disputes between various schools of romanticists and classicists all dealt with the same problem, but until the present time the importance of thoroughly recognizing these types and their distinctive reactions has never been properly understood, and in no other way as yet devised can any real understanding of human personality be gained.

Jung deals for the time being with the two very distinct and definite types which are most easily recognized and are everywhere in evidence, and these he calls the extravert and the introvert types. He does not deny that there are probably other types not yet clearly defined, but from my own rather large experience I am inclined to believe that these are variations of these two main types, depending upon the functions used and the degree of subjectivity or objectivity affecting the individual. The basic types can be conceived of as being at opposite poles—and between them the less pronounced individuals who lean, however, definitely toward the one or the other side, until the middle is reached, when they would partake of the nature of both introvert and extravert.

The two main types are characterized by absolutely opposite reactions and are in marked contrast to each other. The one called by Jung extravert is chiefly recognized by responding to stimuli with action. He feels his way, as it were, into the situation and identifies himself with the object so that the ego and the object become one. This is the so-called man of action. His thought function is ordinarily less developed and is inferior to his feeling which is frequently so finely differentiated as to enable him to handle difficult situations and meet practical problems

of life in a highly successful way, and this often passes for intellectual acumen. He is frequently referred to as the person who acts first and thinks afterwards.

Exactly contrary is the reaction of the introvert. He reacts to stimuli by thinking and tends to withdraw from the object to think it over and weigh matters. For him action is difficult, uncertain, and delayed. He cannot make an immediate and direct contact with the object because between his feeling and the object is the ego. An extreme example of this type is Hamlet "all sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." He broods, meditates and is often moody.

If the introvert has had an intellectual training and development he substitutes for his difficulty in activity and quick adjustment to the changing conditions of life, the creation of theories, philosophies and logical reasoning about things and seeks to adapt himself mentally—his trouble comes in putting these ideas into practical application. This does not mean that he is without feeling. Indeed, he may have the strongest feelings—one class of introvert is often called the emotional type—but his feeling is undifferentiated, and he reveals an inadequate emotional reaction and valuation. His emotions when aroused frequently show undeveloped character so that it is not surprising to find highly cultivated introverts acting in a childish and infantile manner with deep moods of depression and a tendency towards infantile sexual manifestations.

The introvert is also affected by a feeling of inferiority which is so unbearable that there is developed a mechanism which is constantly striving to overcome this by an overaccentuation of the ego—the power system—Adler's masculine protest.

The extravert, however, has not these same difficulties. Our modern world, with its accent on action and results, was made for him. He responds to stimuli, to people and events with finely differentiated feeling and in the tumult

and struggle of the world he is more or less at home. He is preëminently the natural fighting man. His difficulty, however, lies in his too great bondage to the object and in his thinking. When this is required of him instead of action, it is often disclosed as of an undeveloped character—conventional and collective in type.

Two individuals prominent in American public life represent these types most perfectly and they may serve to make this subject clearer. These are ex-President Wilson and ex-President Roosevelt. Roosevelt is obviously the extravert of rather an extreme type—highly successful in action with responsive feelings and a keen sense of events and situations—a man who can pick men—a man who makes warm friends and strong enemies, and who sways people by his emotional appeal. However, if his thought is examined, it will be found to follow action rather than precede it. It is conventional and lacking in originality, is usually made over from the ideas and thoughts of others, and he can quickly reverse himself when the occasion demands. Ex-president Wilson, on the other hand, was an introvert. He was a student and thinker, slow to action, with a policy called watchful waiting; that is, of thinking well over a matter before acting—of trying to understand all the causes and processes of problems. He could construct a political philosophy, or build up a religious international vision for the world. He referred to himself as having a single-track mind, meaning that having once thought out a path of action he must unswervingly follow it no matter what new situations may arise demanding a reversal or quick adaptation. His weakness was in the realm of feeling and action. He was often, it would seem, mistaken in his judgment of men, and in the field of action his retardation has frequently brought forth criticism from his most ardent admirers.

In another way one may say briefly that the extravert puts the accent on the object and the introvert on the ego or subject. The extravert feels out and acts. He is the

opportunistic, feeling his way and acting according to the demand of the moment. The true introvert thinks in and about as it were; he is able to act effectively only after a fully worked out line of procedure in which the subject is first and the object second. This is the reason that it is so much more difficult to treat the neurosis in the introvert than the extravert. He attaches himself to the object in order to assist and enhance the ego or subject and can only with great difficulty relinquish his hold once made, instead of adapting himself to the object with the ability quickly to change and make a new relation when the need arises.

It is in dealing with the neuroses of the introvert that one realizes the very great part played by the ego-dominant, the "will-to-power," and that recognition must be given to this component in any adequate analytic therapy. It is through this recognition of types that Jung was enabled to reconcile the very opposite conceptions of Freud and Adler. Freud's sexual theory applies more particularly to the extravert and Adler's power theory to the introvert. To be sure, this in no wise means that sexuality is not everywhere to be found and must adequately be met, but simply that the emphasis in one type is on the ego and in the other on the sexual aspect of the individual.

The introvert can far more successfully repress his sexuality and be freer of its claims in consciousness than the extravert; and instead of struggling with the sexual problem as the central theme, his struggle is with the feeling of inferiority, which is an almost constant accompaniment of this type, and with his oversensitiveness, which is concomitant with the intense ego demand. The important factor in the recognition of these psychological types is to realize that they can never under normal conditions be changed to the opposite types any more than can the physiological types be altered. Therefore, admonitions and advice to do or be otherwise is futile and this explains why in the psychoneuroses a given line of treatment is

successful with one patient and fails utterly with another. The individuals are unable to respond except according to their own mechanism.

It is therefore most necessary that in the reductive process of analytic treatment an important place be given to the ego strivings as well as to the sexual components of the personality and that the formula or psychic mechanism of the individual be thoroughly grasped. For there is a very definite unconscious mechanism governing the type of reaction and behavior of the individual and to make this conscious is the first step in aiding him to find a more satisfactory mode than the primitive and instinctive one which governs him.

It now becomes proper to ask what has been established by all this mass of investigation into the soul, and what is its value not only as a therapeutic measure for the neurotic sufferer, but also for the normal human being?

First and perhaps most important is the recognition of a definite psychological determinism. Instead of human life being filled with foolish, meaningless or purposeless actions, errors and thoughts, it can be demonstrated that no expression or manifestation of the psyche, however trifling or inconsistent in appearance, is really lawless or unmotivated. Only a possession of the technique is necessary in order to reveal, to any one desirous of knowing, the existence of the unconscious determinants of his mannerisms, trivial expressions, acts and behavior, their purpose and significance.

This leads into the second fundamental conception, which is perhaps even less considered than the foregoing, and that is the value of the conscious mind and thought. It is the general attitude of people to judge themselves by their surface motives, to satisfy themselves by saying or thinking "this is what I want to do, say" or "I intended to do thus and so," but somehow what one thought one intended to say or expected to do is very often the contrary of what actually is said or done. Every one has had

these experiences when the gap between the conscious thought and action was gross enough to be observed. It is also a well-known experience to consciously desire something very much and when it is obtained to discover that this in no wise satisfied or lessened the desire, which was then transferred to some other object. Thus one became cognizant of the fact that the feeling and idea presented by consciousness as the desire was an error. What is the difficulty in these conditions? Evidently some other directing force than that of which we are aware is at work.

Dr. G. Stanley Hall uses a very striking symbol when he compares the mind to an iceberg floating in the ocean with one-eighth visible above the water and seven-eighths below—the one-eighth above being that part called conscious and the seven-eighths below that which we call the unconscious. The influence and controlling power of the unconscious desires over our thoughts and acts are in this relative proportion. Faint glimmers of other motives and interests than those we accept or which we believe, often flit into consciousness. These indications, if studied or valued accurately, would lead to the realization that consciousness is but a single stage and but one form of expression of mind. Therefore its dictum is but one, often untrustworthy, approach to the great question as to what is man's actual psychic accomplishment, and as to what in particular is the actual soul development of the individual.

A further contribution of equal importance has been the empiric development of a dynamic theory of life; the conception that life is in a state of flux—movement—leading either to construction or destruction. Through the development man has reached he has attained the power by means of his intelligence and understanding of definitely directing to a certain extent this life energy or libido into avenues which serve his interest and bring a real satisfaction for the present day.

When man through ignorance and certain inherent

tendencies fails to recognize his needs or his power to fulfill them, or to adapt himself to the conditions of reality of the present time, there is then produced that reanimation of infantile paths by which an attempt is made to gain fulfillment or satisfaction through the production of symptoms or attitudes.

The acceptance of these statements demands the recognition of the existence of an infantile sexuality and the large part played by it in the later life of the individual. Because of the power and imperious influence exerted by the parents upon the child, and because of the unconscious attachment of his libido to the original object, the mother, and the perseverance of this first love model in the psyche, he finds it very difficult, on reaching the stage of adult development and the time for seeking a love object outside of the family, to gain a satisfactory object.

It is exceedingly important for parents and teachers to recognize the requirements of nature, which, beginning with puberty, imperiously demand of the young individual a separation of himself from the parent stem and the development of an independent existence. In our complex modern civilization this demand of nature is difficult enough of achievement for the child who has the heartiest and most intelligent coöperation of his parents and environment—but for the one who has not only to contend with his own inner struggle for his freedom but has in addition the resistance of his parents who would hold him in his childhood at any cost, because they cannot endure the thought of his separation from them, the task becomes one of the greatest magnitude. It is during this period when the struggle between the childish inertia and nature's urge becomes so keen, that there occur the striking manifestations of jealousy, criticism, irritability, all usually directed against the parents, of defiance of parental authority, of runaways and various other psychic and nervous disorders known to all.

This struggle, which is the first great task of mankind

and the one which requires the greatest effort, is that which is expressed by Jung as the self-sacrifice motive—the sacrifice of the childish feelings and demands, and of the irresponsibility of this period, and the assumption of the duties and tasks of an individual existence.

It is this great theme which Jung sees as the real motive lying hidden in the myths and religions of man from the beginning, as well as in the literature and artistic creations of both ancient and modern time, and which he works out with the greatest wealth of detail and painstaking effort.

This necessitates a recognition and revaluation of the enormous importance and influence of the ego and the sexual instinct upon the thought and reaction of man, and also predicates a displacement of the psychological point of gravity from the will and intellect to the realm of the emotions and feelings. The desired end is a synthesis of these two paths or the use of the intellect constructively in the service of the emotions in order to gain for the best interest of the individual some sort of coöperative reaction between the two.

No one dealing with analytic psychology can fail to be struck by the tremendous and unnecessary burdens which man has placed upon himself, and how greatly he has increased the difficulties of adaptation by his rigid intellectual views and moral formulas, and by his inability to admit to himself that he is actually just a human being, imperfect, and containing within himself all manner of tendencies, good and bad, all striving for some satisfactory goal. Further, that the refusal to see himself in this light instead of as an ideal person in no way alters the actual condition, and that in fact, through the cheap pretense of being able only to consider himself as a very virtuous person, or as shocked and hurt when observing the "sins" of others, he actually is prevented from developing his own character and bringing his own capacities to their fullest expressions.

There is frequently expressed among people the idea of how fortunate it is that we cannot see each other's thoughts, and how disturbing it would be if our real feelings could be read. But what is so shameful in these secrets of the soul? They are in reality our own egoistic desires all striving, longing, wishing for satisfaction, for happiness; those desires which instinctively crave their own gratification but which can only be really fulfilled by adapting them to the real world and to the social group.

Why is it that it is so painful for man to admit that the prime influence in all human endeavor is found in the ego itself, in its desires, wishes, needs and satisfactions, in short, in its need for self-expression and self-perpetuation, the evolutionary impetus in life?

The basis for the unpleasantness of this idea may perhaps be found in an inner resistance in nature itself which forces man to include others in his scheme, lest his own greedy desires should serve to destroy him. But even with this inner demand and all the ethical and moral teachings of centuries it is everywhere evident that man has only very imperfectly learned that it is to his own interest to consider his neighbor and that it is impossible for him to ignore the needs of the body social of which he is a part. Externally, the recognition of the strength of the ego impulse is objectionable because of the ideal conception that self-striving and so-called selfish seeking are unworthy, ignoble and incompatible with a desirable character and must be ignored at all cost.

The futility of this attitude is to be clearly seen in the failure after all these centuries to even approximate it, as evidenced in our human relations and institutions, and is quite as ineffectual in this realm as in that of sexuality where the effort to overcome this imperious domination has been attempted by lowering the instinct, and seeing in it something vile or unclean, something unspeakable and unholy. Instead of destroying the power of sexuality this struggle has only warped and distorted, injured and

mutilated the expression; for not without destruction of the individual can these fundamental instincts be destroyed. Life itself has needs and imperiously demands expression through the forms created. All nature answers to this freely and simply except man. His failure to recognize himself as an instrument through which the life energy is coursing and the demands of which must be obeyed, is the cause of his misery. Despite his possession of intellect and self-consciousness, he cannot without disaster to himself refuse the tasks of life and the fulfillment of his own needs. Man's great task is the adaptation of himself to reality and the recognition of himself as an instrument for the expression of life according to his individual possibilities.

It is in his privilege as a self-creator that his highest purpose is found.

The value of self-consciousness lies in the fact that man is enabled to reflect upon himself and learn to understand the true origin and significance of his actions and opinions, that he may adequately value the real level of his development and avoid being self-deceived and therefore inhibited from finding his biological adaptation. He need no longer be unconscious of the motives underlying his actions or hide himself behind a changed exterior, in other words, be merely a series of reactions to stimuli as the mechanists have it, but he may to a certain extent become a self-creating and self-determining being.

Indeed, there seems to be an impulse towards adaptation quite as Bergson sees it, and it would seem to be a task of the highest order to use intelligence to assist one's self to work with this impulse.

Through the investigation of these different avenues leading into the hidden depths of the human being and through the revelation of the motives and influences at work there, although astonishing to the uninitiated, a very clear and definite conception of the actual human rela-

tionship—brotherhood—of all mankind is obtained. It is this recognition of these common factors basically inherent in humanity from the beginning and still active, which is at once both the most hopeful and the most feared and disliked part of psychoanalysis.

It is disliked by those individuals who have prided themselves upon their superiority and the distinction between their reactions and motives and those of ordinary mankind. In other words, they attempt to become personalities through elevating themselves and lowering others, and it is a distinct blow to discover that beneath these pretensions lie the very ordinary elements shared in common by all. On the other hand, to those who have been able to recognize their own weaknesses and have suffered in the privacy of their own souls, the knowledge that these things have not set them apart from others, but that they are the common property of all and that no one can point the finger of scorn at his fellow, is one of the greatest experiences of life and is productive of the greatest relief.

It is feared by many who realize that in these painfully acquired repressions and symptoms lie their safety and their protection from directly facing and dealing with tendencies and characteristics with which they feel unable to cope. The repression and the accompanying symptoms indicate a difficulty and a struggle, and in this way are a sort of compromise or substitute formation which permit, although only in a wasteful and futile manner, the activity of the repressed tendencies. Nevertheless, to analyze the individual back to his original tendencies and reveal to him the meaning of these substitute formations would be a useless procedure in which truly "the last state of that man would be worse than the first" if the work ceased there. The aim is not to destroy those barriers upon which civilized man has so painfully climbed and to reduce him to his primitive state, but, where these have failed or imperfectly succeeded, to help him to attain his greatest possibilities with less expenditure of energy, by less wasteful

methods than nature provides. In this achievement lies the hopeful and valuable side of this method—the development of the synthesis. It is hopeful because now a way is opened to deal with these primitive tendencies constructively, and render their effects not only harmless but useful, by utilizing them in higher aims, socially and individually valuable and satisfactory.

This is what has occurred normally in those individuals who seem capable and constructive personalities; in those creative minds that give so much to the race. They have converted certain psychological tendencies which could have produced useless symptoms or destructive actions into valuable productions. Indeed it is not uncommon for strong, capable persons to state themselves that they knew they could have been equally capable of a wasteful or destructive life. This utilization of the energy or libido freed by removing the repressions and the lifting of infantile tendencies and desires into higher purposes and directions suitable for the individual at his current status is called *sublimation*.

It must not be understood by this discussion that geniuses or wonderful personalities can be created through analysis, for this is not the aim of the procedure. Its purpose is to remove the inhibitions and restrictions which interfere with the full development of the personality, to help individuals attain to that level where they really belong, and to prepare people to better understand and meet life whether they are neurotic sufferers or so-called “normal people” with the difficulties and peculiarities which belong to all.

This reasoning and method of procedure is only new when the application is made to the human being. In all improvements of plants and animals these general principles have been recognized and their teachings constructively utilized.

Luther Burbank, that plant wizard whose work is known to all the world, says, “A knowledge of the battle of the

tendencies within a plant is the very basis of all plant improvement," and "it is not that the work of plant improvement brings with it, incidentally, as people mistakenly think, a knowledge of these forces, it is the knowledge of these forces, rather, which makes plant improvement possible."

Has this not been also the mistake of man regarding himself, and the cause, partly at least, of his failure to succeed in actually reaching a more advanced and stable development?

This recognition of man's biological relationship to all life and the practical utilization of this recognition, necessitates a readjustment of thought and asks for an examination and reconsideration of the facts of human conduct which are observable by any thoughtful person. A quiet and progressive upheaval of old ideas has taken place and is still going on. Analytic psychology attempts to unify and value all of the various phenomena of man which have been observed and noted at different times by isolated investigators of isolated manifestations and thus bring some orderly sequence into the whole. It offers a method whereby the relations of the human being biologically to all other living forms can be established, the actual achievement of man himself adequately valued, and opens a vista of the possibilities of improvement in health, happiness and accomplishment for the human being.

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES¹

BY DR. C. G. JUNG

The number of psychoanalytic investigations² into the psychology of dementia præcox has considerably increased since the publication of my book upon the subject.³ When, in 1903, I made the first analysis of a case of dementia præcox, there dawned on me a premonition of the possibilities of future discoveries in this sphere. This has been confirmed.

Freud first submitted a case of paranoid dementia to closer psychological investigation.⁴ This he was enabled to do by means of an analytic technic perfected through his rich experiences with neurotics. He selected the famous autobiography of P. Schreber, *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken*. The patient could not be analyzed personally, but having published his most interesting autobiography all the material wanted for an analysis was to be found in it.

In this study Freud shows out of what infantile forms of thought and instincts the delusioned system was built up. The peculiar delusions which the patient had about his doctor whom he identified with God or with a godlike being, and certain other surprising and really blasphemous ideas, Freud was able to reduce most ingeniously to his infantile relationship to his father. This case also presented similar bizarre and grotesque concatenations of

¹ From *Analytical Psychology*, by C. G. Jung. Reprinted by courtesy of the publishers, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

² This is an addition to an earlier paper.

³ *The Psychology of Dementia Præcox*.

⁴ *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschungen*, III, pp. 9, 558

ideas to the one I have described. As the author himself says, his work confines itself to the task of pointing out those universally existent and undifferentiated foundations out of which we may say every psychological formation is historically developed.⁵ This reductive analytical process did not, however, furnish such enlightening results in regard to the rich and surprising symbolism in patients of this kind as we had been accustomed to expect from the same method in the realm of the psychology of hysteria. In reading certain works of the Zürich school, for example, Maeder,⁶ Spielrein,⁷ Nelken,⁸ Grebelskaja,⁹ Itten,¹⁰ one is powerfully impressed by the enormous symbol-formation in *dementia præcox*.

Some of the authors still proceed essentially by the method of analytic reduction, tracing back the complicated delusional formation into its simpler and more universal components, as I have done in the preceding pages. One cannot, however, resist the feeling that this method hardly does justice to the fullness and the almost overpowering wealth of phantastic symbol-formation, although it does undoubtedly throw a light upon the subject in certain directions.

Let me illustrate with an example. We should be thankful for a commentary upon *Faust* which traced back all the diverse material of Part II. to its historical sources, or for a psychological analysis of Part I. which

⁵ Cf. also Ferenczi, *Über die Rolle der Homosexualität in der Pathogenese der Paranoia*, *Jahrb.* II, p. 101.

⁶ Maeder, *Psychologische Untersuchungen an Dementia præcox Kranken*, *Jahrbuch f. psychoanalyt. Forsch.* II, p. 185.

⁷ Spielrein, *Über den psychologischen Inhalt eines Falles von Schizophrenie*, *l.c.*, III, p. 329ff.

⁸ Nelken, *Analytische Beobachtungen über Phantasien eines Schizophrenen*, *l.c.*, IV, p. 505ff.

⁹ Grebelskaja, *Psychologische Analyse eines Paranoiden*, *l.c.*, IV, p. 116 ff.

¹⁰ Itten, *Beiträge zur Psychologie der Dementia præcox*, *l.c.*, p. V, 1 ff.

pointed out how the dramatic conflict corresponds to a personal conflict in the soul of the poet; we should be glad of an exposition which pointed out how this subjective conflict is itself based upon those ultimate and universal human things which are nowise foreign to us since we all carry the seeds of them in our hearts. Nevertheless we should be a little disappointed. We do not read *Faust* just in order to discover that we also are, in all things, "human, all too human." Alas, we know that but too well already. Let any one who has not yet learnt it go for a little while out into the world and look at it without preconceptions and with open eyes. He will turn back from the might and power of the "too human," hungrily he will pick up his *Faust*, not to find again what he has just left, but to learn how a man like Goethe shakes off these elemental human things and finds freedom for his soul. When we once know who was the "Proktophantasmist," to what chronological events the mass of symbols in Part II. relates, how it is all intimately bound up with the poet's own soul and conditioned by it, we come to regard this determination as less important than the problem itself—what does the poet mean by his symbolic creation? Proceeding purely reductively, one discovers the final meaning in these universal human things; and demands nothing further from an explanation than that the unknown and complicated shall be reduced to the known and simple. I should like to designate this kind of understanding as *retrospective understanding*. But there is another kind of understanding, which is not analytic reduction, but is of a *synthetic* or *constructive* nature. I would designate this *prespective understanding*, and the corresponding method as the *constructive method*.

It is common knowledge that present-day scientific explanation rests upon the basis of the causal principle. Scientific explanation is causal explanation. We are therefore naturally inclined, whenever we think scientifically, to explain causally, to understand a thing and to regard

it as explained whenever it is reduced analytically to its cause and general principle. In so far Freud's psychological method of interpretation is strictly scientific.

If we apply this method to *Faust* it must become clear that something more is required for a true understanding. It will even seem to us that we have not gathered the poet's deepest meaning if we only see in it universal foregone human conclusions. What we really want to find out is how this man has redeemed himself as an individual, and when we arrive at this comprehension then we shall also understand the symbol given by Goethe. It is true we may then fall into the error that we understand Goethe himself. But let us be cautious and modest, simply saying we have thereby arrived at an understanding of ourselves. I am thinking here of Kant's thought-compelling definition of comprehension, as "the realization of a thing to the extent which is sufficient for our purpose."

This understanding is, it is true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those to whom science and explanation by the causal principle are identical. But the validity of this identification is open to question. In the sphere of psychology I must emphasize my doubt on this point.

We speak of "objective" understanding when we have given a causal explanation. But at bottom, understanding is a subjective process upon which we confer the quality "objective" really only to differentiate it from another kind of understanding which is also a psychological and subjective process, but upon which, without further ado, we bestow the quality "subjective." The attitude of today only grants scientific value to "objective" understanding on account of its universal validity. This standpoint is incontestably correct wherever it is not a question of the psychological process itself, and hence it is valid in all sciences apart from pure psychology.

To interpret *Faust* objectively, *i.e.*, from the causal standpoint, is as though a man were to consider a sculp-

ture from the historical, technical and—last but not least—from the mineralogical standpoint. But where lurks the *real meaning* of the wondrous work? Where is the answer to that most important question: what aim had the artist in mind, and how are we ourselves to understand his work subjectively? To the scientific spirit this seems an idle question which anyhow has nothing to do with science. It comes furthermore into collision with the causal principle, for it is a purely speculative constructive view. And the modern world has overthrown this spirit of scholasticism.

But if we would approach to an understanding of psychological things we must remember the fact of the subjective conditioning of all knowledge. The world is *as we see it* and not simply objective; this holds true even more of the mind. Of course it is possible to look at the mind objectively, just as at Faust, or a Gothic Cathedral. In this objective conception there is comprised the whole worth and worthlessness of current experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. The scientific mind, thinking causally, is incapable of understanding what is ahead; it only understands what is past, that is, retrospective. Like Ahriman, the Persian devil, it has the gift of After-Knowledge. But this spirit is only one-half of a complete comprehension. The other more important half is prospective or constructive; if we are not able to understand what lies ahead, then nothing is understood. If psychoanalysis, following Freud's orientation, should succeed in presenting an uninterrupted and conclusive connection between Goethe's infantile sexual development and his work, or, following Adler, between the infantile struggle for power and the adult Goethe and his work, an interesting proposition would have been solved—we should have learnt how a masterpiece can be reduced to the simplest thinkable elements, which are universal, and to be found working within the depths of everything and every-

body. But did Goethe construct his work to *this* end? Was it his intention that it should be thus conceived?

It must be sufficiently clear that such an understanding, though undoubtedly scientific, would be entirely, utterly, beside the mark. This statement is valid for psychology in general. To understand the psyche causally, means to understand but half of it. The causal understanding of *Faust* enlightens us as to how it became a finished work of art, but reveals nothing of the living meaning of the poet. That meaning only lives if we experience it, in and through ourselves. In so far as our actual present life is for us something essentially new and not a repetition of all that has gone before, the great value of such a work is to be seen, not in its causal development, but in its living reality for our own lives. We should be indeed depreciating a work like *Faust* if we were only to regard it as something that has been perfected and finished; it is only understood when conceived as a becoming and as an ever-new experiencing.

Thus we must regard the human psyche. Only on one side is the mind a Has Been, and as such subordinate to the causal principle. On the other side the mind is a Becoming that can only be grasped synthetically or constructively. The causal standpoint asks how it is this actual mind has become what it appears today? The constructive standpoint asks how a bridge can be built from this actual psyche to its own future?

Just as the causal method finally reaches the general principles of human psychology by the analysis and reduction of individual events, so does the constructive standpoint reach aims that are general by the synthesis of individual tendencies. The mind is a point of passage and thus necessarily determined from two sides. On the one side it offers a picture of the precipitate of the past, and on the other side a picture of the germinating knowledge of all that is to come, in so far as the psyche creates its own future.

What has been is, on the one hand, the result and apex of all that was—as such it appears to the causal standpoint; on the other hand, it is an expression of all that is to be. The future is only *apparently* like the past, but in its essence always new and unique (the causal standpoint would like to invert this sentence), thus the actual formula is incomplete, germlike so to say, in relation to what is to be.

To get any conception of this expression of what is to be we are forced to apply a constructive interest to it. I almost felt myself tempted to say, “a scientific interest.” But modern science is identical with the causal principle. So long as we consider the actual mind causally, that is scientifically, we elude the mind as a Becoming. This other side of the psyche can never be grasped by the exclusive use of the causal principle, but only by means of the constructive standpoint. The causal standpoint reduces things to their elements, the constructive standpoint elaborates them into something higher and more complicated. This latter standpoint is necessarily a speculative one.

Constructive understanding is, however, differentiated from scholastic speculation because it imposes no general validity, but only subjective validity. When the speculative philosopher believes he has comprehended the world once for all by his System, he deceives himself; he has only comprehended himself and then naïvely projected that view upon the world. In reaction against this, the scientific method of the modern world has almost put an end to speculation and gone to the other extreme. It would create an “objective” psychology. In opposition to such efforts, the stress which Freud has placed upon individual psychology is of immortal merit. The extraordinary importance of the subjective in the development of the objective mental process was thus first brought adequately into prominence.

Subjective speculation lays no claim to universal valid-

ity, it is identical with constructive understanding. It is a subjective creation, which, looked at externally, easily seems to be a so-called infantile phantasy, or at least an unmistakable derivative of it; from an objective standpoint it must be judged as such, in so far as objective is regarded as identical with scientific or causal. Looked at from within, however, constructive understanding means redemption.

"Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering and easiness of living."¹¹

Starting from these considerations as to the psychology of those mental patients to whom the Schreber case belongs, we must, from the "objective-scientific" standpoint, reduce the structural phantasy of the patient to its simple and most generally valid elements. This Freud had done. But that is only half of the work to be done. The other half is the constructive understanding of Schreber's system. The question is: What end, what freedom, did the patient hope to achieve by the creation of his system?

The scientific thinker of today will regard this question as inappropriate. The psychiatrist will certainly smile at it, for he is thoroughly assured of the universal validity of his causalism, he knows the psyche merely as something that is made, descendent, reactive. Not uncommonly there lurks the unconscious prejudice that the psyche is a brain-secretion.

Looking at such a morbid system without preconception, and asking ourselves what goal this delusional system is aiming at, we see, in fact, firstly, that it *is* endeavoring to get at something, and, secondly, that the patient also devotes all his will-power to the service of the system. There are patients who develop their delusions with scientific thoroughness, often dragging in an immense material of comparison and proof. Schreber certainly belongs to this class. Others do not proceed so

¹¹ Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathustra."

thoroughly and learnedly, but content themselves with heaping up synonymous expressions for that at which they are aiming. The case of the patient I have described, who assumes all kinds of titles, is a good instance of this.

The patient's unmistakable striving to express some thing through and by means of his delusion Freud conceives retrospectively, as the satisfaction of his infantile wishes by means of imagination. Adler reduces it to the desire for power. For him the delusion-formation is a "manly protest," a means of gaining security for himself against his menaced superiority. Thus characterized, this struggle is likewise infantile and the means employed—the delusional creation—is infantile because insufficient for its purpose; one can therefore understand why Freud declines to accept Adler's point of view. Freud, rightly on the whole, subsumes this infantile struggle for power under the concept of the infantile wish

The constructive standpoint is different. Here the delusional system is neither infantile nor, upon the whole, *eo ipso* pathological but *subjective*, and hence justified within the scope of the subjective. The constructive standpoint absolutely denies the conception that the subjective phantasy-creation is merely an infantile wish, symbolically veiled; or that it is merely that in a higher degree; it denies that it is a convulsive and egoistic adhesion to the fiction of its own superiority, in so far as these are to be regarded as finalistic explanations. The subjective activity of the mind can be judged from without, just as one can, in the end, so judge everything. But this judgment is inadequate, because it is the very essence of the subjective that it cannot be judged objectively. We cannot measure distance in pints. The subjective can be only understood and judged subjectively, that is, constructively. Any other judgment is unfair and does not meet the question.

The absolute credit which the constructive standpoint confers upon the subjective, naturally seems to the

"scientific" spirit as an utter violation of reason. But this scientific spirit can only take up arms against it so long as the constructive is not avowedly *subjective*. The constructive comprehension also *analyses*, but it does not *reduce*. It decomposes the delusion into *typical* components. What is to be regarded as the type at a given time is shown from the attainment of experience and knowledge reached at that time.

Even the most individual delusional systems are not absolutely unique, occurring only once, for they offer striking and obvious analogies with other systems. From the comparative analysis of many systems the typical formations are drawn. If one can speak of reduction at all, it is only a question of reduction to general type, but not to some universal principle obtained inductively or deductively, such as "Sexuality" or "Struggle for Power." This paralleling with other typical formations only serves for a widening of the basis upon which the construction is to be built. If one were to proceed entirely subjectively one would go on constructing in the language of the patient and in his mental range. One would arrive at some structure which was illuminating to the patient and to the investigator of the case, but not to the other scientific minds. The public would be unable to enter into the peculiarities of the speech and thought of the individual case in question without further help.

The works of the Zürich school referred to contain careful and detailed expositions of individual material. In these materials there are very many typical formations which are unmistakably *analogies* with *mythological formations*. There arose from the perception of this relationship a new and valuable source for comparative study. The acceptance of the possibility of such a comparison will not be granted immediately, but the question is only whether the materials to be compared really are similar or not. It will also be contended that pathological and mythological formations are not immediately comparable.

But this objection must not be raised *a priori*, for only a conscientious comparison can determine whether any true parallelism exists or not. At the present moment all we know is that they are both structures of the imagination which, like all such products, rest essentially upon the activity of the unconscious. Experience must teach us whether such a comparison is valid. The results hitherto obtained are so encouraging that further work along these lines seems to me most hopeful and important. I made practical use of the constructive method in a case which Flournoy published in the *Archives de Psychologie*,¹² although he offered no opinion as to its nature at that time. The case dealt with a rather neurotic young lady who, in Flournoy's publication, described how surprised she was at the connected phantasy-formations which penetrated from the unconscious into the conscious. I subjected these phantasies, which the lady herself reproduced in some detail, to my constructive methods and gave the results of these investigations in my book, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*.

This book has, I regret to say, met with many perhaps inevitable misunderstandings. But I have had one precious consolation, for my book received the approval of Flournoy himself, who published the original case which he knew personally. It is to be hoped that later works will make the standpoint of the Zürich school intelligible to a wider public. Whoever, by the help of this work, has taken the trouble to grasp the essence of the constructive method, will readily imagine how great are the difficulties of investigation, and how much greater still are the difficulties of objective presentation of such investigations.

Among the many difficulties and opportunities for misunderstanding I should like to adduce one difficulty which is especially characteristic. In an intensive study of Schreber's or any similar case, it will be discovered that

¹² Miss Miller, *Quelques faits d'imagination créatrice subconsciente*. Vol. V, p. 36

these patients are consumed by the desire for a new world-philosophy which may be of the most bizarre kind. Their aim is obviously to create a system such as will help them in the assimilation of unknown psychical phenomena, *i.e.*, enable them to adapt their own unconscious to the world. This arrangement produces a subjective system which must be considered as a necessary transition-stage on the path to the adaptation of their personality in regard to the world in general. But the patient remains stationary at this transitory stage and assumes his subjective view is the world's, hence he remains ill. He cannot free himself from his subjectivism and does not find the link to objective thinking, *i.e.*, to society. He does not reach the real summit of self-understanding, for he remains with a merely subjective understanding of himself. But a *mere* subjective understanding is not real and adequate. As Feuerbach says: *Understanding is only real when it is in accord with that of some other rational beings.* Then it becomes objective¹³ and the link with life is reached.

I am convinced that not a few will raise the objection that in the first place the psychological process of adaptation does not proceed by the method of first creating a world-philosophy; secondly, that it is in itself a sign of unhealthy mental disposition even to make the attempt to adapt oneself by way of a "world-philosophy."

Undoubtedly there are innumerable persons who are capable of adaptation without creating any preliminary philosophy. If they ever arrive at any general theory of the world it is always subsequently. But, on the other hand, there are just as many who are only able to adapt themselves by means of a preliminary intellectual formulation. To everything which they do not understand they are unable to adapt themselves. Generally it comes about that they do adapt themselves just in so far as they can grasp the situation intellectually. To this latter group

¹³ Here "objective" understanding is not identical with causal understanding.

seem to belong all those patients to whom we have been giving our consideration.

Medical experience has taught us that there are two large groups of functional nervous disorders. The one embraces all those forms of disease which are designated *hysterical*, the other all those forms which the French school has designated *psychasthenic*. Although the line of demarcation is rather uncertain, one can mark off two psychological types which are obviously different; their psychology is diametrically opposed. I have called these—the *Introverted* and *Extroverted* types. The hysteric belongs to the type of *Extroversion*, the psychasthenic to the type of *Introversion*, as does dementia præcox, in so far as we know it today. This terminology, *Introversion* and *Extroversion*, is bound up with my way of regarding mental phenomena as forms of energy. I postulate a hypothetical fundamental striving which I designate *libido*.¹⁴ In the classical use of the word, *libido* never had an exclusively sexual connotation as it had in medicine. The word *interest*, as Claparède once suggested to me, could be used in this special sense, if this expression had today a less extensive application. Bergson's concept, *élan vital*, would also serve if this expression were less biological and more psychological. *Libido* is intended to be an energizing expression for *psychological values*. The psychological value is something active and determining; hence it can be regarded from the energetic standpoint without any pretense of exact measurement.

The introverted type is characterized by the fact that his *libido* is turned towards his own personality to a certain extent—he finds within himself the unconditioned value. The extroverted type has his *libido* to a certain extent externally; he finds the unconditioned value out-

¹⁴ This energy may also be designated as *hormé*. *Hormé* is a Greek word *δρμή*—force, attack, press, impetuosity, violence, urgency, zeal. It is related to Bergson's *élan vital*. The concept *hormé* is an energetic expression for psychological values.

side himself. The introvert regards everything from the aspect of his own personality; the extrovert is dependent upon the value of his object. I must emphasize the statement that this question of types is *the* question of our psychology, and that every further advance must probably proceed by way of this question. The difference between these types is almost alarming in extent. So far there is only one small preliminary communication by myself ¹⁵ on this theory of type, which is particularly important for the conception of dementia præcox. On the psychiatric side Gross ¹⁶ has called attention to the existence of two psychological types. His two types are (1) those with limited but deep consciousness, and (2) those with broad but superficial consciousness. The former correspond to my introverted and the latter to my extroverted type. In my article I have collected some other instances among which I would especially call attention to the striking description of the two types given by William James in his book on *Pragmatism*. Fr. Th. Vischer has differentiated the two types very wittily by her division of the learned into "reason-mongers," and "matter-mongers." In the sphere of psychoanalysis Freud follows the psychology of Extroversion, Adler that of Introversion. The irreconcilable opposition between the views of Freud and those of Adler (see especially his book *Über den nervösen Charakter*) is readily explained by the existence of two diametrically opposed psychological types which view the same things from entirely different aspects. An Extrovert can hardly, or only with great difficulty, come to any understanding with an Introvert, on any delicate psychological question.

An Extrovert can hardly conceive the necessity which compels the Introvert to conquer the world by means of a system. And yet this necessity exists, otherwise we

¹⁵ A contribution to the Study of Psychological Types. Lecture delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress, Munich, 1913.

¹⁶ *Die zerebrale Sekundärfunktion*. Leipzig, 1902.

should have no philosophical systems and dogmas, presumed to be universally valid. Civilized humanity would be only empiricists and the sciences only the experimental sciences. Causalism and empiricism are undoubtedly mighty forces in our present-day mental life but it may come to be otherwise.

This difference in type is the first great obstacle which stands in the way of an understanding concerning fundamental conceptions of our psychology. A second objection arises from the circumstance that the constructive method, faithful to itself, must adapt itself to the lines of the delusion. The direction along which the patient develops his morbid thoughts has to be accepted seriously, and followed out to its end; the investigator thus places himself at the standpoint of the psychosis. This procedure may expose him to the suspicion of being deranged himself; or at least risks a misunderstanding which is considered terribly disgraceful—he may himself have some world-philosophy! The confirmation of such a possibility is as bad as being “unscientific.” But every one has a world-philosophy though not every one knows he has. And those who do not know it have simply an unconscious and therefore inadequate and archaic philosophy. But everything psychological that is allowed to remain in the mind, neglected and not developed, remains in a primitive state. A striking instance of how universal theories are influenced by unconscious archaic points of view has been furnished by a famous German historian whose name matters to us not at all. This historian took it for granted that once upon a time people propagated themselves through incest, for in the first human families the brother was assigned to the sister. This theory is wholly based upon his still unconscious belief in Adam and Eve as the first and only parents of mankind. It is on the whole better to discover for oneself a modern world-philosophy, or at least to make use of some decent system which will prevent any errors of that kind.

One could put up with being despised as the possessor of a world-philosophy; but there is a greater danger. The public may come to believe the philosophy, beaten out by the constructive method, is to be regarded as a theoretical and objectively valid insight into the meaning of the world in general.

I must now again point out that it is an obstinate, scholastic misunderstanding not to be able to distinguish between a world-philosophy which is only psychological, and an extra-psychological theory, which concerns the objective thing. It is absolutely essential that the student of the results of the constructive method should be able to draw this distinction. In its first results the constructive method does not produce anything that could be called a scientific theory; it furnishes the *psychological lines of development*, a *path* so to say. I must here refer the reader to my book, *Psychology of the Unconscious*.

The analytic reductive method has the advantage of being much simpler than the constructive method. The former reduces to well-known universal elements of an extremely simple nature. The latter has, with extremely complicated material, to construct the further path to some often unknown end. This obliges the psychologist to take full account of all those forces which are at work in the human mind. The reductive method strives to replace the religious and philosophical needs of man, by their more elementary components, following the principle of the "nothing but," as James so aptly calls it. But to *construct* aright, we must accept the developed aspirations as indispensable components, essential elements, of spiritual growth. Such work extends far beyond empirical concepts but that is in accordance with the nature of the human soul which has never hitherto rested content with experience alone. Everything new in the human mind proceeds from speculation. Mental development proceeds by way of speculation, never by way of limitation to mere experience. I realize that my views are parallel

with those of Bergson, and that in my book the concept of the libido which I have given, is a concept parallel to that of *élan vital*; my constructive method corresponds to Bergson's "intuitive method." I, however, confine myself to the psychological side and to practical work. When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but expressed by him in consummate language and in a wonderfully clear philosophic style.

Working speculatively with psychological material there is a risk of being sacrificed to the general misunderstanding which bestows the value of an objective theory upon the line of psychological evolution thus elaborated. So many people feel themselves in this way at pains to find grounds whether such a theory is correct or not. Those who are particularly brilliant even discover that the fundamental concepts can be traced back to Heraclitus or some one even earlier. Let me confide to these knowing folk that the fundamental ideas employed in the constructive method stretch back even beyond any historical philosophy, viz., to the dynamic "views" of primitive peoples. If the result of the constructive method were scientific theory, it would go very ill with it, for then it would be a falling back to the deepest superstition. But since the constructive method results in something far removed from scientific theory the great antiquity of the basic concepts therein must speak in favor of its extreme correctness. Not until the constructive method has presented us with much practical experience can we come to the construction of a *scientific theory, a theory of the psychological lines of development*. But we must first of all content ourselves with confirming these lines individually.

THE ADLER CONCEPTION OF NEUROSIS (DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY) ¹

BY DR. PAUL BJERRE (STOCKHOLM)

Translation by Elizabeth N. Barrow, Revised by
Dr. James S. Van Tieslaar

Adler's work, which culminated in a separation from Freud, has had a purely biologic starting point. Freud began his activity by translating into his own tongue the works of the French hypnotists and practicing his profession in accordance with their methods, while Adler's most important first work was his contribution entitled, *Studien über die Minderwertigkeit von Organen*. In this study he considers all the usual imperfections in the child's organism and tries to interpret their origin on a biological basis. It is not my purpose to take up this matter more closely; for the present I want merely to point out that from this beginning he advanced towards the study of the neuroses. The path was already staked out in the study mentioned above; Adler's subsequent work was an elaboration of the standpoint adapted therein.

That when an organ sustains an injury, nature endeavors to make redress by some structural development which should compensate for the handicap brought on by the injury, is well understood. If, for example, some of the heart valves are injured, the heart performs additional work; as a consequence the muscular activity increases, so that it can fully carry out the new demands

¹ Reprinted from History and Practice of Psychoanalysis, by Paul Bjerre, M.D. Translated by Elizabeth N. Barrow. Richard G. Badger, Publisher. Boston.

upon it. Or if one kidney is removed, the remaining one enlarges, so that it can do the work of both. Adler points out another kind of compensatory arrangement of nature and an understanding of this is, according to his interpretation, very important, because only by means of it as a starting point is it possible to comprehend the building up of neuroses.

An organ's capacity for work depends not only upon its physical condition but even more decidedly upon the nerve impulses which go out to it from the central nervous system. Everybody knows how by means of a vigorous tension of will it is possible to accomplish work which under ordinary conditions one is powerless to perform. Accordingly a physically defective organ can be made to function normally by means of augmented nerve impulses. The physical deficiency is compensated, in other words, by an energetic overefficiency. But this arrangement of nature easily involves an oversensitization of the weakened organ, and this, in turn, lays the foundation for nervous suffering. In examining, for instance, an adult who is subject to nervous diarrhoea, it is almost invariably found that before this particular disturbance began, he had had some physical trouble in the intestinal tract. This may lie far back in his past, *e.g.*, it may have lasted for some months during the first years of life. Even if it has apparently been cured, it has left behind it a weakness, or an oversensitiveness, which a few decades later may appear in some form of neurosis. What is thus true concerning an organ or organic system, is also true of the organism as a whole. If the subject of the childhood is brought up when a neurotic is examined, the following will often be heard: "I was weak and tired even at that time, was quite done up with my school work, was tormented by a disability that put me behind," etc. In the same way in which a single weakened organic function may persevere through dynamic compensation, so is it also with the whole of a poorly equipped organism. This

explains, too, the apparently paradoxical circumstance, that one often finds great feats of strength emanating from individuals of relatively weak physical development. They are obliged to keep their will-tension in constant training, in order to keep up at all; and because of this unnaturally disciplined power they are able sporadically to accomplish amazing things. To this type belongs that spasmodic manner of working characteristic of the nervous sufferer; after a sporadic flaring up of the forces, this type of patient may at once sink back into a state of exhaustion. Patients of this type are well known for their good beginnings, good ideas—but they are unable to carry anything through to the end. The oversensitiveness of neurotics belongs to the same category. Every part of the organism responds with exaggerated vibrations to whatever takes place about this class of patients. Of course the consequences of these arrangements are extremely variable, depending partly upon the extent of original impairment, partly upon the measure in which the compensation is successful. Adler places beside one another the three conceptions: degeneration—neurosis—genius. In the first case the compensation has been unsuccessful, just as it has fully succeeded in the last. The degenerate sinks out of life, while genius rises by fitting itself to a new type of life. The neurotic, in more or less heterogeneous blending, shows features of both—he wavers between the two extremes, unable to find a permanent balance.

From the biological starting point, Adler passed over to the psychology of neurosis-formation, by going more deeply into the question how organic deficiency acts upon the sufferer's mental life and character-development. In this way he discovered many interesting things.

II

The most apparent consequence of an organic weakness is that it attracts attention to itself and demands a certain

interest. If one has a weak heart, one must think about it and be on guard continually to take proper care of it; it cannot be left to itself as if one were in a state of health. Because of this directing of the attention upon a delicate organ its sensitiveness is emphasized through autosuggestion. I have already in another connection pointed out the rôle of the attention in the formation of suggestions. Here the way lies open for hypochondriacal concern with the body and its pains. Disturbances of this nature may be quite amenable to suggestive treatment.

But far more serious than the exaggerated cherishing of the weak organ and of the enfeebled organism are the special psychic reactions which the enfeeblement forces to the surface. It not only strives to absorb the sufferer's interest—it tends also to stamp the whole emotional life, to annihilate its free activity and to drive it into compulsion, which is fatal to development. The organic defect produces a feeling of deficiency, a feeling that the sufferer is worth less than his fellows; and this fundamental coloring of the feelings, in its turn, brings about displacements in development along various lines, the result being nervous character traits and disease.

It may be easier to make all this plain by means of a simple example.

Suppose a strong, energetic, happy boy becomes suddenly ruptured. He is taken to a physician, is examined and given careful orders;—he must keep out of the gymnasium, must give up athletics, must not run, must not fight; he must pay such attention to himself that never will he thoughtlessly forget to follow the doctor's directions. For if he should forget, something dangerous might happen—he might have to be operated upon at once in order to save his life, etc. The boy is thus compelled to divide his attention between the rupture and everything which hitherto has been a source of pleasure to him. He no longer can devote himself to anything with the same undisturbed interest as before; the fact of his disability

forces itself continually upon him. He has always to be on his guard. In this last circumstance, perhaps, lies by far the more significant moment. For it means that the hitherto spontaneous, self-evident relationship to the surrounding world has been broken. A human being lives only through reciprocal action between himself and the external world; if life goes on harmoniously this reciprocal action is so self-evident that it is never even a subject for reflection. This is the state of the child who still preserves a dim memory of its condition in the mother's body, where it was completely at one with its surroundings. The boy who formerly had gone his way without extra consideration as part of the family, in the circle of his comrades, in school, now feels that danger threatens him everywhere. Instead of being accepted and cherished as heretofore by the world about him, it has now become an enemy which challenges him at every turn. "You must not go with the others to the gymnasium." He is weaker than the others, incapable of doing the same things they do; he is cast aside—left alone. The restraint he must constantly lay upon himself awakens in him as constantly a feeling of being out of sorts. Those things which formerly delighted him no longer please him. Everything that had amused him he now must guard himself against; pleasure itself becomes an enemy. He feels himself obliged to find some means of getting out of this condition; and as this thought forces itself upon him, life becomes a problem—a problem that the more perplexes him, becomes the more insolvable, the more he broods over it.

All this has to do with a case in which the child comes upon a defect during its development, which places it in a difficult situation. Almost the same thing takes place when a person enfeebled from the very start becomes conscious of his inferiority.

As a rule we take for granted that the life of a child is very simple. If an adult could recall everything experienced during the first ten years of life, other conclusions

would be reached. The struggle after favor, the effort to keep up on a level with others, to win in competition—all these things which rule the greater part of the life of the adult are by no means unknown to the child. On the contrary. The child who cannot stand on his own legs is absolutely dependent upon surroundings; the verdict of others becomes of radical importance. If the child loses the good graces of those nearest it, goes under in the competition with brothers, sisters or comrades, it is a far more miserable experience than a grown person as a rule can imagine. What despair and oppression then it must be, to be from the very beginning oppressed by a feeling of inferiority? Consider a little girl when she discovers that she does not possess the beauty or loveliness by means of which she naturally would win all hearts. This is worse when the feeling of aloofness, which such an experience carries with it, cannot be cleared away—how shall a child explain to a grown person what it suffers under such circumstances—it does not even understand itself what is going on within it.

There arises now a serious question as to what a child may do when it has thus come askew with life and when this state becomes an insolvable problem.

The answer is simple: the child exchanges the real world it has lost for a world of illusion.

III

The old legend of Paradise is capable of many interpretations of which one and all may contain a seed of truth. But I wonder whether just that second in which this change takes place does not mark the most material boundary between the original relative state of harmony and its breaking up into turbulent dissension. Paradise—that is the world into which, without reflection, we flow together with the whole, in which each one is a part and of which each life is a symbol. Happiness—that is the feeling when our forces radiate without obstruction, touch-

ing into life all with which they come in contact, as we are borne on by the creating power. Into the world of the damned comes he who no longer is a partaker in all this joy, who withers within himself—longing only after fantasies that fade into nothingness as he tries to grasp them.

We may be pretty sure that the child to whom the real world becomes an affliction will try to find its way out of its trouble by living more and more deeply in the world of fantasy. All those desires which could not find realization in actuality, become fulfilled in imagination. If a boy gets the worst of it in a fight with some comrade, he unfailingly constructs afterwards a fantasy in which he is the rightful victor. The more evident the whipping was, just the more unrestrained works his imagination, in order that his humiliation may thus be counteracted. The notoriously weak and feeble in their dreams become great soldiers who crush hordes of enemies and let the sun of their own power shine upon poor human slaves. The little girl, ugly even to disfigurement, becomes a great enchantress, whom no one can resist.

Most of those who have had to do with children have undoubtedly noticed some time how a formerly sound and happy child changes and grows shy and reserved, reticent and irritable. The inner change makes its appearance externally in this way. The child wants to be left in peace with its fantasies, reacting with irritability against everything which would detach it from them. It cannot speak about the things which fill its thoughts—therefore it does not, as a rule, speak at all. The fatality in this displacement lies simply in the fact that it is so difficult to right, when it takes place in this early stadium. Grown people, too, may occasionally fill up the gap left by some disappointment, by means of imagination—in this manner retrieving the loss. But if one has been firmly set on the path of reality it is not hard to return to it again. Entirely different, however, is the case of a child who has not yet fitted itself into that reality, in which it is to

love, nor acquired full connection with it. If imagination takes possession of it, this may all too easily become the world in which it truly lives. It is by no means unusual that a child is not even able to separate fantasy from reality, but with entire sincerity believes in its imaginings rather than in its real experiences.

IV

All this, however, carries along with it under different circumstances widely different consequences. The matter is best understood if Adler's grouping of terms is kept in mind:—degeneration—neurosis—genius. The difference in these three instances depends upon the degree to which the enfeebled individual has been able to compensate for his enfeeblement. It thus finally means the inner power of production. But because the whole of that process through which a compensation is produced has so much to do with fantasy, it is scarcely possible to get a true conception of it without having in mind the excessively great part which fantasy plays for any one who is burdened with the feeling of inferiority.

What is most characteristic about the mental life of the degenerate is that mass of shadowy fantasies upon which he lets himself weakly be carried away. The baron in Gorki's *Lower Depths* is a characteristic type; he has slipped down, from the aristocratic position in which he was born, into the most wretched dregs of society, without knowing how he got there. The whole of the external world has had for him so little reality-value that passage through it was not even registered as a mechanical memory—only empty fantasies altogether, fantasies that broke before his eyes like soap-bubbles, without his lifting a hand to try to grasp them. At the same time that this moving along on the formless stream of imagination disintegrates the inner life into unreality, it carries the individual farther and farther away from the outside reality. This is fatal simply because the degenerate is thus de-

prived of all necessity for that adaptation, which the outside world always means to the sound mind. Every one may chance to go astray; but when one least suspects it one feels the iron grip of necessity. And this carries one back where one must go. But for the degenerate, that compulsion *necessarily* remains an unreality like all the rest.

Things take on another aspect when an abyss yawns between a strong, talented child and that world in which it has lived hitherto as a homogeneous part. It also may be pushed back by its surrounding circumstances and overwhelmed by their verdict: "You are lazy," we say. "You have a poor memory. You can never learn to parse verbs as well as others"; even such little things may press down into the feeling of inferiority. But when a child must admit its disadvantage it always does so with certain reservations:—"In other ways," it says to itself, "I am superior. Just wait and I'll show you what I can do!" The most gifted likewise may be forced out of the world of reality into that of fantasy. But for them from the very beginning fantasies have had a stamp of higher reality. Out of such fantasies presently proceeds a form of life that in its deepest significance comes nearer to the real than that from which it has been separated;—it may mean the inventor's improvement of material conditions, the politician's solution of municipal problems, or the poet's revelation of a world of inner beauty. In a word, the instant a creative genius is thrown out of banal reality, forces within are set in motion which some time become the source of new life and due to which a nobler human type may be created. If a person, as a rule, is to become anything else than one ingredient in the mass, stamped by its affects and with all its lack of spirituality, he must at a very early stage have been left alone to face the difficulties of life. No work bears the imprint of genius, unless already in childhood the worker learned to take hold of existence in an original way and to solve its con-

flicts by means of his original qualifications. The whole of this process of individualizing and of independent productivity which, in the adult, breaks forth in a life of action and at the same time frees him and draws others towards a higher form of life, all this process must have its foundation laid almost simultaneously with the dawn of consciousness and must develop during the whole period of growth; only then is it genuine.

The neurotic, as I have said already, occupies a place between these two extremes. He keeps himself within the framework of the outside reality; but he lives either upon fantasies which have nothing to do with reality—or else makes continual unsuccessful efforts to overcome it as a creator. To Adler, Strindberg is the embodiment of this conception. It is well known how, in childhood, Strindberg suffered from an overruling feeling of inferiority; and all his after life was a series of desperate efforts to work himself out of this in the most widely separated ways. All that he builded towards this end soon collapsed and he again stood in the same place as before. In spite of all his unprecedented power for creating, he never succeeded in bringing out one single value that became established for himself or could show a way out for others;—it all dissolved in chaos. Finally he succumbed to the feeling of inferiority with which he had started out, dying with the cross before his eyes and hate in his heart;—the cross, which is the everlasting symbol of inability to master the earthly life, and hate, which is only the negation of all emotional value.

V

From this general standpoint let us go on to a more critical examination of the formation of neuroses in detail, according to Adler's opinions. Adler's strength lies in his limitations and in his strict logic. The whole of his work consists of a study of those different ways by which compensation-formations seek a way out. All this

may be summed up in two broad strokes—one Adler calls “die Sicherung,” the other he calls “der männliche Protest.”

Freud had already pointed out that neurosis is a flight away from life into the realm of disease. Adler has laid stress upon the way in which life, for him who is burdened with a feeling of inferiority, comes to be looked upon as one big danger. It is not enough to flee continually from this danger, one must always try as well to guard one's self against it. As little as the weak can meet trouble with an open mind, in order through these troubles, as through hell-fire, to arrive at abiding harmony, just as little is such a one able to make himself secure beforehand by building life up upon a genuine foundation of truth and undisturbed reality. He tries instead to protect himself by means of various stratagems. Adler has a great faculty for catching, behind all neurotic symptoms, a glimpse of diverse delusions, illusions, poses, attitudes; tersely, unrealities behind which the neurotic tries to protect himself from the unmercifulness of reality. He explains a great part of the symptomatology by this rearing up of sham barricades.

There is no doubt that the defense-mechanism plays a main part in a great number of neurotic conditions. The man who struggles with his polygamous tendencies and wishes to escape prostitution, rears up in his mind the syphilis-phobia syndrome, and behind this wall feels himself safe; because he is overcome with anxiety and thinks only of this deadly peril into which he might fall merely through one kiss, he is secure against becoming the victim of sensuality. The wife who wishes to escape the marriage connection and the bearing of many children notices some vague, uncomfortable feelings in her reproductive organs; she grasps these feelings as a drowning man grasps a straw, she makes as much as she can of them until they become an actual pain which necessitates long-standing local treatment from a clever specialist—it may

even happen that she has her home in a country town, but that the specialist can be seen only in a metropolis where she has always longed to live. The young girl, who has been put into an office and finds the monotony of the work there as loathsome as the boldness of the men, suddenly gets agoraphobia—there is nothing to do but to allow her to stay at home and thus she escapes her part towards helping in the common support of the home. The teacher who has too much to do faints in the middle of a lecture—she is carried home, gets a free day and thus protects herself against overtiredness. The advanced neurotic who already spends his life in bed and thinks it monotonous to be alone, gets peculiar attacks in which, for example, he rushes to the window and tries to throw himself out; these attacks necessitate the continual presence of a nurse, in spite of the fact that the family can little afford the luxury. A poor woman who suffers from her insignificant position in life, when she moves to any new place, may attempt suicide, so that every one is frightened and she is thus made a topic of general conversation, as if she were some great celebrity—so for a time she is assured against the ignominy of obscurity. Innumerable examples might be given.

VI

It is evident that an understanding of this defense-mechanism is of especial importance for every practicing physician. For it is very often with the assistance of the doctor that neurotics are successful in carrying through such stratagem. The patient himself has no comprehension of the trouble to which he has suddenly fallen a victim. In spite of the fact that in its very nature it is something illusory, he accepts it as reality; the neurosis lies in this fact. The family is unable to explain the right connection, although they often have a faint suspicion of it. If then the physician comes and with his authority

supports the tendency to ill health, the patient succeeds in putting it through in spite of all opposition. Far from being nullified by prescriptions which have no causal connection with the formation of the illness, these act only as a means of embedding it more firmly into the nervous system. The harm which has in this way been done in the handling of neuroses through routine treatment, isolating cures, and other blunders, can scarcely be estimated. There is no possibility of coming to a rational way of treating neuroses without a general understanding of this matter. We must not forget that the overcoming of a defense mechanism demands work from within, and may often be painful and take the energy of years. When the patient finds out that he no longer is left in peace but must take up the battle of life in order to be well—then he runs to some other doctor. And this one perhaps lets him once more sink back into his protective measures, and by so doing cuts off the road to health which had begun to be cleared out.

It may indeed be a difficult task to once more take hold of life when a man has well established himself as a neurotic, under this defense-mechanism. But, on the other hand, it not infrequently happens that severe symptoms which have been built up in this manner disappear as if by magic when the causal associations are cleared up. It is as if the patient had become enmeshed in a net of illusions against his will—it needs only that this be torn asunder in order that he become well and free. He has fled from reality; but the neurosis has provided a new experience;—however dangerous reality itself may be, there is one thing still more dangerous; and that is the effort to assure one's self against it in any way whatever.

VII

After these hints concerning Adler's meaning as it has to do with neurotic defense-mechanism, I shall point out

briefly what is involved in his other fundamental idea, viz., "the masculine protest." It may be most suitable to start from a concrete case.

A robust man of about thirty years consulted me once because of impotence. It came out at once that the impotence applied only to his marriage; during the whole time of his youth he had been unusually vigorous in the sexual respect. He had married solely for love and his wife was in no way opposed to him. This seems peculiar, but the association is very simple. I asked him some questions concerning his father and he then broke out with the greatest bitterness. His father, he told me, had ruined his life. All through his student days this father had dogged his steps in every possible way—he had made home a perfect hell during his childhood, etc., etc. He continued: "As far back as I can remember, I was determined never to be the cause of bringing children into the world—I would not bring about such damnation as I had known in my own life." Here was the thing quite clear. The young man's waking consciousness in childhood had been impressed with a protest against the father, the flame being continually fed by new feelings of hatred which must be suppressed. Out of this protest against the father arose a protest against fatherhood. And it was this which brought about all that failure of the sexual-mechanism, when danger of fatherhood arose because of his marriage. I asked him if he still held fast to his decision not to wish to become a father. "No, for God's sake!" he answered. "My wife would like ten children if I could do my part." Consciously then he had given up the protest. In such cases that is always the first step toward health. Sometimes the imprint which the protest puts upon the unconscious mind is also blotted out: but if this is deep-seated it may require tedious work to repair the consequences of the past.

In this case it is easy to see the characteristics of the

neurotic attitude toward life. In the face of the fact of an unhappy childhood, the sound, strong man says to himself: "If I have children it will be the effort of my life to see to it that they do not suffer as I have done." This is a positive goal; it is something which leaves the mind open for what is to come, and at the same time leaves the mind a content. The neurotic, on the contrary, flees from difficulties; the impotence was an unconscious stragem, by means of which this patient had beforehand saved himself, without the trouble of taking hold in earnest of the solution of a risky problem. Neurosis is the negation of life. The protest is the active side of this negation. The passive side is the defense reaction.

This protest-mechanism clears understanding of very many neurotic disturbances. I just now recall a man who suffered from the same trouble as the patient I have last mentioned; he had been left behind by his competitors, and his feelings were engulfed in protest against this unmerited treatment. He was so taken up with thoughts concerning this occurrence that he never had time to devote himself to his wife and his home. Another patient who came to me for treatment for alcoholism, said to me: "I notice that if any one suspects me of being unable to control myself, something within me arises in protest and I go and get drunk. This protest is more dangerous for me than anything else."

I said before that the neurotic, unlike the degenerate, lets himself be carried away by shadowy fantasies; he must constantly keep hold of himself in the unavailing effort to alter the reality of which he is not master. The protest is this everlasting rebellion against life, which leads to nothing and after which the neurotic once more sinks into his helplessness—there is no one who exhausts his forces so unnecessarily as the victim of a protest-mechanism. The so-called neurasthenic "tiredness" is often caused simply by this.

VIII

Adler gives the protest the epithet "masculine." This means that all the struggling, the eagerness to be first in competition with others, the strife for power, which characterize the mind-current, has to do with those qualities we are accustomed to call masculine. But there is also another and more important reason. We come upon the protest in the study of neurosis to a great extent and in a special form, among women, who inwardly rise up against their position as women. Behind much neurotic suffering among women Adler believes that he is able to see the hidden desire to escape the position of woman. He gives many examples of women who ever since the awakening of consciousness have been in open strife with their sex, and who react with anxiety, insomnia and other symptoms against everything which reminds them of their part in life. This is not so strange as it may appear. Woman since the earliest days of civilization has been placed in a subordinate position; one might almost say that the feeling of inferiority throughout centuries has enmeshed womanhood itself and now burdens the whole sex. A girl becomes aware of this disadvantage as soon as she experiences the condescending airs and disdain with which her brothers talk "of girls not being any good." Not at all strange that such talk awakens a desire to outshine them. But in this very fact may a foundation be laid in the girl for a conflict with her own nature, which later on becomes fatal. The protest, which should be directed against what is fallacious in the opinion, instead directs itself against the nature of womanhood itself. While on this subject it might be a temptation to see how Adler's point of view holds good concerning the so-called feminist movement. Undoubtedly he believes this movement is just, as a means of rectifying the mistakes of the history of civilization. But he wonders if it does not sometimes come upon paths which have relationship with

illness, where occasionally a woman goes astray, because, without understanding the matter, she rises in arms and tries to suppress that which is by far the finest and noblest in her nature. In the strife after "equality with man" alone lies the seed for one such way of straying;—in this one sees an inkling of the "masculine protest," just as in every other place where the woman puts forward man and masculinity as an aim for her struggle. What the feminist movement properly implies is not that the woman shall be forced into the same plane as the man and have opportunity to develop her powers so that she shall set up an opposition against him; what it does mean is that she must be freed from the estimation and standard of life which men have forced upon her and thus have a fair chance to develop freely and fully her own nature.

What makes early straying upon any one of these many wrong paths fatal is the fact that the individual puts before him delusive aims and at the same time fashions his life-plan after them. The neurotic, because of a feeling of inferiority, is separated from real life and is thus forced into a life of fantasy. Instead of working towards tangible external goals, his aim is something which he constructs in his imagination. He thus deprives himself of the happiness that lies in the attainment of something tangible. He is continually confronted with the painful discovery that his own fantasies are incongruous with real life. "It has not turned out as I expected it to," he says. "What is the use in striving for anything?" and so his activity is paralyzed and he comes into the state of relaxation of will-power so characteristic of the neurasthenic.

The danger in the building up of such fictitious ideas is simply this: the formation-process itself in essential degree finally is decided by those tendencies with which the neurotic tries to compensate the feeling of inferiority. In other words: his whole life-plan comes to be decided either by the defense-mechanism or the protest. In order to abandon his illusions it may often be necessary for the

neurotic to rebuild his whole life from the very foundation. Generally so-called regression plays a great part in every treatment. Through regression a stop is put to that development in which the individual is being driven on by his inner forces. He is compelled to go farther and farther back in order to review every point in life's falsification to which he has become a victim. After this has been done he reverts to his present life as if after an inner voyage of exploration; he sees it in another light and comprehends toward what genuine purpose he should direct himself.

IX

It is without doubt simply in the ruling of the whole life-plan by wrong tendencies that insurmountable hindrances often arise in the road to health.

I shall here give an example of what I mean.

I was consulted once by a man of about thirty years, who was troubled by a disturbance in the organ of speech. He did not stammer exactly, but suddenly without the slightest warning the tongue refused to do its service. It was a particularly unfortunate trouble for him because he had intended to become a popular lecturer. He had put before him as his aim in life the elevation of the people, and he meant to stand forth himself as a moral example. Because he had been originally a poor peasant boy, and gave me the impression of being orderly and diligent, but nevertheless exceedingly poorly gifted, I suspected at once that there was a plain incongruity between his qualifications and his ambition. I thought that in all probability the trouble with the speech had some dim association with this fact. Investigation revealed that in childhood this patient had indulged in the wildest imaginations connected with war and plans for being a great victor; he wanted to eclipse the great generals of his country and make it once more a world power, etc. As soon as he was grown up he had enlisted in the army. In this act there was nothing

peculiar. But he had by no means taken this course with the thought of remaining a non-commissioned officer or any such insignificant thing—he had done it with the undisturbed conviction that he shortly would become Chief of the General Staff and in this position would be able to work out his plans as soon as a war broke out. Then came upon him the trouble with his speech which forced him on to another path. He had then gone to New Zealand. “Why New Zealand?” I asked him. He told me because he had wanted to say that he had been farther away from his native land than any one else, and so had chosen the point on the globe which was precisely opposite his own country. I shall not repeat all the queer circumstances with which this analysis swarmed. Tersely, at each decision he allowed himself to be dominated by his childhood’s fiction of being foremost. His work as a lecturer was naturally nothing else than the use of such subjects as temperance, the education of the people and various other questions of the day, in order to attract attention to himself, just as indeed many others use such means. The disturbance of speech had arisen as a natural means to try to force him to fit into reality—a thing I must here pass by. In order to become well the man had to give up his ideas of greatness and be resigned to the fact that he was entirely an every-day unimportant workman, who must make an honorable means of self-support his purpose in life;—this change was too much for him.

In referring to the origin of inferiority, I touched upon one circumstance which puts great hindrances in the way of making over of the fictitious life-plan, viz.: that the feeling of inferiority itself is woven in with actual physical weaknesses and irregularities. These thus constantly sustain the erroneous mind-building processes. In this last case, for example, there existed a malformation of the gum which made it hard for the patient to pronounce the letter “s.”

There is still another circumstance which in this respect

is of even greater import and which for the sake of simplicity I have hitherto passed by. I have so presented the matter that it would seem as if the feeling of inferiority arose in connection with physical weakness and as if the defense- and protest-mechanisms originated in connection with those difficulties met with on account of it, in the fitting in with reality. But all this has very often a deeper association. Anomalies mean psychic educational faults, and it is against these that compensation must be established in different directions. In other words, the individual has something constitutional within him from which he always tries to escape and against which he continually revolts. Let us take as an example a homosexual trait in a deeply moral man of strong character. Under such circumstances a compulsion-neurosis with a complicated ritual may be erected, which forces the individual every second of the day to be on his guard. He may, for instance, be subjected to the compulsion of dressing himself in a certain way, of walking upon certain stones in certain streets, of carrying out his work in a certain way—he may, because of agoraphobia, be frightened away from all places where men solicit, etc. I recall one man of splendid education, but constitutionally homosexual, who joined the Salvation Army and for whom religion played the part of such a protecting defense-measure. Or the process may also appear in the protest form. We might in that case say that the protest is the tension between abnormal tendencies—such as perverted animal instincts, and the forces which build up morals. The more one is reminded of the impulse the stronger arises the protest; this protest is then attached to other relatively indifferent objects and is projected into the surrounding world and into work in accordance with well-known mechanisms. So the reason which causes a woman's shrewishness, through which she destroys her own happiness as well as that of others, may lie in some hidden perversity, from which she continually, by this means, tries to turn her attention.

If neurotic conditions do not become amenable to cure, the reason will often be found in such constitutional anomalies, which make the fitting into real life an impossibility. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that the situation can be improved, that is to say, after analysis of the associations the individual may replace the neurotic defense-system with something better;—for example, replace a compulsion-system that paralyzes the whole working power with a useful work which holds the attention and engrosses the energy.

Such deep unchangeable abnormalities hold good about psychopathic conditions. For the explanation of the psychology of these also, Adler's lines of thought have value. This is understandable if one keeps in mind the aim toward which both fundamental tendencies point most surely—an aim realized in both extreme psychotic types, *i.e.*, in the dement- and the protest-paranoiac. The former withdraws entirely from the outside world and lives only in the fantasies which he himself produces. He shields himself by means of walls built up from the compulsion-system, symbols, attitudes, automatisms, etc., in such a way that he is no longer approachable. The latter, on the other hand, instantly takes an "on guard" attitude toward every one he meets. He is oversensitive in regard to the outside world in such a way that he makes use of each little thing as a welcome means of obtaining outlet for the hate-saturated disharmony within him. Of course in the construction of psychopathic conditions, causes of quite another sort than those here described also come into play; with them medical psychology has nothing to do. It is limited to searching into psychological associations.

X

It may need no more than the above hints concerning Adler's teachings to make clear to every one how widely they differ from everything that is connected with the name of Freud. Obviously a presentation of everything,

which according to Adler is fundamentally important for the construction of neurosis, may be given, without once bringing the sexual life into question. In his earnestness to point out other causes than those emphasized by Freud, he has even gone so far as wholly to deny that the sexual-life and its conflicts are explanatory foundations for nervous suffering. It may appear of only paradoxical interest. But really that is the conclusion we must arrive at, if Adler's opinions are followed out to the goal toward which they point. And Adler may be accused of anything but inconsistency.

The forces which Adler pointed out, and the action of which he tried to follow in detail, play, according to him, such a dominating rôle, that the sexual life itself, by the side of them, recedes to the background. Where the feeling of inferiority has found a way into a person's life everything must yield to the effort to build up compensation in one way or another,—everything is subordinated to this, even the longing to reach freedom of the senses. Before the purpose of defending one's self against the dangers of life, or the longing to overcome other dangers by means of the masculine protest, the neurotic loses sight of all other purposes. He not only loses love as an aim in life, but he loses the faculty to love. He meets every rising tendency within himself with an anxious effort to flee from it. He dare not devote himself to anything which may bring him in contact with this dangerous reality, which is his constant terror. Love would compel him to give up those dreams which are dearer to him than life, and drive him to the humiliating acknowledgment that he has striven after an illusory goal; so he rises in protest against it. Because of this everlasting seeking after fictitious aims, after unreality, the neurotic can never give himself up to the risk of a real emotion, as he must do, if by means of it he is to redeem himself. All that has to do with the erotic remains for him just as unreal as everything else in his life—a fantasy, an arrangement, a

pose, a part to play. Because of this Adler believes that it is preposterous to ascribe a causal significance to neurosis-formation, even where the patient himself stresses such significance and when on a superficial consideration it seems to play a chief part. The deciding factors are, instead, all those things which drive the neurotic into a life of unreality and impede his emancipation.

Even if Freud's sexual doctrine may not be eliminated from scientific consciousness in so convenient a way, Adler's point of view contains nevertheless very much of value. It can not be denied that the "libidinous satyr-play" is often an external phenomenon, deep under which "the tragedy of the masculine protest" works the destruction of the individual. Strindberg, whose life and work are an inexhaustible well-spring for the exemplification of Adler's viewpoint is, in this regard, singularly instructive. One of Adler's most faithful adherents, Freschl, has recently devoted himself to a study of Strindberg's book, *For Pay*. This points out how, for the author, everything was a question of power, an effort to demonstrate his superiority. He feels his inferiority in regard to woman and marries three times in the hope of finally becoming master over some one. At the bottom of his inclination to endow woman at one and the same time with irresistible charm and with the most horrible qualities, lies one of those strange stratagems which are so often met with in neurotics; he does it to protect himself from the humiliation which otherwise would mean his going under in the battle against her, for no one need be ashamed of being unable to withstand such monsters of artifice and enchantment as he makes his fictitious women appear to be.

Helen must conquer in order to show the dangerous power of which she is possessed and it is easy to understand the need of the man to protect himself against her, —against women—etc. Out of Strindberg's life and out

of all his books it is easy to see how aggression-tendencies originated from a neurotic thought-scheme to which he had to hold fast in order to protect himself, since he plainly felt how great was his insecurity against women. This feeling of powerlessness in the struggle against her, was, however, only one expression standing out in the foreground, for the general feeling of inferiority which he had with him from the very beginning.

When Strindberg speaks of love between man and woman, it does not mean anything like love, but only the question which of the two shall get the better of the other in the struggle for power.

This is of interest as showing how Adler thus throws new light upon a problem which Freud believed he had made quite clear. Adler has brought about a revaluation of all those facts which Freud dragged forth and made subjects for discussion.

The most important question is the manner in which Adler manages the incest doctrine. During the development of psychoanalysis this doctrine has become such a center in the whole structure of the teaching, that it often seems as if an answer to all the fundamentally essential questions pertains to it. Adler's greatest import lies perhaps simply in the fact that he constructed a dam against the inclination of this incest doctrine to overflow all the different spheres of human nature.

The material for the incest doctrine has been chiefly gathered from dreams. It can neither enter Adler's mind nor that of anyone else who is practically engaged with psychology, to deny that in the dreams of neurotic patients incestuous fantasies are to be met with about as Freud describes them, and that through analysis one may find a trace of such things in the unconscious life of every one. The question therefore is not so much this fact in and for itself, but how it shall be explained. The opposition which arose was chiefly against Freud's manner of interpreting it as an expression of an unconscious wish.

which prevents free play of the feelings and rouses insuperable resistance against psychic freedom. What Adler above all objected to was the establishment of the incest motive as a reality in the life of the individual. Having accepted the erotic conflict in neurotics as an unreality—as a curtain, behind which all these other forces are acting, it was but a step for him to view also the origin of those conflicts as an illusion, a self-deception. He regards it only as a staging of the longing for protection and the struggle for power. When a man, for instance, dreams of intimate intercourse with his own mother, it means only that he runs to her from the dangers of life in the same way he did as a child. And so it is always. The fact that these sensuous situations appear in dreams so relatively often depends most closely upon a technical circumstance in the formation of dreams. We possess in the unconscious mind, so to speak, a stratum of memory pictures which superimposes an earlier stadium in connection with the most primitive sensuous sensations. Among these memories, pictures of our nearest relations play the chief rôle—they being then the only individuals who existed for us. Of the psychic material furnished by this stratum, we make use in dreams in order to express those tendencies by which our conscious ego is ruled; we use them to illustrate endeavors of quite another sort.

But the strife which is going on between Freud and Adler is more than a matter of scientific controversy; it involves the ground work of medical psychology.

It was pointed out elsewhere that Freud tries to interpret the psychic-life from its causal assumptions, just as every investigator of natural science interprets phenomena which come within his field of research. The basic idea in the sexual doctrine is simply an attempt to resolve all different expressions of the mental life into more or less fundamental forms, by the power which rules

the whole of the animal world. Freud, in other words, attempts to harmonize his teaching concerning the mental life with the whole scheme of natural science. Adler's opposition is an expression of humanity's persistent protest against under-valuation of the specifically human forces; it is the claim of the final viewpoint against the causal.

According to Adler we understand nothing of that which takes place within us unless we first and foremost direct attention to the ineffaceable groping for a purpose which rules all our undertakings. The nature of neurosis is unveiled to us only when we learn to distinguish between real and illusory aims. If this struggle for a purpose comes from within and carries with it the stamp of our deepest, truest volition—if the purpose is in harmony proportion with our forces and if its attainment leads to the emancipation of these forces, then we are on the right road. But if the effort itself is distorted, stressed, and really an egotistical desire to demonstrate our own superiority; if the purpose is something which in actuality we do not desire, something, which looked deeper into, is of no worth to us, a will-o'-the-wisp after which we reach only because it shines beautifully before our eyes—then we are on the road to disease.

Behind this struggle toward a goal Adler catches a gleam of the permanent life-plan. The concept for him, carries with it almost a mystical purport, and in reading his works one sometimes feels that this idea is his name for the substance of life itself. To show how deeply the life-plan is grown into the psyche, he has investigated the earliest memories of childhood in a very large number of cases; he has found thereby that these always are a symbol of the life-plan. As an instance, I questioned a young man about his earliest recollections; he had sat upon somebody's knee and told tales of robbers and had been overjoyed when some of the people near him expressed delight. He was then three years old. Now he is over

twenty and wants to study to become an artist; his life is ruled by the longing to charm in some such capacity his contemporaries. The life-plan is the indwelling, primitive, central point in the human soul. Life consists of an effort to realize it. Everything else must give way, and all other tendencies must be subordinated to it.

Adler's rigid consistency comes out strongest by far in the way in which he puts another construction on the Freud incest doctrine. Even the forces which penetrate most deeply into the assumptions of our earthly existence are not, according to Adler, decisive for the form of it. By themselves they are empty, illusory. Their real import is discovered only when they are seen in connection with the life-plan; that is the substance which fills out these forces with real content, which negotiates their associations with reality in general.

It may thus be seen that Adler asserts purposiveness with that same ruthless one-sidedness with which Freud emphasizes causality, as the driving, creating, power in human life.

ANAGOGIC PSYCHOANALYSIS ¹

(After a Lecture Before the Psychologic-Philosophical
Society at Goteborg, Sweden)

BY DR. EMANUEL OF GEIJERSTAM (GOTEBORG)

Translated by Dr. James S. Van Teslaar

We all know what an important rôle the forbidden plays in the teachings of Freud. He defines conscience as follows: "Conscience is the inner perception of the rejection of certain wishes existing within us." (*Imago*, 1912; *Das Tabu*.) The ethical standards which have arisen as the result of training and environmental influences are, according to Freud, incompatible with our instincts, with our sexuality. That the sexual instinct generates the feeling of guilt is a common human experience which the psychotherapist has an uncommonly good opportunity to verify. The question is whether the feeling of guilt, in its deepest sense, actually has its roots in sexuality. Let us first consider what may be called an elementary example, viz.: the classical type, commonly called sexual neurasthenia. A neurotic of this type usually has been addicted to masturbation, he has read "house physicians" who have taught him the alleged evils of the so-called "secret" vice. I may point out that the writings which inspire neurotics with fear do not always emanate from quacks. There are to this day more physicians than one would think credible who represent in these matters a viewpoint which has become an anachronism. (As to the non-injuriousness of onanism consult the writings of Dr. W. Stekel.) The neurotic is induced on account of his

¹ From *Psyche and Eros*. Reprinted by permission.

hypochondriac motives to engage in a bitter struggle against masturbation. These motives, as we know, are usually fortified by religious scruples, since the neurotic's education leads him to identify sexuality with sinfulness. It is well known—and a fact frequently stressed by Freud—that the worst neurotic conflicts break out precisely when the struggle against masturbation has been won and the habit has been given up. In very serious cases the whole sexual instinct may be completely suppressed. In its place the patient displays anxiety and eventually other neurotic symptoms. Undoubtedly Freud is correct when he teaches that in such cases the sexuality is repressed, driven out of consciousness. As is well known, Freud also says that the neurotic does not succeed thereby in getting rid of his sexuality. The latter still persists in the unconscious and presses forward for expression. As it is not permitted to come to the surface it breaks through in the form of anxiety. The libido becomes transformed into anxiety. Freud sees in this a process of self-punishment and states very properly that to a certain extent all anxiety represents the operation of conscience. Anxiety appears to be the result of a feeling of guilt which has its roots in sexuality.

But upon analyzing neurotics of this type I have been unable for my part to convince myself that this is a fact. A couple of years ago I treated a twenty-two-year-old neurotic. In the course of a dream analysis he gave the following association: "I recall how I prayed very fervently to God one day, some time ago, to protect me against the habit of masturbation." Following the analytic technique of Dr. Stromme I asked whether he had fought the day before against the habit. He had not. But his whole day had been filled with terror concerning the coming Easter preparations. He was employed in a store. He had in fact uttered a pious little prayer. He had prayed to God to save him from having to work. I asked whether he could recall having felt better after the prayer. He

was surprised at that, but answered very promptly that he recalled very distinctly that this had not been the case. He now saw the reason for it. The same patient reacted to another dream with the following association: "I must absolutely give up masturbation, otherwise I shall become so sick that I shall have to take my life." Here there was a similar relationship. The day before he had actually thought to himself: "Work will yet drive me to suicide." In other words, in his unconscious fantasy he regarded masturbation in the same light as work. Undeniably it sounds rather far-fetched to find the sign of equation between onanism and work. One may also raise the objection that such examples are accidental, and that these proofs point to no more than a rather superficial play on words. But I am in a position to quote masses of similar examples. It not infrequently happens that young students act before their comrades as if they are lazy, as if they took pride in being lazy, when as a matter of fact they are really fairly diligent. They do their work secretly just as they secretly masturbate. Moreover, the neurotic is often conscious of a similar attitude towards work as towards sexuality, of course without being aware of the parallel. He believes he has become ill on account of overwork, he is afraid of the evil consequences of hard work, just as he is afraid of masturbation. In fact he fears the loss of energy (a narcissistic factor). Moreover, it is very convenient and therefore very easy for the neurotic to attribute the responsibility to something he has already done and cannot undo. (It is, in fact, a typical neurotic wish, observable in many patients, that they are uncommonly keen to know when and how their neurosis had its genesis. A person would rather trace something to the remote past than to yesterday.) If in the course of his treatment a neurotic dreams that he has kissed a woman, he usually feels better the following day and is better able to work. As I have pointed out in a previous lecture, I stand decidedly upon a broader libido concept

and I see in the sexual libido only a portion of the general interest in life. The dream depicts *pars pro toto*, the sexual object instead of the life aim. Particularly in woman's consciousness, man and marriage stand as specific representatives of the life aim. A similar rôle is played in the case of the male by the thought of founding his own home. The sexual in dreams has not merely a literal meaning, but above all a symbolic, an anagogic significance.

Freud, as is well known, lets his patients associate freely, requests them to give free course to the flow of thoughts and to relate without the least control everything that comes to consciousness. Freud states that when our customary purposive thinking is abandoned, the unconscious assumes the determinative rôle for the content of our associations. We also find that the sexual plays the same rôle in the free associations roused during the waking state as in the dream. We may have a sexual parallel to the previous day's activity, though that need not necessarily be the case. But an anagogic parallel does seem always to be present. Upon a more careful scrutiny of the matter, it is not very surprising after all, if, as Siremme has recently expressed it, analysis discloses a possible equation between sexuality and work. It is well known that, in spite of the most careful explanation showing that masturbation is but an infantile or juvenile form of gratification of the sexual instinct and that it need not be considered in itself harmful to health, the sexual neurasthenic is relatively seldom able to overcome his hypochondriac fears. When the orthodox conception of the sixth commandment comes into play, it naturally aggravates the despair of the neurotic. The modern translation of that commandment ("Thou shalt not commit adultery") has, in my experience, the effect of supporting the therapist's efforts to some extent. An orthodox patient usually looks eagerly for a free thinker in his physician, *i.e.*, some one to rid him of his qualms of conscience. I am reminded

particularly of an elderly, pious school-teacher who suffered from so-called "sexual excitation," *i.e.*, masturbation. It was hopeless to try to touch upon that subject with her. Through hypnosis her sexual excitability was diminished and after a certain measure of self-criticism she thanked me because she believed herself as well as it was possible for her to be. In the last analysis it is surprising, however, that these patients, aside from their religious views, find it so hard to forgive themselves their masturbation habit. Freud, as is well known, states that the symptom is a substitute gratification for sexuality. In anagogic terms this means that there is something purposive back of every symptom. Stromme states very properly, that there is truth in all compulsive thoughts—if only they are rightly interpreted. That is true also here. There is a valid reason why the sexual neurasthenic cannot forgive himself. The fact is he has committed the so-called sin against the Holy Ghost, a transgression for which no one has yet been able to achieve self-forgiveness. With the overcoming of his masturbation and the repression of his sexuality, he has also lost his pleasure in life, he has repressed his pleasure in work—hence the feeling of guilt. What breaks into the field of consciousness in the form of anxiety is not sexuality alone, but also the (similarly repressed) joy in work. The primary factor of the neurosis consists in the shrinking back from exertion. The neurotic, to use Stromme's expression, does not want to expend his energy. And there is profound truth in the saying that avarice is the root of all evil. Freud continually reiterates that our moral self wants to know nothing of our sexuality. It becomes, so to speak, a negative, proscriptive conscience. Freud speaks of the self-judging factor, the censorship, our conscience. (*Cf. his A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis.*) It is the factor which exercises a censorial influence on dreams at night and through which the repressed energies break forth. But in a deeper sense we have in our unconscious a moral

self which refuses to know that a natural instinct is being repressed as something abhorrent, just as it does not tolerate the repression of the craving for work. The sexual neurotic who overcomes his masturbation habit without overcoming the neurosis, suffers, strictly speaking, from anxiety not because he has masturbated, but because he did not dare continue the habit—from the anagogic standpoint, because he fails to give proper expression to the craving for life and work. And the orthodox teaching, according to which he ought to be satisfied to be free from his sexual longings, helps him as little as any alleged free-thinking attitude. Failure properly to express the natural cravings generates a feeling of guilt. Freud says that the neurotic represses his sexuality because of a feeling of guilt. That is correct in so far as it explains the attitude of the neurotic towards his struggle against his instinctive cravings. But as I see it, the truth is rather that he has the feeling of guilt *because* he has repressed his sexuality. When the neurotic recoils from his tasks, becomes a victim of anxiety attacks, and seeks to be consoled by his mother, in other words, when the Œdipus complex is being actualized, the feeling of guilt comes into play not because he loves his mother, but because he does not love his work. I cannot accept the Freudian doctrine that the feeling of guilt in relation to sexuality has its deepest roots in the incestuous object-choice. If the Œdipus complex be taken literally, the feeling of guilt is due rather to the hostile attitude towards the father. The young neurotic, so bound to his mother that he is not comfortable at home except during his father's absence, is not rarely met with. An eleven-year-old neurotic, with asthmatic symptoms, among others, dreamed as follows: "A man stepped in through the bedroom door, held a knife in his hand and wanted to stick it into my mother. Then I dreamed that I awoke from my sleep, gripped the intruder by the wrist and tore the knife out of his hand." This dream, which, incidentally, ought to be of interest to those who doubt the

Œdipus theory and the doctrine of sexual symbolisms, hardly requires interpretation. I do not propose to analyze it at present. From the patient's father I obtained subsequently an excellent substantiation of the analysis of this dream. The young boy had been to the theater with his parents the previous evening. When they returned home the parents sat up and engaged in conversation while the boy was sent to bed. Excited by the evening's entertainment, the boy retired most unwillingly. Looking now merely at the objective side of the dream, it is very plain to me that the feeling of guilt must be traceable here to the boy's jealousy of his father. Subjectively the man in the dream represents egoism. The feeling of guilt which stands back of the neurotic's fear is never due to love, but to the absence of love; *it is due not to what the neurotic does, but rather to what he fails to do*. The sins of omission are the worst. It is psychologically very appropriate that in Ola Hansson's *Ung Ofegs visor* (The Songs of Young Ofeg), the worst fate overtakes the man who keeps silent.

I want to quote one more example to illustrate the rôle which sexuality, and particularly masturbation, may play in neurosis. A few years ago I treated a thirty-year-old patient who suffered from agoraphobia. When he was at his worst, he had no sexual interest, felt no trace of joy in his work, but instead was subject to depression, apathy and fatigue. After a time his condition improved somewhat. The first sign of that was that he began to masturbate. At the same time his interest in work returned. Then he began indulging in sexual relations. (He was a Don Juan, a sexual type which is distinctly neurotic). Simultaneously his zest in his daily occupations became strong or as strong as it could be in a man of his type. If after a while he became worse again, his pleasure in work also decreased; he began to masturbate again and after a time fell once more into a deep depression during which his interest in work and his sexual cravings alike

were at the lowest level. During the upward swing of the curve the onset of masturbation was a symptom of improvement and during the downward course of his condition it was a symptom of neurosis. In fact, all symptoms are in a certain sense a sign of unconscious progressiveness (*i.e.*, anagogic translation of Freud's "libido"). Freud calls them substitutes. They are, so to speak, a less laborious, more easily attainable form of the gratification of the pleasure in life than sensible forms of work. In the truest sense the patient wants to have his symptoms, although he does not understand this. There is therefore sense in the advice often given to the neurotic that he ought to learn to put up with his symptoms. Unfortunately this advice is of little use to him because he does not acquire at the same time an insight into the mechanisms of a neurosis. When, in the case cited above, cohabitation displaced masturbation, the latter was really a surrogate, a sign of diminished craving. But we must not forget that it stands also for the only possible outlet for progression available to the patient. The most serious cases of neurosis are those which show a scant formation of symptoms, which are characterized by apathy rather than by anxiety, and in which the subjects cling almost with the stubbornness of the insane to the idea that they are ill.

The case mentioned above illustrates also very clearly the psychic parallels between sexual craving and pleasure in work. In fact, the neurotic assumes towards all life problems in general precisely the same inhibited attitude which he displays towards his sexual life. For the present I wish to point out that the sexual neurasthenic who feels such deep regrets over his masturbation often lacks similar compunctions with regard to loose morals otherwise, and that in spite of orthodox views—this being further proof that the neurotic reaction against sexuality has little to do with morals in the deeper sense.

That moral fanaticism is a pure neurosis and nothing more need hardly be specially emphasized in this connec-

tion. A twenty-two-year-old girl suffering from hysteria and phobias once complained in the course of her analysis that she awoke that morning with a very peculiar feeling: she felt little pleasure in work. She thought it was on account of an unpleasant dream she had had. The dream was as follows:

"I was at home—it was late at night. I went to bed. After a while my betrothed came into the room. He was undressed as he approached my bed. At first I was horrified and uneasy, but presently I felt a most pleasant sensation, such as I have never experienced in reality. I was not ashamed that he had come to me; I seemed to take it quite naturally. Then mother came in. At once my betrothed disappeared; she began busying herself in my room. I could not understand why she did not go away. I waited impatiently for her to go so that my betrothed might return, but she stayed."

This is a good example of how one may understand one's dreams. As might be expected, she attributed her dysphoric feelings to the erotic element in the dream. As a matter of fact, the dream mother stood for moral fanaticism. Concerning her mother the patient related that she was a very nervous person, very critical in her judgments of others and particularly severe in her criticism of the liberties men took. "Whenever mother speaks that way, I feel precisely as she does," added the girl. She herself had expressed herself on various occasions with the utmost disgust and indignation about all who are morally impure. The account she gave of her betrothed corresponded with his characteristics as she had described them on the previous day to the analyst. He represents the analysis—subjectively he stands for her progressive self. Her own and her mother's moral fanaticism becomes—the neurosis, the resistance against the analysis. (The freedom of men—the candor of the analyst.) The dream arose out of the struggle she passed through in the course of the previous day's analysis when she tried to overcome her aver-

sion and to express herself frankly—an aversion which, according to her own statement, rested on pretended bashfulness. The unpleasant feelings which followed the dream were due, therefore, not to the appearance of the betrothed in the dream, as she thought, but to the fact that he disappeared and that the mother failed to do so. Such a dream is very characteristic of a young hysterical girl who had been subjected to a wrong educational system.

Some time ago I treated a forty-year-old bachelor suffering from impotentia cœundi. After a couple of months he broke off the treatment under some pretext or other. I had therefore no opportunity to finish the work I had begun and therapeutically I could obtain but a partial result. But the case is interesting nevertheless and not least so from the anagogic standpoint. Like many others suffering from the same trouble, he thought that in other respects he was quite normal. But a sexual impotence of this character is unthinkable without a corresponding disturbance of one's attitude towards life in general. It actually turned out that not infrequently he suffered from marked depression, dislike for work and mental indolence. He was bashful and timid, and in his social relations he described himself as one who is not easily drawn into conversation. This attitude of his determined his relations to women as well as to his work. At the age of twenty-one he acquired a venereal disease; because of this he was disgusted with sex and lived abstinently for years, during which time he "repressed all feelings." He succeeded very well in this and the result was—impotence. During the first analysis he invented the cryptolalic, *i.e.*, artificial, expression "Krusamynta." To the term "krusa" ("ruffle") he associated "ruffled collars, such as priests wore formerly around their necks." In a moving picture play about Joan of Arc, priests wearing such collars were represented as sitting in judgment on her. The priests were goaded by the English (who, in his mind, stand for puritanism, public opinion—which condemns sexuality). The

priests, therefore, stand for the neurosis. To "kru" he associated "kruka," *i.e.*, fear. To "Samynta," the Samoan Islands, "famous for their fertility." Accordingly "Krusamynta" means: "I fear and condemn sexuality because of public opinion." Incidentally I may draw attention to the fact that cryptolalia (gift of tongues) is one of the best means whereby to convince one of the existence of unconscious mental processes. Nothing proves it more convincingly *ad oculos*, as it were. (Cf. O. Pfister, *Kryptolalie, Kryptographie, etc.*, in *Jahrb. f. Psa.*, vol. V.)

The patient above mentioned has had a number of interesting cryptolalias. "Brunevarepar," literally translated, "en brun Eva repararer impotensen" (a brown Eva repairs impotence). He liked brunettes. In the word "Krverisam," there were fused the word "krav" (demand) and parts of the words Eremit, ensam (lonely), venereal, isolate, eroticism and samlag (coitus). It meant, approximately: "Life makes certain demands on bachelors."

A woman patient yielded an excellent key to herself through the cryptolalia "Tystari"—"tysnad" (taciturnity inadequacy, resistance). I myself once formed the cryptolalia "Allafara." The circumstances were that my wife as well as my daughter had to leave the following day on account of illness. Upon analysis I first noticed that "Allafara" is practically the same as "Alle fahren," *i.e.*, "all travel." The word also contained the thought "Alle gefahren" (all gone), partly on account of the illness, and partly because my wife and I had been warned the same day against diphtheritic infection on the way. There was also a third thought in the word, but discretion compels me to leave it unrecorded.

To return now to the patient suffering from sexual impotence: at the second sitting he related a dream which was to the effect that he had been called to military service and had been given a sword which was nearly broken across at the middle and was bent and uneven besides. An interesting example for any one inclined to doubt

sexual symbolism! I should perhaps add that the patient was an uncultured man, who had not so much as heard the words "sexual symbol." Shortly afterwards he had the following dream:

"I enter a garden where I see an apple tree. I pick a couple of apples and put one in each coat pocket; thus it would be less noticeable than if I put both in one pocket. Later I came across the gardener or owner of the garden. I caught a glimpse of the man only as I took the apples; then he suddenly appeared quite close to me; I was surprised. I don't remember any conversation with him. But I was very anxious to hide carefully the apples which I carried in my pockets, so that he would not see them. Subsequently I found myself in the company of a lady wearing a green shirtwaist and I kissed her. Another gentleman was present at the time. (Addendum:) I thought it strange, improper, to kiss the lady. She and I lay half stretched out on a sofa; the woman turned towards me to be kissed. The man was lying on the floor a little distance off and towards the foot of the bed and had his back towards me. I saw only his shoulders, his back and his neck. He did not see me kiss her."

This dream, as we see, falls into two parts. It is plain that the two parts are variants of the same theme. In both a forbidden act is being carried out. The first part of the dream reminds us at once of the fall in Chapter III of the First Book of Moses (*Genesis*). The dream certainly appears an excellent illustration of Freud's theory that every dream is the fulfillment of an egoistic wish. In a previous lecture I have expressed the view that the dream does not represent merely the literal fulfillment of infantile inferior wishes, but that the symbols employed are merely the form in which the language of dreams expresses our progressive striving. The apparently infantile, egoistic wish of the dream, in other words, becomes a symbol for what is deepest and best in us.

But how is it in the present instance?

According to Freud, the dream in question would be an Œdipus dream: the apple tree would be the mother, the gardener or proprietor would be the father. Undoubtedly that interpretation is correct. But we must note that the apple tree also stands for the analysis. On the previous day the thought had occurred to the subject that the analysis will "bear fruit." It is a well-known fact that the dream material does not necessarily always reveal during the first analysis of the dream the infantile sexuality. And for therapeutic purposes the writer seldom analyzes dream material more than once. Nothing sexual came to surface in the infantile material back of this dream, but it did associatively bring into the subject's mind the recollection that as a child he had broken into orchards to steal apples when no one saw him. His father had been the manager of an estate which included orchards; he was literally, therefore, a watchman over forbidden fruit. One who always seeks to find in the analysis the current relations will necessarily inquire: what was there in the previous day which stands in parallel relation to the apple stealing in childhood? A clear sexual parallel I was unable to uncover. The previous day's analysis, which was concerned with his sexual repression, may possibly have been brought out again during the associations. But a more satisfactory explanation is found in the fact that on the previous day the patient had obtained a detailed report about his professional training course. The patient had formerly been employed in business by another man. During that time he devoted his evenings to preparatory studies which should enable him eventually to establish himself in a business of his own and this he succeeded in accomplishing. He thus worked behind the employer's back to make himself independent—conduct which was not in the least unethical. Nevertheless it figures in the dream and in the associations. One of his associations was: "stolen fruit tastes sweetest." What would taste sweetest to him would be to be his own master. It may

be noted also that he had to struggle against a very strong distaste for work in order to accomplish the necessary preparation which enabled him to establish himself independently in business. This is shown in the dream by his compunctions against stealing and by his unpleasant surprise when he saw the gardener. The fact is also to be noted that he was unable to recall any conversation with the latter. The element of wish-fulfillment comes into play particularly at this juncture. The forbidden fruit, therefore, is not only the mother—womanhood—the sexual object, but, above all, the theme of life—activity (work). Subjectively the forbidden fruit is naturally a libido symbol, but viewed anagogically it stands not for an inferior instinct, but for the interest in life. Objectively the gardener becomes the father, the chief, the competitor. But the objective interpretation of such an Œdipus dream is of secondary significance, even when it is anagogic; the subjective is the deeper and incomparably more significant interpretation. In the first place he himself is the gardener, *i.e.*, his weaker, neurotic self. For who is the antagonist, the parasite in his soul, if not the neurosis, *i.e.*, the regressive tendencies which have always handicapped his pleasure in life and in work, which, in other words, have always played the rôle of prohibitive influences? The gardener is the neurotic unwilling to part with his libido, the dragon of the fairy tale who guards the treasure.

I need hardly go into the second half of the dream. The woman there is an equivalent of the apple tree, her husband is the gardener. But it is plain that what Freud calls conscience, the critical element, is represented in this dream by the gardener and the husband. In other words, they are here nothing but the regressive, repressive conscious tendencies. It is certain that dreams often show also other, entirely different, progressive, symbols for conscience. It is a very frequent occurrence that there appears in the dream some one possessing the progressive

qualities which the dreamer actually lacks in his consciousness. Such a dream image represents precisely the demands of conscience, conscience in its progressive aspect—a positive conscience, such as is always functioning in the unconscious. During analytic treatment this is often represented by the analyst or by some substitute for him. Back of the representatives of conscience there often are various persons (Freud's "Verdichtung," condensation), possibly one of the parents (usually the one of opposite sex), a teacher or some similar person. This conscience, however, is not prohibitory; it represents merely what the subject has failed to do. I recall a dream in which the subject found himself standing before a semicircle of judges. The latter represented the progressive demands. They were various editions of the subject's progressive self. Freud states, very properly, that when many persons, ultimately "the whole family," appear in the dream, it signifies a great secret. Many persons will stand for a great interest. By the appearance of numerous persons the dream attempts to bring into sharp outline the most sensitive element of conscience.

The more terrifying our life tasks appear, the more uncanny are the forms under which they are symbolized in the dream. The monster in the dream, *e.g.*, a snake, certainly represents sexuality, but not sin; on the contrary, it stands for the progressive tendencies. But Freud's contention that the unconscious transposes plus and minus contains a deep truth and the snake may represent also sinfulness; but in that case it stands not for sexuality, but for the neurosis, apprehension. It becomes what Jung calls a negative phallus symbol.

I recall a dream which a twenty-two-year-old anxiety hysteric reported at the beginning of his psychoanalytic treatment. He dreamed that he was standing on the top of a church steeple and that a snake crawled up and curled around him. It does not require much analytic experience to see in such a dream the expression of strong re-

ressive tendencies. He had a great dislike for work. The snake was the analysis, activity, etc. The snake, he said, was something unpleasant, cunning. It crept noiselessly upon its victim. He was unable to protect himself against the snake and was helpless in its presence. He had discovered that analysis was a cunning and uncanny procedure; he had actually felt himself helpless before the analyst "who can get anything out of one at will." His associations brought forth also the thought of ghosts which scared him; it seemed to him that there was something mystical about psychoanalysis. Another association was as follows: "When I was twelve years old, a boy lay on me, held my arms and legs tight and tickled me; it was very unpleasant." This scene represented his feeling of helplessness in the presence of analysis. The infantile admixture of anxiety and delight, uneasiness and pleasure, which he experienced when he was tickled was an appropriate expression for his attitude towards the latter. The homosexual admixture appears here in its actual setting. (Another neurotic recalled associatively, in some connection or other, homosexuality, which he regarded as a detestable vice. That was also his feeling-attitude towards the analysis and towards work.) It is noteworthy that analysis, though centered on the actual situation, does not by any means overlook the infantile sexual roots. But it endeavors to determine what the infantile reminiscences now signify rather than what meaning they had formerly. Such an association as the last mentioned, for instance, shows that during the previous day the patient had found himself in an infantile situation. We see also how positive transferences have their beginning. The rest of the latent dream material disclosed only a negative attitude.

I have mentioned already that the dream of apple-stealing mentioned above recalled associatively the Biblical fall into sin. It is, as is well known, a psychoanalytic theory that our unconscious contains archaic material and that our dreams often correspond most surprisingly to the

aboriginal myths and legends (the latter pointed out first by Jung). But to me it has been clear for a long time, long even before I obtained the dream of apple-stealing, that sexuality has a wholly different meaning, at least in the dreams of my patients, than it appears to have in the story of the fall of man.

As I have already mentioned, I find almost always that sexuality symbolizes the task of living. The fall of man has always seemed to me very obscure from the psychoanalytic standpoint. It fits splendidly into Freud's theories, with his morality versus sexuality principle and, as is well known, Freud looks upon the lost paradise as representing the lost and innocent childhood, that period in which the parents have not yet interfered with the child's sexual life.

But how does the fall of man fit in with the anagogic standpoint? If sexuality represents the life problems, God must represent the inferior, or in psychoanalytic language, the regressive element. Would it not be a sign of a blasphemous fantasy to make Satan, the snake, represent the good, and God the symbol for evil? Indeed, the idea is not a novel one. I need only call to mind the myths of Lucifer and Prometheus. But another and more important consideration rests for me in the fact that in the course of analysis nearly always I find that the religious represents the progressive element regardless of the subject's personal convictions. And this is of course perfectly natural for unconsciously, if not consciously, we aim to enjoy the whole of life, irrespective of the considerations of the cold logic which tells us that life is not worth while. Jung very properly says that the rationalism of modern life has driven the irrational into the unconscious. The will to live regardless of all logical considerations bears a certain resemblance to religious faith, which means the blind acceptance of something. I always say to my patients: "You know that deeply within yourself you have the will to live. Your constant depression and

your despondency are therefore contrary to your real will." If therefore the neurotic lacks the ability to accept his own will to live, if he opposes himself to the world instead of feeling he himself is a part of it, in other words, if he lacks so-called belief in life, which is the essential element in all forms of religion, it is evident that the religion is well adapted to represent the unconscious progressiveness. Nevertheless I hold that in the fall of man God represents our neurotic, life-denying tendencies. And as a matter of fact the God in the Old Testament stands above all for the strict disciplinarian, the representative of the "thou shalt not" principle, in contrast to Christ, the representative of the principle "thou shalt love."

A psychoanalyst of the Freudian school, Dr. Ludwig Lewy, pointed out in a very valuable essay on *Sexual-symbolik in der biblischen Paradiesgeschichte* (Sexual Symbolism in the Biblical Story of Paradise) that in the older religions divine service, with its invocations to fertility, phallic worship, etc., degenerated into sexual orgies. The religious believers, in other words, took the symbols literally. The Jewish religion represented a reaction against that tendency. But it is noteworthy that in our own age persons make use in their dreams of the same symbolisms which were utilized in the older religions. Even in such a dream as the one about the stolen apples, where it seems that the sexual represents something inferior, a more thorough analysis shows that precisely the contrary is the case.

Very characteristic of the author of Genesis is the divine punishment for the sinful transgression. The punishment is work, which thus becomes a burden, an evil. Indeed, precisely that is the light in which the neurotic looks upon work. It is true, indeed, that there are neurotics who work fairly well, but at best work is a burden to them. Owing to his fear of exertion the neurotic abstains from work as well as from sexuality and from all other things dangerous to life. There are sexual neu-

rotics who speak of the evil effects of work with the same feeling-attitude which they display towards the alleged evil consequences of masturbation. The neurotic divides his life problems into two categories between which he draws a sharp dividing line. One is the realm of duty and that he conceives as something horrible, or at least tedious. The other is the world of eroticism, of pleasure, etc. One of the fundamental characteristics of neurosis is the sharp contrast between duty and pleasure. One is reminded of the story of the old Major who with bitter self-irony summarized the experiences of his whole life as follows: "Everything that is good is harmful and everything that is pleasurable is sinful." The neurotic certainly is unaware that in his dreams the same symbols represent duty as well as his so-called gratifications. He does not appreciate the fact that work, sociability, pleasure, in other words, the common tasks of daily existence, are but different objectives of the same life ideal (or interest). Naturally he is even farther from perceiving that activity (or work) is the only objective in life capable of yielding lasting gratification, and that in the absence of work all other objectives are but surrogates. Because duty, activity, is hateful, spiritual health also becomes hateful. It is very common for the neurotic to see in health something trivial and prosaic. The identification of health with mental inferiority is also not uncommon. The healthy are weak-minded, the neurotic is made of better stuff. A patient once said to me: "Average folks who are energetic often do better than intelligent persons who are lazy." He himself was a type of the intellectual indolent; in his opinion all healthy, active people were a pack of idiots. Some neurotics are ashamed of their virtues and pride themselves on their shortcomings. It is also characteristic of many of these patients that they are unable to enjoy vacations. One who finds no gratification in work is also unable to experience any joy in leisure. I remember a patient with whom the first signs of im-

provement showed themselves in the ability to enjoy leisure. One's attitude towards amusements and towards the use of leisure time is often an excellent index to mental health. Ferenczi, one of Freud's most prominent followers, very properly speaks of "Sunday neuroses." The neurotic suffers from an unhealthy craving for freedom. The whole problem of freedom ceases to exist for him from the moment he learns to recognize that in his innermost self he is really unwilling to be free.

THE FINAL RESULTS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT¹

BY DR. WILHELM STEKEL (VIENNA)

Translated by Dr. James S. Van Tieslaar

Every psychoanalyst finds that it is very difficult for the patient to reconcile himself to the discovery of his hidden instinctive cravings. If the analyst is careless, and discloses too much of the cryptic interplay of forces during the first consultation, he awakens thereby the patient's resistance against the treatment, and as a result the patient is likely later to absent himself under one pretext or another. Sometimes the greatest care is of no avail in this respect. The fact is that the patient first enters the physician's consulting-room with the determination "not to give himself away." Every neurotic guards the secret of his neurosis as a precious possession, as his special treasure, of which he must not allow himself to be deprived. If he scents danger for his pet fancies he takes refuge in flight. . . . The greatest precaution is often powerless to prevent this. In a couple of days or so the patient will suddenly discover that he is already cured and take his leave, with profuse declarations of gratitude to the physician, not forgetting to add that he will recommend the treatment to some of his relatives and friends. . . . As a matter of fact, he is no better than he was at the beginning. Another will be suddenly called away on an unexpected journey; a third discover that the treat

¹ Reprinted by permission of Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

ment is "too exciting" for him, and that he must quiet himself down before he goes on with it; and so on. There are endless variations to the excuses conjured up. It is well, therefore, to enter upon each case with a considerable amount of skepticism and with the greatest care. The more the doctor keeps his trump cards and his knowledge to himself, the more certain is a favorable result to ensue. It is foolish to offer explanations to the patient during the first stages of the treatment, even should he appear to be well informed on the subject of psychoanalysis and perhaps a physician himself. The reverse is the fact. Those well informed are the most difficult patients to treat. They are forewarned, and use their knowledge of psychoanalysis to organize resistances against their own analysis. I therefore absolutely agree with Freud, who advises against the plan of lecturing to the patients with a view to explaining psychoanalysis to them or in the expectation of thus aiding the progress of the treatment.² At first sight it might seem as though this might hasten the cure. The patients read psychoanalytic writings eagerly, and thereby learn ways of concealing their inner self against the physician's attempts to disclose their unconscious tendencies. It is foolish to allow patients to read everything. I did this whilst I still believed that the patient had a genuine desire to be cured. Now I know that the neurotic is animated by but one dread, *i.e.*, the fear that he will get rid of his neurosis. One of my compulsion-neurotics in the course of the analysis developed a new dread, this very fear of "losing something." It turned out that the root of that feeling of dread was the fear of getting rid of the neuroses and of becoming well.

The psychoanalyst who prepares his patient with preliminary talks is like the strategist who delivers into the enemy's hands his plan of attack. Therefore I only allow

² Freud, *Ratschläge für den Arzt bei d. psychoanalytischen Behandlung*, Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, Vol II.

my patients to read general, superficial accounts of the subject. One of my patients studied psychoanalytic literature day and night, with the alleged intention of hastening his recovery. When I objected to this plan, he met my remonstrance with the statement that when doing so he recalled various significant incidents. These reminiscences he then carefully noted down so that the consultation hour was hardly long enough to cover the ground. But all this was farcical, and, in spite of his endless notes and reminiscences, he only hovered over the surface of things.


We cannot proceed successfully towards the prosecution of our aim until we have learnt to appreciate this effort on the patient's part in its true light. The greatest measure of resistance does not depend on the transference, *i.e.*, on the patient's "falling in love" with the physician, as we once thought. The transference is but a form of resistance. Every psychoanalysis betrays a tendency to switch the attention of the patient away from the past and from the neurosis proper by concentrating it on the present moment. Every patient is inclined to interrupt the consultation with numerous accounts of his present complaints. Sometimes patients will even say: "As long as I don't get this off my mind there is no use in trying to continue!" The consultant should not permit these tactics to obscure the issue. Whenever the danger is impending that the nucleus of the trouble may be disclosed, these minor complications break in. One of the most potent factors is the transference, the attachment to the physician. What is the use of talking about the emotional fixation on the father when there is, so to speak, a present emotional attachment to be dealt with? This attachment to the physician may be used as a means of promoting the patient's recovery. For neurotics never get well for their own sake. They get well to please the physician. They do it as a favor to him.

It is now some years since I first pointed out³ that a patient's first dreams often display his resistance symbolically, and with irresistible strength.

A patient submitted to me the following dream:

"I am standing at the teacher's desk in front of the blackboard, on which I see the following drawing. My task is to solve the problem mathematically, or by means of drawing, and I feel quite helpless. Lamp-light."

The patient draws the picture as follows:



The analysis of this dream reveals a number of determinative factors. It would be very tempting to explain the patient's whole neurosis on the basis of this dream. But I must limit myself here to my present theme. The patient showed me the drawing with the light marked by points. "Here the picture ends," said the patient, pointing to where the rays break off. He merely has the feel-

³ *Darstellung der Neurose im Traume, Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. III, No. 1.

ing that behind the wall there is a source of light. The dream indicates that the source of the neurosis must remain undisclosed. The five rays, on first association, remind him of five girls with whom he had been in love at different times; Ray *a* is thickest; then the rays grow successively dimmer, so that ray *e* is rather vague. All the five girls become fused into one picture. They revert back to one central point. I found out afterwards that the central point in question was his mother. In other words, the five girls were surrogates for the only genuine love of his life . . . the most recent was the strongest love affair. But ray *e* was nearly forgotten.

But what is the meaning of this first dream as a whole? Plainly, that he does not propose ever to disclose to me the whole truth. The analysis will only lead up to a certain point and there stop. The physician who, in this dream, is represented as the examining teacher, will never find out the whole truth. The patient will only penetrate as far as the superficial layers of his mind; his memories and thoughts will reach no farther.

I pass by the other determinations of the dream as irrelevant in connection with our immediate subject. I only want to point out the unfavorable omen which the dream casts upon the treatment. And the patient actually behaved as the dream foreshadowed. His memory only carried him to a certain level, beyond which he found himself unable to go. But, as the dream-analysis revealed against his will the whole extent of his complexes, particularly his unconscious homosexuality (burning point = anus), he suddenly discovered all sorts of excuses for taking refuge in flight. Before that, he had diligently studied, though against my advice, everything on which he could lay his hands that bore on psychoanalysis, in order, as he asserted, that we might get along more rapidly with the analysis. As a matter of fact, this was but a means for learning how to cover up his neurosis with various defenses. He studied diligently the plans and

strategy of his antagonist—the psychoanalyst. Three months later he returned, determined to take up the struggle anew. For he was chiefly interested in winning a victory over the psychoanalyst and in bidding farewell to the physician without having been understood or cured. In a few days he brought me the following dream, which plainly disclosed his new attitude towards the struggle:

“I am standing with my brother in front of my new house, and am keeping sharp watch. A couple of thieves appear; I point my revolver and shoot. I hit one in the back. I think to myself: ‘Oh, this is unpleasant—how shall I prove that I acted in self-defense?’”

I pass over the obvious homosexual meaning, and turn my attention to the resistance displayed in this dream. The new house is his new neurosis. He had built a new house during my absence. The brother also figures as a symbol of his neurosis. I myself am one of the thieves (the other, according to the patient’s associations, is Freud), and I am trying to break into the dark chamber of his soul. Here we have the functional symbolism (Silberer) in its wonderful plasticity. He cannot act in any other way. He must defend his neurosis and protect himself with all the means at his disposal, against my skill in the art of breaking through. . . .

In another dream this patient saw a certain Professor Jodl swimming with powerful strokes in a basin of water. He was ordered to follow the swimmer, and did so, reluctantly, and presently stopped the professor. The basin represented his soul. Jodl, a professor of psychology, stood for me. The end of the dream was that he swam back alone. The dream revealed his jealousy of the analyst, his attempt to surpass the latter, and to accomplish his own cure unaided.

III

The deeper I penetrate into the nature of psychoanalysis, the stronger is my conviction that the analysis really means

a continuous struggle with the reluctant patient, who is, at heart, unwilling to get well, even though he pathetically avers the contrary. The illness is generated expressly for the purpose of enabling the patient to dominate his environment and to carry out his will, though at great cost to himself. The patient is therefore antagonistically disposed towards the analyst from the very beginning. His own fate comes to be a secondary consideration. For the time being, the physician stands as a symbol for the whole world. The patient aims at winning a victory over his father and over his teacher and over his whole environment by defeating his analyst. If he does get well, he does it to please the physician. But instances of this kind are relatively rare. In most cases the patient is disposed to deride the physician's efforts, and intends to come out victorious in the end. Even sufferers from *impotentia*, who complain so bitterly of their misfortune and avow that they would be the happiest people on earth if they could only get rid of this handicap, meet the physician's efforts with considerable inner resistance.

The "will to power" is the neurotic's all-powerful trend. And that "will to power" means, "Above all, I want to be loved." . . . Will to power is will to be loved. The patient endeavors in every possible way to induce his physician to love him. He even goes so far as to lead the way by proffering love, and does not disdain to beg for love in return. He at first yields to the sway of his will to subjection and falls in love with the physician, who, in the course of this emotional transference, is made to play all sorts of rôles.

His own final object is always borne in mind by the patient from the beginning of the treatment. To begin with he does not wish to prove an easy case. When I first began practicing psychoanalysis I was naïve enough to think that I was doing the patient a favor when I told him that his case was not a serious one, and that I had treated others like him. Every neurotic looks upon his

neurosis as an extraordinary work of art, an ingenious structure securely protected by numberless walls and moats against the incursion of any enemy; hence he is incensed at the thought of having to share his invention—the product of his genius—with others. An easy cure would, of course, prove that his ailment was of a trivial character—and that he is by no means willing to admit, or to allow others to believe. I once treated a physician who had retired from practice and had had to return home. I had been treating him for four months. He chanced to meet a man who had been under treatment by Freud for over a year. This made him angry, and he wasted a month's time brooding over his disappointment at the thought that his own case had been cured so much more quickly. Why had the other man required a whole year? Was not his a more serious case? Perhaps I had underestimated the seriousness of his condition, and so forth.

This example illustrated in a very instructive manner the analysis of the transference. Some psychoanalysts believe that dissolution of the transference means drawing the patient's attention to the fact that he is emotionally attached to his physician. In most cases, nothing is gained thereby, and the patient remains as closely attached as before. Dissolution of the attachment means the uncovering of the parallel constellation which has detached from its moorings an affect not yet abreacted or cleared up, but still operative. Furthermore, it means revealing the resistance which that situation generates instead of allowing it to remain concealed under the emotional transference. That is what happened in the case just mentioned. The patient's father did not believe that his case was very serious. And as I stood as substitute for the father, my belief that his case was not a serious one, and that a few months of treatment would effect a cure, roused great anger and resistance on his part. During the stage of transference I stood in the place of the father.

I will turn now to another case to illustrate the meaning of transference. I recently treated a patient to whom I proposed that we should carry on our talks whilst walking out of doors—a form of treatment which I have found highly efficacious in some cases. But this particular patient was unable to recall any associations, and remained peculiarly silent during our walks. He preferred to stay indoors, where he “felt much better.” It turned out that in his youth his father had often compelled him to join him on walks and the recollection of these unpleasant compulsory excursions with his father acted as a resistance during the transference. The old attitude of contrariness against the father was revived by the parallel situation.

We see, therefore, that psychoanalysis may reawaken the old relationship of opposition between father and son, between the older generation and the new. The struggle with the physician arouses the old feelings of antagonism endowing them with new strength and life. Presently it will lead the patient to adopt the attitude of supremacy over his physician, and to part from him victorious in the end. We must not forget, either, the pleasure conferred by the neurosis itself. What can we offer the patient in its stead? Realities which, in contrast with his fancies, must appear to him to be pathetically inadequate substitutes.⁴

I may add a few remarks concerning the nature of transference. To love a person means to understand that person. To be loved means to be understood. If the

⁴ I must refer the reader to the exhaustive account of a case of impotence in which this struggle continued for six years, until finally, with my aid, the patient triumphed over his former physician. This is Case 103, in *Male Impotence: the Clinical Psychopathology of Man's Love Life*. The English version of the work will appear shortly, together with the companion volume, *Sexual Frigidity of Woman*. Both belong to the *Disorders of the Instincts and the Emotions* series of studies, translated by Van Teslaar.

patient is confident that the physician understands him, he will love him. We must not forget that most neuroses are disorders of the love-affect. He who heals their troubles must be capable of giving the patients the supreme medicament for which they are yearning—*i.e.*, love. The transference of that love from the sexual to the erotic realm, and its transposition into the ethical standards, often requires the highest skill on the part of the physician, who may easily succumb to counter-affection.

IV

In my larger work, *The Dreams of Artists* (authorized English version by J. S. Van Teslaar) I have exposed and described the neurotic's faith in his "great historic mission." The skill with which neurotics cover up this faith, and how they struggle against giving up the fiction, are difficult of belief. What is reality worth to them when compared with the alluring fantasy of their great historic mission? The neurotic is an apostle; he is God's anointed; he has hitched his wagon to a star! The whole world will some day admire him and prostrate itself before him! The world may scorn and scoff at him now, but he will yet triumph over all! And the struggle with the physician becomes a replica of his struggle with the world at large. He measures his forces against the physician's, and fights for the right to retain his neurosis. For, we must repeat, he does not really want to get well. He seeks all sorts of reasons for this *Wille zur Krankheit*. For instance, a neurotic may fear that the analysis may interfere with his creative ability as a writer, yet he may never have accomplished anything as an author. His very neurosis may have attained such depths as to render any creative activity impossible. One neurotic told me in all earnestness that he feared the analysis might foster a tendency to perversions in him. . . . Another brought me the following dream at our first session: "I am lying on a sofa. Kornitzer arrives, and is very tender towards me. I say to him:

‘Now you have come to me, but it is too late. I do not want you now.’”

Kornitzer had been a former colleague with whom he had been on friendly terms until they parted on account of business differences. It is easy to see that there was a certain homosexual tension between them, and that Kornitzer here stood for myself. In the dream he lies down on the sofa, as he does during the progress of the psychoanalysis. [His was one of the cases in which the reclining posture favored the flow of the association of ideas.] And yet this dream contains a deeper meaning: it betrays a rationalized resistance. I ask him whether Kornitzer is good looking: “The very picture of health,” the patient answers promptly. Kornitzer, then, is also the picture of health in the dream—translated, the dream means: What is the use of the treatment? Health has been too late in coming. If I were younger there would be some sense in it. But—at my age! Yet the man was only thirty-five years old.

This undercurrent of resistance suggests to patients all sorts of objections to psychoanalysis. One patient declares himself tremendously interested in the art of dream-interpretation. He brings so many dreams with him that it would take years to analyze them. The dreams give some indications of the trend which the physician has suspected from the very beginning. But there is trouble ahead for the inexperienced analyst, who may be led thereby to declare: “We shall soon discover the important trauma in the situation; we are getting nearer to it.” The dream-chase then begins in earnest. Each dream appears to be more interesting than the previous one. The trauma is dramatized in the most varied forms and pictures. The associated thoughts come nearer and nearer to the significant traumatic incident. Months pass by—but the sought-for nucleus does not reveal itself—it was not there at all! The patient was playing hide-and-seek with his physician. Within himself, the neurotic will

smile and feel triumphant over his physician's helplessness and shortsightedness.

v

The misuse (due to misunderstanding) of the notion of sexual trauma is extraordinarily widespread. For years I have held that in and of themselves the traumas mean nothing, and that incidents are raised to the quality of traumas by the neurotic. The traumas seem to retain an actual determinative power only in the case of certain forms of "psychosexual infantilism" (fetishism, exhibitionism, etc.). Usually such traumas are fully conscious. Members of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society will remember that I once facetiously declared that for certain children traumas are the best form of sexual enlightenment. The trauma acts thus only within certain definite constellations and on the basis of a physical predisposition—a fact which Abraham had already pointed out. Elsewhere I have described the significance of sexual traumas in the life of the adult. It would almost seem that children easily shake off the effects of traumas. For while these traumas of children are exceedingly frequent, they are relatively rare among the real determinative factors in the etiology of the neuroses.

Indeed, we see children who experience numerous traumas, and who nevertheless remain perfectly well. The neurotic has the tendency to scrutinize the past critically, and to search for incidents on which to fix his consciousness of guilt. He also needs to find occurrences independent of his will and hence serving as excuses. The "Tendency to find excuses for himself" plays a great rôle in the dynamics of the neuroses. The trauma frees the patient from the troublesome self-reproach with which he has surrounded his neurosis. He transfers his responsibility to some traumatic episode. Some traumas act as perpetual moral admonitions. It is a striking fact that most neurotics are able to relate their traumas at the first

consultation. We used to think that this was exceptional: but it is the rule. The neurotics know their traumas, and many attribute to them their troubled state, from the very first. This is especially true of those patients who are familiar with Freud's doctrine of the neuroses. Indeed, sometimes neurotics begin with the skeptical remark: "I don't see how psychoanalysis is going to help me. I know my traumas; I know my repressed thoughts—in fact I have none at present. I am quite aware of my incestuous tendencies. . . . Consequently, what can I expect psychoanalysis to do for me?" Physicians, especially those who themselves practice psychoanalysis, are likely to assume this attitude and to evince that obstinacy, with reference to their own complexes, which I have called "psychoanalytic scotoma." Among them are to be found some rather keen-witted, well-trained minds. But in matters pertaining to himself the cleverest of men may be rendered stupid by an affect.

In his *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in der Psychoanalyse* (Vienna: Heller, 1917) Freud gives us a synthetic account of his latest views regarding his doctrine of the libido. According to this account, the libido strives to become attached to some object in the external world. If its course is interfered with—in other words, if the individual finds he is unable to find external gratification of his erotic cravings—the libido becomes dammed up. It reverts to various infantile positions, and through this reversion the old infantile traumas again acquire significance. This is said to be the origin of the psychoneuroses which Freud, following a suggestion made by Jung, calls "transference neuroses" (*Übertragungsneurosen*, i.e., hysteria and compulsion-neurosis); or else the libido reverts to the person's own self, this giving rise to the narcissistic neuroses (dementia præcox, paranoia—the latter called by Freud paraphrenia—and melancholia). As the libido endows the infantile unconscious traumas, it flows back into the unconscious. The task of the analysis is, there-

fore, to dissolve the fixation upon childhood, to release the unconscious, and to facilitate a new fixation of the libido upon its proper external objects, or its sublimation into spiritual values.

Here we again have the doctrine of the significance of the infantile traumas, which has caused so much confusion in psychoanalysis. Freud has recently emphasized the significance of trauma. In his latest contribution, *Aus der Geschichte einer Infantilen Neurose* (*Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, 4te Folge. Vienna: Heller, 1918) he again attempts to prove that an infantile sexual trauma was the cause of a serious neurosis. The trauma in question was not disclosed until after three years' exploration!

Without attempting to belittle the significance of infantile traumas, I can only state that the case as published did not seem to me convincing. In previous writings I have expressed myself at length regarding the disadvantages of such protracted periods of treatment. I strongly suspect that many neurotics are tortured for years with questions about their sexual traumas. The histories of those cases which I have published, and the prompt results obtained, at least show us that it is possible to attain a satisfactory insight into the depths of a neurosis, and that, therapeutically too, the best that we ought to expect may be achieved without overstressing the infantile factors. I could not have accomplished more than this, had I prolonged the treatment over a course of three years. The duration of the treatment in individual cases was from a few days, a few weeks, to, at most, six months.

VI

There are, of course, a number of cases in which certain repressions are first disclosed through the analysis. But in most cases the patients relate things which they have always known and have not wanted to disclose.

Thus, for instance, one neurotic did not describe her compulsive ceremonial (mannerisms) to me until after six months. She had, in fact, mentioned it before, but she had done it so superficially and imperfectly that she had not given a true conception of the situation.

Another compulsive neurotic did not describe his mannerisms (ceremonial) on defecation to me until after a year's treatment. This is the patient to whom I owe the clearest and deepest insight into the pliancy of the neurosis. I must frankly confess that I did not learn to appreciate the dynamic power of resistance until I came into contact with this case. He did not want to confess his defecation-mannerisms to me. He wanted to triumph over me. He wanted to prove himself the stronger. He did not want to get well. I was at the time still under the spell of Freud's doctrines, and I believed that a compulsive neurotic could be cured only after a prolonged course of treatment (one year or longer). Now I achieve that result in three or four months, even in the most severe cases of compulsion-neurosis.

I know of patients to whom inexperienced psychoanalysts have promised a cure as soon as their infantile traumas should be disclosed. Thereupon there has followed a wild chase through their dreams. Dreams were brought up daily which referred to some trauma. The physician was triumphant, "Now we are near the trauma; we shall soon have it now." But the patient's secret victory was greater than his doctor's. He was merely leading his physician by the nose. He produced the most artful dream-constructions, which the physician finally had to reject as artifices. This went on for four months. The patient stayed at home all day long wracking his brain to recall his reminiscences. He reproached himself very seriously for not coöperating better. The physician on his part dissolved transference after transference, yet the analysis did not progress any farther. . . .

What we must specifically bear in mind is, that patients

are really not keen to get well. With their tongues they clamor for a cure, but their actions prove the reverse.

It is not easy to induce a patient to give up his neurosis. The dissolution alone is not enough. Sometimes the patient permits the dissolving of a symptom, thus lending a semblance of reality to his alleged desire to get well, and permitting the physician a slight triumph. The emotional transferences may be accomplished without following the devious and troublesome path of psychoanalysis. That is why certain slight forms of neurosis may be readily cured by a superficial psychoanalysis. But this, too, may be sometimes accomplished by other means. The fact is that it is not the method, but the physician who heals. Psychoanalysis enables us to penetrate more deeply into the structure of the neurosis proper. It lays bare before us the patient's resistance to his complete recovery. It discloses his antagonistic attitude, his perennial readiness to assume the offensive—an attitude which is at the same time a defense.

Considerable ingenuity and experience are required to penetrate through these disguises, to release the patient, and to free him from his contrary inclination.

Bearing in mind these various considerations, we are led to recognize the fact that the ending of a psychoanalytic course of treatment is one of the most difficult problems. The best prognosis is yielded by those cases in which the attendant circumstances permit only of a relatively short time for the treatment. The employe with but a couple of months' vacation at his disposal, the physician who has to interrupt his practice, people who make great material sacrifices for the sake of their health, these are the people particularly anxious that the treatment should take as short a time as possible. The problem is much more difficult in the case of wealthy, independent people who seem never to want to get through with it. Their struggle with the physician becomes more important to them than the ultimate result of the analysis. They

will forego the prospective cure, about which they **are** but lukewarm, if they may only triumph over their physician; they would rather be able to maintain the attitude: "You may have cured a great many others, but you cannot deal with my case so easily. In fact, you cannot cure me at all."

I treated a wealthy man for a serious neurosis, whose one refractory symptom was a fear of public places (agoraphobia). In every other respect he was cured. His gastric disturbances, his attacks of indigestion, his social reticence, his inability to work, had all been overcome. But, in spite of all my efforts his agoraphobia did not disappear. He interrupted the analysis unexpectedly, and returned to his former physician. The latter advised him to go to an oculist who was curing troubles of that nature by prescribing glasses. In fact, the doctor accompanied the patient on the journey to Germany to consult this particular oculist. And what did this faithful patient say, when in the train? Why! characteristically enough he declared: "It will be the greatest triumph of my life to know that Dr. Stekel did not absolutely cure me—that he could not—that I shall owe my complete recovery to some one else!"

The glasses helped him for a few days, but soon the old trouble returned. He was disinclined to attribute the victory even to his family physician. The next thing was that he heard about a masseur, who undertook to cure him in a few days by massage. As a matter of fact, he was able to walk about the city freely after only three applications of massage. He was completely cured. He owed his recovery to a simple masseur, and thus scored against all his professional advisers.

VII

If we take these peculiarities in our subjects into consideration, certain matters become quite clear to us. We can understand the results obtained in certain sanatoria

with patients who have previously undergone a psychoanalytic course of treatment. Many an opponent of psychoanalysis takes pride in the fact that he has in a short time cured cases which the psychoanalyst was unable to cure after a prolonged course of treatment. But these gentlemen merely reap where others have sown.

We can easily understand why our erstwhile patients become our most inveterate antagonists, fighting us with scientific arguments and with slander. The final result of the analysis discloses the true character of the person analyzed. A person of real delicacy of feeling will not lend himself to such procedure in spite of the inner urge, but those of a different temperament, such as we often meet in the course of our psychoanalytic practice, will just as certainly follow out their lower impulses.

On the other hand, we may console ourselves with the obvious fact that our good results are *de facto* far-reaching and much more effective than they appear on the surface to be. For many patients who leave us apparently uncured, do, after a short period of incubation, effect a self-cure, or are healed by some other physician, sometimes even by some quack.

Nearly all patients dread the termination of the analysis. I will here point out only a few of their devices to show how diplomatically the psychoanalyst has to conduct his cases in order to parry his patients' subterfuges, with even subtler tact.

A woman, who had been under my care for about half a year on account of a fear of public places (agoraphobia) was apparently well and ready to return home. She could go some distance without fear or anxiety, and she fully appreciated this improvement in her condition, for she had been troubled for thirty years with this difficulty, and during that time she had been unable to travel, or to go out at all, even with an escort. A few days before her departure she experienced a tremendous attack of dread while in the streets. She came to me very discouraged,

and told me of her plight. How could she go home now, before she was really well? I made it clear to her that this was a case of unconsciously seeking a reason for prolonging the treatment and for remaining in Vienna. Her anxiety-attack had developed in order that she might need a continuation of the treatment. Her next dream was as follows:

"I had given my old shoes to my aunt and was standing naked and barefoot. I thought to myself: 'How can you now go into town!' and I dreaded having to go through the streets without my shoes on. . . ."

The aunt in question had been dead long since. She had been a poor woman, and had received small gifts from the dreamer—possibly a pair of shoes. The patient related that she was fond of walking barefoot, and lately she had often been surprised to find herself starting out without her shoes. Here we find clear indications of foot-fetishism, such as are frequently met with among neurotics suffering from disorders of locomotion. But the explanation of the dream as an exposition of my patient's neurosis yielded the following result: The old shoes were very large and yet they pressed her feet. Indeed, they had irritated her feet across the insteps. The shoes were the symbol of her neurosis. She was about to transfer the neurosis—to make a present of it—to her deceased aunt, that is, to bury it with the dead, and to attempt to live without her neurosis. But she had lived with her neurosis for thirty years. The illness caused her discomfort (shoe pressure), but it was to her a sure defense against the uncertainties and dangers of life. . . . Now the task she had to face was to go through life without the protection of the neurosis. She dreaded it. Another determinant led associatively to my name. Shoe-heels are called here, colloquially, *Stöckel*. She needs low *Stöckel*. This is a pun on my name. In short, she is unable to get along now without my protection, my advice, my suggestions. The dream portrays also a desire

for freedom, like many of the later dreams of those who are cured. I am thrown aside with the dead.

Now began the hide-and-seek game on the patient's part. She wanted to be well, and yet was afraid to be well. If her emotional attitude be motivated largely by contrariness she will cling to her agoraphobia. The situation was further complicated by the patient's inability to free herself from me. At such a stage the doctor must have the will and determination to break off the analysis as soon as the chief motives of the patient's anxiety have been revealed and the patient sees clearly the relationship between the feeling of dread and these cryptic motives. The patient, under the circumstances, may return home dissatisfied, but after having tried some other cure, will often, without taking any further steps, shortly begin to walk about freely. This was the condition of the patient that I have described in Chapter XXI of the second, and Chapter XX of the first edition of my *Conditions of Nervous Anxiety*. The treatment was interrupted after four weeks, and the patient left in an improved condition. I met her walking along the *Ringstrasse*, without escort—a thing she had previously been unable to do. She admitted that shortly after giving up the treatment she began to improve without having recourse to any further remedies. The patients feel that they are protected by their neurosis. One of my patients called his neurosis his *Gehschule*. . . . The physician becomes to them the substitute for their neurosis. Eventually they have to learn to do without their neurosis and without its substitute, the physician. That is a tremendously difficult task for those who have lost all power of self-reliance. . . .

To return to my patient who could not walk. She had measured her strength against mine all along. She now had to face the necessity of giving up the treatment and of acknowledging herself conquered. That was beyond her power.

VIII

Anyone who becomes familiar with the hidden structure of the neuroses cannot but recognize the justice of Adler's contention when he speaks of a fictitious goal which the patients seek as the aim of their underlying motives. I have found that this fictitious goal is Heaven and eternal bliss. In the case of the woman under consideration, her whole neurosis was directed towards safeguarding herself against temptation and insuring for herself eternal happiness. She intuitively felt she was too weak to follow the strait and narrow path of virtue, and therefore she thought of insuring for herself eternal bliss in the next world through her dread of open spaces in this. What were to her the joys of this world compared to heavenly bliss? Her one object was to reach Heaven. I believe her whole life was a preparation for the supreme test before her God. She hoped that all her privations would be so many points in her favor and must increase her chances of eternal bliss. She also manifested a belief in her "great historic mission"—a very widespread fiction among neurotics. She was no ordinary person—she was holy, God must take special note of her, and must mark her for special treatment. In short, she made herself as snug within her neurosis as the proverbial "bug in a rug," and thus protected herself against the crude realities of everyday life. She no longer cared to walk about. Among other dreams she had the following: "I am going out, and rejoice at the thought. Then I cannot find my pretty knitted jacket, so I have to stay at home. I might otherwise catch cold."

The knitted jacket is the web of her neurosis. She cannot live without her neurosis. She is afraid lest the beautiful ardor of her faith should cool, and so she wanted to prolong the treatment.

I assumed a bellicose tone. I told her that "I had decided to discontinue her treatment, that she might return

to her home." The indignant woman pointed out that other women who had suffered from a similar agoraphobia had been under my treatment for a longer time.

"True," I answered, "but the outlook was more encouraging. Those patients used to come to me, unaccompanied, after the first few weeks. If you would come to me by yourself, I should be more hopeful as to your prospects of a cure, and might then consider the question of continuing your treatment. Your fear of open spaces is not the neurosis, but only a visible symptom of it. . . ."

Three days later the woman came to me unaccompanied, and since then she has been walking about the streets freely without any fear.

I pressed for an early termination of the treatment. The woman hesitated, and, as it turned out later, with good reason. There were still some things she had to tell me. There was another feature in her emotional attitude which had to be corrected. She was anxious to triumph over me and disclose my incapacity. She brought me the following dream: "I scolded my servant because she had only half-cleaned the kitchen. In one-half of it there was a lot of dirt lying about; the other half was clean."

That kitchen was a symbol of her soul, or, if you prefer, a symbol of her brain, and the neurosis was being swept out of it. I had not done the work thoroughly. I was the servant girl in the dream. I was her hired servant. She gave her orders, and I was to obey. In short, her pride would not permit me to end the treatment. *She* wanted to be the one to do that when she thought the proper time had come. It was her privilege to give notice to her hired help. She then brought forward a mass of additional material information, which she declared she had already told me. This was again an artifice to belittle me and to triumph over me! Such assertions are often made by the patients. They keep their most important fancies and reminiscences hidden for a time, and

afterwards insist emphatically that they have told us all about them; or they exclaim with an air of innocence: "Didn't I tell you that before? I seem to remember distinctly having spoken to you about it."

The patient next related to me the most important factor in her condition—her belief in the omnipotence of thought. Thought is capable of inflicting the greatest misfortune! This woman believed herself to be a particularly gifted person. This belief in her greatness, which now came to the surface, is what I have named the neurotic's belief in "his great historic mission." Without an appreciation of this trait in neurotics, no analysis can be complete. It is not enough for the patient to overcome his idea of his own "littleness," his feeling of inadequacy, his alleged inferiority; he must also learn to give up his belief in his unconquerable nature, the fiction of his "great historic mission." If he is cured through psychoanalysis, the cure probably indicates the first occasion on which the patient has allowed himself to be conquered, after which he is content to assume the modest rôle which he is destined to play in real life.

This patient afterwards decided when the treatment should end. She suddenly became desirous to return home. But she first intimated that there were still some things of which she wanted to free her soul. Finally she relented and told me the last fantasies she had been withholding during the entire period of the treatment. They showed that she had always held the belief that she would attract the attention of the higher powers through her exemplary abstemious conduct. The fancies of her youth had reacted upon her as an "eternal warning" to turn from the path of self-indulgence and to devote herself to a life of virtue. Her mind was chiefly concerned with the problem of eternal bliss. That was why she had been able for thirty years to endure a prisoner's life, locked in her room. For what does this short life amount to when contrasted with an endless eternity? Her sufferings were

but a preparation for the highest bliss, and were to earn her a place in Heaven. In that other life she would triumph over all those who had devoted themselves to earthly pleasures in this. Her life was a preparation for the last triumph, and the feeling of dread would protect her against the chance of sinning.

Cures of this kind can be effected without psychoanalysis. I recall the famous case of the woman-sleeper of Oknō who maintained her dormant state for thirty years and then suddenly rose and went about her household duties. People flocked from far and wide to witness the miracle. This woman had undoubtedly been preparing herself for that historic occasion. Her whole life had been a preparation for that great miracle.⁵ My patient, too, longed to be looked upon as a wonder. She told everybody that after thirty years of invalidism she had been cured by me, and that, after having been treated without result by sixty-three other physicians in succession.

I wanted to introduce her to a medical association at one of its meetings, but on that particular day she had a fresh attack of dread and was unable to come to me unattended. That she begrudged me the triumph was shown by the fact that the very next day she went about the streets freely by herself. She juggled with her fears so skillfully that by their aid she dominated her whole family; she tried to press me into her service, too. Not succeeding in this, she gave up her anxiety, which did not return until the day when my triumph was to have become public. At the same time she confessed to me that it would have given her great satisfaction to have made her appearance and to have been admired as a "rare case." Suddenly, however, the thought had come into her mind: "You will not be an unusual case. You are an ordinary healthy person."

I have received from this patient a number of letters

⁵ Fully explained in my *Monograph, The Will to Sleep*.

expressing her gratitude. She wrote me an account of her triumph. In Russia she looked up all the physicians who had treated her without result, and showed them that she was cured.

Then she wrote and asked me whether she had not better come to Vienna for a short visit in order to undergo an "after-cure." There were a number of important points she wanted to go over with me. I advised her not to do so. I pointed out that it was a lengthy journey from Riga to Vienna, and urged her to rid herself of the remains of her neurosis through her own efforts.

I was very astonished one day to see her enter my consulting-room. She then related the following occurrence: She had gone to a famous physician in Petrograd, and had told him about her wonderful cure. (This doctor had tried his own method of treatment on the patient without satisfactory results.) He gazed at her for some time and then said: "This Dr. Stekel must be a clever man." That remark had caused her to stop and think. "Do you know," she continued, "I once read about a patient who insisted that there was a bird in his head. A make-believe operation was performed on him, and he was shown a bird which he was told had been found in his head and removed. The patient got well. It has occurred to me that perhaps you have not cured me by the new method after all, but through suggestion, and that you have made me believe that I am well."

I looked at her for a moment in astonishment. The patient who had suffered from agoraphobia for thirty years, but was now well, had obviously returned to Vienna to get back her old trouble, and triumph over me.

"Can you go out by yourself freely?"

"Yes."

"Have you any attacks of dread?"

"No."

"Then what more do you want? You can be glad that you are well. Is it not immaterial how you got well so

long as you can walk about alone with no feelings of anxiety?"

I explained frankly to her that she had returned to Vienna in order to punish me for my brief and business-like letters, by relapsing into her old agoraphobia.

The explanation worked wonders. In a few days she returned home perfectly satisfied and without a particle of her old anxiety left.

This case illustrates the sources of and pathway to success in psychoanalytic treatment. In psychoanalysis Freud has furnished us with a tremendous weapon: a weapon capable of inflicting terrific wounds if handled carelessly, but of inestimable value in fighting a neurosis if carefully used. Only we may have to modify many of our views, and we must guard against the tendency of appraising the value of the method merely on the basis of its current successes and failures.

IX

In the above case psychoanalysis helped me to uncover the root of the patient's feeling of guilt and acted as a mental release. But four months of treatment did not bring to light a single incident of which the patient had not been previously conscious. The reverse, of course, happens in some cases. But in this case it was only necessary to correct the patient's false-feeling attitude and the conflicts were clearly brought to light. The patient learned to speak and to think about phases of life about which she had previously been unwilling to talk or to think. She became aware of her death-wish for others, her criminal trends, her brutal egoism, her indolence, her envy and boundless selfish ambition. But she was cured only after she had given up her belief in herself as an "exceptional" being. The moment she had resolved to be an "ordinary" person the physician's task was accomplished. It is manifest that the chief task of psychoanalysis is to disclose the patient's resistance to treatment, and to con-

vince him that he does not truly care to get well, that he is unwilling to give up the secret goal existing only in his fantasies.

I may illustrate this generalization by a quotation from the thoughts of Otto Ludwig. The creative writer knows what we physicians were for a long time ignorant of. The patient's belief in his "great historic mission" must be dissipated before he can find reality acceptable. Finally all psychoanalytic endeavors lead to the one aim—to reconcile the patient with the sober facts of reality. Ludwig expresses this thought very beautifully:

"Youthful idealism is vanity. With a certain measure of deliberation a young man turns his enthusiasm to any object which becomes linked with his vanity. And this feeling of vanity, to what more does it amount in the end than the lofty disdain with which the young man, in his deluded self-conceit, looks down upon everything real and human as something beneath him? He requires the impossible of others, not because he is capable of accomplishing the impossible himself—not that—but because in his case he takes that for granted.

"Skepticism, which is a phase following the period of enthusiasm and grows out of the latter as its antithesis, is the great educational fever through which man's soul must pass, and the condition of its enlightenment. A man must learn to doubt his imaginary worth in order to become certain of his real worth. What he formerly expected of others without knowing whether he himself could do it or not, this he will now do without expecting it of others.

"His highest ideal was at first to die gloriously for something; now his ideal is the supreme one: to live humbly for something."

This is the final result which the psychoanalyst must from the beginning bear in mind. He who has learned this secret holds the key to the greatest possibilities of successful treatment.

X

There was a particularly sacred doctrine advocated in psychoanalysis to the effect that "the patient must take the lead." This rule certainly has its justification. It would be ridiculous to say: "Today I will take up the incest-complex, tomorrow I shall discuss the problem of the relationship to the father," etc. The patients should be ready for the definite problems before they are taken up. The experienced psychoanalyst can judge when the proper time has come for discussing this or that particular problem. But woe to the analyst who permits the patient to take the bit between his teeth without the least control, and who looks upon the spontaneous associations of the patient as rulers in the field! Thereby the gates are set wide open to wantonness, and it is in the patient's power to lead the physician by the nose, as it were, and to prolong the treatment *ad infinitum*. It is for the analyst to appraise the associations critically, and he must distinguish between what is useful and what merely arises on account of the resistance. He must know how to separate the grain from the chaff, and he must always be ready to step in at the proper moment. That is far from easy, because a sensitive patient is readily disturbed and always defends the significance of his associations with great stubbornness. Indeed, these defenses are the channels through which he forgets his ingenious weapons of obstruction and passive resistance.

All the actual current events, upon which the patient is fond of dwelling, the letters from home and from his sweetheart, the exciting occurrences of the previous day, the endless dreams which are produced in unaccountable numbers, are so many manifestations of resistance: it is necessary firmly to limit these accounts to essentials, to ignore completely any theoretic objections to psychoanalysis, and, by an inflexible discipline, to put an end once for all to obstructions.

I may illustrate this in connection with a case of psychic impotence. A physician who ran away from women at the critical moment, or, at the most, accomplished *ejaculatio ante portas*, began a psychoanalytic interview by reading a letter he had just written to his bride, which was supposed to exhibit his bipolar attitude. I have heard dozens of such letters, and this time I refused to listen to it. The physician next recalled certain impressions which the reading of a case in the *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse* had made on him. I made short work of that, too. After a pause of a few minutes, the patient told me that, when he was a school-boy, he could not bear it when the teacher wrote on the blackboard with chalk. It gave him a physical sensation of discomfort, almost amounting to pain, in his teeth. His next association was that the sight of, and especially the stroking of, satin, had a similar effect, setting his teeth on edge, and it made him shudder when he passed his hand over a satin collar. His next association was that he was reminded of a friend who was hard of hearing.⁶ One had to shout into the man's ears. But sometimes this friend would show a wonderful adroitness in "catching on." (I mentally thanked him for the implied reproach and compliment.) The next thing he told me was that he had often regretted that he had not specialized as a gynecologist and particularly as a surgeon. In that connection there followed a long-drawn out tale about a teacher who adopted the policy of searching his pupils' homes to discover whether they were hiding books of a forbidden character. (Again a reference to our inquisitorial rôle.) Next followed an animated account of the various High School teachers, which I recognized at once as mere "padding," and firmly put a stop to. I felt I should like to investigate the meaning of that particular idiosyncrasy—his objection to the chalk-writing on the blackboard, and I asked the patient

⁶ Referring to the analyst, who was so hard of hearing *that he failed to hear the things of most importance.*

how he explained that in his own mind. He pondered a little and then said: "The chalk is a phallus symbol; the board is the vagina." Now I assumed a tone of anger: "Do you consider me such a fool and simpleton that you dare to advance such an explanation?"

The patient laughingly answered: "I confess frankly that I wanted to make fun of you. I thought that you, the symbolist, would certainly fall into the trap."

I then pointed out the connection between the idiosyncrasy and the sensation in the teeth. The chalk obviously symbolized bone, satin the "satin-like" skin, and that we probably had to do here with a case of the cannibalistic complex.

Suddenly the patient became loquacious. The day before he had discussed cannibalism for an hour. He had confessed to a number of sadistic fantasies, and had stated that they had played a great rôle in his childhood. He recalled something that had not crossed his mind for twenty years. He was a child of four or five when he heard the story of a butcher who was very famous for his "sweet hams," and carried on a very successful business. The story ran that this man had a trapdoor, through which purchasers, calling at odd times when no one else was by, disappeared into the cellar, where he himself murdered them. The human flesh thus acquired he used in the preparation of his goods, and that was what made the hams so "tasty" and sweet. (Such stories are told to children!) Another story of a man who devoured his sweetheart had also made a powerful impression on his mind. The old blood-accusation brought against the Jews came up for discussion and he confessed that he believed the Jews did use human blood. . . . In a word, important material flowed from his lips like water gushing from a newly opened spring.

On the following day he reveled in cannibalistic fancies. He was obviously bent on reducing my discovery *ad absurdum*, and represented himself in his fantasy as de-

vouring his sweetheart piecemeal. He exaggerated his sadistic leaning towards women, and attempted to make it look ridiculous through exaggeration. There followed reflections of doubt concerning psychoanalysis. The associations might rouse forgotten complexes and thus lead to confusion. . . .

I explained to him that psychoanalysis does not create these complexes, that it merely brings them forward into the light of consciousness. He said he was secretly afraid of these instincts, and that was why he had never married. That was why he did not dare to go near a prostitute, he, for whom Jack the Ripper was a cryptic ideal. But through my treatment he hoped he might find that he had been afraid of mere shadows, that these fantasies would never crystallize into deeds. He hoped he might quietly examine the Medusa head and put the question at rest for ever. Every neurotic represents a regressive stage of existence in which the primitive instincts are immeasurably the strongest. But these instincts have long since been tamed and converted into moral standards. If he feels that he stands above these instinctive cravings he need have no fear, etc.

It is the task of psychoanalysis to unburden the patients' minds, to convince them of the harmlessness of their fantasies which often only scare them and hold them in check. They then use these childish fantasies in order that they may always possess a memento of their vileness, and they compare themselves with others, with the result that they become obsessed with a feeling of their own inferiority.

XI

I have already said that it is very difficult to induce a patient to abandon his fiction about his "great historic mission," and to modify his ideas of his own importance. The *sentiment d'incomplétude* serves as a bipolar

antithesis for protection against the urge of selfish ambition as well as a self-excuse: "You would attain the greatest position the world offers if you were not so weak and ill—if you were only in good health!" The neurosis itself plays into the hands of this tendency to self-excuse and as a genuine reason for failure to accomplish anything great, i.e., as a counterpoise to self-reproach for achieving nothing and for the indolence which arises from the natural dislike of ordinary occupations.

The task of the analyst is to reconcile the patient to reality. With that end in view, the analyst must also be qualified to act as an educator; consequently the practice of psychoanalysis requires men of above the average capacity; they must be to a certain extent creative artists, capable of building up personalities. The analysis must be followed by synthesis, to use Dr. B. Martin's apt expression.

Naturally in such cases the patient looks upon his physician as the representative of authority, against which he has fought all his life, and in that struggle his illness supplies him with the most valuable weapon.

The old spitefulness now reasserts itself against the physician, and the treatment becomes either an open or a hidden struggle, in which the physician must be allowed finally to play the rôle of victor. I can only agree with Alfred Adler, who, as an experienced psychotherapist, declares: "As a last resort, after an exhaustive treatment, the self-sacrifice of the physician must be called upon; he must assume all responsibility for his alleged failure to complete a cure. In two of my cases this subterfuge worked well; one patient was healed by a Bosnian rural physician through correspondence, and another—a case of trigeminus neuralgia of several years' standing, in which in the course of two years, I had achieved by waking suggestion. Often cases such as these, after the actual treatment has ceased, show marked improvement, enjoy

long intervals of good health, and sometimes complete recovery.”⁷

For these reasons it is very difficult to furnish statistics regarding one's therapeutic results. I have really very seldom heard patients say: “Doctor, I am well now—thanks to you!” On these occasions the patient was generally far from cured, but said it merely as a subterfuge to put me off the track and to prevent my further searching of the unconscious. More often the patient is inclined to prolong the course of treatment, hoping thus to prove to the physician that his case is hopeless. Again, the treatment often has to come to an abrupt end. I once cherished the illusion of remaining the patients' friend, to guide them and advise them after the treatment, to see them from time to time and direct them on their proper path. Today I know that it is best for those who are healed to bid a final farewell to the physician; and I also know that sometimes it is best to bring about the parting abruptly, even at the cost of one's personal feelings. The abrupt ending of relations between doctor and patient is an excellent means of rousing the patient's feelings of spite.

I treated the serious case of a compulsive neurotic who had abandoned his studies for four years, although he was ready to take his doctor's degree. The treatment brought about no alleviation, although all his compulsive acts had been cleared up. The clearing was helpful only so long as the patient was obliging enough to yield to the analyst. I therefore wrote to his parents and warned them not to be surprised if I should drop their son's case; that we might have a scene in the course of which I might show him the door. A few days later I thought that the time had arrived for me to stop the case. The patient was always “over-sensitive.” I reproached him for not re-

⁷ Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, authorized English version by Dr. B. Glueck and Dr. J. E. Lind. Kegan Paul, London. Moffat, Yard & Co., New York, 1921.

suming his studies and for concealing his indolence. He gave a sharp and excited answer; I retorted still more sharply, and that roused him to make a cutting remark. I used this as a pretext, and informed him that I had done with his case, adding: "The fact is, you do not want to get well, and now that I have withdrawn my assistance, you will not get well."

"On the contrary," was the excited retort. "I shall show you that I can get well without your treatment!"

That is just what happened. He returned home, took up his studies again, received his doctor's degree, and—his equilibrium restored—afterwards made it up with me. Previous to that, I had met all his requests for forgiveness and for permission to resume the treatment with the most relentless and firm refusal.

The treatment of cases of impotence is more gratifying. The results are obvious. In such cases the patients themselves are anxious to be able to indulge in their *vita sexualis*. The "will to be ill" is more easily overcome and is displaced by the will to be well.

XII

Another important question is: Shall the ex-patient continue to be interested in the analysis and to preoccupy himself, for instance, with its literature? Shall he be trained in psychoanalysis by us and be thereafter expected to free himself permanently of his compulsive and symptomatic acts and of his various newly developed symptoms? Shall he become the physician of his own soul?

This is a question towards which I have radically changed my attitude. I consider it a mistake to make psychoanalysts out of one's patients and to introduce them in psychoanalytical societies. I have never seen this course followed by such good results as when patients are encouraged to forget all about psychoanalysis and their troubles. It is not the function of psychoanalysis

to convert neurotics into psychoanalysts. It is natural that most physicians should become psychoanalysts in that way, for many a one in trying to help others helps himself,—says Nietzsche. Psychoanalysis becomes for those physicians a calling and an aim. Unfortunately these psychoanalysts themselves remain anchored to their complexes—a condition I have designated as “psychoanalytic scotoma,” the psychoanalyst’s “blind-spot.” That may be the reason why so many bitter feelings are displayed between physicians, especially among neurologists and still more among psychoanalysts.⁸ But we should endeavor to raise ourselves above our affects and to overcome our complexes. We must do so if we are to help others. But the neurotic will do well promptly to forget the analysis and everything pertaining to it, as soon as he is cured. Otherwise the psychoanalysis will only become a pretext for him to hold on to his neurosis. This may be seen particularly often in the case of compulsive neurosis. The apparently cured sufferers are no longer obsessed with their various compulsive images or acts, but they often become just as much obsessed with their dissolutions and explanations instead; in short, their interest is still centered on their morbidly over-stressed complexes, with this only difference, that they now clothe their obsessions in psychoanalytic terms.

I have seen many such cases—neurotics who dreaded their incestuous wishes, where formerly they had been obsessed by a symbolized form of anxiety. So long as

⁸ It is never decorous to tell tales out of school. But even an inexperienced person after some intercourse with psychoanalysis must arrive at the conviction that most of Freud’s younger pupils have scarcely applied the principles of psychoanalysis towards the removal of their own complexes. How much I had to endure as a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society! I hope some day to write the history of the psychoanalytic movement objectively and with care. I must wait until I can have the benefit of looking at the problem from a distance. According to reports which have reached me the situation does not differ from that in other places.

the patient is not free from anxiety, we are not justified in speaking of a cure, even though he has become fully aware of the objects of his feeling of dread (incest, paraphilia, criminality). He must first raise himself above his complexes. That is also true of the feeling of doubt. I saw a man who had been treated for some time by Adler on account of a morbid feeling of doubt. He was in love with a girl, and doubted whether he was sufficiently potent, whether he could make her happy, whether he would be able to support her, and so on. He came to me with the statement that he was in love with a girl, but was all the time trying to "belittle" her; he feared she would triumph over him and would always be above him. He could not bear to be belittled and "subject"; that roused the "male protest" on his part and that was the reason why he was unhappy. He persisted in his feeling-attitude of doubt—but this time he had adopted the Adlerian mechanisms. Probably his feeling-attitude of doubt was due to his resistance to the physician, and that was the reason of his change of physician and why he had come to me. But this very feeling-attitude of resistance or contrariness, which had belonged originally to the father-imago, showed that his reactions were still morbid, and therefore in his case we could not speak of a cure.

The patient must cease to regard himself as a patient. He should put aside psychoanalysis and everything pertaining to it. He should not try to interpret dreams, or to ferret out symptomatic acts or solve obsessions. He should turn from himself and his psyche, and cultivate outside interests.

The longer he is preoccupied with psychoanalysis the more decisively will the latter assume in his mind the functions of his old neurosis. He reproaches himself when associations fail to come to his mind; he fears that resistances are beginning to reassert themselves, and begins to doubt whether the physician is really helping him. This explains a remarkable fact. Certain cases grow worse

the longer they are treated. The therapy of gonorrhœa has evolved a particular term with which to express over-treatment. Some cases of gonorrhœa fail to get cured because, through the treatment, the urethra is kept continuously irritated. Similar overtreatment may also take place in psychoanalysis. The longer a case is treated the more difficult becomes the final separation from the analyst. There are certain serious cases which do require a prolonged period of treatment of twelve months or even longer. But I confess frankly that after my earlier experiences I have adopted the policy of lessening the period of treatment very considerably, and allow a longer time for the most advanced cases only—for patients who are downright invalids and who have also experienced organic trouble. I do not usually suggest such a long period as a whole year, and endeavor to curtail it as much as possible. As I have already stated: those patients who have but a limited time at their disposal—physicians who have left their practice, employes who have been granted a limited leave, housewives whose presence is urgently needed at home—patients such as these give the best prognosis.

That may explain the fact that my results were so satisfactory at the beginning of my psychoanalytic practice. The period of treatment was short. I described some of the cases in my work, *Nervous Anxiety*.

I now propose to go through the cases which I reported there, and to give a brief critical report of the final results of some of them. It is very difficult to obtain accurate data and to arrive at definite statistical facts. Many patients disappear entirely into the obscurity from which they had emerged. Of others one hears only incidentally and in round-about ways.

XIII

Looking over my results, I have reason to be very contented. I possess some information about most of

the cases which I recorded in my *Conditions of Nervous Anxiety*. The singer (case No. 106 of the 2nd edition) is able to appear in public, to withstand the buffets of Fate, and suffers only from minor neurotic disturbances from time to time. These are not serious enough to prevent her from striving and achieving in her chosen career. (Duration of treatment, four months, one half-hour to one hour daily.) Of the Rumanian priest (case 98) I had not heard for a long time. One day a lady came to me from Rumania suffering from agoraphobia. The priest (I. B.) had sent her to me. He had been very seriously ill, and a physician had cured him in Vienna with some simple drops. He had said this with a peculiar smile. She was merely to tell Dr. Stekel that he was perfectly well. She requested me to prescribe those miraculous drops for herself, and could not believe that I had cured the priest "only with talk." The treatment of this case lasted six weeks. And thus most cases get along fairly well, if Fate does not press them too hard. Some have withstood even the most severe blows very successfully.

On the whole, therefore, I am justified in feeling fairly well satisfied with my results, especially when I add those cases which got well subsequently, ostensibly through another kind of "treatment," as, for instance, the singer, who after taking a tea-infusion prescribed by a quack, for two months, entirely overcame a troublesome nervous disorder which had interfered with his singing. I must again give as my emphatic opinion that a short period of treatment leads to the best results, particularly in the case of phobias. That, I surmise, is due to the fact that the shorter time renders the dissolution (that is the giving up) of the transference more easy for the patient and does not afford the opportunity for too great differences in the emotional tension.

We also come across some patients who, after having been under treatment for hardly a week, rush round and

tell everyone they meet that psychoanalysis has not helped them. A doctor who suffered from a severe compulsion-neurosis and was introduced to a medical meeting at Odessa as one of the failures (!) of psychoanalysis, had been under my care for only about a week.

I may mention a successful case: A young man suffering from various obsessions and severe compulsive mannerisms came to me once a week only, for about half-an-hour each time. It would be gratifying if I could achieve such excellent results in all similar cases. But a cure is not often brought about as easily as that. These patients are particularly proud of their illness and generate the severest resistances. (For the treatment, as I have repeatedly stated, resolves itself into a hard struggle between patient and physician.) Sometimes this is due to the fact that the analyst fails to realize he is being led by the patient, and allows the latter to skim over the surface of things with his associations. Under such conditions, progress is hardly to be expected, and the treatment may go on for ever. If the compulsion-neurotic is allowed to take the lead, the treatment may last a year or longer—it might be for years or a lifetime. The patient intends to prove, thereby, the serious character of his illness. The doctor must have the courage to throw up the treatment, and to do so abruptly. This is the very class of patients likely to return every now and again for an hour or so's consultation, merely to get rid of this or that particular symptom; soon their old dread of losing something reasserts itself, their morbid fear of *verdigris*, syphilis (*syphilidophobia*), or some other obsession of the most foolish kind—for instance, that the book-shelf is poisoned. The patients mean to prove thereby that the physician has not helped them out of their difficulty at all, and that they are as badly off as they were at the beginning. I avoid these possibilities by sending off the patients as soon as the treatment is ended, and by reducing correspondence with them to a minimum—in fact, I

advise them to act as if they barely knew me. A large number of them obey the right impulse of their own accord, and act thus without any special instruction. They free themselves absolutely from the physician, just as they should. Such patients forget their physician readily, unless they present the evil picture of the Judas-neurosis. In my work *The Language of Dreams* (English version by J. S. Van Teslaar) I have described the Christ-neurosis on the basis of a number of illustrative instances. By the side of this we also find the Judas-type of neurosis. A patient of this type once confessed to me during our very first consultation that he had it in his mind to write a drama about Judas. "He thought his character was of a much more interesting type than that of Christ. Judas had sacrificed himself, and had by his act of treason raised Christ to a Godhead"; the patient "could not but feel that Judas was the greater of the two." I at once recognized that that man was himself a Judas, and that he would act in accordance with his character towards me. He strongly resented the inference. His whole nature was, he said, steeped in gratitude and feelings of friendship. But at a critical moment in my life he played precisely the part of a Judas towards me.⁹ Some of the patients of this type resolve to lecture on psychoanalysis after their treatment is over, so as to prove that it is good for nothing, a passing fad; and state that they intend to sue for the return of the money spent on the treatment. They write scurrilous articles and letters to newspapers, become the bitterest enemies of psychoanalysis, discover biologic foundations for the neuroses, and emphasize the hereditary factors—in short, they plan their revenge and deliberately seek, and actually hanker after, some opportunity to play the rôle of a Judas. Since a number of practicing psychoanalysts are former patients of mine who have themselves submitted to psychoanalysis, the tendency to seek out schis-

⁹ Cf. The chapter, *The Traitor*, in my book *Unser Seelenleben im Kriege*. Otto Salle, Berlin.

matic differences and to become antagonistic may be due partly to this Judas-complex, and the fault may not always be with the unfortunate neurotic. A skillful analyst should be able to uncover the potential Judas, and avoid a perpetration of deceptions by that type of patient. He predicts it so frequently, he proves it so often through the patient's symptomatic acts and dreams, that the latter, out of sheer contrariness, will fail to assume the rôle of a Judas, so as to prove his physician in the wrong.¹⁰

On the whole, it may be affirmed that psychoanalysis has proved itself superior to all other forms of psychotherapy, particularly in the compulsion-neuroses. Ordinary influences and explanations do no lasting good in cases of this type. And, if the psychoanalysis succeeds, the result is so convincingly plain, and it involves so radical a transformation of the patient's whole personality, that the psychotherapist is assured of the gratitude of the patient's whole family. At any rate the treatment of these severe cases is the touchstone of the psychotherapist's skill. The termination of the treatment, the freeing and overcoming of the patient's feelings, the adjusting of the latter to life and to reality, from which he had previously shrunk back, are tasks beset with difficulties and obstacles.

¹⁰ I recently had an amusing experience with a typical "Judas"—a physician. Of his own free will he read my *Nervöse Angstzustände* and told me every day that he had found himself reading something else. With that and with his coming just a few minutes late and leaving very punctually (not to give "himself away" freely) he indicated his spirit of independence. One day he told me that he had read through Jones' study of Hamlet at one sitting with great enjoyment; a work no doubt greatly enhanced in value, he thought, by its excellent translation into German. It turned out that he had confused Tausig, the translator, with a medical man, "Tausk," who had often attacked me and my methods of investigation. He admitted that he thought "Tausk" was really "Tausig." He also suddenly thought of going to Freud and later still the wish to be treated by Tausig played a great rôle in his "Judas" phantasy.

XIV

We must take up every case as if the whole riddle of the neuroses were to be unfolded before our eyes for the first time. This open-minded attitude has enabled me to arrive at new conclusions in the interpretation of dreams. I am not unmindful of the fact that we are but at the beginning of our knowledge in the investigation of dreams and of the neuroses. Much water will yet be poured into our old wine. But we shall be all the more sober for that, and, instead of the intoxication of victory, followed by the disillusionings of the "morning after," we shall have the experience of tracing back the trail of truth with open eyes.

My statements should be taken in this sense. They are also intended as a warning against the practice of psychoanalysis by persons who are not qualified by native gifts and capabilities.

I have the impression that there is already too much promiscuous practising of psychoanalysis. Analysis may be compared to a serious laparotomy. Psychoanalysis is a complicated science, and, to use a fitting expression of Riklin's, "the delicate structures of a neurosis should not be handled by rough and untrained fingers."

Every psychotherapist is inclined to prove his views by his patients' statements. But in the course of the treatment the patient learns his physician's jargon, and uses the terms he has learned from the latter when he attempts to describe his condition. That leads to serious errors about the methods and the findings in a given case.

I am reminded of the air-balloons with which children love to play. The neurotic, too, allows himself to be filled with our ideas and "air." He thus seems to be a substantial massive figure. But he bursts when overstretched or he gives off the surplus of air. Only the degree in which the new ideas, attitudes, and views are permanently retained is the test of the method and the proof of its success.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE¹

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I

In the history of science it is not often that it falls to the lot of a single investigator to inaugurate an entirely new method of research or to discover a whole group of general laws, each valid, each equally fundamental.

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, has done both: he has inaugurated the analytic method of inquiry which is being successfully applied to all the manifestations and products of mental activity; and through the careful use of this technique he has uncovered fundamental principles hitherto either wholly unrecognized or perceived but vaguely.

For the first time psychoanalysis introduces true order and understanding into some of the most obscure and baffling provinces of the mind—phobias, compulsions, obsessions and dreams.

For the first time, too, we are acquiring true insight into the meaning, the psychic development and mechanism of that most dreadful of all personal calamities, mental breakdown or insanity; and through the aid of psychoanalysis correct principles are being evolved for its prevention—in so far as mental disorder may be preventable.

Although psychoanalytic research is only in its initial stage, it has already thrown a flood of light on mental growth during infancy, childhood and adolescence; and the respective educational and hygienic requirements are becoming clear as the development of human personality is traced with scientific accuracy. The unfoldment of character traits is becoming a study as objective in its

¹ Reprinted from the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*.

technique and results as any study of natural history. Human behavior is being subjected to scientific scrutiny at last without the handicap of ego-centric presuppositions.

It would not be easy at this early stage properly to estimate the great practical benefits in terms of personal and racial welfare bound to follow the wider extension and applications of psychoanalysis and certain to be witnessed in the immediate future. In unraveling for us the natural history of mental growth and thus placing within our ken the means for its conscious direction and control, Freud's discoveries promise to accomplish, with respect to our knowledge of the subjective, inner world of our psyche a transformation as radical as that which Newton's discovery of the laws governing the Cosmos has accomplished with respect to our knowledge of the world of external reality.

The same precision, of course, cannot be expected in the two fields of inquiry. The laws of mind are infinitely more complicated and do not lend themselves to mathematical treatment like the laws of nature. But in general aspects the comparison holds. The position of both Newton and Freud is alike unique in the history of science; for just as there is no other cosmic system for man to repeat Newton's discovery of its laws so there is but one subjective world for man to delve into and Freud has shown the way of discovering law and order therein.

The earliest significant observations were made by Freud in connection with his professional studies of persons suffering from various nervous complaints. These incidental observations have led him to most important discoveries. From the field of abnormal psychology in which they first arose, Freud and his pupils extended the important discoveries to the whole realm of psychology. Not psychology alone but all contiguous disciplines, anthropology, folklore, religion, economics, sociology, history, and even literary criticism, politics and biography, are becoming indebted to psychoanalysis.

The work is only at its beginnings, as mentioned, but significant contributions have already been made in some of these various directions. Already it is not premature to assert that psychoanalysis promises to accomplish for the whole group of the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften* (the cultural sciences, as contrasted to the exact disciplines) what the evolutionary theory—and specifically the work of Darwin—has done for the biological group of sciences. Indeed, in a broad sense, it may be said that psychoanalysis represents but an extension of the theory of evolution, an application of the principle of evolution to the study of mind or, rather, a rediscovery of that truth in terms of concrete psychologic data, facts.

Scientific discoveries so wide in their range of applicability, so novel—even revolutionary—and of such tremendous consequence as those which form the major body of psychoanalytic theory, cannot but rouse extreme skepticism, even hostility—at first.

That is precisely the fate that psychoanalysis has met at the hands of critics too startled by the new principles to view them with objective detachment.

Psychoanalysis is nothing short of revolutionary, exactly as Darwinism has proven to be. That the introduction of conceptions compelling a rearrangement of fundamental principles should create havoc is only to be expected. Such a change foretells the doom of the old and customary viewpoints whose protagonists will not yield the ground without a struggle.

Now, psychoanalysis challenges the whole group of scientific disciplines in any way related to the operations of the mind. It requires all psychologic branches of learning to undertake nothing less than a restatement in terms of evolutionary dynamics of the principles upon which they are based. Freudian psychology has sounded the death-knell of static, descriptive, atomistic psychology just as surely as Darwinism has put an end to the pre-evolutionary biology.

The world at large cannot remain long indifferent to the Freudian transformations of psychology. This is not merely a matter concerning specialists. The controversy raised by psychoanalysis does not center on theoretic problems and abstract points such as are popularly supposed to be dear to the dry-as-dust scientist. The problems raised by psychoanalysis relate most intimately to the practical concerns of health and everyday living. If Freud be correct, if the unconscious, for instance, plays the rôle he assigns to it and if it is truly possible to get at it through the analysis of dreams and of the other formulations and products of the unconscious by means of the technique he has evolved, we have in our hands, for the first time in the history of science, a scientific method for controlling our psychic energies and for properly directing their outward flow. Through psychoanalysis, at last, mental health, efficiency, education of mind and body, human welfare generally—racial as well as personal—become subject to purposive direction and control, exactly as the forces of nature are today in the engineers' hands.

The prospect is not overdrawn. Psychoanalysis clearly holds out no less a promise than this.

Not the least merit of Freud is that he has at last linked in a practical, rigorously scientific manner our so-called "normal" mental activities with those considered "abnormal," and has proven the essential unity of mental functions.

That mental disorders are the result of the psychic forces governing the normal reactions of mind has long been accepted as a truism—in the abstract. But in the practical working out of the subject, in our text-books on psychiatry, for example, this essential truth played no part. It was practically disregarded—abstract theory and practice did not conform to each other in this instance, for the simple reason that there had been found no way of utilizing the truth; no method of interpreting the dis-

ordered mind through a knowledge of what is going on in the healthy mind and *vice versa*.

To assert the essential unity of mental functions as a truth flowing out of theoretic considerations is one thing; to prove, as well as make fruitful use of, this important fact, is quite another.

This bridging over of normal and abnormal, the rediscovery of the essential unity of oneness of mind, has been accomplished by Freud.

The links that connect normal and abnormal mind are furnished by the functions of the unconscious. The notion of the unconscious, of course, is not in itself a novel contribution of psychoanalysis. Indeed, as a mere hypothesis the unconscious is as old as, and perhaps antedates, the formulation even of our earliest scientific conceptions in psychology. But Freud gave the principle its present scientific and precise formulation. Above all he has evolved the technique for the empiric investigation of the unconscious—a technique that enables us to deal with the facts and forces of mind as objectively as with any other facts and forces in nature.

The concept of the unconscious had been rejected from modern scientific psychology because of its metaphysical and highly speculative character. But with the adoption of Freud's rigorous, practical method of inquiry the principle of the unconscious has become the core of psychology.

It is in this connection that Freud has evolved the study and analysis of dreams. The results are overwhelming; they yield a new sense of order and permit our understanding to reach down to the nethermost depths of human nature.

II

The significance of psychoanalysis in the history of science may be best illustrated perhaps by pointing out the background, the historic setting of Freud's invaluable contributions.

The dominant conception in all the biologic sciences,

during the period immediately preceding Darwin's epoch-making discoveries and before Darwinism made itself felt, may be designated as atomism.

The age of atomism in biology was preceded by, and to a large extent contemporaneous with, atomism in politics, philosophy, theology and education; for in every age the dominant idea spreads itself over the whole realm of its characteristic culture.

Political atomism culminated in the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence.

The sense theory of knowledge carried to its logical extreme by Hume with his denial of causality and true selfhood, by Leibniz with his theory of monads, and by Kant's teacher, Wolff, with his so-called Rational Psychology, illustrates the philosophical atomism of the period.

Theological atomism manifested itself in the crude theism of that period separating a kind of atomic divinity from the aggregate of units called the Universe, and representing that unit as standing in a sort of preferential relationship to the other atoms—an offshoot, clearly, of the Leibniz-Wolffian doctrine.

Educational atomism blossomed forth in the theories of Rousseau, notably his "Emile."

Finally upon the sociologic-economic field we have, towards the end of the atomistic period, the materialistic conception of history culminating in the doctrine of the struggle between classes, a little earlier the *laissez-faire* doctrine and between the middle and the end of that period, again, the formulation of the philosophical anarchism of Godwin and Proudhon. Thus the various cultural movements manifested the same or a similar dominant note—individualism, atomism.

Closely upon the heels of this atomistic *Weltanschauung*, there followed the conception of energy. Indeed, the doctrine of energy was inherent in the standpoint of atomism. Just as atomism attempted to show us the constitution, "energeticism" was to explain the dynamics of the universe

and of human existence. Then followed in rapid succession the discoveries of new energies in nature, the harnessing of electricity, steam, and other labor-saving forces, the multiplication of means for creating power, the rise of large cities, of international trade combinations and of corporations for the exploitation of natural resources on a tremendous scale—all in keeping with the new cultural development.

At that stage Darwin introduced the concept of unfoldment, of scientific evolution. It became the fashion of scientific endeavor to explain what a thing really is by showing how it came to be, that is, by giving its developmental history.

In the history of psychology "associationism" represents the atomistic phase of the science of mind. The pre-Freudian conception of psychic dynamism is a sort of metaphysical, philosophic, speculative energeticism. Though rooted in physiology and often expressed in terms current in biology, it is at bottom but little more than the psychology of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Bain—to mention only some of the chieftains of British speculative psychology.

Even the psychology of Herbert Spencer does not typify the true evolutionistic development. In his day the data were not yet available for the adoption of evolution as a *working principle* in psychology; but to Spencer belongs the credit of having anticipated with many keen generalizations, though speculatively, the next phase in the development of the science of mind.

At any rate the adoption of the evolutionistic or developmental concept in biology and the rapid spread of that viewpoint to contiguous sciences represents the next great general phase in the history of culture. Even disciples of speculative character, philosophy, sociology, ethics, adopted the new viewpoint. But clinical psychology remained strangely aloof, and experimental psychology

lagged behind. The "energeticism" of Herbart and Lotze, fruitful and significant as it has been, remained a secondary development. No working basis had been devised for the adoption of evolution as a guiding principle in the practical concerns of psychology. The main course of development in the study of mind during health and disease alike persisted on the old path of atomism. The doctrine of the association of ideas and the more recent doctrine of the "conditional reflex" are typical of the standpoint of non-Freudian psychology to this day in spite of the influence of the principle of evolution upon the course of scientific development.

In that state psychology and clinical psychiatry were not likely to yield significant results along other than descriptive lines. Kraepelin, the high light of psychiatry, arranged his text-book with the conscientious scruples of one who appreciates the scientific value of classification and description. His clinical entities are divided, classified and subdivided, tabulated and labeled with much care. Progress between succeeding editions of Kraepelin's text-book on Psychiatry consists largely of the introduction of some new subdivision or in the transfer from one label to another of a part of its contents.

The tendency of clinical psychology and psychiatry in its atomistic stage to emphasize description and classification, as illustrated in Kraepelin, is equally obvious in the French school of clinical psychologic research. The Raymond-Janet contributions are masterly descriptions of psychologic states. Janet's works, in particular, read like romances. His studies of hysteria, neuroses, fixed ideas and psychic automatisms have inspired Professor William James to hold out the expectation, in his *Principles of Psychology*, that, "all these facts, taken together, form unquestionably the beginning of an inquiry which is destined to throw a new light into the very abysses of our nature."

The new light came as the result of Freud's important discoveries. To the two-dimensional, atomistic, descriptive

psychology of the French school and of the Kraepelinian psychiatry Freud has added a third dimension—the genetic, developmental, evolutionistic viewpoint. The result is as radical a transformation of all branches of psychology as that which Darwin has inaugurated in the biological sciences. Freud's discoveries are doing for psychology what Darwin's have done for biology.

III

The method of Freud is known as psychoanalysis. It recognizes a selective property whereby ideas group and regroup themselves in accordance with laws governing their emotional value to the person concerned. Freud's psychology lays stress on the emotional, affective value of our ideas rather than on their logical content: that feature constitutes one of the chief differences between it and the older psychology.

Even in that regard Freud's work is not altogether novel. The most radical departure is the serviceable, accurate conception of the qualities and forces of our psyche which he has formulated as the result of his recognition of the unconscious.

An illustration will make this matter clear. Suppose a person has undergone a strong emotional experience—a sudden shock, fright, some keen disappointment or painful loss. The reaction to that experience will vary with the person's temperament, mental status, and other conditions. Suppose the person in question is highly nervous and the shock results in some degree of dissociation, that is, in a loss from memory of certain parts of the experience. This is a most frequent occurrence. In such cases, too, it is common for some unreasonable and unaccountable fear to appear, the fear being associated with some object or situation harmless in itself. For instance, the person in question may be afraid of closed doors, or of open spaces, or of crowds or of being alone, or of some animal or person. The victim cannot account for this fear: cannot

even tell when it began or why it appeared. The fear may be partly overcome in the course of years. But the chances are rather that it will persist and that all through his future life that person will go about more or less handicapped by that unreasonable fear. I have chosen this example because it is a very common experience and in its milder form may be found in every person's experience.

If the victim of such a condition is helped to reestablish a free intercommunication of his ideas by regular periods of concentration upon the disturbing situation or idea or object which happens to become associated with his unreasonable fear, it will soon be evident that there is an intimate connection between the object of his fear and the unpleasant experience which became lost from ordinary consciousness. Through concentration of the mind around the disturbing object, thought, or image, and allowing all ideas which crop up in that connection to come to the surface (aided thereby by the counsel of the consulting psychologist), the afflicted person finds that the ideas evoked, at first scattered and coming as if by chance from nowhere in particular, point gradually and at last irresistibly to the particular event which, because of its painful or unpleasant character, had become excluded from consciousness. Following the ramification of the ideas as they crop up, it is soon found that a number of other experiences, entirely forgotten, many of them dating from early childhood, have become associatively linked to the painful occurrence or incident and have fortified the fear or other unreasonable symptom with their own emotional strength. While this is going on another strange thing happens. As the painfully unpleasant, apparently forgotten memories are brought to the surface and the emotions with which they were originally associated are recalled, the fear which was the object of investigation disappears either suddenly or more or less rapidly. The reawakening of painful reminiscences, apparently lost from memory, dissolves the unreasonable and apparently mean-

ingless fear. The connection between the painful incident and the later fear is thus disclosed.

But what is the nature of that relationship? The two are linked through a common emotion or complementary affect. Where the condition is not entirely relieved by the recall of certain painful reminiscences, further inquiry leads to the unearthing of additional occurrences which had become similarly excluded from ordinary consciousness and have added their emotional strength to the unpleasant existing state. This teaches us that when painful experiences are pushed out of memory, they are really only pushed further in; they disappear from conscious memory but only to lie dormant and to influence the subject unconsciously, throwing up emotional bubbles in most unexpected ways. No matter how deeply this ingrown emotion may lie buried it does not wholly get out of reach. Following up the free association of ideas, especially those which arise around the subject's dreams, the submerged memory is brought back, element by element.

One of the most remarkable features of repressed emotions is that they belong in large part to our childhood life. Even when the events to which they pertain belong to a later period the reaction they evoke is characteristic of our childish or infantile attitude towards life and does not belong to the age at which it appears. In other words, certain infantile emotional reactions persist in the unconscious and become the center of psychic shocks or injuries.

Previous to Freud's discovery of these important facts clinical psychology, as I have pointed out already, was concerned chiefly with description and classification. In the case mentioned it would have limited itself to inquire: What is the person most afraid of? Closed doors? That is claustrophobia. Open spaces? That is agoraphobia, and so forth. Freud found that these fears have specific meanings in every instance. That "open spaces" and "closed door," for instance, have particular meanings for the persons concerned on account of which they play the

rôle they do in certain instances; that their rôle is always determined by what they stand for in the subject's own mind—perhaps a meaning acquired in connection with some actual experience, forgotten, or rather repressed, or a fanciful meaning derived symbolically.

In other words, our fears, morbid dreads, doubts, feelings of incapacity and numerous other emotional handicaps have an inner, or subjective developmental history; their course must be traced back to the earliest episodes in connection with which they have arisen, before we can expect to be completely freed of them.

Now, childhood has been compared to the primitive state of mankind. Conversely, savage society is said to represent the childhood of the race. This much was surmised here and there even during the pre-evolutionistic phase of science.

Since Darwin, the comparison between childhood and primitive mankind as representative of the same developmental stages has achieved new significance. Darwinism has led to the theoretic assumption that in our physical as well as mental development we recapitulate the biologic history of the race. Herbert Spencer has popularized this idea. It has led to the formulation of the so-called recapitulation theory—an idea which has been worked out extensively in embryology where it is associated chiefly with the researches of Ernst Haeckel. Readers will recall the interesting series of embryologic sections which were circulated years ago, showing that during the various stages of its development the human foetus resembles in form and functional arrangement one after another various animal species from the lower to the higher.

The recapitulation theory maintains that during the embryonic stage every individual repeats, in abbreviated form of course, many of the important stages through which the human race has passed in its ascent from the lower and more primitive forms. Countless centuries of unfoldment are thus condensed and recapitulated in the

brief course of our intra-uterine existence. Beginning as an unicellular organism, a protozoon in all respects, the fertilized human ovum becomes a metazoon, assumes shapes and forms resembling one after another various organisms from the simpler to the more complex and at birth still resembles man's immediate anthropoid progenitor more than the human race.

This is not the place to mention the numerous limitations and strictures that have been placed upon this ingenious theory as originally worked out by Haeckel and his enthusiastic pupils. It is true that some phases of intra-uterine existence appear to correspond to a higher phyletic branch than the immediately following ones, as if in repeating the story of the biologic unfoldment of the human race, the embryo rushed ahead a period or two and returned to the omitted sections subsequently, exactly as one often does when telling an interesting story. This and other minor considerations in no way detract from the significance of the theory as a whole any more than rushing from one crucial point to another in the telling of a story and then returning to dwell on details makes the story untrue. The facts are sufficient in their essentials to prove the recapitulation theory is sound.

IV

Now, turning our attention to the individual mind, may not that, too, similarly recapitulate in the course of its growth the psychic unfoldment of the human race? That our mind does that very thing has long been a theoretic conclusion of biological investigators.

Unfortunately, psychologists had discovered no way to lift that capital idea from the realm of hypothesis and transmute it into a working, useful, practical principle. Neither the technique of ordinary laboratory psychology nor that of clinical psychiatry was such as to enable students of mind to make use of this fundamental truth in their work. Both psychology and psychiatry remained

as before Darwin, atomistic, loosely dynamistic, descriptive. Whole text-books on psychology have been written without the term "development" becoming once necessary in the description of mental processes. At this stage in the history of science that in itself should have warned the old school psychologists and psychiatrists that something was the matter with the technique of their disciplines.

Freud did not set out deliberately to cover the gap between atomism and evolutionism. His ambition was limited to the direct and practical task of finding out what was wrong in the case of that large number of functional nervous disorders which ordinary methods of therapy, including hypnosis and suggestion, failed to cure. His task was a practical one, his attitude that of a specialist in nervous diseases interested in the welfare of his patients.

When Freud found that his patients suffered from painful reminiscences, hidden or suppressed, he set to work to discover the forces which lead to suppression. He found that the reminiscences in question were linked emotionally to promptings incompatible with ethical standards, and violating the most common dictates of culture—here I use the terms "ethical" and "culture" in their broadest meaning. Persons mentally handicapped, those who undergo "nervous" breakdowns or who give way entirely, becoming subjects for sanatoria, are burdened with "unethical" and "irrational" cravings of which they are often unaware. Mental and nervous disorders are caused by an attempt of the primitive residue of the psyche to break through. This proposition is as simple as it is fundamental to the proper understanding of the forces which govern human nature. Freud found that ordinarily we are often prompted by bits of our racial past in the form of an obscure craving, an unorganized attitude, a blind predisposition impelling us to think or do things which consciousness would refuse openly to contemplate. He found further that manifestations of this primitive, raw, unmoral attitude together with the cravings to which it gives

rise, far from being exceptional, is the rule during the earlier phases of our mental existence; namely, during the preconscious stage of infancy and early childhood.

Incidentally Freud's discovery shows that in the course of its development the individual mind repeats our racial history. The details of Freud's work amount to a restatement of the recapitulation theory applied to the biologic history of the mind. For the first time there has been disclosed to us the manner in which psychic recapitulation operates and its consequences.

Primordial cravings that persist are racial vestiges of the mind. They are racial endowments belonging to early psychic stages in our individual development just as certain structures and organs of the embryo represent passing phases in the course of our physical development. Some embryonic organs disappear when higher stages are reached; but certain other organs and structures persist in rudimentary form long after their functions have ceased. But, unlike the embryonic organs which disappear after fulfilling whatever rôle they may play during the embryonic phase of our physical existence, unlike the rudimentary structures which are carried forward but lie dormant and useless in the adult, the mental vestiges of our earlier existence, our primordial cravings, our racial instincts persist in their raw and naked form alongside the more complex, subtle emotions, ideals and aspirations which we acquire in later life as the heritage of historic civilization. Our raw instincts not only persist but so long as they are allowed to remain "uncharted" within us they compete with consciousness for mastery over our conduct.

Man's unconscious, the bearer of the racial past, the instinctive and primordial in human nature, functions long before consciousness is awakened. Its beginnings cannot be traced. It seems to be always present. It reaches far beyond any stage in our individual development which can be subjected to direct investigation. All we know is that

during intra-uterine existence the foetus already shows reactions which must have a psychic counterpart, be it ever so vague. Certain it is that our mental life does not begin with consciousness; and consequently any psychology that concerns itself with consciousness to the total exclusion of the unconscious is neglecting the greater for the lesser part of our mental existence. The unconscious has back of it a biologic history of millions of years compared to which the phyletic period of man's consciousness is like the efflorescence of an hour. A proper knowledge of the unconscious will enable us the better to penetrate the mental processes of primitive folk and to reconstruct, as it were, the kind of world in which man's ancestors moved, lived and had their being. Finally we can understand neither the mental aspects of childhood and infancy nor the true requirements of education unless we appreciate the significance, extent, operation and consequences of our unconscious mental processes.

Sleep is a state during which it is possible for the unconscious within us to find a sort of vicarious expression. Dreams are largely the expression of the unconscious, hence the significance of the meaning of dreams; hence the fundamental importance of Freud's discovery of the technique and methodology for the interpretation of dreams.

v

For the first time since Darwin announced his discoveries, an important corollary of the theory of evolution—recapitulation—is thus proven to hold good of the psyche. It happens that the ontogenetic account of the mind is of greatest practical significance because in no other field is an appreciation of the workings of recapitulation so important. Thus it is interesting to know that the appendix, for instance, is a vestigial organ representing a phase of existence during which man's dietary habits were what we call today "vegetarian." It is interesting to know that certain sets of muscles around our ears prove

that at one stage in his long past man had the ability to move his ears in all directions with the agility displayed today by animals depending for safety upon acute hearing more than man does. Such remnants are tell-tale signs of man's previous history, as much as the findings exhibited in our museums of natural history. They testify as to man's past habits and ways of living. But when the appendix becomes inflamed it is no longer a matter of "museum interest" for the person concerned. And if all the vestigial, embryonic organs and structures were to persist and flare up into activity, a difficult and serious situation would arise.

That is precisely what often happens upon the mental sphere. Phases of our past, in the widest sense of the term, tend to perpetuate themselves "in their original image," as it were.

An occasional strong flaring up and more commonly, a continuous functional persistence of the mental equipment characteristic of our early stages of existence is the rule rather than the exception. This is precisely what makes an understanding of the processes of psychic recapitulation a matter of such capital importance in the study of human behavior.

In spite of the refinements of civilization, in spite of the influence of education, religion, precept or preachment, our mental equipment still persists in its primordial forms. Eventually most of the cravings of the human race, our raw instincts, undergo transformations and refinements. But for a long time these cravings continue to manifest themselves very much "in the raw." We recognize this fact when we remark that "the child is a savage" or that "youth is callous and cruelly selfish." As youth passes into manhood and womanhood respectively it learns to abide by the more refined manifestations of the instincts which make up life. But the instincts are never abandoned. They are only refined. Moreover, they persist and occasionally flare up in their "original image."

The recapitulation theory, so interesting in other fields of biology, becomes here of the utmost *practical* significance.

It will be understood, of course, that the idea of recapitulation had been conceived as a principle of mental development and somewhat exploited long before Freud. Various attempts, some of them more ingenious than convincing, had been made to trace correspondence between the behavior of children and the life of primitive people on the supposition that children and so-called savages stand psychically close to each other.

We have long been familiar with such expressions as "the childhood of the human race" and by many comparisons we have been led to infer what is implied. The propensity of children for climbing, for instance, has been described as a vestigial tendency harking back, as it were, to the arboreal habits of man's ancestors. Children's games, peculiar choices, curious likes and dislikes, and many of their imageries have been similarly related. But all such observations were conjectural. Proof was lacking.

Freud has stumbled upon the proof; and what is more, he has had the sagacity to recognize the importance of his discovery for science. He has disclosed the rôle of ontogenetic recapitulation in the growth and interplay of our psychic forces.

For the first time in the history of psychology we now have the key to the understanding of human behavior in the light of its biological history.

The technique which Freud has evolved largely in the connection with the analysis of dreams for sounding, investigating and charting the realm of man's unconscious is one of the most important contributions in the history of science. The practical benefits of this discovery have only begun to be realized. Psychology is but beginning to redeem the promise it had long held out of becoming a practical guide in the conduct of our everyday life.

GLOSSARY

- Abasia:** Inability to walk.
- Aboulia:** Indecision; suspension of will power.
- Abreaction:** The process of reviving a past disagreeable experience in speech or action during the analysis.
- Affect:** Sum of emotion or excitation.
- Algolagnia:** Sexual excitement brought on by causing, or felt on experiencing, pain.
- Ambivalent (feelings):** Contrary emotions of love and hatred experienced at the same time for one person.
- Amnesia:** Defective memory for a particular period or event while the memory is otherwise unimpaired.
- Anagoge:** Spiritual or mystical significance.
- Aphonia:** Speechlessness.
- Aphronia:** Lack of practical judgment.
- Astasia:** Inability to stand.
- Autistic (thinking):** Uncritical thinking governed by wishes in contrast to realistic and scientific thinking. (Bleuler.) Called also, Dereistic (thinking).
- Autoeroticism:** Self-gratification.
-
- Bipolarity:** Coexistence of opposite emotions and desires.
- Bisexuality:** Sexual feeling for both sexes.
- Blocking:** Sudden stop in the association of ideas when a complex is reached.
- Bulimia:** Inordinate appetite.
- Catatonia:** Form of mental disorder characterized by peculiar postures.
- Catharsis:** Mental purging induced by bringing into consciousness disagreeable or painful thoughts and experiences.
-
- Censorship (endopsychic):** Sum of emotional forces which induce repressions.
- Claustrophobia:** Dread of closed spaces.

Cleptomania: Uncontrollable inclination to steal.

Cloaca theory: The notion formed by children and maintained by some neurotics that the child comes out like a passage of the bowels because that is the only large outlet from the body with which they are familiar.

Complex: A cluster of ideas or mental images linked together by a stressed emotion and subjected to repression.

Condensation: Fusion of events or mental images.

Contamination: Fusion of words.

Conversion: Transposition of repressed emotions into physical manifestations.

Coprophilia: Liking for filth.

Cryptamnesia: Unrecognized memory.

Cyclothemia: Mild form of manic depressive psychosis.

Delirium: Mental confusion.

Delusion: False idea not subject to the influence of reason.

Dementia præcox: A form of insanity.

Dipsomania: Uncontrollable desire for drink.

Displacement: Substitution of one idea for another; substitution of objects.

Dromomania: Uncontrollable desire to wander.

Dysphoria: Feeling of not being well; unpleasure.

Enuresis: Urinary incontinence.

Erogenous zone: Any organ or bodily region capable of yielding erotic pleasure on stimulation.

Erotic: Pertaining to the love life.

Erotomania: An extravagant affection for some person, usually of the opposite sex, displayed in certain forms of mental disorder.

Euphoria: Feeling of well being.

Exhibitionism: Erotic gratification experienced in the act of exposing one's sexual organs or other bodily parts; morbid desire to exhibit oneself.

Folie de toucher: Compulsive handling or touching of things.

Foreconscious: Mental images of which we become aware only under certain conditions.

Forepleasure: Initial stage of sexual gratification.

Fugue: Centrifugal wandering; running "away from home."

Hallucination: Sensory impression which originates in the brain without any corresponding external stimulus.

Heterosexuality: Love for persons of opposite sex.

Homosexuality: Love for persons of same sex.

Idiogamy: Sexual capacity limited to intercourse with one type of woman.

Illusion (morbid): False belief not subject to the influence of reason.

Introjection: Absorption of the environment into the ego so that external events are reacted to as if they were internal and part of one's personality.

Libido: Sexual craving (Freud).

Emotional craving or capacity for affect (Jung).

Masochism: Enhancement of sexual enjoyment by the wish to be physically subdued and hurt by the sexual objective.

Mixoscopia: Excitement at witnessing a sexual act.

Narcissism: Sexual enjoyment derived through the admiration of one's own body.

Necrophilia: Interest in death.

Nostalgia: Longing for home.

Nosology: Classification of disease.

Nosophobia: Dread of disease.

Oniomania: Buying mania; bargain hunting.

Ontogenesis: Development of the individual.

Over-determination: The hypothesis that a symptom or dream element is determined by every factor revealed through the association of ideas.

Pædophilia: Love for children.

Paralogy: Mental disorder.

Paramnesia: False memory.

Parapathy: Functional nervous disorder.

Paraphilia: Interest in perversions.

Phylogenesis: Race development.

Poriomania: Circular wandering.

Preconscious: Realm of mental processes of which we are ordinarily unaware but which may be recalled to consciousness more or less readily.

Psychogenetic: Of mental origin, as distinguished from physical.

Psychosis: See Paralogy.

Rationalization: The process of investing an attitude or action the real motive of which is unrecognized with an alleged reason.

Regression: (1) The process of reducing an idea back to its sensorial components instead of the usual carrying forward of the idea into action; (2) Reversion of mental processes together with the accompanying feeling-attitude to a form characteristic of an earlier, more primitive stage of development.

Repression: The process which results in withholding from consciousness anything painful or unpleasant.

Resistance: Instinctive opposition against laying bare the repressed mental contents.

Sadism: Erotic gratification derived from inflicting pain.

Schizophrenia: A form of mental disorder; Bleuler's term for Dementia Præcox.

Somatic: Pertaining to the body; physical.

Somatization: Conversion of emotional states into physical symptoms; see Conversion.

Somnambulism: Sleep walking.

Sublimation: Deflection of mental energy, usually of a libidinous character, to socially useful aims.

Tic: Spasm of muscles.

Transference: Transposition of an affect from one object, idea or person, to another.

Trauma: Mental injury or shock.


Unconscious: Mental processes of which we are unaware and which cannot be brought to consciousness without external aid.

Voyeurism: Erotic gratification experienced on looking at another person's private or secondary sexual parts; morbid desire to peep into secrets.

Zoöphilia: Love of animals.

THE END







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